tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-85482019062649995072024-03-13T00:35:51.758-07:00MIKIPEDIA LAW BLOGDAY TO DAY OPINION & ANALYSIS ABOUT THE SO-CALLED LAWFUL WORLD THAT WE LIVE INUnknownnoreply@blogger.comBlogger1119125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-69064808395797434782016-07-31T05:11:00.000-07:002016-07-31T05:12:59.184-07:00TIS CONFERENCE - INSTITUTIONS, LAW AND DEVELOPMENTPlenary 1 - Institutions, Law and Development
Chair: Elisabeth Sadoulet
Speaker: Kaushik Basu
Discussant: Ernest Aryeetey, Haroon Bhorat
The UNU-WIDER development conference in Hanoi, June 2014, concentrated on the core 21st century development challenges in both low- and middle-income countries: economic transformation, inclusive growth, and environmental sustainability.
More about the conference: <a href="http://www.wider.unu.edu/tisconf/">http://www.wider.unu.edu/tisconf/</a>
More about UNU-WIDER: <a href="http://www.wider.unu.edu">http://www.wider.unu.edu</a>
PART ONE
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/PrQ60yNP1mY" width="100%"></iframe>
PART TWO
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PART THREE
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/PrQ60yNP1mY" width="100%"></iframe>
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s1600/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s320/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" width="95%" /></a>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-64037975747335674602016-07-04T07:26:00.001-07:002016-07-04T07:26:23.743-07:00THE LAW OF TORTS - LEGAL APTITUDE LECTURE<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/N8nRnralqiI" width="100%"></iframe> <br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi51Xh94wG0F2kegWzWiT6Ad_-VJ9hr7dI7_TFy0t7FTnn5ETCcE4TnNVEfL_msfvVu8dP7GFa3SfFn8CEL6obwoRJR5M31M8TNjwb7px6Kdss5c6vVjDAeZCVtnyR13QrisYaHWeSPcQ0/s1600/12195913_881489658583783_5714502446551990051_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi51Xh94wG0F2kegWzWiT6Ad_-VJ9hr7dI7_TFy0t7FTnn5ETCcE4TnNVEfL_msfvVu8dP7GFa3SfFn8CEL6obwoRJR5M31M8TNjwb7px6Kdss5c6vVjDAeZCVtnyR13QrisYaHWeSPcQ0/s640/12195913_881489658583783_5714502446551990051_n.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-63087754223205231062016-07-04T07:13:00.000-07:002016-07-04T07:14:26.536-07:00 EPISODE 4.1: AN INTRODUCTION TO NEGLIGENCE"In this episode, Prof. Wiley gives us a brief introduction to negligence."<span style="font-size: x-small;">1</span><br />
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<u><b><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/K8x9x1G6Sa8?list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72" width="100%"></iframe>
FOOTNOTES</b></u><br />
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K8x9x1G6Sa8&list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72&index=9<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s1600/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s640/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-68550907185105385342016-07-04T07:02:00.001-07:002016-07-04T07:07:32.428-07:00 EPISODE 3.3: INTENTIONAL TORTS PRIVILEGES: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC NECESSITY<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/7qYcbohlou4?list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72" width="100%"></iframe>
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFUTo5_futSywfVFXpnQiRgSwEvZSvwitWIGAV__avJn_w81WvG-DGaPR6buUJ-AHfV-7LEEFHL7Uz6__1yEUaTNGYcmQPqwOwY3S6VoGciFwA13xjemA_tu6aGnlqpgK-4PRIilTwj2U/s1600/12369023_895317797200969_712799179080235790_n.jpg" imageanchor="1"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFUTo5_futSywfVFXpnQiRgSwEvZSvwitWIGAV__avJn_w81WvG-DGaPR6buUJ-AHfV-7LEEFHL7Uz6__1yEUaTNGYcmQPqwOwY3S6VoGciFwA13xjemA_tu6aGnlqpgK-4PRIilTwj2U/s640/12369023_895317797200969_712799179080235790_n.jpg" width="640" /></a>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-67436315006009861862016-07-04T07:02:00.000-07:002016-07-04T07:03:12.096-07:00EPISODE 3.2: INTENTIONAL TORTS PRIVILEGES: DEFENSES OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/j8RPfT5Gjtk?list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72" width="100%"></iframe> <br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgylPVgp5eizKTDl7riWzGcSNPHxz3Z-4nxFjObvDYlEzcsEBw3A5gJYZJs8sfYwTn-v2uvWZ2IYyaVQk5naxvhBBAPnPMTVia3kSKLu2G4PKbqVpVcuCkNnnuPJ0ajV9k7MMpoSUGr7F8/s1600/12698559_922502104482538_7271707660300160750_o.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgylPVgp5eizKTDl7riWzGcSNPHxz3Z-4nxFjObvDYlEzcsEBw3A5gJYZJs8sfYwTn-v2uvWZ2IYyaVQk5naxvhBBAPnPMTVia3kSKLu2G4PKbqVpVcuCkNnnuPJ0ajV9k7MMpoSUGr7F8/s640/12698559_922502104482538_7271707660300160750_o.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-28813834060729564522016-07-04T06:49:00.003-07:002016-07-04T06:49:38.933-07:00 EPISODE 3.1: INTENTIONAL TORTS: CONSENT"Prof. Lindsey Wiley of American University Washington College of Law tells us about consent in torts."<span style="font-size: x-small;">1</span><br />
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/h30R1RWJlX8?list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72" width="100%"></iframe>
<b><u>FOOTNOTES</u></b><br />
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h30R1RWJlX8&index=6&list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGzCfipLfl-sNC_oKv2ovY9JhgKhVAGQCTW7UahbhadF2YIt_HXwxsTG2R83fgRj72Q_WvUMZLEgRjwXvAMBCcEyP0TZbtPq-HVBDbii6KzJYMZPJrGlj73TQbHFC3lgcVI4Z_RlJvpz8/s1600/Slide1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGzCfipLfl-sNC_oKv2ovY9JhgKhVAGQCTW7UahbhadF2YIt_HXwxsTG2R83fgRj72Q_WvUMZLEgRjwXvAMBCcEyP0TZbtPq-HVBDbii6KzJYMZPJrGlj73TQbHFC3lgcVI4Z_RlJvpz8/s1600/Slide1.jpg" /></a></div>
<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-16928022686206305572016-07-04T06:40:00.001-07:002016-07-04T06:41:46.887-07:00 EPISODE 2.3: INTENTIONAL TORTS: BATTERY"Prof. Lindsay Wiley teaches us about battery."<br />
<u><b><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/-y5u_7x4Fjs?list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72" width="100%"></iframe>
FOOTNOTES</b></u><br />
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-y5u_7x4Fjs&index=5&list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s1600/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s640/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-30588836349759813732016-07-04T06:35:00.000-07:002016-07-04T06:43:17.440-07:00EPISODE 2.2: INTENTIONAL TORTS: ACT AND INTENT"Prof. Lindsey Wiley of American University Washington College of Law tells us about the act and intent elements in torts."<span style="font-size: x-small;">1</span><br />
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<u><b><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/_BpNDRl9hIk?list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72" width="100%"></iframe>
FOOTNOTES</b></u><br />
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_BpNDRl9hIk&index=4&list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi51Xh94wG0F2kegWzWiT6Ad_-VJ9hr7dI7_TFy0t7FTnn5ETCcE4TnNVEfL_msfvVu8dP7GFa3SfFn8CEL6obwoRJR5M31M8TNjwb7px6Kdss5c6vVjDAeZCVtnyR13QrisYaHWeSPcQ0/s1600/12195913_881489658583783_5714502446551990051_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi51Xh94wG0F2kegWzWiT6Ad_-VJ9hr7dI7_TFy0t7FTnn5ETCcE4TnNVEfL_msfvVu8dP7GFa3SfFn8CEL6obwoRJR5M31M8TNjwb7px6Kdss5c6vVjDAeZCVtnyR13QrisYaHWeSPcQ0/s1600/12195913_881489658583783_5714502446551990051_n.jpg" /></a></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-67077917614581055962016-07-04T06:16:00.002-07:002016-07-04T06:16:35.299-07:00EPISODE 2.1: AN OVERVIEW OF INTENTIONAL TORTS"Professor Lindsay Wiley teaches us about the five main intentional
torts. She will walk you through the restatements and how they relate
to the Prima Facie elements of each."<span style="font-size: x-small;">1</span><br />
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/A1c2GFFm8Ic?list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72" width="100%"></iframe> <br />
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<u><b>FOOTNOTES</b></u> </div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A1c2GFFm8Ic&list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72&index=3</div>
<img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFUTo5_futSywfVFXpnQiRgSwEvZSvwitWIGAV__avJn_w81WvG-DGaPR6buUJ-AHfV-7LEEFHL7Uz6__1yEUaTNGYcmQPqwOwY3S6VoGciFwA13xjemA_tu6aGnlqpgK-4PRIilTwj2U/s640/12369023_895317797200969_712799179080235790_n.jpg" width="640" />
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-69617081085516009042016-07-04T06:04:00.000-07:002016-07-04T06:04:45.928-07:00 EPISODE 1.2: AN OVERVIEW OF TORT LAW – INTENTIONAL TORTS, NEGLIGENCE, AND STRICT LIABILITYThe second episode of this nine part series on Tort Law.<br /><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/f6TUiejBILE?list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72" width="100%"></iframe> <br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCqzbVcYNn6U1KaJ0-ozssjNmdPQL4Z-8ff58yMYuB9bMtqIT8ac4yvv2FcPTCv8lFiFABjQGhuu6-LfuLOUzhzFxs6L9AKHeriNF0-OK7IDg6H-j-YoGwk9l44I2pME4zfzzPOFhUDQo/s1600/Slide1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjCqzbVcYNn6U1KaJ0-ozssjNmdPQL4Z-8ff58yMYuB9bMtqIT8ac4yvv2FcPTCv8lFiFABjQGhuu6-LfuLOUzhzFxs6L9AKHeriNF0-OK7IDg6H-j-YoGwk9l44I2pME4zfzzPOFhUDQo/s640/Slide1.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-30994101246998368722016-07-04T05:47:00.003-07:002016-07-04T07:30:15.076-07:00TORTSTort law is a very interesting, but often misunderstood aspect of law. To help remedy this, Mikipedia Law Blog is aggregating various pieces of information, in video, and written format, using both traditional and non-traditional sources. Naturally, the onus is on the consumer to determine the merit and the applicability of anything that you find in this section.<br />
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<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/torts-center-for-innovation-in-legal.html">TORTS - CENTER FOR INNOVATION IN LEGAL EDUCATION</a><br />
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<a href=http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/the-law-of-torts-legal-aptitude-lecture.html>THE LAW OF TORTS - LEGAL APTITUDE LECTURE</a>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFUTo5_futSywfVFXpnQiRgSwEvZSvwitWIGAV__avJn_w81WvG-DGaPR6buUJ-AHfV-7LEEFHL7Uz6__1yEUaTNGYcmQPqwOwY3S6VoGciFwA13xjemA_tu6aGnlqpgK-4PRIilTwj2U/s1600/12369023_895317797200969_712799179080235790_n.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiFUTo5_futSywfVFXpnQiRgSwEvZSvwitWIGAV__avJn_w81WvG-DGaPR6buUJ-AHfV-7LEEFHL7Uz6__1yEUaTNGYcmQPqwOwY3S6VoGciFwA13xjemA_tu6aGnlqpgK-4PRIilTwj2U/s640/12369023_895317797200969_712799179080235790_n.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-48466933881872143002016-07-04T05:30:00.000-07:002016-07-04T07:17:02.983-07:00TORTS - CENTER FOR INNOVATION IN LEGAL EDUCATION"Professor Lindsay Wiley from American University Washington College of Law introduces Torts"<span style="font-size: x-small;">1</span><br />
<br />
<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/episode-11-what-is-torts-and-what-torts.html">EPISODE 1.1: WHAT IS TORTS? AND WHAT TORTS IS NOT</a><br />
<br />
<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/episode-12-overview-of-tort-law.html">EPISODE 1.2: AN OVERVIEW OF TORT LAW – INTENTIONAL TORTS, NEGLIGENCE, AND STRICT LIABILITY</a>
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<br />
<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/episode-21-overview-of-intentional-torts.html">EPISODE 2.1: AN OVERVIEW OF INTENTIONAL TORTS</a>
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<br />
<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/episode-22-intentional-torts-act-and.html">EPISODE 2.2: INTENTIONAL TORTS: ACT AND INTENT</a>
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<br />
<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/episode-23-intentional-torts-battery.html">EPISODE 2.3: INTENTIONAL TORTS: BATTERY</a>
<br />
<br />
<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/episode-31-intentional-torts-consent.html">EPISODE 3.1: INTENTIONAL TORTS: CONSENT</a><br />
<br />
<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/episode-32-intentional-torts-privileges.html">EPISODE 3.2: INTENTIONAL TORTS PRIVILEGES: DEFENSES OF PERSONS AND PROPERTY</a><br />
<br />
<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/episode-33-intentional-torts-privileges.html">EPISODE 3.3: INTENTIONAL TORTS PRIVILEGES: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC NECESSITY</a>
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<br />
<a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2016/07/episode-41-introduction-to-negligence.html">EPISODE 4.1: AN INTRODUCTION TO NEGLIGENCE</a>
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<u><b><span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">FOOTNOTES</span></span></b></u><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">1. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQ6smN3lcnY</span></span><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s1600/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s640/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"> </span> </span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-7972473887708605612016-07-04T05:25:00.002-07:002016-07-04T05:27:38.192-07:00EPISODE 1.1: WHAT IS TORTS? AND WHAT TORTS IS NOT<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/jQ6smN3lcnY?list=PLpbtRdN7xWUd2Mjw1haKHAu_g81xK0v72" width="100%"></iframe> <br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-22976415132664870852016-05-09T02:30:00.000-07:002016-05-09T04:24:21.583-07:00WHEN THE QUEEN OF AUSTRALIA WAS CREATED - IT WAS NOT 1973.<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g">There
was a meeting of Prime Ministers of the Empire in London in December
1952. </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g">This meeting is now known as the Commonwealth Heads of Government
Meeting aka C.H.O.G.M.<br />At this meeting, it was decided that each Commonwealth would be granted permission to designate the style and title of their monarch.<br />It was also decided @ this meeting that Elizabeth would be next in line to the throne.<br />In
1953, England passed the Royal Style Act that statutorily gave the
aforementioned permissions. This Act was the first proclamation of
Elizabeth. </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2013/12/royal-titles-act-1953-uk-1-2-eliz-2.html" target="_blank">READ THE UNITED KINGDOM ROYAL TITLES ACT 1953 HERE</a></span></span></span><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhAa0YOQO4XfmfL9msK6h5JtkaLMJsVJXi5oxYq_qKbX4QaoYdZ1jU3_PKIEZgDImGtGHblHVZ6Iny6tM-X94AlFuRMavFkqu8JO-Q_yBG1IEoiJ_sGXTuL995jprXk-QABKAqmDqcBqVo/s1600/ROYAL+STYLE+ACT.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="232" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhAa0YOQO4XfmfL9msK6h5JtkaLMJsVJXi5oxYq_qKbX4QaoYdZ1jU3_PKIEZgDImGtGHblHVZ6Iny6tM-X94AlFuRMavFkqu8JO-Q_yBG1IEoiJ_sGXTuL995jprXk-QABKAqmDqcBqVo/s640/ROYAL+STYLE+ACT.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><br /><span style="font-size: x-large;">Most, if not all Commonwealth nations
followed suit with the Menzies liberal government passing it in
Australia, later that year. </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><a href="http://mikiverselaw.blogspot.com.au/2014/01/royal-style-and-titles-act-1953.html" target="_blank">READ THE AUSTRALIAN ROYAL STYLE AND TITLES ACT HERE</a></span></span></span><br />
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<span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><br /><span style="font-size: x-large;">The office of the Queen of
England, Australia and her other realms was included in Australian
statutes for the first time. </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g">The 1973 Royal Style and Titles Act
amended the 1953 Act removing the United Kingdom from the title "</span></span><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><b><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody">Elizabeth
the Second, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom, Australia and
her other Realms and Territories Queen. Head of the Commonwealth,
Defender of the Faith"</span></span></b>. </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g">You can read some background material gained by a friend of mine by </span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g"><a href="http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/NAAMedia/ShowImage.aspx?B=12044500&T=PDF">CLICKING HERE </a></span></span></span><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhTMTjq8I3AGUeqYffJqyAgD6oFRhtVP-nTj0rMug_uPh7HBvnj6XBDv4eZPkunRD4psr1O_DGD-FJSlXCwZKJPGN1NMHGBgJnGZ1sXG2YzO1F205WBoIKrz_oRs3zeEW5iiqudkYLCuO4/s1600/1973.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="312" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhTMTjq8I3AGUeqYffJqyAgD6oFRhtVP-nTj0rMug_uPh7HBvnj6XBDv4eZPkunRD4psr1O_DGD-FJSlXCwZKJPGN1NMHGBgJnGZ1sXG2YzO1F205WBoIKrz_oRs3zeEW5iiqudkYLCuO4/s640/1973.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<a href="http://recordsearch.naa.gov.au/SearchNRetrieve/NAAMedia/ShowImage.aspx?B=11191507&T=PDF"><span style="font-size: x-large;">OR HERE</span></a><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s1600/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhlIVr_5CVyI-ziQQx1DT6tfpLN3__6Q7mC3Aa4a7YgxFsJDRu4uE-9gCoSee_ERECCVFQWQq5bQYDQzJ7izrOtpIso8Sk5g_J2AARCFl_PcM3sJuz2WvN9dcknNWfP7smYAsUK9qLuB3k/s640/WHEN+PROPAGANDA+MEETS+REALITY.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
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<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-20317095069040815982016-03-20T18:40:00.000-07:002016-03-20T19:53:10.924-07:001973: UNRAVELLING THE MYSTERY HOW THE 'COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA' BECAME 'AUSTRALIA'<div data-contents="true">
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<span data-offset-key="2i6mc-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Over the past few years, some of you may have come across research, conversation and debate about the apparent re-branding of the<b> Commonwealth of Australia</b> to the simpler <b>Australia</b>, apparently in 1973.</span></span><br />
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<span style="font-size: large;">Given that this conversation is largely engaged in by Constitutionalists, and common law researchers, other elements such as Queen of Australia, Great Seals, the corporatisation of Australia, the bankruptcy and takeover of Australia by the U.S becomes part of the conversation, which usually aims it's scope toward Gough Whitlam as the destroyer of the much-fabled 'Australian way of life'.</span><br />
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<span style="font-size: large;">The tenor is that Whitlam broke 'the law' in 1973 by changing the Commonwealth of Australia into Australia, and by changing the name of the country, the Commonwealth of Australia into Australia.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">It is a lovely, affirming philosophy for some, but, similar to the accusations that Whitlam created the Queen of Australia in 1973, false. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="" data-block="true" data-editor="fpq52" data-offset-key="2i6mc-0-0">
<span style="font-size: large;">So, now is the time to illustrate the intriguing tale of how a country changes its name.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">On June 19, 1973, the Acts Interpretation Act 1973 was assented to by the Governor-General, Sir Paul Hasluck. Hasluck was a former Liberal parliamentarian who was appointed Governor-General in April 1969 by the soon to be concluded, McMahon Liberal government.</span></div>
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<br />
<span style="font-size: large;">This act made two significant changes.</span><br />
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<span style="font-size: large;">1. S.4 (1) amended the Acts Interpretation Act 1901-66 by </span><span data-offset-key="fvo4i-0-0"><span data-text="true"><span style="font-size: large;">deleting paragraphs (a) & (b) and replacing those paragraphs with "a
provision declaring that the term 'Australia' or the term 'The
Commonwealth' should mean the 'Commonwealth of Australia.'"</span> <span style="font-size: x-small;">1<span style="font-size: xx-small;">.</span></span> </span></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhqxl8yAitwz4Uz5Lzf3c6-4Bu3xrbPqGjRumGcQBVH62ygE9mr8yc_hNTmmtLvtqHxH55KyuyTLntc2uMdBYJcjbZiddXGvF2d8tVnpQxNzvWjaHyyM1kCTfnGP2jhTqHrzZCYfHpJdYQ/s1600/S.4+1973+ACTS+AMENDMENT+ACT.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="346" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhqxl8yAitwz4Uz5Lzf3c6-4Bu3xrbPqGjRumGcQBVH62ygE9mr8yc_hNTmmtLvtqHxH55KyuyTLntc2uMdBYJcjbZiddXGvF2d8tVnpQxNzvWjaHyyM1kCTfnGP2jhTqHrzZCYfHpJdYQ/s640/S.4+1973+ACTS+AMENDMENT+ACT.png" width="640" /></a></div>
<div class="" data-block="true" data-editor="fpq52" data-offset-key="2i6mc-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fvo4i-0-0"><span data-text="true"> </span></span> </div>
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<span style="font-size: large;">Please note that this excerpt <b>does not</b> <b>state</b> that<b> the Commonwealth of Australia means either 'Australia' or the 'Commonwealth'</b>. That type of re-definition would be an attempt to alter the Constitution outside of the referendum process. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="" data-block="true" data-editor="fpq52" data-offset-key="2i6mc-0-0">
<span style="font-size: large;">2. Additionally, S.4 (2) amended the definition of the term "The Gazette" whereby the 'Commonwealth of Australia Gazette' was changed to the 'Australian Government Gazette'. </span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgFR6MXhp8c1S2CXdDfroHEQoATho3gaTmFO4rcfqPqsqW42dJFArKX5iFcO7X0fZ4nda7FgFxJ065Jd7HHnYD33tA3vOmvIwrZnW0dCoMlU220TytHxRD74h0Ps-oF8BaGCW8om7JfLT4/s1600/S.4+%25282%2529+ACTS+INTERPRETATION+ACT+1973.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="284" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgFR6MXhp8c1S2CXdDfroHEQoATho3gaTmFO4rcfqPqsqW42dJFArKX5iFcO7X0fZ4nda7FgFxJ065Jd7HHnYD33tA3vOmvIwrZnW0dCoMlU220TytHxRD74h0Ps-oF8BaGCW8om7JfLT4/s640/S.4+%25282%2529+ACTS+INTERPRETATION+ACT+1973.png" width="640" /></a></div>
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<span data-offset-key="b4der-0-0"><br data-text="true" /></span></div>
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<span data-offset-key="6kp06-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Now. In the realm of jurisprudence, you may argue that the original grant of power given to parliament, by the English parliament, to make laws meant always using the referendum process, as opposed to their practice of making statutory law. </span></span></div>
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<div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="asv29-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="asv29-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><br data-text="true" /></span></div>
</div>
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<div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="b1k38-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="b1k38-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">If this is the case, and parliament only held a remit to make law via the referendum process, then, every piece of statutory legislation is invalid.</span></span></div>
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<span data-offset-key="5jl9o-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><br data-text="true" /></span></div>
</div>
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<div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="5m97p-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="5m97p-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">If, however, if the Constitution does confer on parliament the ability to make statutory law, then all of the statutory changes are completely 100% valid. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span data-offset-key="5m97p-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">The most compelling evidence that this is the correct interpretation of the two situations is that parliament has followed this statutory law creation process since 1901 with full knowledge of the English parliament and their subordinates, the English royal family. </span></span><br />
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<span style="font-size: large;">It is reasonable to presume that if the franchise head office in England was not happy with the way one local franchise was creating its internal laws that it would intervene and change it.</span><br />
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<div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="5m97p-0-0">
<span style="font-size: large;">It is worth noting, that these changes, at least officially, have nothing to do with incorporation or bankruptcy, if you take the evidence that exists from the time, namely, the Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates that tells us that; </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: large;">"The Bill also contains provisions to give effect to the Government's intention to use, wherever possible, the term 'Australia' to signify the Australian nation. This involves adopting the name 'Australian Government Gazette' in place of the 'Commonwealth of Australia Gazette', the use of the imprint "Government Printer of Australia' instead of 'Commonwealth Government Printer' on official documents and the use of the term 'Australia' instead of 'Commonwealth' in legislation."</span><span style="font-size: x-small;"> <span style="font-size: xx-small;">2.</span></span><br />
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</div>
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<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: large;">There is no law or no logical reason for the Australian Government to change it's name in the aforementioned manner in order to incorporate or be taken over by America as a bankrupt entity. </span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: large;"> </span> </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: large;"> FOOTNOTES </span></div>
<div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="5m97p-0-0">
<span style="font-size: large;">1. The Australian Law Journal - Volume 48, January 1974 p.2</span></div>
<div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="5m97p-0-0">
<span style="font-size: large;">2. Commonwealth Parliament Debates, 24th May, 1973, p.2642</span></div>
<div class="_1mf _1mj" data-offset-key="5m97p-0-0">
<span style="font-size: large;">Both images are taken from the Acts Interpretation Act 1973 and can be downloaded here; <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1973A00079/Download">https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C1973A00079/Download</a></span></div>
</div>
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-76242930705315803382016-03-06T04:22:00.000-08:002016-03-06T04:23:49.348-08:00EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE POLICE IN AUSTRALIA<h2 class="make-database">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
Carabetta, Joseph --- "Employment Status of the Police in Australia"
[2003] MelbULawRw 1; (2003) 27(1) Melbourne University Law Review 1
</span></h2>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<h1 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Employment Status Of The Police In Australia</span></h1>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">JOSEPH CARABETTA<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn1" name="fnB1">[*]</a></span></div>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><i>[A long-established rule of the common law is that police officers are not
‘employees’. This article examines the origins
of this rule, and
argues that it is without proper foundation and also lacks modern support. The
implications of the rule, particularly
from the perspective of state-appointed
police officers in Australia, are also discussed. The rule is presented as being
not only
inequitable, but also incompatible with state police officers’
current (statutory) employment rights, including their rights
under federal
industrial laws. It is argued, however, that the current common law position
ought to be re-examined not through further
legislative reform, but through
judicial intervention.]</i></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<div align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">CONTENTS</span></div>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading33">I Introduction</a></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading51">II The Current Position And Its Origins</a></span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading52">A Introduction</a></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading70">B The Legislative Framework</a></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading100">C The Common Law Theory of Police Employment Status</a></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading193">D A Preferred Approach</a></span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading216">III Some Implications Of Police Employment Status</a></span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading217">A Operation of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth)</a></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading304">B Contractual Remedies</a></span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Heading329">IV Conclusion: Redefining Police Employment Status</a></span></li>
</ul>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><br />
<h2 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536697"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading33"></a>INTRODUCTION</span></h2>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It is a well-established rule of the common law that members of the police
force are not ‘employees’. The Privy Council
made it clear as long
ago as 1955, in <i>Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co
Ltd</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn2" name="fnB2">[1]</a> that the relationship of master and
servant does not exist between the Crown and its police officers, but that
police constables
are independent office-holders exercising ‘original
authority’ in the execution of their duties. Traditionally, Australian
courts have had very little hesitation in applying or reaffirming this
rule.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn3" name="fnB3">[2]</a> In more recent times, however, the
general issue of police officers’ employment status has been the subject
of much closer
scrutiny by the courts, and several judges of high authority have
suggested that it may be time for a review of this apparent
anomaly.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn4" name="fnB4">[3]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">In Australia, as in other common law countries, the operation of the common
law rule<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn5" name="fnB5">[4]</a> has largely been modified by statute.
Largely, but not entirely. In many areas, the law has undergone significant
change, ensuring
that police officers enjoy essentially the same protective
employment and industrial rights as regular employees. In others, however,
there
has either been no direct attempt to resolve the uncertainties and inequities
stemming from the rule or, even where this has
occurred, those uncertainties
have only been partially dealt with, so that the common law theory of police
employment status still
gives rise to a number of potential practical problems,
and still produces undesirable outcomes.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">In recent years, the employment status of police officers has been an
important issue in a number of contexts, including termination
of
employment,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn6" name="fnB6">[5]</a> industrial
matters,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn7" name="fnB7">[6]</a> vicarious
liability,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn8" name="fnB8">[7]</a> and occupational health and
safety.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn9" name="fnB9">[8]</a> The issue has been especially
significant since the High Court’s decision in <i>Re Australian Education
Union; Ex parte Victoria</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn10" name="fnB10">[9]</a> where it was
confirmed that, in a constitutional sense, police officers are capable of being
the subject of an industrial dispute.
That decision was made in the context of
an application, under the former <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ira1988242/">Industrial Relations Act 1988</a></i> (Cth), by
the organisation then representing members of the Australian Federal Police
(‘AFP’) for consent to an alteration
of its eligibility rules to
allow it to represent police officers throughout Australia. This objective was
ultimately achieved, leading
to the establishment of the Police Federation of
Australia. Importantly, however, the question of whether state police officers
are
not employees at common law, and therefore outside the scope of the federal
Act, apparently played no part in the reasoning of the
High Court in <i>Re
AEU</i>.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It is against this background that in recent years the police authorities
have been reappraising the nature of the relationship between
the Crown and
members of the police force. For the police unions, meanwhile, it had been hoped
that the <i>Konrad</i><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn11" name="fnB11">[10]</a> case in the Full
Federal Court might have provided a suitable vehicle for re-examining the rule
that police officers are not employees.
This, however, was not to be; the Court
held that state-appointed police officers could access the federal termination
provisions
regardless of their status at common law. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">A key purpose of this article is to consider the origins of, and reasoning
behind, the common law doctrine that police officers are
not employees. It is
argued in <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ira1988242/index.html#p2">Part II</a> that the distinction drawn between police constables and
ordinary Crown employees is not entirely sound, that <i>Perpetual Trustee</i> is
open to question, and that the reasoning behind that decision was to some extent
due to the judicial atmosphere in which it was
made. It is also shown that we
are now seeing a trend towards the recognition of police officers as both
office-holders and employees,
and that this view not only has a certain
contemporary attractiveness but also accords with the approach that has been
applied to
other office-holders in Australia.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ira1988242/index.html#p3">Part III</a> of this article considers some of the implications of police
officers’ employment status, focusing mainly on members of the
state and
territory police forces. It is argued that, although the special characteristics
of police service would place certain
restrictions on police officers’
employment entitlements, state and territory police officers could have much to
gain from
the establishment of a formal employment relationship. It is also
suggested that this would tie in with their current employment
entitlements and
may even increase the effectiveness of those entitlements.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ira1988242/index.html#p4">Part IV</a> of this article considers proposals for reform. The conclusion
reached is that, because of the complexity of the political issues
involved, and
because of the attendant technical difficulties, parliamentary intervention may
only deliver partial reform and, realistically,
judicial intervention is
required to achieve the relevant changes to police officers’ employment
status.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h2 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536698"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading51"></a>II THE CURRENT POSITION AND
ITS ORIGINS</span></h2>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h3 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536699"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading52"></a>A <i>Introduction</i></span></h3>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The linchpin in any definitive examination of the employment status of police
officers in Australia is <i>Perpetual
Trustee</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn12" name="fnB12">[11]</a> In that case, the Privy
Council, in considering the nature of the relationship between the Crown and a
member of the police force,
adopted the following proposition:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
there is a fundamental difference between the domestic relation of servant and
master and that of the holder of a public office and
the State which he is said
to serve. The constable falls within the latter category. His authority is
original not delegated and
is exercised at his own discretion by virtue of his
office ...<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn13" name="fnB13">[12]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Together with the
earlier decision of the High Court in this
case,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn14" name="fnB14">[13]</a> this highly unusual pronouncement has
been consistently applied and reaffirmed in numerous Australian
cases,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn15" name="fnB15">[14]</a> including a series of recent
decisions.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn16" name="fnB16">[15]</a> The key presumption behind it is
that, unlike most other public sector workers, police officers exercise special
discretionary powers
which they derive directly from the law itself and not
indirectly by delegation from some other source, such as a minister for police.
A police officer, therefore, is the servant of no-one ‘save of the law
itself’ and ‘answerable to the law and to
the law
alone.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn17" name="fnB17">[16]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The ‘original powers’ doctrine is drawn from British law and
tradition and is supported by the pristine view of the position
of the police
constable as simply ‘a person paid to perform, as a matter of duty, acts
which if he were so minded he might
have done
voluntarily.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn18" name="fnB18">[17]</a> The doctrine was first
introduced into Australian law in <i>Enever v The
King</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn19" name="fnB19">[18]</a> a vicarious liability case. Along
with the leading British decision of <i>Fisher v Oldham
Corporation</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn20" name="fnB20">[19]</a> that case has been the
subject of widespread criticism. One of the more common criticisms is that, in
focusing on the inability of
the Crown to ‘control’ police
constables in the exercise of their duties imposed by law, <i>Enever</i> is
dependent on what has now become an outdated definition of
employment.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn21" name="fnB21">[20]</a> On first thought there seems to
be a certain appeal and logic to this argument. The major difficulty with it,
however, is that in
the case of police constables, as with certain other
office-holders to which the doctrine has been applied, it has been the absence
of <i>legal</i> control that has been considered significant in establishing
their independent status. This is to be compared to the absence of control
which, in the case of highly skilled employees, for example, stems merely from
the employer’s <i>physical</i> inability to control the worker’s
activities.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn22" name="fnB22">[21]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It should also be noted at this point that the basic idea that police
constables exercise ‘original powers’ in the execution
of their
functions has generally not been called into question in the modern cases which
have dealt with the issue of their employment
status. The real issue in many of
these cases, rather, has been the question of whether because police constables
are entrusted with
such powers, the general relation between the Crown and
members of the police force is not that of employer and employee. It will
be
seen that across the common law world the courts have given contradictory
answers to this question, and in some jurisdictions
the fact that police
officers are entrusted with special powers by law has not prevented them from
being held to be employees. In
Australia, as in Britain, however, the courts
have adopted a far more restrictive approach and the long-held view, reflected
in the
passage quoted above from <i>Perpetual Trustee</i>, has been that it
follows by analogy from the original powers concept that police officers are not
employees.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">But how, it must be asked, did the courts come to accept such a view? The
main purpose of this section will be to examine this issue.
Before doing so,
however, it is useful to look at some of the key statutory provisions that
govern the appointment of police officers
in Australia.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h3 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536700"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading70"></a>B <i>The Legislative
Framework</i></span></h3>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The starting point in any exposition of the legal status of the police in
Australia must be the arrangements relating to the appointment
and removal of
police officers. Unlike their counterparts in localised British police forces,
members of the Australian police forces
are generally appointed and dismissed
either by the Crown directly, or by the Commissioners of Police, with or without
any direct
government involvement. The Commissioners themselves are appointed
and are removable by the Governor-General, Governor, Governor-in-Council
or
Administrator-in-Council, as the case may be, and sometimes on the
recommendation of the relevant Minister.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn23" name="fnB23">[22]</a>
Deputy Commissioners and Assistant Commissioners are also generally appointed
and removable at gubernatorial level, although in some
cases this is done on the
recommendation of the relevant Minister, who in turn normally acts on the advice
of the Commissioner.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn24" name="fnB24">[23]</a> Other senior officers
(variously commanders, superintendents and inspectors) are appointed and removed
either by the Governor-General
or Governor, sometimes on the recommendation of
the Commissioner<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn25" name="fnB25">[24]</a> or, in other cases, by the
Commissioner of Police subject to government
approval.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn26" name="fnB26">[25]</a> Finally, all non-commissioned
police officers in Australia (sergeants, constables and other ranks) are
appointed and removed by the
relevant Commissioner of Police subject again,
however, to governmental approval in some
jurisdictions.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn27" name="fnB27">[26]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Historically, as has already been noted, one of the major distinguishing
features of appointment as a police officer in common law
jurisdictions has been
the special nature of the police officer’s powers. In Australia, as in
other common law jurisdictions,
these powers are generally derived from
statutory provisions which confer upon members of the police force the status,
powers and
duties of a
‘constable’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn28" name="fnB28">[27]</a> The effect of
these provisions is to confer on the individual police officer all the powers of
the ancient common law office of constable<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn29" name="fnB29">[28]</a>
and any additional statutory powers associated with that office. What is
significant about these powers is that they are vested directly
by law in each
individual police officer. Furthermore, a number of key powers are discretionary
powers, and require constables to
make their own decisions about whether, for
example, they have reasonable grounds to exercise a particular
power.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn30" name="fnB30">[29]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Another striking feature of a police officer’s appointment is the oath
of office which police officers are required to take
prior to the commencement
of their duties. In Australia, all police, irrespective of rank, are upon
appointment required to take
an oath, or make an affirmation, in the following
form: </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
I, AB, do swear that I will well and truly serve our Sovereign in the office of
constable ... and that I will, to the best of my
power, without favour or
affection, malice or ill-will, cause the peace to be kept and preserved, and
prevent all offences against
the persons and properties of the Sovereign’s
subjects; and that while I continue to hold the said office I will, to the best
of my ability, skill, and knowledge, discharge all the duties thereof faithfully
according to law. So help me
God.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn31" name="fnB31">[30]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It is significant also
that all Commissioners of Police in Australia are accountable either to a
Minister for Police (or some other
ministerial officer), or to a
Governor-in-Council. The <i>Police Regulation Act 1958</i> (Vic), for example,
provides that:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
The Chief Commissioner shall have, subject to the directions of the Governor in
Council, the superintendence and control of the force
...<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn32" name="fnB32">[31]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Only in Western
Australia has no such provision been made, but the Governor-in-Council and the
Minister have certain other powers,
including, for example, the right to approve
regulations for the general government of the police
force.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn33" name="fnB33">[32]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The main power held by all Australian Commissioners of Police is the general
control of the operations and management of the
police.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn34" name="fnB34">[33]</a> In order to fulfil this
responsibility, the Commissioners also have a number of additional powers. Most
Commissioners are authorised
to make general or specific orders and instructions
with respect to the control and management of the police, or for the effective
and efficient conduct of police operations.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn35" name="fnB35">[34]</a>
The Western Australian Commissioner of Police may, subject to the approval of
the Minister, make rules, orders and regulations for
the general government of
the police force.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn36" name="fnB36">[35]</a> The Queensland
Commissioner of the Police Service may issue directions where desirable or
necessary for the efficient and proper
functioning of the police
service.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn37" name="fnB37">[36]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">As well as the general powers noted above, in each jurisdiction there are
also a number of additional provisions relating to the control
and discipline of
police officers. Of particular significance is the requirement that members obey
all ‘lawful orders’
from superior
officers.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn38" name="fnB38">[37]</a> It is not altogether clear, under
the terms of these provisions, what the precise scope of a ‘lawful
order’ might be.
What is clear, however, is that even on a narrow
interpretation, a lawful order would be one that relates to the general common
law
and statutory duties of a police officer. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Finally, in each jurisdiction there are broad regulation-making powers in
relation to the police force. In New South Wales, Queensland
and South Australia
the Governor is authorised to make regulations dealing with a wide range of
issues concerning the management
and control of the
police.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn39" name="fnB39">[38]</a> In Victoria, Tasmania and the
Northern Territory the Governor-in-Council or Administrator-in-Council is
empowered to make regulations
for, inter alia, the general government and
discipline of the police and to give effect to police
legislation.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn40" name="fnB40">[39]</a> Similar provisions also apply
in respect of members of the AFP.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn41" name="fnB41">[40]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h3 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536701"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading100"></a>C <i>The Common Law Theory
of Police Employment Status</i></span></h3>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading101"></a>1 <i> The ‘Original Powers’
Doctrine</i><b><i> </i></b></span></h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The principle that police constables exercise ‘original powers’
in the discharge of their functions can be traced back
to British law. Its
presence in Australian law, where it has also been extended to other
office-holders, is due to the decision of
the High Court in
<i>Enever</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn42" name="fnB42">[41]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><i>Enever</i> concerned the legal relationship between the Crown, as
represented by the executive government of Tasmania, and a police constable
appointed under the terms of the <i>Police Regulation Act 1898 </i>(Tas). The
specific question raised was whether a police constable endowed with authority
to arrest by statute<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn43" name="fnB43">[42]</a> was in the supposed
exercise of that authority acting as an ‘officer, agent or servant’
within the meaning of the <i>Crown Redress Act 1891</i> (Tas). It was not
disputed that the police constable was himself liable for the wrongful arrest.
Rather, the central issue was whether
the government could also be held liable.
The Court identified the key issue as being whether the police constable was
under these
circumstances a servant of the government in such a sense that the
maxim <i>respondeat superior</i> could be applied. In answering this question,
all three members of the Court (Griffith CJ, O’Connor and Barton JJ)
emphasised
the absence of control by the ‘employer’ — that is,
the executive government of the state. Griffith CJ said, in
a key passage to
which I shall return shortly, that ‘the powers of a constable, qua peace
officer, whether conferred by common
or statute law, are exercised by him by
virtue of his office’ and are strictly personal in
nature.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn44" name="fnB44">[43]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The result of the application of these
principles<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn45" name="fnB45">[44]</a> was that the Crown could not be
held liable for the constable’s wrongful arrest, since <i>on this occasion
</i>the constable had not been performing a function which had made him a
servant in the relevant sense. Another significant aspect of
<i>Enever</i>,
however, was that in arriving at that conclusion, the Court also made a number
of important observations about the nature of the
relationship between the Crown
and a member of the police force.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Of particular significance are the judgments of Griffith CJ and
O’Connor J, which reveal some interesting variations in approach
regarding
this issue. Griffith CJ drew heavily upon the historical common law
position of a constable and the special nature of the
constable’s office.
He pointed out that:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
At common law the office of constable or police officer was regarded as a public
office, and the holder of it as being, in some sense,
a servant of the Crown.
The appointment to the office was made in various ways, and often by election.
In later times the mode of
appointment came to be regulated for the most part by
Statute, and the power of appointment was vested in specified authorities,
such
as municipal authorities or justices. But it never seems to have been thought
that a change in the mode of appointment made
any difference in the nature or
duties of the office, except so far as might be enacted by the particular
Statute.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn46" name="fnB46">[45]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">In considering
‘whether the party sought to be made responsible retained the power of
controlling the act’,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn47" name="fnB47">[46]</a> Griffith CJ
went on to state that:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
the powers of a constable, qua peace officer, whether conferred by common or
statute law, are exercised by him by virtue of his office,
and cannot be
exercised on the responsibility of any person but himself. ... Moreover, his
powers being conferred by law, they are
definite and limited, and there can be
no suggestion of holding him out as a person possessed of greater authority than
the law confers
on him. ... A constable, therefore, when acting as a peace
officer, is not exercising a delegated authority, but an original authority,
and
the general law of agency has no
application.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn48" name="fnB48">[47]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">These comments
have been confirmed and applied in a number of decisions which have held that
police constables are not employees.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn49" name="fnB49">[48]</a> They
have also been deliberated on and generally approved of in various police Royal
Commission reports.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn50" name="fnB50">[49]</a> It might be argued,
however, that these conclusions were far more sweeping than what was required in
the case. The Court was, after
all, primarily concerned with the
constable’s statutory powers of arrest, and not any other aspect of a
police officer’s
appointment. Furthermore, it is significant that in
reaching the conclusion that the ‘general law of agency has no
application’,
Griffith CJ made no direct reference to the relevant
statutory provisions governing the appointment of the ‘modern’
Tasmanian
police constable. In particular, he made no reference to the
provisions which place members of the police force under the authority
of the
Commissioner of Police, nor to those suggesting that the Crown has ultimate
control over the police force.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">O’Connor J’s judgment also proceeded on the basis of the
‘original powers’ concept. In contrast to Griffith
CJ, however,
O’Connor J’s conclusion was based on the view that although the
police constable was a servant ‘in
a general
sense’,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn51" name="fnB51">[50]</a> in the exercise of the
particular act complained of he could not fall within that category. In relation
to the first point, his Honour
said that the constable</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
held his office under the [Tasmanian] <i>Police Regulation Act</i> <i>1898</i>,
which gave the Government power to employ, to pay, and to dismiss him. He was
probably required to perform many duties besides those
imposed upon a constable
at common law and by Statute, and in the performance of such duties he would be
the servant of the Government,
and they would be directly liable for any neglect
or default committed by him in the course of his employment
...<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn52" name="fnB52">[51]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Even if it can be
assumed that the ‘original powers’ doctrine is valid, it will be
seen from the differing approaches
of Griffith CJ and O’Connor J above
that <i>Enever</i> itself revealed some uncertainty as to the proper
<i>scope</i> of that doctrine. What also becomes apparent from an analysis of
the judgments in that case, however, is that much like O’Connor
J, Barton
J also appeared to be of the view that police officers might be employees in the
‘general sense’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn53" name="fnB53">[52]</a> It would seem,
therefore, that the decision in <i>Enever</i> does not support the proposition
that police officers are not Crown employees. Indeed, there seems to be a
suggestion in that case
that police officers are employees, a suggestion that,
as will be seen later, is repeated in a number of more recent (but mainly
non-police) decisions.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Apart from <i>Enever</i>, another decision which has been crucial to the
development of the ‘original powers’ theory is
<i>Fisher</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn54" name="fnB54">[53]</a> also a vicarious liability
case. In that matter, it was held that the police, although appointed, paid and
removable by a municipal
corporation through its watch committee, were not, as
such, servants of the corporation.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn55" name="fnB55">[54]</a> McCardie
J cited various British decisions<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn56" name="fnB56">[55]</a> and,
inter alia, some earlier American<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn57" name="fnB57">[56]</a> and
Canadian<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn58" name="fnB58">[57]</a> authorities, in support of this
view. His Honour’s main emphasis, however, was on the passage from the
judgment of Griffith
CJ in <i>Enever</i> to the effect that police constables,
when carrying out their peacekeeping duties, exercise original, and not
delegated authority.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn59" name="fnB59">[58]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">There are a number of important points that need to be made about
<i>Fisher</i>. In the first place, it should be noted that although McCardie J
placed extensive reliance on the comments of Griffith CJ in <i>Enever</i>, he
also described each<i> </i>of the remaining judgments in that case as
‘most weighty and most
instructive’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn60" name="fnB60">[59]</a> He did this, however,
without noting any of the major variations in the High Court’s approach.
In other words, he seemed to
make the assumption that, like Griffith CJ,
the remaining members of the Court had also adopted the view that police
officers were
not employees.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Secondly, a further strand of the <i>Fisher</i> judgment, which McCardie J
sought to combine with the ‘original authority’ argument from
<i>Enever</i>, involved the case of
<i>Stanbury</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn61" name="fnB61">[60]</a> In that case, which had
also been referred to (but only partially applied) in <i>Enever</i>, Wills J had
commented that:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
This case is, to my mind, almost exactly analogous to the case of a police
officer. In all boroughs the watch committee by statute
has to appoint, control,
and remove the police officers, and nobody has ever heard of a corporation being
made liable for the negligence
of a police officer in the performance of his
duties. I think that the reason why that is so ... is expressed in the passage
quoted
in [the second edition of] <i>Beven on Negligence</i>. ... If the duties
to be performed by the officers appointed are of a public nature and have no
peculiar local characteristics, then
they are really a branch of the public
administration for purposes of general utility and security which affect the
whole kingdom
...<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn62" name="fnB62">[61]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Two
comments may be made about this quotation. Focusing firstly on the latter
portion of the passage, it can be seen that the reason
for the rule of
non-liability stated by Wills J had nothing to do with whether the employing
authority could ‘control’
its police
constables.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn63" name="fnB63">[62]</a> The second point is that
although it is clear that McCardie J had relied upon <i>Stanbury </i>as
authority for the proposition that police constables were office-holders <i>and
nothing more</i>, it is not entirely certain whether that decision was based on
the point that the officer in question was not a servant but a statutory
office-holder, or whether it rested on the view that, although a servant, the
particular act complained of was performed pursuant
to his duties as a statutory
official.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn64" name="fnB64">[63]</a> These are two distinct, but
related, questions which, as has already been noted in relation to McCardie
J’s analysis of <i>Enever</i>, his Honour seemed to ignore in his judgment
in <i>Fisher</i>. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Finally, another factor which McCardie J singled out as justifying his
decision in <i>Fisher</i> related to the apparent division of a British
constable’s engagement between local and central authority, and ‘the
fullness
of central administrative
control.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn65" name="fnB65">[64]</a> He strongly emphasised the
fact that, in a number of areas, the United Kingdom’s <i>Municipal
Corporations Act 1882</i>, 45 & 46 Vict, c 50 gave ‘but limited’
or ‘shared’ powers to the watch committee of the defendant
corporation,
as compared with those of other governing authorities, including
the Home Secretary.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn66" name="fnB66">[65]</a> As will become clear,
this issue is of considerable importance in assessing the subsequent Australian
case law on police employment
status.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536703"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading144"></a>2 <i>The </i>Perpetual
Trustee<i> Cases</i><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn67" name="fnB67">[66]</a></span></h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><i>Perpetual Trustee</i><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn68" name="fnB68">[67]</a> concerned an
action for the loss of services of a member of the New South Wales police force
caused by the negligent act of another
under the cause of action <i>per quod
servitium amisit</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn69" name="fnB69">[68]</a> Because of the
similarities between the military service of the Crown and service in the police
force, it was held, following the
earlier decision of the High Court in
<i>Commonwealth v Quince</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn70" name="fnB70">[69]</a>
that the action could not lie in the case of a police
constable.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn71" name="fnB71">[70]</a> Once again, however, a further
issue which had been raised in this case concerned the nature of the
relationship between the Crown
and members of the police force.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Viscount Simonds delivered the judgment of the Privy Council. Before
addressing the main point in the case, relating to the scope
of the action
<i>per quod servitium amisit</i>, his Lordship cited the relevant statutory
provisions applying under the <i>Police Regulation Act 1899 </i>(NSW). With a
few exceptions, those provisions are indistinguishable from the provisions of
the current <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/pa199075/">Police Act 1990</a></i> (NSW). After highlighting the references in
the Act to the ‘office of constable’, and referring extensively to
the decisions
in <i>Enever</i> and <i>Fisher</i>, his Lordship observed that:
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
No doubt great changes have been made which are reflected in the organization of
the police force in New South Wales today, but the
substantial change was made
long before <i>Enever’s Case</i> was decided in Australia or
<i>Fisher’s Case</i> in England, and those cases show convincingly that
neither changes in organization nor the imposition of ever-increasing statutory
duties have altered the fundamental character of the constable’s
office.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn72" name="fnB72">[71]</a></span> </blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">His Lordship then
referred to the provisions relating to the constable’s ‘oath’,
saying that in such a context the
use of the word ‘serve’ is of
negligible significance and that, on the other hand, the oath ‘is not the
usual concomitant
of the master and servant
relationship.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn73" name="fnB73">[72]</a> Later in the judgment
he presented the Privy Council’s final conclusions on the case, and made
the following, now famous, remarks:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
there is a fundamental difference between the domestic relation of servant and
master and that of the holder of a public office and
the State which he is said
to serve. The constable falls within the latter category. His authority is
original not delegated and
is exercised at his own discretion by virtue of his
office: he is a ministerial officer exercising statutory rights independently
of
contract. The essential difference is recognized in the fact that his
relationship to the Government is not in ordinary parlance
described as that of
servant and master.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn74" name="fnB74">[73]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It will
be seen that the Privy Council’s views on the special character of the
police constable’s office are consistent
with the earlier observations of
Griffith CJ in <i>Enever</i>. Those observations had also commended themselves
to McCardie J in <i>Fisher</i> as applying to the position of a British
police constable. Prior to the Privy Council decision in <i>Perpetual
Trustee</i>, three of the five majority members of the High Court had reached
the same conclusion on the character of the police officer’s
appointment,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn75" name="fnB75">[74]</a> as had the NSW Supreme Court
below.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn76" name="fnB76">[75]</a> In the High Court, Kitto J, after
referring to, amongst other cases, <i>Enever</i> and
<i>Ryder v Foley</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn77" name="fnB77">[76]</a> said:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
The matter may be summed up by saying that a member of the police force is under
an obligation to perform duties of which some are
statutory, some derive from
the common law, and all are of a public character; and although a member of the
police force is bound
to obey the lawful orders of his superiors (s 14), neither
they nor the Crown itself can lawfully require him to abstain from performing
the duties which the law imposes upon him with respect to the preservation of
the peace and the apprehension of offenders, or can
lawfully direct the detailed
manner in which he shall perform those duties, and neither they nor the Crown
itself ... can be held
liable for acts done by a constable in relation to the
duties of his office. <i>These considerations seem to me sufficient in
themselves to negative the existence of a master and servant
relationship</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn78" name="fnB78">[77]</a></span> </blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Webb and
McTiernan JJ also reached the conclusion that ‘the Crown and the policeman
were not master and servant in the legal
sense.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn79" name="fnB79">[78]</a> McTiernan J reached that
conclusion strictly on the basis of the <i>Police Regulation Act 1899</i>
(NSW).<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn80" name="fnB80">[79]</a> Webb J, on the other hand, referred
specifically (and solely) to the judgments of Griffith CJ and O’Connor J
in <i>Enever</i>, remarking that:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
A police constable has always been an arm of the law and never a servant
employed to do a master’s bidding on all occasions
and in any
circumstances. His authority is original, and not derived from a master or
exercised on behalf of one, but is exercised
on behalf of the public
...<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn81" name="fnB81">[80]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It is submitted, with
respect, that this conclusion cannot be drawn from the cases or statutory
provisions relied on. So far as the
authorities are concerned, the only decision
which, if relevant, might support such a view is that of McCardie J in
<i>Fisher</i>. As noted above, however, that decision was concerned with the
non-liability of a municipal employer of police under a localised
British
policing system. It seemed that a determinative ground for the decision was the
fact that many of the terms and conditions
governing the appointment and
operation of the police were controlled by central government, rather than by
the watch committee as
the authority responsible for appointing police
constables. It is difficult to argue, in view of these factors, that the
judgment
could have any real relevance in Australia where all police forces are
governed under centralised structures, or where there is no
organisation
standing between the Crown and its police officers. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">This leaves only the High Court’s decision in <i>Enever</i> as
support.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn82" name="fnB82">[81]</a> But that decision, properly
understood, does not support the view that police officers cannot be regarded as
Crown employees. <i>Enever</i> provides only partial<i> </i>support for such a
view, but equally points to the fact that a police officer (in respect of some
duties at least) is in the same
position as an ordinary
employee.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn83" name="fnB83">[82]</a> This is expressly acknowledged in
the obiter remarks of Dixon and Fullagar JJ and in the dissenting judgment of
Williams J.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn84" name="fnB84">[83]</a> It is also acknowledged in a
number of High Court decisions in which the <i>Enever</i> doctrine has been
applied<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn85" name="fnB85">[84]</a> and, indirectly, in certain
overseas decisions concerning police
officers.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn86" name="fnB86">[85]</a> There is a clear suggestion in
these cases that <i>Enever</i> turned not on the presence or absence of a
master-servant relationship <i>as such</i>, but on the question of whether, in
the exercise of the ‘independent’ powers conferred upon the police
officer by law,
particularly his power of arrest, the police constable concerned
was acting in the course of his employment by the Crown. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Insofar as the statutory framework is concerned, it is true that all of the
incidents of the relationship between a police officer
and the Crown, including
the power of the Crown and of senior officers to control and discipline police
officers, are determined
by law and not by agreement. It is also true that at
the time of <i>Perpetual Trustee</i>, as now, the words ‘office’ and
‘appointment’, and the expression ‘member of the police
force’,
were used significantly throughout the relevant statutory
provisions. It might therefore be reasonable to deduce a legislative intention
that members of the police force should be viewed as office-holders in the full
sense and not as employees. There are, however, a
number of countervailing
factors which, it is submitted, are sufficient to establish that police officers
and the Crown are in an
employment relationship. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Of particular significance are the provisions stating that the
Commissioner’s superintendence of the police force is ‘subject
to
the direction of the Minister’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn87" name="fnB87">[86]</a> No
specific reference was made to these provisions when the Privy Council decided
<i>Perpetual Trustee</i>. In the High Court, on the other hand, Kitto J, after
drawing the conclusion from <i>Enever</i> that police officers were not
employees, noted that the ultimate direction of the police force was vested by
these provisions not
in the Crown, but in the
Minister.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn88" name="fnB88">[87]</a> However, most modern public
sector statutes in Australia vest the administration of their provisions in a
Minister, and it is difficult
to see why the position should be all that
different for this purpose for the modern police organisation. Although the
provisions
surely do not diminish the police constable’s traditional
common law and statutory duties, they must have at least some implications
for
how police conduct their activities.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn89" name="fnB89">[88]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">There would also seem to be a strong case for interpreting the provisions
relating to the internal management of the police force
— including those
relating to the Commissioner’s powers of superintendence and control over
members — as indicators
of employee status for police. As with the
provisions relating to executive control over the police force, the difficulty
with these
provisions lies in trying to determine precisely what kinds of
restrictions they might impose upon constables given their independent
status as
office-holders. But again, it cannot reasonably be said that because police
constables have certain discretionary powers
to perform that these provisions
can therefore have no overall effect on their
functions.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn90" name="fnB90">[89]</a> Clearly they must have some<i>
</i>impact on police activities, particularly in broader policy-making areas.
The problem with the generalised approaches in <i>Perpetual Trustee</i> and
<i>Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd</i>,<i>
</i>however, is that nowhere was any particular attention paid to these kinds of
provisions, and so nowhere was the duality in the role
of the police constable
recognised. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The authority of <i>Perpetual Trustee</i> is also undermined by the presence,
at the time of that decision, of s 10 of the <i>Police Regulation Act 1899
</i>(NSW). That section provided that every person taking the oath of office
shall be deemed: </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
to have thereby entered into a written agreement with and shall be thereby bound
to serve Her Majesty as a member of the police force
and in the capacity in
which he has taken such oath, at the current rate of pay for such member, and
from the day on which such oath
has been taken and subscribed until legally
discharged: Provided that ... no such agreement shall be set aside, cancelled,
or annulled
for want of reciprocity ...</span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The Privy Council did
make some mention of this section at the outset of its judgment in <i>Perpetual
Trustee</i>, stating that the fact that a constable was bound to ‘serve
Her Majesty’ was in no way
conclusive.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn91" name="fnB91">[90]</a> It seems rather odd, however,
that the provision was left standing in this way. The provision itself seems to
suggest that, upon
taking their oath of office, police officers enter into an
employment contract, the nature of which is the same as is ordinarily
entered
into by Crown servants, namely a contract which enables termination at the
Crown’s pleasure.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn92" name="fnB92">[91]</a> Indeed, there have
been a number of High Court decisions which have considered these kinds of
provisions,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn93" name="fnB93">[92]</a> and although the issue of
police employment status was not crucial to the outcome in these cases, it seems
significant that the conclusions
were based on the assumption that police
officers were employees.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Whether the action <i>per quod servitium amisit</i> is out of harmony with
modern conditions, and whether it should be applied to police constables, are
questions which are beyond the
scope of this article. It does, however, seem
unfortunate that it was against this background that the question of whether
police
officers could be employees was decided. The action for loss of services
was seen in <i>Perpetual Trustee</i> and <i>Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual
Trustee Co Ltd</i> as applicable to a private, essentially domestic,
master-servant relationship, and one having little to do with modern employment
relationships.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn94" name="fnB94">[93]</a> Furthermore, what became
clear, especially from the Privy Council’s judgment, was the marked
judicial aversion to the action
and the strong desire not to extend it to the
loss of service ‘of one who ... is the holder of an office which has for
centuries
been regarded as a public
office’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn95" name="fnB95">[94]</a> It is therefore not
surprising that very little attention was paid to the relevant statutory
framework and that, once again, the
main focus of the two decisions was on the
police constable’s office.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn96" name="fnB96">[95]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h3 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536704"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading193"></a>D <i>A Preferred
Approach</i></span></h3>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">As noted above, three members of the High Court in <i>Attorney-General
(NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co
Ltd</i><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn97" name="fnB97">[96]</a> had expressed opinions consistent
with the view that police officers were employees. Dixon J was emphatic on this
point. After referring
to a number of the key provisions of the <i>Police
Regulation Act 1899</i> (NSW), he said: ‘So far I should have thought that
everything pointed to a member of the police force occupying the position
of a
servant of the Crown for the loss of whose services ... the Crown might sue the
wrongdoer.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn98" name="fnB98">[97]</a> His Honour then
added:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
But the question remains whether because a constable is entrusted by law with
specific powers and given specific duties which he
must execute as a matter of
independent responsibility, the general relation between the Crown and a member
of the police force is
not that of master and servant. In my opinion this
consequence does not follow. In most respects a member of the police force is
subject to the direction and control which is characteristic of the relation of
master and servant. It does not matter that there
is a chain of command. That is
necessary in some degree in all organizations military and civil, public and
private. It is only when
in the course of his duties as a servant of the Crown
he is confronted with a situation involving the liberty or rights of the subject
that the law places upon him a personal responsibility of judgement and
action.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn99" name="fnB99">[98]</a></span></blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">In essence, the
approach taken by Dixon J in the above passage is that although a police officer
has duties to perform which are derived
directly from the law itself and require
individual judgment and action,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn100" name="fnB100">[99]</a> that fact
does not, by itself, preclude him or her from being regarded as an employee. It
is suggested that this approach, which
has drawn strong
judicial<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn101" name="fnB101">[100]</a> and
other<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn102" name="fnB102">[101]</a> support, provides a far more
realistic and logical view of a police officer’s employment status in
Australia, and that it is
therefore the approach to be preferred.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Furthermore, it is clear from the remarks made in various court
decisions,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn103" name="fnB103">[102]</a> and particularly in some of
the recent cases on the status issue,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn104" name="fnB104">[103]</a>
that there is widespread support for some general notion of a dual status for
police officers in Australia. Indeed, it might be said
that the High Court
itself, through its 1986 decision in <i>Oceanic Crest
Shipping</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn105" name="fnB105">[104]</a> has formally endorsed the
view that police officers ought to be regarded as both office-holders and
employees.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn106" name="fnB106">[105]</a> It also cannot be denied
that, as well as the extensive powers of control exercised over members of the
police force,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn107" name="fnB107">[106]</a> there are many other
aspects of their engagement that are indicative of an employer-employee
relationship between them and the Crown.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn108" name="fnB108">[107]</a>
Such factors include the powers relating to suspension and dismissal, the right
to demand exclusive service, the high level of organisational
integration, the
permanency of appointment, and various other employment
criteria.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn109" name="fnB109">[108]</a> The presence of such factors
also provides a compelling reason for police officers to be classified as both
office-holders and employees.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Finally, it has been said that, ultimately, the lack of an employer-employee
relationship between police constables and the Crown
rests on the important
constitutional principle that, in Britain, the police ‘are not under the
direct control of the central
government ... This is an important facet of the
constitution, and a prime safeguard against the evils of the police
state.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn110" name="fnB110">[109]</a> A move to a dual status
relationship for the police, however, would not alter the discretionary powers
conferred upon them by law.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn111" name="fnB111">[110]</a> Nor would it
affect the independence of police constables. It would therefore not involve any
‘grave and most dangerous constitutional
change’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn112" name="fnB112">[111]</a> This would be so even if
the broad approach put forward by Dixon J in <i>Attorney-General (NSW) v
Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd</i><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn113" name="fnB113">[112]</a> were
adopted.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h2 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536705"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading216"></a>III SOME IMPLICATIONS OF
POLICE EMPLOYMENT STATUS</span></h2>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h3 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536706"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading217"></a>A <i>Operation of the
</i>Workplace Relations Act 1996<i> (Cth)</i></span></h3>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536707"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading218"></a>1 <i>Industrial Disputes:
Awards/Certified Agreements</i></span></h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Having regard to the decision of the High Court in <i>Re
AEU</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn114" name="fnB114">[113]</a> it must now be taken as
established in Australia that the Commonwealth Parliament is able to legislate
with respect to the prevention
and settlement of industrial disputes involving
members of the state and territory police forces. The (ultimate) effect of the
High
Court’s decision was the creation of a national umbrella police union
named the Police Federation of Australia (‘PFA’).
The details of the
PFA’s new eligibility rules and its status as a registered organisation of
employees will be considered
shortly. For present purposes, however, it is
important to note that, despite these developments, under the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/repealed_act/wra1996220/">Workplace
Relations Act 1996</a> </i>(Cth)<i> </i>(‘<i>WR Act</i>’) the term
‘industrial dispute’ is limited to ‘matters pertaining to the
relationship between <i>employers</i> and
<i>employees</i>’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn115" name="fnB115">[114]</a> This means that
since police officers in the Australian state and territory systems are not
employees under the general law, disputes
about matters relating to their terms
of engagement cannot come within the traditional provisions of the <i>WR
Act</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn116" name="fnB116">[115]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">But let us suppose that all police officers in Australia were to have a
contract of employment. Would this allow police members in
the state
jurisdictions and their associations to notify industrial disputes and seek
awards under Part VI of the <i>WR
Act</i>?<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn117" name="fnB117">[116]</a> Of course, in considering the
significance of this question, it must be remembered that the role of arbitrated
awards is now a restricted
one under the <i>WR Act</i>, with industrial disputes
being confined, for most purposes, only to certain ‘allowable’
matters.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn118" name="fnB118">[117]</a> On the other hand, it is also
crucial to note that, although basic terms and conditions of engagement in the
state police forces
are dealt with by the ordinary tribunals in most cases,
traditionally the common pattern has been for many employment conditions
to be
regulated by detailed statutory provisions or regulations determined at state
level. It seems valid to assume, therefore, that
access to the federal
industrial tribunal for state-based police, as well as, perhaps, providing the
scope for a more ‘scientific’
and coordinated approach to the
regulation of police salaries and other employment conditions in the state
systems,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn119" name="fnB119">[118]</a> could also potentially broaden
the range of matters that may be award-regulated within these jurisdictions.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">However, access to the award-making mechanisms of the <i>WR Act</i> may not
become available to members of the state and territory police forces simply by
introducing a contract. This is because, as
has been highlighted in a number of
commentaries on the <i>WR Act</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn120" name="fnB120">[119]</a> that
Act now places substantial limitations on the Australian Industrial Relations
Commission (‘AIRC’) when dealing with
disputes where some or all of
the employees involved are already covered by state awards or agreements. In
particular, s 111AAA(1)
of the <i>WR Act</i>, which is mandatory in effect,
states that the AIRC must cease dealing with an industrial dispute in
circumstances where a ‘State
award or State employment agreement governs
the wages and conditions of employment of particular employees whose wages and
conditions
of employment are the subject of an industrial dispute.’ </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">In light of these considerations, perhaps a preferred option for police
officers, were they to be classified as employees, would be
to seek a certified
agreement under Division 3 of Part VIB of the
Act.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn121" name="fnB121">[120]</a> One of the advantages in pursuing
this kind of strategy would be that at no point during the agreement-making
process would the provisions
of s 111AAA apply. In addition, the content of an
agreement made under these provisions would not be constrained by the
‘allowable’
matters concept applying to federal awards made under
Part VI of the <i>WR Act</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn122" name="fnB122">[121]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Importantly, the <i>WR Act</i> provides that, subject to certain exceptions,
a certified agreement will prevail over ‘terms and conditions of
employment’
in state laws, awards or state employment agreements, to the
extent of any inconsistency.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn123" name="fnB123">[122]</a> In this
context, ‘state law’ is defined in terms which exclude, inter alia,
occupational health and safety and workers’
compensation.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn124" name="fnB124">[123]</a> However, omitted from the
list of exclusions are a number of the key statutory entitlements applying to
state-appointed police officers,
such as annual leave, long service leave and
superannuation. And so, again, what this means is that many aspects of police
employment
which would normally remain under the exclusive control of the state
governments might become the subject of negotiation between
the parties.
Furthermore, a federal certified agreement for police would generally prevail
not only over an inconsistent state law
and state award, but (unlike in the case
of a federal award) also over an enterprise agreement which qualifies as a
‘state
employment agreement’. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The impression which emerges from the discussion thus far seems to be that,
so far as the objective of achieving federal industrial
regulation for state
police officers is concerned, members of the state police forces could have much
to gain from the introduction
of a contract. Indeed, if nothing else, the mere
fact that police officers from various state jurisdictions could, for the first
time in the history of police labour relations in Australia, enter the federal
system and potentially gain national coverage of some
of their basic terms and
conditions would be of enormous symbolic
significance.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn125" name="fnB125">[124]</a> However, before leaving
this topic, it is also necessary to consider to what extent the provisions noted
above might be considered
constitutionally invalid as infringing upon a
state’s capacity to function as a
government.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn126" name="fnB126">[125]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">In <i>Re AEU</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn127" name="fnB127">[126]</a> a majority of the
High Court made it clear that there was no basis for holding that the AIRC was
precluded on constitutional grounds
from exercising at least some of its powers
in relation to the making of awards for state police
officers.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn128" name="fnB128">[127]</a> In reaching this conclusion,
the Court drew no distinction between state police officers and other state
public servants. The only
public sector officials which the majority members of
the Court were prepared to exclude altogether from the operation of the federal
constitutional power were those engaged ‘at the higher levels of
government’, and it was clear that police officers did
not fall into this
category.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn129" name="fnB129">[128]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The Court’s conclusions in <i>Re AEU</i> were of key significance,
since prior to that decision there had been some doubt as to whether police
officers could be involved
in an industrial dispute. It is important to note,
however, that the only issue actually before the Court in <i>Re AEU</i> was
whether the eligibility rules of the Australian Federal Police Association could
be extended so as to apply to members of the
state and territory police
forces.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn130" name="fnB130">[129]</a> What impact the implied
limitation might have on the power of the AIRC to make an award prescribing
particular terms and conditions
for police officers was a question which the
Court was not required to consider. The majority of the Court only held that an
award
which prescribed minimum wages for state police officers would not
infringe the implied limitation.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn131" name="fnB131">[130]</a> It was
also emphasised, in relation to state public servants generally, that whether a
minimum wages and conditions award is beyond
constitutional competence would
turn on matters of fact, including the character and responsibilities of the
employees in question.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn132" name="fnB132">[131]</a> On the basis of
these conclusions, therefore, it might be thought that there are many types of
employment matters which, if they
were to be included in a federal award or
certified agreement for state police officers, might offend the implied
limitation. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Tending against such a view, however, is the decision of the Full Federal
Court in <i>Konrad</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn133" name="fnB133">[132]</a> In that case,
the State of Victoria argued that the operation of the termination provisions of
the former <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/ira1988242/">Industrial Relations Act 1988</a></i> (Cth) (‘<i>IR
Act</i>’) were invalid to the extent that they applied to members of the
police force. One of the grounds relied upon by Victoria in
making this argument
concerned the view, first put forward in <i>Re AEU</i>, that: </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
The police force is central to the government of the State as such. It is sui
generis. Without it ... the State would become ungovernable.
In that respect, it
comprises a class of persons complementary to Ministers and judges upon whom the
State depends for its integrity
and autonomy. As [was said by Lord Watson in
<i>Coomber v Justices of the County of Berks</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1883/TC_2_1.html" title="View Case">[1883] UKHL TC_2_1</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281883%29%209%20AC%2061" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1883) 9 App Cas 61</a>, 74]:
‘... the administration of justice, the maintenance of order and the
repression of crime are among the primary and inalienable
functions of a
constitutional Government.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn134" name="fnB134">[133]</a></span>
</blockquote>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">A further argument put to the Court was that to go so far as to
require a state to reinstate a police officer under s 170EE of the
Act would be
so destructive of the authority of those who command a disciplined force, and of
the good order and morale of the force,
that it would amount to an undue
interference with the state’s capacity to
function.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn135" name="fnB135">[134]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The Court, however, went on to dismiss this argument, although Finkelstein J
did accept that the power to order reinstatement would
have such an
effect.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn136" name="fnB136">[135]</a> It was held, firstly, that the
termination provisions at issue had nothing to do with the specific exclusions
that had been singled
out by the High Court in <i>Re
AEU</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn137" name="fnB137">[136]</a> Beyond this, however, it was
also emphasised that, coupled with the fact that the federal powers themselves
were governed by several
qualifications, there were already provisions under the
<i>Police Regulation Act 1958 </i>(Vic) placing restrictions on the dismissal of
members of the police force. These restrictions were, to some extent, analogous
to
those under the federal law.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn138" name="fnB138">[137]</a> It
followed, therefore, that the federal termination provisions could not unduly
interfere with the performance by Victoria of its
functions as a
government.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn139" name="fnB139">[138]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">But if, on the basis of this approach, federal laws restricting the dismissal
of state police officers (other than on redundancy grounds)
would not constitute
an impairment for a state in the sense meant by the majority in <i>Re AEU</i>,
it seems difficult to see how many other basic employment rights could be seen
as doing so, if police officers are already able
to claim such rights under
state laws. If this view is correct, then it seems reasonable to suppose that
— unless there are
questions concerning such matters as the numbers and
identity of persons to be employed or declared redundant in the police force
— the application of the award and agreement-making provisions of the
<i>WR Act</i> to state police officers, and in particular the prescription by
federal awards or agreements of minimum working conditions, would
generally not
infringe the implied limitation.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn140" name="fnB140">[139]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It would be inappropriate, however, to allow state police officers access to
the ‘protected action’ provisions in Division
8 of Part VIB of the
<i>WR Act</i>. This is distinguishable from affording them access to many other
protective employment conditions, such as remedies for unfair dismissal.
Access
to the ‘protected action’ provisions would carry with it the real
possibility of undermining the authority of
those who command the police force.
Assuming that this argument provides a viable basis for the operation of the
implied limitation,
it seems that, so far as police officers’ general law
enforcement functions are concerned, at least, the protected action provisions
could not validly apply. There may, therefore, need to be specific measures
introduced into the <i>WR Act</i> to accommodate state police officers in
respect of these arrangements.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536708"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading260"></a>2 <i>Termination of
Employment</i></span></h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">In recent years, police officers’ uncertain employment status made it
possible to question whether members of the state and
territory police forces
were ‘employees’ for the purposes of the termination provisions in
Division 3 of Part VIA of
the <i>IR Act</i> and the equivalent provisions
of the <i>WR Act</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn141" name="fnB141">[140]</a> It is clear that,
together with the general state unfair dismissal
laws,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn142" name="fnB142">[141]</a> access to these provisions,
although subject to a number of statutory constraints, could offer considerable
advantages for many state-appointed
police officers. This is so for three main
reasons. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The first relates to the fact that, while state police officers will at times
have access to certain other appeal rights in respect
of an adverse dismissal
action taken against them,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn143" name="fnB143">[142]</a> generally the
only avenue of redress for them to challenge the <i>merits</i> of any such
action is provided by their particular police disciplinary
code.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn144" name="fnB144">[143]</a> Although the codes provide a right
of appeal to a member of the police force who has been dismissed for committing
an offence against
the discipline of the police force, it is clear that an
appeal will not necessarily lie against all types of dismissals or in all
situations. Thus, termination of a probationary constable’s appointment,
for example, may be appealed against on its merits
if it relates to an issue of
misconduct as defined by the code, but not if it is done on administrative
grounds, such as for incapacity.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn145" name="fnB145">[144]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The second point is that, although an appeal on the merits will lie where a
police officer is dismissed under the disciplinary code,
in some cases the
result of such an appeal is merely a recommendation to the Commissioner; the
decision whether to actually rescind
the dismissal remains with the
Commissioner.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn146" name="fnB146">[145]</a> It is also important to
note that, unlike in unfair dismissal proceedings, the central issue on appeal
will not relate to the overall
‘fairness’ of the decision to
dismiss. Rather, the key issues to be determined by the review tribunal will
relate to
the correctness of the finding of guilt and the appropriateness of the
penalty.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn147" name="fnB147">[146]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The third point is that a substantial line of authority suggests that neither
the disciplinary code, nor the police Acts or regulations
as a whole, can be
seen as curbing the Crown’s common law power to dismiss at
will.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn148" name="fnB148">[147]</a> Where this special power exists
and is exercised, there will be no right of appeal for police officers against
such an action on
its merits, nor any other entitlement, although the decision
to dismiss would, it seems, have to be exercised by the
Governor-in-Council.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn149" name="fnB149">[148]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The question as to whether state police officers can access the federal
termination laws has now been resolved, in part, by the decision
of the Federal
Court in <i>Konrad</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn150" name="fnB150">[149]</a> In that case
Finkelstein J, with whom North and Ryan JJ concurred, held that as one of the
stated objects of Division 3 of Part VIA
of the former <i>IR Act</i> was to give
effect to the International Labour Organisation’s <i>Convention</i>
<i>Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer</i>,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn151" name="fnB151">[150]</a> and as there was nothing
in the Act to suggest that the term ‘employee’ as used in Division 3
was to be given a meaning
that was inconsistent with the scope of the
<i>Convention</i>, the Division should not be construed more narrowly than the
<i>Convention</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn152" name="fnB152">[151]</a> It followed that,
having regard to such factors, as the language and the preparatory work of the
<i>Convention</i>, the word ‘employee’ as used in Division 3 was not
confined to its common law meaning, but included all public sector
workers,
including police constables, within its
scope.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn153" name="fnB153">[152]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The decision of the Full Federal Court in <i>Konrad</i> is of key
significance, since it seems clear that, in a general sense, the
‘unlawful’ termination provisions in Subdivision
C of Division 3 of
the <i>WR Act</i> still rely on the
<i>Convention</i>.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn154" name="fnB154">[153]</a> Thus, section
170CD(2) of the <i>WR Act</i> provides that the expressions in subdivision C
(and in subdivisions D and E) are to be given the same meaning as in the
<i>Convention</i>. As far as the ‘unfair’ termination provisions in
Subdivision B are concerned, however, it is clear that those provisions
apply
only to certain categories of employees in the strict sense. The most general of
these categories, as set out in s 170CB(1),
is a ‘federal award employee
who was employed by a constitutional corporation’. It is clear, however,
that even if members
of the state police forces were employees at common law,
they would not come within this category. On the other hand, it is significant
to note that also listed in s 170CB(1) are ‘Territory employees’.
This means that if police officers were to become employees
at common law,
members of the Northern Territory police force, at least, could bring claims
under Subdivision B as well as Subdivision
C.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn155" name="fnB155">[154]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Before leaving this topic, there is one final matter that must be mentioned.
Although the state police Acts provide for an appeal
on merits under the
disciplinary code, they often contain special or additional removal provisions
which do not allow for a review
on merits, or which provide for a review only on
administrative law grounds.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn156" name="fnB156">[155]</a> Similarly,
and more particularly, under the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/afpa1979225/">Australian Federal Police Act 1979</a></i>
(Cth), terminations involving a declaration of serious misconduct are not
reviewable under the <i>WR Act</i>, whereas other terminations
are.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn157" name="fnB157">[156]</a> Accordingly, if state police
officers are to have access to the federal termination laws, it may be that the
federal Parliament will
adopt a similar approach and seek to restrict them from
gaining general access to those provisions. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536709"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading285"></a>3 <i>The Police Federation
of Australia </i></span></h4>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">On 26 August 1997, the Australian Federal Police Association
(‘AFPA’) became officially known as the
PFA.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn158" name="fnB158">[157]</a> The reason for the name change was
to reflect the fact that, under its new eligibility rules, the AFPA would now be
able to represent
police officers throughout the whole of Australia. The Rules
of the PFA provide that:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The [PFA] shall consist of an unlimited number of persons who are: </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">(i) members, staff members or special members of the Australian Federal
Police; or</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">(ii) persons appointed to any rank, grade, classification or designation of
police officer of any Police Force or Service of any State,
Territory or
Commonwealth Government of Australia
...<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn159" name="fnB159">[158]</a></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">This expanded coverage for police officers is a result of a 1993 decision of
Williams DP approving alterations to the AFPA’s
eligibility
rules.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn160" name="fnB160">[159]</a> As discussed above, it was in the
context of a challenge to that decision that the High Court, in <i>Re AEU</i>,
confirmed that state-appointed police officers were capable of engaging in an
industrial dispute. Following <i>Re AEU</i>, however, the decision of
Williams DP was the subject of an appeal to a Full Bench of the AIRC, in
<i>Re AFPA.</i><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn161" name="fnB161">[160]</a><i> </i></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The key issue raised before the Full Bench involved the question of whether
police officers and police trainees were capable of coming
within any of the
classes of persons referred to in s 188(1)(b) of the <i>IR Act</i>. At the time
of the decision (as now) that section relevantly provided that an association
capable of applying for registration under
the <i>IR Act</i> is one in which:
(a) ‘some or all of the members are employees who are capable of being
engaged in an industrial dispute’;
and (b) the remaining members, if any,
are either officers of the association or ‘persons specified in Schedule
3.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn162" name="fnB162">[161]</a> In contrast to Williams DP,
who had reached the view that police officers, on the basis that they were
employees, were capable of
falling within the first limb of this provision, the
Full Bench held that, given that police officers in Queensland and Western
Australia
fell within the classes of persons specified in Schedule 3 of the
<i>IR Act</i>, it was unnecessary to determine that issue.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Two comments may be made here. First, it should be emphasised that in <i>Re
AFPA</i>, the Full Bench took the view that, in the event that police officers
and police trainees were not capable of falling within any
of the categories set
out in s 188(1)(b), the AFPA’s application should have been
refused.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn163" name="fnB163">[162]</a> Although the Full Bench deemed
it appropriate to determine this issue, in the circumstances it found it
necessary to do so only in
respect of Queensland and Western Australia. In other
words, the question of whether members from other jurisdictions might be persons
specified in Schedule 3 of the <i>IR Act</i>, or whether they could otherwise
come within s 188(1)(b) of the <i>IR Act</i>, played no part in the reasoning of
the Full Bench.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The second point is that while Schedule 3 of the <i>IR Act</i> allows a
federally registered union to accept as members persons who, although not
employees, are eligible for union membership under
state industrial legislation,
not all state jurisdictions are included in the
Schedule.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn164" name="fnB164">[163]</a> This suggests that police
members from those jurisdictions not brought in by Schedule 3 must fall within
the first limb of s 188(1)(b).
If the vast majority of police officers in these
jurisdictions are not employees, however, they could not be considered as coming
within this category. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">One of the key objects of the PFA is ‘to uphold the rights and to
foster, protect and improve the rights and interests of members
industrially and
otherwise’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn165" name="fnB165">[164]</a> However, although the
PFA may now have the status of a registered organisation of employees under the
<i>WR Act</i>, it is clear that, as matters stand, its ability to gain access to
the scheme under that Act depends upon many of the traditional
‘employee’ provisions of the <i>WR Act</i>. Furthermore, for the
reasons given above, it may be that, to the extent that the eligibility rules of
the PFA purport to make eligible
for membership state police officers not
falling within the classes set out in the second limb of s 188(1)(b), those
rules are invalid.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn166" name="fnB166">[165]</a> If this view is
correct, then it can certainly be said that, in this context, the introduction
of a contract of employment for state
police officers would be vital to their
industrial interests.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h3 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading304"></a>B <i> Contractual Remedies</i></span></h3>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536710"></a>As already noted, police officers will usually be
able to rely on public law remedies, particularly where they seek to reverse a
dismissal
decision on the grounds that the rules of natural justice have not
been adhered to. It may be that a move to contractual status will
narrow the
scope for them to obtain such remedies.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn167" name="fnB167">[166]</a>
Once again though, while this might represent a significant loss to many police
officers, the application of some of the major contractual
principles to their
appointment would mean that they could still have much to gain as employees.
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">One area where a contract may be of particular significance is in relation to
the employer’s implied contractual obligation
of ‘mutual trust and
confidence’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn168" name="fnB168">[167]</a> In Britain, employers
have been found in breach of this obligation in many different
ways.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn169" name="fnB169">[168]</a> It is submitted that this implied
term could have a significant impact in a policing context. It is true, as one
British commentator
has pointed out, that ‘it would be impossible to meet
some operational needs if too much attention is paid to the needs and
feelings’ of police constables, and that there would be important public
policy issues to consider in this
context.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn170" name="fnB170">[169]</a> However, there seems to be no
reason why (as with a number of other protective employment rights which already
apply) the obligation
could not apply to many ‘non-operational’
areas of a police officer’s
engagement.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn171" name="fnB171">[170]</a> Not only would application
of the term be consistent with police officers’ statutory employment
rights, it would also be consistent
with their current ‘good faith’
obligations, both towards their employer and the wider community. Indeed, it
seems a
valid argument that it would tie in with contemporary police employment
entitlements, and may even increase the effectiveness of
those entitlements, if
police officers had the same basic rights as other employees in this context.
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Another important area of contractual rights concerns the right to sue for
dismissal in breach of contract. A remedy for wrongful
dismissal, were it to
become available to police officers, would be significant for two main reasons:
firstly, because, as noted
above, even if police officers were held to be
employees, some police would still lie outside the protection of unfair
dismissal
laws; and secondly, and more specifically, because it may be open to
police officers to argue that, since they work in a specialised
profession with
no alternative avenues in either the private or public sector, and since
one’s rank in the police force is
still governed largely by promotion, the
deprivation of these opportunities ought to be the subject of special
consideration in any
damages claim. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">As already noted, however, it is clear from the case law that the rule that
police officers may be dismissed at the will of the Crown
is well-established in
Australia, and indeed in some cases the rule has been expressly preserved by
statute.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn172" name="fnB172">[171]</a> Although it has been argued
that, where it has not been so preserved, the rule can be excluded by
contract,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn173" name="fnB173">[172]</a> the alternative view is that
it can only be excluded by statute. Further, it has sometimes been suggested
that there is no real difference
between police and military officers in this
context, meaning that the same <i>additional</i> public policy justifications
apply.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn174" name="fnB174">[173]</a> What each of these factors
suggests, therefore, is that even if police officers were held to be employees,
they may still have no
right to a claim for wrongful dismissal.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">In view of these issues, it seems important that if a contract were to be
introduced, this should be accompanied by the outright removal
of the dismissal
at pleasure doctrine. In Australia, the doctrine has been criticised by judges
and academic commentators as being
entirely at odds with modern employment
practices and the cause of blatant
injustice.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn175" name="fnB175">[174]</a> It has been similarly
criticised in Britain.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn176" name="fnB176">[175]</a> The main
justification for the rule in a policing context is said to be the maintenance
of discipline in the police force. Again
though, in an era when most police
officers have similar dismissal rights as other employees, including, in some
instances, rights
to remedies for unfair dismissal, there is no reason why the
rule should be maintained. Despite the fact that remedies such as reinstatement
will rarely be available in this context, the removal of the dismissal at
pleasure rule would at least make it possible for those
police officers excluded
from unfair dismissal laws to pursue an action for damages. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Another important area of contractual rights for police officers concerns
‘the legitimate scope of the constable’s
employment.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn177" name="fnB177">[176]</a> It has been argued in
Britain that the obligation of police constables to obey all ‘lawful
orders’, coupled with the
absence of a contract, leaves individual
constables exposed to the ‘virtual absolute discretion’ of the chief
officer
of police.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn178" name="fnB178">[177]</a> Together with the
fact that there is no clear authority as to what is meant by a
‘lawful’ order in this context, the
courts have consistently refused
to set precise limits on the scope of the police officer’s
duties.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn179" name="fnB179">[178]</a> Thus it is argued that the
establishment of an employer-employee relationship would give greater clarity to
the scope of a police
officer’s duties. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">More particularly, however, provided that a ‘lawful order’ is one
which is not only not unlawful, but one which must also
relate to the common law
and statutory duties of constable, it might also provide a framework through
which the constable could challenge
the legitimacy of orders considered beyond
the range of such duties.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn180" name="fnB180">[179]</a> It is true
that the courts would tend to view police officers as constituting a special
category for these purposes, because of their
extensive statutory and common law
obligations.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn181" name="fnB181">[180]</a> Nonetheless, the British
courts have recognised that not <i>every</i> activity constables may lawfully
perform would necessarily fall within the scope of their
duty.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn182" name="fnB182">[181]</a> It therefore seems reasonable to
assume that the existence of a contract would also assist in defining the scope
of orders (and discipline)
to which the constable may be made subject. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Finally, it is of course true that if police officers were to become
employees, the Crown might then be able to sue for breach of
contract. However,
as already mentioned, the statutory provisions applying to a police
officer’s employment already impose
wide-ranging obligations upon police
officers. Furthermore, not only do these obligations impinge on their activities
both inside
and outside the workplace, they also tend to prescribe penalties
which extend beyond those normally available to the Crown (or Commissioner)
at
common law. This suggests that, in many contexts, the presence of a contract for
police would have little impact. It also seems
fair to say that if (instead of
relying on statutory remedies) the Crown actually claimed financial compensation
for breach of a
particular contractual obligation, damages would be rather more
difficult to assess.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<h2 align="center">
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc38536711"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading329"></a>IV CONCLUSION: REDEFINING
POLICE EMPLOYMENT STATUS</span></h2>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It is true, as D C Thomson wrote in 1963, that because of the special
characteristics of police work, employment conditions in the
police force will
always have to be ‘rather different from those in other
occupations.’<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn183" name="fnB183">[182]</a> Thus, although many
police employment conditions now substantially reflect general employment
conditions, they are also often subject
to special exemptions relating to police
operational requirements. There can be no compelling reason, however, why this
factor alone
should prevent police officers from being employees. Nor can it be
said that such a move would be prejudicial to discipline within
the police force
now that, in a number of key areas, many of the usual protective employment
rights are specifically extended to
police officers. What it would do, however,
is promote symmetry between police officers’ current employment
entitlements and
their position at common
law.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn184" name="fnB184">[183]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">There can also be no reason to suppose that the courts themselves, if faced
with competing public interest considerations relating
to the police, could not
find a balance between those interests.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn185" name="fnB185">[184]</a>
This seems to be recognised in the recent reforms to the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/afpa1979225/">Australian Federal
Police Act</a></i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/afpa1979225/"> <i>1979</i></a> (Cth), which have drawn only a few direct
distinctions between the Commissioner’s general ‘employment’
powers on
the one hand, and his or her powers as ‘commander’ of the
police force on the other. It has also been recognised in state
legislation
including police officers in the same broad category as other Crown
employees.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn186" name="fnB186">[185]</a> To simply assume that police
officers are not employees, however, is to risk paying too little attention to
the rights of the individual
police constable. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The recent Australian decisions on police employment status have prompted
some states to introduce further remedial legislation in
respect of their police
officers. New South Wales and Western Australia, for example, have followed the
lead of other jurisdictions
and introduced provisions ‘deeming’
members of the police force to be employees for the purposes of the occupational
health and safety laws in those states.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn187" name="fnB187">[186]</a>
Bearing in mind that voluntary arrangements have also commonly operated in these
areas, this suggests that state governments themselves
generally support the
idea that police officers ought to have the same employment rights as other
employees in most situations. It
might therefore not be entirely out of step for
them to introduce additional deeming provisions for police. Or, indeed, in view
of
recent reforms to the AFP, it may be open to some state legislatures to adopt
a similar model and address the status issue in its
entirety. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It could be argued, however, that the state legislatures’ reliance on
deeming provisions for police officers reveals their tacit
acceptance of the
current common law position.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn188" name="fnB188">[187]</a>
Furthermore, past experience would suggest that proposals for the introduction
of deeming provisions for police have not always been
successful, with the
parties left to rely on informal
arrangements.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn189" name="fnB189">[188]</a> A further problem is that,
even when the possible exclusion of police has been foreseen and countered in
express terms, some of the
legislative arrangements made have not dispensed with
contractual notions. This is likely to give rise to a number of practical
problems,
particularly in statutes where such expressions as ‘course of
employment’ or ‘course of service’ are
applied.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn190" name="fnB190">[189]</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It has also been suggested that the decision of the Full Federal Court in
<i>Konrad</i><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn191" name="fnB191">[190]</a> has laid the groundwork
for a broader and more effective definition of the employment relationship. In
particular, it has been argued
that the decision has shown how a federal
government could legislate to give employment rights to all kinds of workers,
including
certain
‘non-employees’.<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn192" name="fnB192">[191]</a> Certainly,
insofar as it might allow state police officers to gain access to the federal
industrial relations framework, the approach
adopted in <i>Konrad</i> by the
Full Federal Court could eventually be of major importance. The decision will
also be significant if it encourages other courts
and tribunals to interpret the
meaning of the term ‘employee’ in similar legislation to include
police officers. It remains
to be seen, however, to what extent <i>Konrad</i>
will be relied upon in drafting new federal legislation. It also remains to be
seen just how far the decision will be applied to
police officers in other legal
contexts. Given the widespread legislative acceptance of the
employee/non-employee distinction, and
given the courts’ traditional
approach to the interpretation of employment legislation in
Australia,<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn193" name="fnB193">[192]</a> much will probably still
depend on the particular wording of the provisions in question. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">In view of these factors, it is suggested that legislative reform might not
be the most practical option, and may only be able to
deliver piecemeal reform.
Nor, however, should reliance be placed merely on informal arrangements. The
presence of such arrangements
has undoubtedly been of great benefit to many
police officers over the years. Nonetheless, as has been argued in other
contexts,
these arrangements place a good deal of faith in the Crown acting as a
‘model employer’. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">We shall have to wait for another major decision to reconsider the rule that
police constables are not employees. The response of
the High Court in its 1952
decision in <i>Attorney-General (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co
Ltd</i><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fn194" name="fnB194">[193]</a> was arguably understandable,
considering the context in which that case was decided. But whatever
justification the rule might have
had then, it is certainly no longer
justifiable. Given the universal discontent with the <i>Perpetual Trustee</i>
doctrine, and given the practical difficulties and inequities arising from that
doctrine — even in modern times — the
High Court should re-examine
<i>Perpetual Trustee</i> and hold that police officers are both office-holders
and employees.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span>
<hr />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB1" name="fn1">[*]</a> MLLR (Hons) (Syd); Lecturer, School of
Business, Faculty of Economics and Business, The University of Sydney. The idea
for this article
originated in a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Labour Law and Relations in
the Faculty
of Law at the University of Sydney. I would like to thank the <i>Melbourne
University Law Review</i>’s anonymous referees for their helpful comments
and Professor Ron McCallum for his feedback on a much earlier version of it.
I
also wish to thank all the legal and industrial relations practitioners who
provided court submissions and background information
in the lead up to some of
the more recent Federal Court decisions dealt with in the article. Of course,
responsibility for any errors
and omissions that remain in the article rests
with me alone. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB2" name="fn2">[1]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1955/9.html" title="View Case">[1955] HCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281955%29%2092%20CLR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1955) 92 CLR 113</a> (‘<i>Perpetual
Trustee</i>’). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB3" name="fn3">[2]</a> See, eg, <i>Irvin v Whitrod [No 2]</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1978%5d%20Qd%20R%20271" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1978] Qd R 271</a>, 276 (Campbell J); <i>Sellars v Woods </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1982/281.html" title="View Case">[1982] FCA 281</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281982%29%2045%20ALR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1982) 45 ALR 113</a>,
121–2 (Fisher J); <i>Chapman v Australian Federal Police Commissioner
</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281983%29%2050%20ACTR%2023" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1983) 50 ACTR 23</a>, 33 (Kelly J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB4" name="fn4">[3]</a> See, eg, <i>Ferguson v Commissioner of
Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2072%20IR%20145" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 72 IR 145</a>, 151 (Boon JR) (‘<i>Ferguson</i>’);
<i>Konrad v Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20152%20ALR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 152 ALR 132</a>, 144 (Marshall J). See also
<i>Re Australian Federal Police Association</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2073%20IR%20155" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 73 IR 155</a>, 158 (Boulton
J, Polites SDP and Simonds C) (‘<i>Re AFPA</i>’) and <i>Minister of
Police v Western Australian Union of Workers</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WAIRComm/2000/226.html" title="View Case">[2000] WAIRComm 226
(Unreported</a>, Sharkey P, Fielding SC, Scott C, 14 November 2000) [122] (Fielding
SC),</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">[128]–[129] (Scott C). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB5" name="fn5">[4]</a> In some of the state and territory police
jurisdictions in Australia, certain members of the police force (most notably
high-level
‘executive’ officers) are in fact engaged on the basis of
a ‘contract of employment’: see, eg, <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/qld/consol_act/psaa1990301/">Police Service
Administration Act 1990</a></i> (Qld) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/qld/consol_act/psaa1990301/s5.3.html">ss 5.3</a>, <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/qld/consol_act/psaa1990301/s5.4.html">5.4</a>, <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/qld/consol_act/psaa1990301/s5.7.html">5.7</a> (‘<i>Qld
Act</i>’); <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/pa199075/">Police Act 1990</a></i> (NSW) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/pa199075/s27.html">ss 27</a>, <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/pa199075/s41.html">41</a>–<a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/pa199075/s7.html">7</a> (‘<i>NSW
Act</i>’). Also, so far as the Australian Federal Police
(‘AFP’) is concerned, there are now special provisions stating
that
members of that police force, with the exception of certain senior officers and
special members, are to be initially engaged
as ‘AFP employees’:
<i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/afpa1979225/">Australian Federal Police Act 1979</a></i> (Cth) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/afpa1979225/s24.html">ss 24</a>, <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/afpa1979225/s40b.html">40B</a>, <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/afpa1979225/s40d.html">40D</a> (‘<i>AFP
Act</i>’); <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/afplaa2000417/">Australian Federal Police Legislation Amendment Act 2000</a>
</i>(Cth) sch 1. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB6" name="fn6">[5]</a> See <i>Cook v Commissioner of Police</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281996%29%2066%20IR%20361" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1996) 66 IR 361</a> (‘<i>Cook</i>’); <i>Ferguson</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2072%20IR%20145" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 72 IR 145</a>;
<i>Ward v Commissioner of Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1998/9.html" title="View Case">[1998] FCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20151%20ALR%20604" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 151 ALR 604</a>; <i>Konrad v Victoria
Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20152%20ALR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 152 ALR 132</a>; <i>Orchard v Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%2079%20IR%20476" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 79 IR
476</a>; <i>Konrad v Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95</a>
(‘<i>Konrad</i>’); <i>Commissioner of Police v Ward</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/1058.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 1058</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%20165%20ALR%2057" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 165
ALR 57</a> (‘<i>Ward</i>’). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB7" name="fn7">[6]</a> See, eg, <i>Minister of Police v Western
Australian Police Union of Workers</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WAIRComm/2000/226.html" title="View Case">[2000] WAIRComm 226 (Unreported</a>, Sharkey
P, Fielding SC, Scott C, 14 November 2000); <i>Industrial Relations Amendment
Act 2000</i> (WA) s 5. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB8" name="fn8">[7]</a> See <i>Acts Amendment (Police Immunity)
Act 1999</i> (WA) s 5, inserting <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/pa189275/s137.html">s 137</a> of the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/pa189275/">Police Act 1892</a> </i>(WA)
(‘<i>WA Act</i>’). See also <i>Police Regulation (Amendment) Act
1999</i> (Vic) s 16, inserting s 123 of the <i>Police Regulation Act 1958
</i>(Vic) (‘<i>Vic Act</i>’). These provisions provide protection
from civil action against police officers in these states. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB9" name="fn9">[8]</a> See <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/osaha1984273/">Occupational Safety and Health Act
1984</a></i> (WA) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/osaha1984273/s3.html">s 3(4)</a> (commencing <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/osaha1984273/s3.html">3</a> January 2004) and <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/repealed_act/ohasa2000273/">Occupational Health and
Safety Act 2000</a></i> (NSW) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/repealed_act/ohasa2000273/s134.html">s 134</a>, which both deem police officers to be Crown
employees for the purposes of the occupational health and safety laws in these
jurisdictions.
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB10" name="fn10">[9]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/71.html" title="View Case">[1995] HCA 71</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281995%29%20184%20CLR%20188" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1995) 184 CLR 188</a> (‘<i>Re
AEU</i>’). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB11" name="fn11">[10]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB12" name="fn12">[11]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1955/9.html" title="View Case">[1955] HCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281955%29%2092%20CLR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1955) 92 CLR 113.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB13" name="fn13">[12]</a> Ibid 129 (Viscount Simonds). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB14" name="fn14">[13]</a> <i>A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd
</i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/2.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2085%20CLR%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 85 CLR 237.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB15" name="fn15">[14]</a><i> Koehne v Gay</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1964%5d%20SASR%20107" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1964] SASR 107</a>,
109 (Hogarth J); <i>Byrne v Hoare</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281965%29%20St%20RQd%20135" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1965) QSR 135</a>, 140–1 (Stable J),
149 (Gibbs J); <i>Firemores Transport Pty Ltd v Cluff</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281973%29%202%20NSWLR%20303" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1973) 2 NSWLR 303</a>,
304 (Lord Hailsham LC, Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Simon and Lord
Salmon); <i>Pense v Hemy</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1973%5d%20WAR%2040" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1973] WAR 40</a>, 42 (Bunt J); <i>Irvin v
Whitrod [No 2]</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1978%5d%20Qd%20R%20271" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1978] Qd R 271</a>; <i>Re Police Officers Industrial Agreement
</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1981%5d%20AR%20%28NSW%29%20272" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1981] AR (NSW) 272</a>, 273 (Dey J); <i>Sellars v Woods </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1982/281.html" title="View Case">[1982] FCA 281</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281982%29%2045%20ALR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1982) 45 ALR 113</a>,
121–2 (Fisher J); <i>Re Commissioner of Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281982%29%203%20IR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1982) 3 IR 132</a>,
136–7 (Olsson J), 143 (O’Loughlin J); <i>Re Police Officers
Award</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281982%29%202%20IR%20397" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1982) 2 IR 397</a>; <i>Chapman v Australian Federal Police Commissioner
</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281983%29%2050%20ACTR%2023" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1983) 50 ACTR 23</a>, 33 (Kelly J); <i>Griffiths v Haines</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281984%29%203%20NSWLR%20653" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1984) 3 NSWLR
653</a>, 661–2 (Lee J) (‘<i>Haines</i>’); <i>Lackersteen v
Jones</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281988%29%2092%20FLR%207" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1988) 92 FLR 7</a>, 45 (Asche CJ); <i>R v Commissioner of Police; Ex
parte Ross</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1992%5d%201%20Qd%20R%20289" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1992] 1 Qd R 289</a>, 291–2 (Derrington J); <i>Minister for
Police v WA Police Union of Workers </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1995%5d%20AILR%2013%2d012" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1995] AILR 13-012.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB16" name="fn16">[15]</a> <i>Ferguson</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2072%20IR%20145" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 72 IR 145</a>; <i>Re
AFPA</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2073%20IR%20155" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 73 IR 155</a>, 158 (Boulton J, Polites SDP and Simonds C); <i>Ward v
Commissioner of Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1998/9.html" title="View Case">[1998] FCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20151%20ALR%20604" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 151 ALR 604</a>; <i>Konrad v Victoria Police</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20152%20ALR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 152 ALR 132</a>; <i>Orchard v Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%2079%20IR%20476" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 79 IR 476</a>, 478
(Marshall J); <i>Konrad</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95</a>; <i>Minister of Police v Western
Australian Police Union of Workers </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WAIRComm/2000/226.html" title="View Case">[2000] WAIRComm 226 (Unreported</a>, Sharkey
P, Fielding SC, Scott C, 14 November 2000). These cases confirm that, at common
law, a police officer is the employee of
no-one, not of the Crown or of the
Commissioner of Police. There are also many British cases to the same effect:
see Lord Mackay
(ed), <i>Halsbury’s Laws of England</i>, vol 36(1) (4th
ed, 1999) Police, ‘1 Introduction’ [205]. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB17" name="fn17">[16]</a> <i>R v Commissioner of Police of the
Metropolis; Ex parte Blackburn</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1968%5d%202%20QB%20118" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1968] 2 QB 118</a>, 136 (Lord Denning MR). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB18" name="fn18">[17]</a> J F Stephen, <i>A History of the
Criminal Law of England</i> (1889) 494, quoted in United Kingdom, <i>Report of
the Royal Commission on Police Powers and Procedure</i>, Cmnd 3297 (1929)
[15]. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB19" name="fn19">[18]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/3.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%203%20CLR%20969" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 3 CLR 969</a>
(‘<i>Enever</i>’). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB20" name="fn20">[19]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1930%5d%202%20KB%20364" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1930] 2 KB 364</a>
(‘<i>Fisher</i>’). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB21" name="fn21">[20]</a> See, eg, <i>Zuijs v Wirth Brothers Pty
Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1955/73.html" title="View Case">[1955] HCA 73</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281955%29%2093%20CLR%20561" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1955) 93 CLR 561</a>; <i>Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/1.html" title="View Case">[1986] HCA 1</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281986%29%20160%20CLR%2016" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1986)
160 CLR 16.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB22" name="fn22">[21]</a> This issue is adverted to generally in
<i>Oceanic Crest Shipping Co Pty Ltd v Pilbara Habour Services Pty Ltd
</i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/34.html" title="View Case">[1986] HCA 34</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281986%29%20160%20CLR%20626" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1986) 160 CLR 626</a> (‘<i>Oceanic Crest Shipping</i>’). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB23" name="fn23">[22]</a> <i>AFP Act</i> ss 17(1), 22; <i>NSW
Act</i> ss 24(1), 28(1); <i>Vic Act</i> s 4(1); <i>WA Act </i>s 5; <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/pa199875/">Police Act
1998</a> </i>(SA) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/pa199875/s12.html">ss 12</a>, <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/pa199875/s17.html">17</a> (‘<i>SA Act</i>’); <i>Police Administration
Act 1978</i> (NT) s 7 (‘<i>NT Act</i>’); <i>Police Regulation
Act</i> <i>1898</i> (Tas) ss 8, 11, 11A (‘<i>Tas Act</i>’) and
<i>Tasmanian State Service Act 1984</i> (Tas) pt V. In Queensland, the
recommendation made by the Minister to the Governor-in-Council of an appropriate
person for appointment
must also be agreed to by the Criminal Justice
Commission, and this also applies in relation to certain dismissals: <i>Qld
Act</i> ss 4.2, 4.5. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB24" name="fn24">[23]</a> <i>AFP Act</i> ss 17(1), 22; <i>NSW
Act</i> ss 36(1)(a), 51(1)(a), 181D(2); <i>NT Act</i> s 7; <i>Interpretation Act
1978</i> (NT) s 34(1); <i>Qld Act</i> s 5.3; <i>SA Act</i> ss 14(1), 17(1);
<i>Tas Act</i> ss 9, 9A(1); <i>Vic Act</i> s 4(2); <i>WA Act</i> ss 6, 8. In
South Australia, Assistant Commissioners are appointed and removed by the
Commissioner: <i>SA Act</i> ss 15(1), 17(1). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB25" name="fn25">[24]</a> <i>SA Act</i> ss 20, 40, 45, 46; <i>Tas
Act</i> ss 10(1), 11; <i>WA Act</i> ss 6, 8. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB26" name="fn26">[25]</a> <i>NSW Act</i> ss 36(1)(b), 51(1)(b)
(superintendents) and ss 64, 181 (inspectors); <i>NT Act</i> s 16(1); <i>Qld
Act</i> ss 5.6, 6.1; <i>Vic Act</i> ss 8, 76(1)(g), 80(1)(e). There are
sometimes additional provisions governing the removal of members of the police
force, including
commissioned officers, and these also generally refer to the
Commissioner as the relevant disciplinary authority. Also, so far as
the AFP is
concerned, all remaining senior members of the force are not appointed directly
as constables, but are initially engaged
as ‘AFP employees’ by the
Commissioner, who in turn is also responsible for their removal: <i>AFP Act</i>
ss 24, 28, 40B, 40D, 40K. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB27" name="fn27">[26]</a> <i>NSW Act</i> pt 6, div 4 and ss 179,
181D; <i>NT Act</i> ss 16(1)(a), 16(1)(aa); <i>Qld Act</i> ss 5.6, 6.1; <i>SA
Act</i> ss 21, 40, 45, 46; <i>Tas Act</i> s 12; <i>Vic Act</i> ss 8, 76(1)(g),
80(1)(e); <i>WA Act</i> ss 7(1), 8. Again, special provisions apply in respect
of those members of the AFP who are ‘AFP employees’. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB28" name="fn28">[27]</a> <i>AFP Act</i> s 9(1); <i>NSW Act</i> s
14; <i>Qld Act</i> s 3.1; <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/soa1953189/">Summary Offences Act 1953</a></i> (SA) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_act/soa1953189/s82.html">s 82</a>; <i>Tas
Act</i> s 15; <i>Vic Act</i> s 11; <i>WA Act</i> s 7(1). In the Northern
Territory, members of the police force have all the powers and duties conferred
or imposed upon them ‘by
any law in force in the Territory’: <i>NT
Act</i> s 25. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB29" name="fn29">[28]</a> Examples of the general common law
powers of a constable include the power to prevent a breach of the peace, the
power to restore
public order, and the power to apprehend offenders. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB30" name="fn30">[29]</a> See, eg, <i>Criminal Code Act 1924</i>
(Tas) s 27(2), which states that a police officer may arrest without warrant any
person whom he or she ‘believes on reasonable
grounds’ to have
committed certain offences. See also Rudolf Plehwe and Roger Wettenhall,
‘Policing in Australia: An
Historical Perspective’ (Paper presented
at the National Conference on Keeping the Peace: Police Accountability and
Oversight,
Sydney, 20–21 May 1993) 5. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB31" name="fn31">[30]</a> <i>Tas Act</i> s 16, sch 2, form 1;
and, similarly, <i>AFP Act</i> s 36; <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_reg/afpr1979334/">Australian Federal Police Regulations
1979</a></i> (Cth) sch 1, form 2; <i>NSW Act</i> s 13; <i>Police Service Regulation
2000</i> (NSW) reg 8; <i>NT Act</i> s 26, sch, forms 1, 2; <i>Qld Act</i> s
3.3; <i>SA Act</i> ss 25, 60; <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_reg/pr1999184/">Police Regulations 1999</a> </i>(SA) reg 72,
sch 1; <i>Vic Act</i> s 13(1), sch 2, form A; <i>WA Act</i> s 10. In some
jurisdictions, there are also provisions stating that, upon taking the oath of
office, police officers shall be deemed
‘to have ... thereby entered into
an agreement with, and shall be thereby bound to serve Her Majesty’:
<i>Vic Act</i> s 13(3); see also <i>NT Act</i> s 28; <i>SA Act</i> s 26; <i>Tas
Act</i> s 18. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB32" name="fn32">[31]</a> Section 5; see also <i>AFP Act</i> s
37(2); <i>NSW Act</i> s 8(1); <i>NT Act</i> s 14(2); <i>Qld Act</i> s 4.6(2);
<i>SA Act</i> s 6; <i>Tas Act</i> s 8. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB33" name="fn33">[32]</a> <i>WA Act</i> ss 6–9. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB34" name="fn34">[33]</a> <i>AFP Act</i> s 37(1); <i>NSW Act</i>
s 8(1); <i>NT Act</i> s 14(1); <i>Qld Act</i> ss 4.6(2), 4.8; <i>SA Act</i> s 6;
<i>Tas Act</i> s 8(2); <i>Vic Act</i> s 5; <i>WA Act</i> s 5. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB35" name="fn35">[34]</a> <i>AFP Act</i> s 38; <i>NSW Act</i> s
8(4); <i>Police Regulations 1974</i> (Tas) reg 37(a); <i>SA Act</i> s 11; <i>Vic
Act</i> s 17(1). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB36" name="fn36">[35]</a> <i>WA Act</i> s 9. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB37" name="fn37">[36]</a> <i>Qld Act</i> s 4.9. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB38" name="fn38">[37]</a> See, eg, <i>Police Service Regulation
2000</i> (NSW) pt 2, regs 9(1), (4). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB39" name="fn39">[38]</a> <i>NSW Act</i> s 219; <i>Qld Act</i> s
10.28; <i>SA Act</i> s 76. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB40" name="fn40">[39]</a> <i>Vic Act</i> s 130; <i>Tas Act</i> s
29; <i>NT Act</i> s 167. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB41" name="fn41">[40]</a> <i>AFP Act</i> s 70. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB42" name="fn42">[41]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/3.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%203%20CLR%20969" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 3 CLR 969.</a> For a critique on the
origins of <i>Enever</i>, see S C Churches, ‘“Bona Fide”
Police Torts and Crown Immunity: A Paradigm of the Case for Judge Made
Law’
<a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UTasLawRw/1980/5.html" title="View Case">[1980] UTasLawRw 5</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281980%29%206%20University%20of%20Tasmania%20Law%20Review%20294" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1980) 6 <i>University of Tasmania Law Review</i> 294.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB43" name="fn43">[42]</a> At the time of the decision, the
relevant power to arrest was contained in the <i>Police Act 1865</i> (Tas) s
197. It authorised a police constable to arrest ‘any person who within his
view ... disturbs the public peace’.
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB44" name="fn44">[43]</a> <i>Enever</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/3.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%203%20CLR%20969" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 3 CLR 969</a>,
977. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB45" name="fn45">[44]</a> The judgments in <i>Enever</i> had
relied to a large extent on <i>Tobin v The Queen</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/EngR/1864/21.html" title="View Case">[1864] EngR 21</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281864%29%2016%20CB%20NS%20310" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1864) 16 CB NS 310</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=143%20ER%201148" title="View LawCiteRecord">143 ER
1148.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB46" name="fn46">[45]</a> <i>Enever </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/3.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%203%20CLR%20969" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 3 CLR 969</a>,
975. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB47" name="fn47">[46]</a> Ibid 977. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB48" name="fn48">[47]</a> Ibid. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB49" name="fn49">[48]</a> Most notably in <i>Fisher</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1930%5d%202%20KB%20364" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1930] 2
KB 364</a> and <i>Perpetual Trustee</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1955/9.html" title="View Case">[1955] HCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281955%29%2092%20CLR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1955) 92 CLR 113.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB50" name="fn50">[49]</a> See especially United Kingdom, <i>Royal
Commission on the Police 1962 Final Report</i>, Cmnd 1728 (1962) [62]. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB51" name="fn51">[50]</a> <i>Enever</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/3.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%203%20CLR%20969" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 3 CLR 969</a>,
990. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB52" name="fn52">[51]</a> Ibid. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB53" name="fn53">[52]</a> See <i>Enever</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/3.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%203%20CLR%20969" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 3 CLR 969</a>,
981, where Barton J states that whether ‘the constable was acting as an
officer, agent or servant of the Government is not
the only question; though the
constable might be an officer, agent or servant of the Government, he would
still have to be such within
the meaning of the [Tasmanian] <i>Crown Redress Act
1891</i> before the liability could attach.’ Barton J (at 982) also points
out that the fact that the police constable was an office-holder
was not open to
question, but that that did not conclude the matter in the Crown’s
favour. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB54" name="fn54">[53]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1930%5d%202%20KB%20364" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1930] 2 KB 364.</a> <i>Fisher</i> has been
trenchantly criticised, particularly in the police governance literature in
Britain: see especially Laurence Lustgarten,
<i>The Governance of Police</i>
(1986)</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">55–61, where Lustgarten endorses the earlier criticisms made by
Geoffrey Marshall, <i>Police and Government: The Status and Accountability of
the English Constable</i> (1965). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB55" name="fn55">[54]</a> <i>Fisher </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1930%5d%202%20KB%20364" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1930] 2 KB 364</a>, 371,
377–8 (McCardie J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB56" name="fn56">[55]</a> <i>Mackalley’s Case</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/EngR/1572/233.html" title="View Case">[1572] EngR 233</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281611%29%209%20Co%20Rep%2061" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1611) 9
Co Rep 61b</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=77%20ER%20824" title="View LawCiteRecord">77 ER 824</a>; <i>Coomber v The Justices of the County of Berks</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1883/TC_2_1.html" title="View Case">[1883] UKHL TC_2_1</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281883%29%209%20AC%2061" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1883) 9 App Cas 61</a>; <i>Stanbury v Exeter Corporation</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1905%5d%202%20KB%20838" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1905] 2 KB 838</a>
(‘<i>Stanbury</i>’). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB57" name="fn57">[56]</a> <i>Buttrick v City of Lowell</i>, <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=83%20Mass%20172" title="View LawCiteRecord">83
Mass 172</a> (1861). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB58" name="fn58">[57]</a> <i>McCleave v City of Moncton</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281902%29%2032%20SCR%20106" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1902) 32 SCR 106.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB59" name="fn59">[58]</a> <i>Fisher</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1930%5d%202%20KB%20364" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1930] 2 KB 364</a>,
372. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB60" name="fn60">[59]</a> Ibid. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB61" name="fn61">[60]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1905%5d%202%20KB%20838" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1905] 2 KB 838.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB62" name="fn62">[61]</a> Ibid 842–3 (citations
omitted). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB63" name="fn63">[62]</a> Rather, the principle being applied
here, which originated in a series of American and Canadian decisions, was one
which had also
been extended to other public officials: see Dermot Walsh,
‘The Legal Status of an Irish Police Officer: New Clothes for the
Ancient
Office of Constable’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1994%5d%20Anglo%2dAmerican%20Law%20Review%2023" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1994] <i>Anglo-American Law Review</i> 23</a>, 63,
85–6; Philip Stenning, <i>Legal Status of the Police: A Study Paper
Prepared for the Law Reform Commission of Canada </i>(1982) 101–12. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB64" name="fn64">[63]</a> Paul Atiyah, <i>Vicarious Liability in
the Law of Torts</i> (1967) 77–8. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB65" name="fn65">[64]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1930%5d%202%20KB%20364" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1930] 2 KB 364</a>, 368; see also
368–71 (McCardie J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB66" name="fn66">[65]</a> Ibid 370–1. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB67" name="fn67">[66]</a> <i>A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co
Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/2.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2085%20CLR%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 85 CLR 237 (High</a> Court of Australia); <i>Perpetual Trustee</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1955/9.html" title="View Case">[1955] HCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281955%29%2092%20CLR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1955) 92 CLR 113 (Privy</a> Council). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB68" name="fn68">[67]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1955/9.html" title="View Case">[1955] HCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281955%29%2092%20CLR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1955) 92 CLR 113.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB69" name="fn69">[68]</a> This is an action for damages by a
person entitled to services from an injured party, against another person whose
wrongful act towards
the injured party has deprived him or her of those
services. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB70" name="fn70">[69]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1944/1.html" title="View Case">[1944] HCA 1</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281944%29%2068%20CLR%20227" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1944) 68 CLR 227.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB71" name="fn71">[70]</a> The High Court had earlier reached the
same conclusion: <i>A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/2.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2085%20CLR%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 85 CLR
237.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB72" name="fn72">[71]</a> <i>Perpetual Trustee</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1955/9.html" title="View Case">[1955] HCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281955%29%2092%20CLR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1955) 92 CLR
113</a>, 120–1 (citations omitted). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB73" name="fn73">[72]</a> Ibid 121. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB74" name="fn74">[73]</a> Ibid 129. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB75" name="fn75">[74]</a> <i>A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co
Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/2.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2085%20CLR%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 85 CLR 237</a>, 273 (Webb J), 303–4 (Kitto J),</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">255–6 (McTiernan J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB76" name="fn76">[75]</a> <i>A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co
Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281951%29%2051%20SR%20%28NSW%29%20109" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1951) 51 SR (NSW) 109</a>, 112–3 (Maxwell J), 117 (Owen J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB77" name="fn77">[76]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/61.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 61</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%204%20CLR%20422" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 4 CLR 422.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB78" name="fn78">[77]</a> <i>A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co
Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/2.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2085%20CLR%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 85 CLR 237</a>, 303–4 (emphasis added). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB79" name="fn79">[78]</a> Ibid 255 (McTiernan J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB80" name="fn80">[79]</a> Ibid 254–6. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB81" name="fn81">[80]</a> Ibid 273. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB82" name="fn82">[81]</a> It is submitted that <i>Ryder v
Foley</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/61.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 61</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%204%20CLR%20422" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 4 CLR 422</a>, which had been referred to by Kitto J, does not
support the proposition that police constables are not employees. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB83" name="fn83">[82]</a> Zelman Cowen, ‘The Action <i>Per
Quod Servitium Amisit</i> and the Police’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?collection=journals&handle=hein.journals/uwatlw2&g_sent=1&div=24" title="View Case">(1953) 2 <i>University of
Western Australia Annual Law Review</i> 263</a>, 276. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB84" name="fn84">[83]</a> <i>A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co
Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/2.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2085%20CLR%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 85 CLR 237</a>, 283 (Fullagar J), 252 (Dixon J), 265 (Williams
J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB85" name="fn85">[84]</a> See especially <i>Field v Nott</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1939/41.html" title="View Case">[1939] HCA 41</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281939%29%2062%20CLR%20660" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1939) 62 CLR 660</a> (legal aid officer) and <i>Oceanic Crest Shipping </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/34.html" title="View Case">[1986] HCA 34</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281986%29%20160%20CLR%20626" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1986)
160 CLR 626</a> (marine pilot). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB86" name="fn86">[85]</a> See <i>Union Government v Thorne</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1930%5d%20SALR%2047" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1930] SALR 47</a>; <i>Sibiya v Swart</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1950%5d%204%20SALR%20515" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1950] 4 SALR 515</a>; <i>Mhlongo v Minister
of Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1978%5d%202%20SALR%20551" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1978] 2 SALR 551</a>; see also Churches, above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567540">41</a>, 300. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB87" name="fn87">[86]</a> <i>NSW Act</i> s 8. At the time of
<i>Perpetual Trustee</i> and <i>A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd</i>, the
relevant provision was s 4(1) of the <i>Police Regulation Act 1899</i>
(NSW). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB88" name="fn88">[87]</a> <i>A-G (NSW) v Perpetual Trustee Co
Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/2.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2085%20CLR%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 85 CLR 237</a>, 304. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB89" name="fn89">[88]</a> <i>Haines</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1984%5d%203%20NSWLR%20663" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1984] 3 NSWLR 663</a>, 661
(Lee J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB90" name="fn90">[89]</a> Marshall, above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#Marshall">53</a>, 18–20; Walsh, above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567550">62</a>, 90–7; Plehwe and
Wettenhall, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567558">29</a>,</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">5–7. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB91" name="fn91">[90]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1955/9.html" title="View Case">[1955] HCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281955%29%2092%20CLR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1955) 92 CLR 113</a>, 118. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB92" name="fn92">[91]</a> <i>Fletcher v Nott</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1938/25.html" title="View Case">[1938] HCA 25</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281938%29%2060%20CLR%2055" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1938) 60 CLR
55</a>, 68 (Latham CJ). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB93" name="fn93">[92]</a> <i>Ryder v Foley</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/61.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 61</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%204%20CLR%20422" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 4 CLR 422</a>;
<i>Fletcher v Nott</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1938/25.html" title="View Case">[1938] HCA 25</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281938%29%2060%20CLR%2055" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1938) 60 CLR 55</a>; <i>Kaye v A-G (Tas)</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1956/3.html" title="View Case">[1956] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281956%29%2094%20CLR%20193" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1956) 94 CLR
193.</a> To similar effect are the decisions of the Supreme Court of Victoria in
<i>Power v The Queen</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281873%29%204%20AJR%20144" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1873) 4 AJR 144</a>, followed in <i>Green v The Queen</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VicLawRp/1891/73.html" title="View Case">[1891] VicLawRp 73</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281891%29%2017%20VLR%20329" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1891) 17 VLR 329</a>, 332 (Higinbotham CJ); <i>Bertrand v The King</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VicLawRp/1949/10.html" title="View Case">[1949] VicLawRp 10</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1949%5d%20VLR%2049" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1949] VLR
49</a>, 50–1 (Herring CJ); <i>O’Rourke v Miller</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VicRp/1984/20.html" title="View Case">[1984] VicRp 20</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1984%5d%20VR%20277" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1984] VR 277</a>,
298–9 (O’Bryan J). See also <i>Martin v Police Service Board</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VicRp/1983/97.html" title="View Case">[1983] VicRp 97</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1983%5d%202%20VR%20357" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1983] 2 VR 357</a>, 367 (Marks J); <i>Kochne v Gay</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1964%5d%20SASR%20107" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1964] SASR 107</a>, 109
(Hogarth J);<i> Re Commissioner of Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281982%29%203%20IR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1982) 3 IR 132</a>, 137 (Olsson J);
<i>Finemores Transport v Cluff</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281973%29%202%20NSWLR%20303" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1973) 2 NSWLR 303</a>, 304 (Lord Hailsham LC,
Viscount Dilhorne, Lord Wilberforce, Lord Simon and Lord Salmon);
<i>Alley v Minister of Works </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281974%29%209%20SASR%20306" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1974) 9 SASR 306</a>, 310 (Zelling
J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB94" name="fn94">[93]</a> Louis Waller, ‘The Police, the
Premier and Parliament: Governmental Control of the Police’ <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MonashULawRw/1980/5.html" title="View Case">[1980] MonashULawRw 5</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281980%29%206%20Monash%20University%20Law%20Review%20249" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1980) 6
<i>Monash University Law Review</i> 249</a>, 261, referring to the High
Court’s decision. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB95" name="fn95">[94]</a> <i>Perpetual Trustee</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281955%29%2092%20CLR%20112" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1955) 92 CLR
112</a>, 130. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB96" name="fn96">[95]</a> It is clear from the judgments of some
members of the High Court that the fact that police constables have always had
independent
peacekeeping functions to perform was, of itself, conclusive. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB97" name="fn97">[96]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/2.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2085%20CLR%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 85 CLR 237</a>, 252 (Dixon J), 265
(Williams J), 278, 283–4 (Fullagar J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB98" name="fn98">[97]</a> Ibid 252. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB99" name="fn99">[98]</a> Ibid (citations omitted). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB100" name="fn100">[99]</a> Such as the constable’s powers
of arrest. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB101" name="fn101">[100]</a> <i>Haines</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1984%5d%203%20NSWLR%20653" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1984] 3 NSWLR 653</a>,
658 (Lee J); <i>Konrad v Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20152%20ALR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 152 ALR 132</a>, 144 (Marshall
J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB102" name="fn102">[101]</a> Peter Hogg, <i>Liability of the
Crown</i> (1st ed, 1971) 106, 163; Peter Hogg, <i>Liability of the Crown</i>
(2nd ed, 1989) ch 5; Michael Bersten, ‘Police and Politics in Australia:
The Separation of Powers and the Case for Statutory
Codification’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281990%29%2014%20Criminal%20Law%20Journal%20302" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1990)
14 <i>Criminal Law Journal</i> 302</a>, 312; Enid Campbell and Harry Whitmore,
<i>Freedom in Australia</i> (1973) 21–2; Waller, above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567575">93</a>, 261–2; Greg McCarry,
<i>Aspects of Public Sector Employment Law</i> (1988) 214; John Fleming, <i>The
Law of Torts</i> (9th ed, 1998) 753. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB103" name="fn103">[102]</a> See <i>Little v Commonwealth</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1947/24.html" title="View Case">[1947] HCA 24</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281947%29%2075%20CLR%2094" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1947) 75 CLR 94</a>, 114 (Dixon J); <i>Ramsay v Pigram</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1968/34.html" title="View Case">[1968] HCA 34</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281968%29%20118%20CLR%20271" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1968) 118 CLR 271</a>,
279–80 (Barwick CJ), 289 (Windeyer J) (discussing governmental liability
for a police officer’s negligent driving);
<i>Haines</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1984%5d%203%20NSWLR%20653" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1984] 3 NSWLR
653</a>, 658, 663 (Lee J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB104" name="fn104">[103]</a> See <i>Ferguson </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2072%20IR%20145" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 72 IR
145</a>, 151 (Boon JR); <i>Re AFPA </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2073%20IR%20155" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 73 IR 155</a>, 158 (Boulton J, Polites
SDP, Simmonds C); <i>Konrad v Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20152%20ALR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 152 ALR 132</a>, 144
(Marshall J); <i>Konrad </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95</a>, 127 (Finkelstein J); <i>Minister
of Police v Western Australian Union of Workers</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/wa/WAIRComm/2000/226.html" title="View Case">[2000] WAIRComm 226
(Unreported</a>, Sharkey P, Fielding SC, Scott C, 14 November 2000) [122] (Fielding
SC), [128]–[129] (Scott C). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB105" name="fn105">[104]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1986/34.html" title="View Case">[1986] HCA 34</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281986%29%20160%20CLR%20626" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1986) 160 CLR 626.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB106" name="fn106">[105]</a> This is seen most clearly in the
judgment of Dawson J, which drew a direct analogy between the position of a
marine pilot, as both
office-holder and employee, and that of the police
constable: ibid 681. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB107" name="fn107">[106]</a> <i>Re Australian Federal Police
Association [No 2]</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281993%29%2051%20IR%20122" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1993) 51 IR 122</a>, 146 (Williams DP) (‘<i>Re AFPA
[No 2]</i>’);<i> Re AFPA</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2073%20IR%20155" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 73 IR 155</a>, 158 (Boulton J, Polites
SDP, Simmonds C). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB108" name="fn108">[107]</a> <i>Re AFPA</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2073%20IR%20155" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 73 IR 155</a>, 158
(Boulton J, Polites SDP, Simmonds C); <i>Konrad v Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20152%20ALR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 152
ALR 132</a>, 144 (Marshall J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB109" name="fn109">[108]</a> These issues were discussed in some
detail in the submissions of the applicants in <i>Konrad v Victoria
Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20152%20ALR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 152 ALR 132:</a> Applicant’s Submissions on Crown Employee
Point, No 1339, 1340 and 1406 of 1997 (27 October 1997) 21–34. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB110" name="fn110">[109]</a> J R L Milton, ‘The Vicarious
Liability of the State for the Delicts of the Police’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281967%29%2084%20South%20African%20Law%20Journal%2025" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1967) 84<i> South
African Law Journal </i>25</a>, 27, quoting William Wade, <i>Administrative Law</i>
(1961) 24–5. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB111" name="fn111">[110]</a> Cf Sir William Wade,
<i>Administrative Law </i>(6th ed, 1988) 148, referring to some of the South
African decisions mentioned in above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref38013659">85</a>. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB112" name="fn112">[111]</a> <i>Fisher</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1930%5d%202%20KB%20364" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1930] 2 KB 364</a>, 378
(McCardie J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB113" name="fn113">[112]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/2.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2085%20CLR%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 85 CLR 237</a>, 252. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB114" name="fn114">[113]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/71.html" title="View Case">[1995] HCA 71</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281995%29%20184%20CLR%20188" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1995) 184 CLR 188.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB115" name="fn115">[114]</a> Section 4(1) (emphasis added). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB116" name="fn116">[115]</a> Police officers in Victoria,
however, have access (subject to certain limitations) to the general
award-making provisions of the
<i>WR Act</i>: <i>Commonwealth Powers (Industrial
Relations) Act 1996</i> (Vic) s 3; <i>WR Act</i> ss 489, 493. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB117" name="fn117">[116]</a> This issue was explicitly raised
during argument in <i>Glasgow v Victoria</i>, an unsuccessful application for
removal to the High Court under <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ja1903112/s40.html">s 40(1)</a> of the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ja1903112/">Judiciary Act 1903</a> </i>(Cth):
see Transcript of Proceedings, <i>Glasgow v Victoria</i> (High Court of
Australia, Gavan Griffith, 11 September 1998). The matter involved was
originally tried by Marshall J in <i>Orchard v Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%2079%20IR%20476" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 79 IR
476</a>, but subsequently overruled by the Full Federal Court decision in
<i>Konrad</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB118" name="fn118">[117]</a> <i>WR Act</i> s 89A. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB119" name="fn119">[118]</a> See generally D C Thomson,
‘Employment and the Law in the New South Wales Police Force’ <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/SydLawRw/1964/5.html" title="View Case">[1964] SydLawRw 5</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281963%29%204%20Sydney%20Law%20Review%20404" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1963)
4 <i>Sydney Law Review</i> 404</a>; Lawson Savery and Shane Bushe-Jones, ‘The
Decline in WA Police Officers’ Salaries 1974–1990’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281992%29%2018%20Australian%20Bulletin%20of%20Labour%20208" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1992) 18
<i>Australian Bulletin of Labour</i> 208</a>, 213, 215. Since the late 1980s, the
various state police associations have been pursuing strategies seeking
nationally consistent
‘benchmarks’ in their salary claims. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB120" name="fn120">[119]</a> See, eg, W J Ford,
‘Reconstructing Australian Labour Law: A Constitutional Perspective’
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2010%20Australian%20Journal%20of%20Labour%20Law%201" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 10 <i>Australian Journal of Labour Law</i> 1</a>, 11–12. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB121" name="fn121">[120]</a> It will be argued below that it
would not be appropriate to allow state police officers access to the
‘protected action’
provisions in pt VIB, div 8 of the Act. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB122" name="fn122">[121]</a> Section 170LI(1). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB123" name="fn123">[122]</a> Section 170LZ(1). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB124" name="fn124">[123]</a> Section 170LZ(2). That provision
also allows for exclusions prescribed by the regulations. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB125" name="fn125">[124]</a> The idea that state and territory
police might one day operate in the federal system seems to have been a key
long-term goal: see,
eg, K D Marshall, ‘Survival within the Arbitration
System’ (Paper presented at the Police Industrial Relations Seminar,
Airlie Police College, Melbourne, 9 December 1982) 109–10. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB126" name="fn126">[125]</a> See <i>Re AEU </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/71.html" title="View Case">[1995] HCA 71</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281995%29%20184%20CLR%20188" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1995) 184 CLR
188</a>, 231 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ); <i>Victoria
v Commonwealth </i>(1996) 187 CLR 416, 498 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, Gaudron, McHugh
and Gummow JJ). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB127" name="fn127">[126]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/71.html" title="View Case">[1995] HCA 71</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281995%29%20184%20CLR%20188" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1995) 184 CLR 188.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB128" name="fn128">[127]</a> Ibid 241 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane,
Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB129" name="fn129">[128]</a> Ibid 233. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB130" name="fn130">[129]</a> An issue initially raised in <i>Re
AFPA [No 2]</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281993%29%2051%20IR%20122" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1993) 51 IR 122.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB131" name="fn131">[130]</a> <i>Re AEU </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/71.html" title="View Case">[1995] HCA 71</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281995%29%20184%20CLR%20188" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1995) 184 CLR 188</a>,
241. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB132" name="fn132">[131]</a> Ibid 230. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB133" name="fn133">[132]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95 (Ryan</a>, North and
Finkelstein JJ). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB134" name="fn134">[133]</a> Submissions of the Respondents,
<i>Konrad v Victoria Police</i>, No VG 44 of 1998 (11 February 1999)
8–9. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB135" name="fn135">[134]</a> See <i>Konrad</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95</a>,
107 (North J), 129–30 (Finkelstein J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB136" name="fn136">[135]</a> Ibid 130 (Finkelstein J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB137" name="fn137">[136]</a> Ibid 102 (Ryan J), 104 (North J),
129 (Finkelstein J). In <i>Re AEU</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/71.html" title="View Case">[1995] HCA 71</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281995%29%20184%20CLR%20188" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1995) 184 CLR 188</a>, 232 (Mason CJ,
Brennan, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ), the High Court had held that it
was critical to a state’s capacity
to function as a government ‘to
determine the number and identity of the persons whom it wishes to employ, the
term of appointment
of such persons and, as well, the number and identity of the
persons whom it wishes to dismiss ... from its employment on redundancy
grounds.’ </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB138" name="fn138">[137]</a> <i>Konrad</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95</a>, 129
(Finkelstein J, North J concurring). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB139" name="fn139">[138]</a> This was held to be so even in the
case of a probationary constable, who could be terminated summarily: ibid
129–30 (Finkelstein
J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB140" name="fn140">[139]</a> A situation, however, where a
federal industrial instrument might be viewed as infringing the implied
limitation would arise where
it placed restrictions upon senior members’
‘command powers’, particularly a Commissioner’s powers
relating
to the control and superintendence of the police force. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB141" name="fn141">[140]</a> See <i>Cook </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281996%29%2066%20IR%20361" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1996) 66 IR 361</a>;
<i>Ferguson </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2072%20IR%20145" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 72 IR 145</a>; <i>Ward v Commissioner of Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1998/9.html" title="View Case">[1998] FCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20151%20ALR%20604" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998)
151 ALR 604</a>; <i>Konrad v Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20152%20ALR%20132" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 152 ALR 132</a>; <i>Orchard v
Victoria Police</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%2079%20IR%20476" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 79 IR 476</a>, 478 (Marshall J); <i>Konrad </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91
FCR 95</a>; <i>Ward</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/1058.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 1058</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%20165%20ALR%2057" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 165 ALR 57</a>; <i>Pooley v Commissioner of
Police of Northern Territory </i>(Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations
Commission, Hoffman C, 5 October 1999). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB142" name="fn142">[141]</a> I shall not discuss the various
state unfair dismissal laws here, though it should be borne in mind that in some
state jurisdictions,
members of the police force do have access, in varying
degrees, to those laws. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB143" name="fn143">[142]</a> In particular, state police officers
will, in many cases, have access to a statutory form of judicial review in
respect of disciplinary
(and other) decisions taken against them, including
dismissal. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB144" name="fn144">[143]</a> <i>NSW Act</i> pt 9, divs 1, 2;
<i>NT Act</i> pts V and VI;<i> Qld Act</i> pt IX; <i>Tas Act</i> s 31, pt IVB;
<i>Vic Act</i> pt V; <i>WA Act</i> s 23, pt IIA. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB145" name="fn145">[144]</a> <i>Kerr v Commissioner of Police</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1977%5d%202%20NSWLR%20721" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1977] 2 NSWLR 721</a>, 728 (Moffitt P); McCarry, <i>Aspects of Public Sector
Employment Law</i>, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567585">101</a>,
147. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB146" name="fn146">[145]</a> <i>Qld Act</i> s 9.5. Similar
provisions existed for some time in Victoria prior to the introduction of a new
Police Appeals Board by the Bracks
Labor government in 1999. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB147" name="fn147">[146]</a> McCarry, <i>Aspects of Public Sector
Employment Law</i>, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567585">101</a>,
126. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB148" name="fn148">[147]</a> <i>Ryder v Foley</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1906/61.html" title="View Case">[1906] HCA 61</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281906%29%204%20CLR%20422" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1906) 4 CLR
422</a>; <i>Fletcher v Nott</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1938/25.html" title="View Case">[1938] HCA 25</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281938%29%2060%20CLR%2055" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1938) 60 CLR 55</a>; <i>Kaye v A-G (Tas)</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1956/3.html" title="View Case">[1956] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281956%29%2094%20CLR%20193" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1956) 94
CLR 193</a>; <i>Reedman v Hoare</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1959/50.html" title="View Case">[1959] HCA 50</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281959%29%20102%20CLR%20177" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1959) 102 CLR 177.</a> Again though, police
officers may nevertheless be entitled to certain public law remedies which could
prevent dismissal in some circumstances,
as in <i>O’Rourke v Miller</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VicRp/1984/20.html" title="View Case">[1984] VicRp 20</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1984%5d%20VR%20277" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1984] VR 277.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB149" name="fn149">[148]</a> <i>Commissioner of Police v
Gordon</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1981%5d%201%20NSWLR%20675" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1981] 1 NSWLR 675</a>, 680–1 (Moffitt P), referring to <i>Fletcher
v Nott</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1938/25.html" title="View Case">[1938] HCA 25</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281938%29%2060%20CLR%2055" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1938) 60 CLR 55.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB150" name="fn150">[149]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB151" name="fn151">[150]</a> Opened for signature 22 June <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=1985%201412%20UNTS%20159" title="View LawCiteRecord">1985,
1412 UNTS 159</a> (entered into force 23 November 1985) (‘the
<i>Convention</i>’). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB152" name="fn152">[151]</a> Ibid 126–7 (Finkelstein
J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB153" name="fn153">[152]</a> Ibid 109–20, 126–7
(Finkelstein J). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB154" name="fn154">[153]</a> <i>WR Act</i> ss 170CB(5)(6),
170CK(1) and 170CA(1)(e). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB155" name="fn155">[154]</a> Of course by virtue of s 170CC of
the <i>WR Act</i>,<i> </i>which authorises the making of regulations to exclude
certain kinds of employees, some state police officers could be excluded from
the rights contained in both sub-div C and sub-div B, even if otherwise
included. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB156" name="fn156">[155]</a> See generally M H Codd, <i>Report on
the Suspension and Removal of Police Officers in Western Australia </i>(2
February 1998) [86]–[102]. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB157" name="fn157">[156]</a> Part IV, div 6 and s 69B(1)(a). The
policy behind these provisions is that, because of the special character of
police service and
the need to maintain the integrity and reputation of the
police force, it would not be appropriate that an outside tribunal should
be
able to remake the Commissioner’s decision to dismiss: Codd, above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567605">155</a>, [102], referring to the
former s 26F provisions. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB158" name="fn158">[157]</a> <i>Re Australian Federal Police
Association</i> (Unreported, Australian Industrial Relations Commission,
Williams SDP, 19 August 1997). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB159" name="fn159">[158]</a> Police Federation of Australia,
<i>Rules of the Police Federation of Australia</i>, r 3. The Rules were assented
to by the Deputy Industrial Registrar of the AIRC Registry on 31 December
1997. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB160" name="fn160">[159]</a> <i>Re AFPA [No 2] </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281993%29%2051%20IR%20122" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1993) 51 IR
122</a>; aff’d <i>Re AFPA</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2073%20IR%20155" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 73 IR 155.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB161" name="fn161">[160]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2073%20IR%20155" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 73 IR 155 (Boulton</a> J, Polites
SDP, Simmonds C). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB162" name="fn162">[161]</a> <i>IR Act</i> ss 188(1)(b)(i),
188(1)(b)(ii). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB163" name="fn163">[162]</a> <i>Re AFPA</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2073%20IR%20155" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997) 73 IR 155</a>,
156. It seems that the Full Bench proceeded on the assumption that the general
requirement that there be at least ‘some’
members of the AFPA who
were employees had already been satisfied. Also, it is of interest to note that
although Williams DP appeared
to adopt the same approach, on the basis of the
earlier views of Moore DP in <i>Re Independent Teachers Federation</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281989%29%2030%20IR%20205" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1989) 30
IR 205</a>, 208–9, he also seemed to entertain the possibility that, even if
most police officers were unable to fall within the classes
referred to, the
reference in the proposed eligibility rule to police officers and police
trainees would still be permissible because
it would only enable the enrolment
of those persons who were employees: <i>Re AFPA [No 2] </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281993%29%2051%20IR%20122" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1993) 51 IR 122</a>,
133, 134 (Williams DP). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB164" name="fn164">[163]</a> The schedule refers only to
‘deemed’ employees under the New South Wales, Queensland, South
Australia and Western Australia
Acts. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB165" name="fn165">[164]</a> Police Federation of Australia,
<i>Rules of the Police Federation of Australia</i>, r 4(a). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB166" name="fn166">[165]</a> The Rules might also be invalid to
the extent that they extend to those state-based police officers who are
‘higher level’
office-holders in accordance with <i>Re AEU</i>
<a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/71.html" title="View Case">[1995] HCA 71</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281995%29%20184%20CLR%20188" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1995) 184 CLR 188.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB167" name="fn167">[166]</a> See Graham Smith, <i>Public
Employment Law: The Role of the Contract of Employment in Australia and
Britain</i> (1987) 203; and <i>Blizzard v O’Sullivan </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1994%5d%201%20Qd%20R%20112" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1994] 1 Qd R
112</a>, holding that the decision to dismiss an executive police officer employed
under contract was not a decision of an administrative
character made under an
enactment and that judicial review was thus unavailable. On the other hand, it
seems that this principle
has been applied to police officers even in the
absence of a contract: see <i>Sellars v Woods </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1982/281.html" title="View Case">[1982] FCA 281</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281982%29%2045%20ALR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1982) 45 ALR 113.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB168" name="fn168">[167]</a> See <i>Bliss v South East Thames
Regional Health Authority</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1987%5d%20ICR%20700" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1987] ICR 700</a>; <i>Malik v Bank of Credit and
Commerce International SA</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1997/23.html" title="View Case">[1997] UKHL 23</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1998%5d%20AC%2020" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1998] AC 20.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB169" name="fn169">[168]</a> Greg McCarry, ‘Industrial Law
and Relations: Damages for Breach of the Employer’s Implied Duty of Trust
and Confidence’
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%2026%20Australian%20Business%20Law%20Review%20141" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 26 <i>Australian Business Law Review</i> 141</a>,
141. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB170" name="fn170">[169]</a> Stephen Piper, ‘Workers’
Rights’ (1997) 105(5412) <i>Police Review</i> 26, 26. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB171" name="fn171">[170]</a> Ibid. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB172" name="fn172">[171]</a> See, eg, <i>Police Regulation Act
1898</i> (Tas) s 11. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB173" name="fn173">[172]</a> Peter Hogg, <i>Liability of the
Crown</i> (2nd ed, 1989) 175. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB174" name="fn174">[173]</a> Chris Arup, ‘Security at Law
of Public Employment in Australia’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281978%29%2037%20Australian%20Journal%20of%20Public%20Administration%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1978) 37 <i>Australian Journal of
Public Administration </i>95</a>, 98; Smith, above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567628">166</a>, 91–3, 196. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB175" name="fn175">[174]</a> Ronald McCallum, ‘Industrial
Law and Relations’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281987%29%2015%20Australian%20Business%20Law%20Review%20366" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1987) 15 <i>Australian Business Law Review</i> 366</a>,
367. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB176" name="fn176">[175]</a> Sandra Fredman and Gillian Morris,
‘Civil Servants: A Contract of Employment?’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1988%5d%20Public%20Law%2058" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1988] <i>Public Law</i>
58</a>, 69–70. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB177" name="fn177">[176]</a> Sandra Fredman and Gillian Morris,
<i>The State as Employer: Labour Law in the Public Services</i> (1989) 73. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB178" name="fn178">[177]</a> Ibid 72–3. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Ref32567643"></a><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB179" name="fn179">[178]</a> See
Gillian Morris, ‘The Police and Industrial Emergencies’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281980%29%209%20Industrial%20Law%20Journal%201" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1980) 9
<i>Industrial Law Journal</i> 1.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB180" name="fn180">[179]</a> Ibid. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB181" name="fn181">[180]</a> Cf <i>Anderson v Sullivan</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281997%29%2078%20FCR%20380" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1997)
78 FCR 380.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB182" name="fn182">[181]</a> Morris, above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567643">178</a>, 6. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB183" name="fn183">[182]</a> Thomson, above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567654">118</a>, 415. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB184" name="fn184">[183]</a> That police officers ought to be
considered employees at common law also finds strong support in Britain: see,
eg, Fredman and Morris,
<i>The State as Employer: Labour Law in the Public
Services</i>, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567666">176</a>, 73;
Lustgarten, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567660">53</a>, 31. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB185" name="fn185">[184]</a> It also seems fair to assume that,
if police officers gained additional rights as a result of being employees, the
courts would view
any activities associated with their general peacekeeping and
law enforcement duties as taking precedence in the case of conflict.
</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB186" name="fn186">[185]</a> Although state employment Acts,
where they refer to members of the police force, often also make exceptions for
them, this is not
always the case. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB187" name="fn187">[186]</a> <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/repealed_act/ohasa2000273/">Occupational Health and Safety
Act 2000</a></i> (NSW) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/repealed_act/ohasa2000273/s137.html">s 137</a>; <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/osaha1984273/">Occupational Safety and Health Act 1984</a></i> (WA) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/osaha1984273/s3.html">s
3(4)</a> (commencing <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/osaha1984273/s3.html">3</a> January 2004). </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB188" name="fn188">[187]</a> Cf Breen Creighton and Andrew
Stewart, <i>Labour Law: An Introduction</i> (3rd ed, 2000) 203. In Western
Australia, for example, legislation has now been introduced which deems police
officers to be employees
for specified industrial purposes: <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/ira1979242/">Industrial
Relations Act 1979</a></i> (WA) sch 3; <i>Industrial Relations Amendment Act
2000</i> (WA) s 5. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB189" name="fn189">[188]</a> A case in point is the Industrial
Relations Amendment Bill (No 3) 1992 (WA), which had proposed to introduce
provisions which deemed
members of the Western Australian police force to be
employees for the purposes of the general industrial statute in that State.
The
Bill was apparently withdrawn in the face of what were considered insurmountable
bureaucratic and political obstacles. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB190" name="fn190">[189]</a> Richard Clayton and Hugh Tomlinson,
<i>Civil Actions against the Police</i> (1992) 37–8. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB191" name="fn191">[190]</a> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/1999/988.html" title="View Case">[1999] FCA 988</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%2091%20FCR%2095" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 91 FCR 95.</a></span> <br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB192" name="fn192">[191]</a> See, eg, Professor Ron McCallum in
Stephen Long, ‘New Protection for Contractors’, <i>The Australian
Financial Review</i> (Sydney), 6 September 1999, 3. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#fnB193" name="fn193">[192]</a> Creighton and Stewart, above n
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html#_Ref32567690">187</a>, 202–3. These authors
refer to the decision in <i>Konrad</i> as a ‘rare exception’. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2003/1.html" target="_blank">This article can be found on AustLii by clicking here.</a></span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-23248131792599399172016-01-10T20:44:00.002-08:002016-02-22T22:55:55.189-08:00FUN AND GAMES IN THE MELBOURNE MAGISTRATES COURT, WITH A 'RUBBER STAMP' JUDICIAL REGISTRAR PRETENDING TO BE A MAGISTRATE REVEALING A DARKER TRUTH ABOUT A REVENUE RAISING MODEL, THAT, RAISES HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS A YEAR, EVERY YEAR FOR HIS EMPLOYER<div data-contents="true">
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="ogq6-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="ogq6-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><b>EXCLUSIVE </b></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="ogq6-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="ogq6-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Popped along to the Melbourne Magistrates last Friday to be entertained by the show. </span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="bug42-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="bug42-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Judicial registrar McCann, acting in this instance as a Magistrate wasn't particularly concerned with arbitration, maybe because it was Friday afternoon, maybe because McCann wanted to avoid the peak hour commute back to Bendigo. </span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="c7ma4-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="c7ma4-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">This bloke was a dead set rubber stamp for the State raising a tick under $1200 in about ninety minutes. It would have been sooner, but, the first matter after the lunch break dragged on a bit.</span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Highlights include the quasi Magistrate agreeing with a Victoria Police's policy enforcers opinion formed, from fifty to one hundred metres away in inner city Melbourne traffic, that a taxi driver deliberately changed lanes without indicating.</span></span></div>
<br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWvY9ZVBjB0J5pNm1tZboxFK6-11JIKTBCQqWaXx8MVAKMul0ieGRWt7ugyyuiisJjnsMwcukmKZFRtYd35mOMqlePOStYUhIsFuOqEKnvXdNbYsmVPJsaoLuVxMDlagqCQcL1LFftCKY/s1600/RATHDOWNE+ST+TOILETS.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="354" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhWvY9ZVBjB0J5pNm1tZboxFK6-11JIKTBCQqWaXx8MVAKMul0ieGRWt7ugyyuiisJjnsMwcukmKZFRtYd35mOMqlePOStYUhIsFuOqEKnvXdNbYsmVPJsaoLuVxMDlagqCQcL1LFftCKY/s640/RATHDOWNE+ST+TOILETS.png" width="640" /></a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: small;">Taxi Driver testified from the witness box that he slightly swerved one wheel in and out of the bicycle lane as passenger was in too much of a rush to indulge his toilet request. (1)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSeHifoP_ghvxOfj9ipinG4YQ1g8r0a825UH05X8OQVT8piYytzgI9PMEY0zSgwLhNAyKVVoNVlsVksOQRIW9enGbKAfdM80VhdaEQTdA6u8aCnv1RYBuCM8JPEXUvwfmf2CZ0PKsX-FM/s1600/50-100+METRES+FROM+TOILETS.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="310" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjSeHifoP_ghvxOfj9ipinG4YQ1g8r0a825UH05X8OQVT8piYytzgI9PMEY0zSgwLhNAyKVVoNVlsVksOQRIW9enGbKAfdM80VhdaEQTdA6u8aCnv1RYBuCM8JPEXUvwfmf2CZ0PKsX-FM/s640/50-100+METRES+FROM+TOILETS.png" width="640" /></a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: small;">The policy enforcers view of the first photo. He testified that he was about 50-100 metres away. If my measurements are correct, there are two sets of traffic lights, a bus stop, a bike lane, and parked cars interfering with the line of vision, nevermind the volume of traffic. (2)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"> Following on from this, Rubber Stamp McCann, decided to mock a self representing defendant, by telling him that if he hadn't of gone to the witness box and incriminated himself, he would have dismissed the case. This appears to fly in the face of the fair model litigant guidelines that would apparently demand that the Magistrate (real or pretend) offer a presumed innocent man a higher level of arbitration than this. </span></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVfNZm3HFVDwVh2bgTR1LEEnHk45yhodCWiF7AH997iqasxCg7FCsXBTTApW0gfYUcYVGOf2TXCqXNQoKh6cqKr85BRn6NnqJCb_ZS3iuxRsaa9Q9LLf3AOv8kx6VQTCQCQnUpOTYjrXU/s1600/MODEL+LITIGANT+GUIDELINES.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="536" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVfNZm3HFVDwVh2bgTR1LEEnHk45yhodCWiF7AH997iqasxCg7FCsXBTTApW0gfYUcYVGOf2TXCqXNQoKh6cqKr85BRn6NnqJCb_ZS3iuxRsaa9Q9LLf3AOv8kx6VQTCQCQnUpOTYjrXU/s640/MODEL+LITIGANT+GUIDELINES.png" width="640" /></a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: small;">Both the pretend Magistrate and the Police Prosecutor appear guilty of failing to meet these standards in court. (3)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">You would think that the matter would have been immediately dismissed as soon as the prosecutor disclosed to the court that there was no witness present that could testify that the defendant was committing the alleged infringement.</span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">You would also presume to think that Victoria Police would have withdrawn the matter for the same reasons...... </span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">This was nothing of course compared to Quick Draw McCann's reaction to the man that had the temerity to ask about his presumption of innocence. Despite it being a foundational bedrock of the violent and predatory law cistern, McCann laughed and started talking about the Magna Carta, before, dismissing the application to have matters before the Infringements Court Computer revoked back to the Magistrates Court without hearing one argument from either party on the matter. </span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">This was the second rejection of this nature, the first relating to accrued fines in anothers name. The mitigating elements, only served to spur on this loyal statist, who reminded that going to court is a risk and that this bloke could go sort it out with the Infringements Court. It sounds very democratic and fair if you are unaware that this Infringements court is staffed by government civil servants punching data into a computer and offering you a choice between paying upfront or in installments.</span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Inbetween was the Melbourne City Council, they, who respected a woman's presumption of innocence by violently stripping her of her clothes because she was engaged in a peaceful, lawful, protest. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">They, who called in the police to violently break up a protest in the city square because it might have looked bad to Elizabeth, a woman that some call Queen & others call a warmongering, genocidal, terrorist cunt, who was due to visit/inspect the property in a few days time. </span></span><br />
<br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">They, who bought a revenue raising parking inspector so fresh from the heart attack ward @ the local hospital to give evidence in aserious matter involving a parking meter!!!</span></span><br />
<br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">They whose lawyer, dribbled questions from the bench to an unrepresented man, about an apparent ongoing relationship between Council and man without immediate censure from the quasi Magistrate, before, perhaps in response, to the audible groans from the gallery, offering a benign reminder that the lawyer stick to the allegation itself.</span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Sometimes Rubber Stamp McCann had to try very hard to secure a conviction, such, as in the matter featuring a trusting and self represented Canadian or American, who plead guilty to a parking violation, on the basis of information he received from the prosecuting Stonnington council. </span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Failing the fair model litigant test by not adjourning, or, at the very least, advising the defendant to go get legal advice, rubber stamp, instead, took a guilty plead, heard the claim about the Stonnington advice -which the Stonnington lawyer did not object to- advised that a guilty plead meant that no mitigating evidence could be presented, heard the evidence about a road sign being unreadable due to overhanging branches obscuring half of the sign, responded to the evidence with a decision from the NSW Supreme Court, that said, that if it was at all possible to read the sign, the fine applied, looked at photos supplied by both parties and then said that it didn't matter because the man had plead guilty and fined him.</span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Many people complain that the courts are ostensibly an instrument designed to endorse the revenue raising exploits of their fellow state departments, and, even if we put aside the stark reality that all courts act pursue a conflict of interest by acting in interest, the actions of McCann did little but emphasise that there is something rotten in the state of Denmark, that this court cistern is a violent, revenue raising scam that will stop at nothing to achieve its aims.</span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0yOprhn477jGoLUMwcgYcX51Qe8f0ImNN4Hzd9VZ7yp4PG5nwR7mtu4TQRWhrdr613WF65810JQSxa1unpxQwv7Y_MUMwAcF2hA2fYoEVrmTEkLOW0oh9SyD6Ta-Ur7TMJ6lW5Xe0FB0/s1600/WARREN+VS+DISTRICT+OF+COLUMBIA+1981.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="428" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj0yOprhn477jGoLUMwcgYcX51Qe8f0ImNN4Hzd9VZ7yp4PG5nwR7mtu4TQRWhrdr613WF65810JQSxa1unpxQwv7Y_MUMwAcF2hA2fYoEVrmTEkLOW0oh9SyD6Ta-Ur7TMJ6lW5Xe0FB0/s640/WARREN+VS+DISTRICT+OF+COLUMBIA+1981.png" width="640" /></a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: small;">It appears that despite the model litigation guidelines, courts in Victoria have no duty to people presumed innocent apart from finding them guilty and issuing a punishment. (4)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">To recap, McCann raised nearly $1200 across ten or so matters in ninety minutes which paid his wage for the day as a reserve or pretend Magistrate, which, according to the Judicial Salaries Act 2004 is $1215 per day as of the beginning of 2014. If court sat from 10-1 and 2-5, then, using the ninety minutes that I witnessed as a projection, McCann raised $4800 that day for the registered business that employs him.</span></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivEZnSCv1QH_FHAF_EyTUhyphenhyphenb3LpI89xQd2qjBJ6rCwQ8IpE39dNJUJaIZuMEGAfBILPgDnywoTrAjufJHSGGxbdACF1ibuY_zXG-fdQfUeXClwyByNJc5wwjB2hAJ309BIoM0n67pOxwc/s1600/Judicial+Salaries+Act+2004+1.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivEZnSCv1QH_FHAF_EyTUhyphenhyphenb3LpI89xQd2qjBJ6rCwQ8IpE39dNJUJaIZuMEGAfBILPgDnywoTrAjufJHSGGxbdACF1ibuY_zXG-fdQfUeXClwyByNJc5wwjB2hAJ309BIoM0n67pOxwc/s1600/Judicial+Salaries+Act+2004+1.png" /></a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: small;">As you can see, Magistrates, Judges and Justices have plenty of financial reasons to arbitrate with a conflict of interest. As a Judicial Registrar, McCann would have been on the $1215 minimum. Was his decision making influenced by the opportunity to one day become an official Magistrate on at least $285k plus car allowances etc. (5)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">If ten courts operated that day on the aforementioned projections, that is $48,000 in the kitty. If twenty courts were operating, it is $96,000. </span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Not bad for a days work.</span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Or a weeks work if you project five working days to $480,000 and one million nine hundred and twenty dollars for the month.</span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">And this is just one court.</span></span><br />
<br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Who tell us that they need a saturday session to help deal with the backlog, but, is obviously another revenue raising exercise. </span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">How many courts are there across the State of Victoria making approximately two million bucks a month, or twenty four million dollars a year?</span></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtAqze5qGiG6snrx4Vz30c2GHAErg-dF1-LAig48q7CLW1M7PV7RWPbyHwAhMEGXYBRdk_RqacnL6LTpqckxiQaF-l5JSBezkI2NSrz9x16vyxI0hsXC0JO2erTn0v1Qdxlf3ubIDbS0s/s1600/STATE+OF+VICTORIA+32+790+228+959.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="624" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhtAqze5qGiG6snrx4Vz30c2GHAErg-dF1-LAig48q7CLW1M7PV7RWPbyHwAhMEGXYBRdk_RqacnL6LTpqckxiQaF-l5JSBezkI2NSrz9x16vyxI0hsXC0JO2erTn0v1Qdxlf3ubIDbS0s/s320/STATE+OF+VICTORIA+32+790+228+959.png" width="640" /></a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: small;">ALL Victorian courts and collection agents are trading names for this business, who also endorses the prosecuting parties such as the councils and the police. This is why it is almost impossible for you to get a fair hearing in a Victorian court (6)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">Hmmmmm..........Of course these are projected figures, many matters attract larger fines, many have no fines, but, nonetheless, there are in actual fact, millions of reasons for the state of Victoria to appoint and pay hundreds of thousands of dollars per annum to a so-called fair and independent judge to deny you a fair hearing.</span></span></div>
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiS6Et_B82b_tnnEn31D8EXKdDgnZf5A94yW_0l8l30glFoM-d4DJ39eKeHU04_g-kld_bshSzQe69kClsfNEXzcUHZ4nvLg8FqRHFaVO6NfbAjxf5aLfB7GQhuHrv0vrebFQYtY3IrqTE/s1600/VICTORIA+THE+PLACE+TO+BE+FINED.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="154" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiS6Et_B82b_tnnEn31D8EXKdDgnZf5A94yW_0l8l30glFoM-d4DJ39eKeHU04_g-kld_bshSzQe69kClsfNEXzcUHZ4nvLg8FqRHFaVO6NfbAjxf5aLfB7GQhuHrv0vrebFQYtY3IrqTE/s640/VICTORIA+THE+PLACE+TO+BE+FINED.png" width="640" /></a></span></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: small;">A bloke in the Melbourne Magistrates Court was laughed at for asking a question about the presumption of innocence. (7)</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="_45m_ _2vxa" data-block="true" data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0">
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><b>FOOTNOTES</b></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span>
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><b>(1) & (2) Screenshot from Google Maps of Rathdowne St, Carlton 11/1/16.</b></span></span><br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">https://www.google.com.au/maps/@-37.8024873,144.9697313,3a,75y,186.36h,86.33t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1soHB4iVXqQNZJ6XDuszCu6g!2e0!7i13312!8i6656 </span></span><br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><br /></span></span>
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">https://www.google.com.au/maps/@-37.801128,144.9699444,3a,75y,180h,90t/data=!3m6!1e1!3m4!1skMSbGjazQ1XIbSHvrVvzlg!2e0!7i13312!8i6656 </span></span><br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><b><br /></b></span></span>
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><b>(3) Screenshot from Model Litigant Guidelines pdf</b></span></span><br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">http://assets.justice.vic.gov.au/justice/resources/21628682-b10c-437c-85d7-e7ebbbc34cf6/revisedmodellitigantguidelines.pdf </span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span>
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><b>(4) Screenshot from unknown location on the internet. </b></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span>
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><b>(5) Screenshot from Judicial Salaries Act 2004.</b></span></span><br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><b> </b>https://www.courts.vic.gov.au/sites/default/files/legal_document_certificate_section_6_judicial_salaries_act_2004_2013_0.pdf</span></span><br />
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true">(6) Screenshot from ABN Lookup webpage.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: large;"><br /></span>
<span data-offset-key="fqe00-0-0" style="font-size: large;"><span data-text="true"><b>(7) Screenshot from </b>http://www.ozpolitic.com/album/forum-attachments/5248333518_a5f747a79f_z_001.jpg</span></span><br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-90636580329476037712016-01-01T17:50:00.000-08:002016-01-01T17:50:31.354-08:00FINN, PAUL --- "COMMON LAW DIVERGENCES" [2013] MELBULAWRW 20; (2013) 37(2) MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 509 <div align="center">
CRITIQUE AND COMMENT</div>
<h1 align="center">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading5"></a><b> COMMON LAW DIVERGENCES</b></h1>
<div align="center">
THE HON PAUL
FINN<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn1" name="fnB1">[*]</a></sup></div>
<blockquote>
<i>
<i>When Sir Owen Dixon commented in 1942 that no good could come of
‘divergences’ between the common law administered in
English and
Australian courts, the then orthodoxy was that the common law of England was the
common law to be applied in Australia.
Over 40 years later and in a much changed
constitutional and legal environment, Sir Anthony Mason highlighted the need to
fashion
a common law for Australia that was best suited to our conditions and
circumstances. The common law of England, like the law of other
jurisdictions,
was simply a possible source of law in Australia. The assistance properly to be
derived from that source is a recurrent
issue for our courts. The recent
decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in </i>Grimaldi v Chameleon
Mining NL [No 2]<i> provides an extended illustration. This lecture focuses
primarily upon equitable doctrine and remedy in Australia and England both
to
illustrate significant differences between the two legal systems and to explain
at least some of the causes. Reference necessarily
will be made to how
divergence is reflected in the differing extents to which commercial dealings
are regulated in the two jurisdictions;
to the debates about unjust enrichment
and its province; and to the significance statutes have in contriving the
context in which
Australia’s common law is
evolving.</i></i></blockquote>
<div align="center">
CONTENTS<sup> </sup></div>
<h2 align="center">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc367804175"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading18"></a><sup>I
</sup>INTRODUCTION</h2>
Let me begin by setting the scene for what follows. The story of the changes
in the formal character of the common law in Australia
is well-known and
requires little elaboration. Seventy years ago, ours was the common law of
England. So much was this felt to be
so that Sir Owen Dixon could state
uncontroversially:<br />
<blockquote>
We are studious to avoid establishing doctrine which English courts would
disavow. For we believe that no good can come of divergences
between the common
law as administered in one jurisdiction of the British Commonwealth and as
administered in
another.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn2" name="fnB2">[1]</a></sup></blockquote>
Thus, it
was that the rules of contract law were the rules of English contract law. This
was their justification. That was
sufficient.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn3" name="fnB3">[2]</a></sup><br />
Forty-five years later, but in a changed Australia, Sir Anthony Mason gave
his imprimatur to a process which was then well in train:<br />
<blockquote>
There is ... every reason why we should fashion a common law for Australia that
is best suited to our conditions and circumstances.
... The value of English
judgments, like Canadian, New Zealand and for that matter United States
judgments, depends on the persuasive
force of their
reasoning.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn4" name="fnB4">[3]</a></sup></blockquote>
A year
later the transition from the common law of England to the <br />
common law of Australia was belatedly formalised for all practical purposes
in the amendment made to <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ja1903112/s80.html">s 80</a> of the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ja1903112/">Judiciary Act 1903</a>
</i>(Cth).<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn5" name="fnB5">[4]</a></sup> As Justice <br />
James Allsop neatly put it extra-curially: ‘The common law of England
had <br />
ceased, literally overnight, to be law, but had become a source of law for
<br />
legal
development’.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Ref364442639"></a><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn6" name="fnB6">[5]</a></sup>
<br />
Today, it is abundantly clear that there are separate bodies of English and
Australian common law.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn7" name="fnB7">[6]</a></sup> And there
are clear ‘divergences’ reflected, not merely in isolated and
specific court rulings, but also in differing
casts of mind, distinctive
methodologies and markedly different contexts (particularly legislative ones) in
which the respective
bodies of common law do their work. My purpose in this
lecture is to illustrate these matters.<br />
If I have a message it is this. We have in the past borrowed, and will
continue to borrow, from abroad in the endeavour of making
our own law. But to
adapt the language of a great Californian Chief Justice and jurist, Roger
Traynor, we must, of necessity, ‘subject
[foreign decisions] to inspection
at the border to determine their adaptability to native
soil’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn8" name="fnB8">[7]</a></sup><br />
This challenge for judge and counsel alike was demonstrated starkly in the
very recent decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court
in <i>Grimaldi v
Chameleon Mining NL [No 2]
</i>(‘<i>Grimaldi</i>’)<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn9" name="fnB9">[8]</a></sup><i>
</i>(a decision in which I participated). It did so in two respects. First,
despite the importuning of the appellants’ counsel,
the Court declined to
engage in detailed consideration of apparently relevant English authority on de
facto directors.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn10" name="fnB10">[9]</a></sup> This was
because, when examined by the Court, ‘the legislative context of the
English decisions ... so differs from Australia’s’,
as to warrant
their being treated with considerable
reserve.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn11" name="fnB11">[10]</a></sup> In any event, the
present state of Australian jurisprudence on de facto directors made it
unnecessary to seek guidance from
abroad.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn12" name="fnB12">[11]</a></sup> <br />
The second illustration from <i>Grimaldi </i>is the more revealing. In the
late 19<sup>th</sup> century, the English Court of Appeal held in <i>Lister
& Co v Stubbs</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn13" name="fnB13">[12]</a></sup> that,
while an agent was accountable to its principal for a bribe or secret commission
received, the agent did not hold the bribe
as a constructive trustee nor could
the bribe be traced by the principal. That proposition was recently reaffirmed
by the English
Court of Appeal in <i>Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles
Trade Finance Ltd </i>(‘<i>Sinclair
Investments</i>’),<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn14" name="fnB14">[13]</a></sup>
notwithstanding the contrary conclusion reached by the Privy Council in
1994.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn15" name="fnB15">[14]</a></sup> The Full Court in
<i>Grimaldi </i>refused to follow <i>Sinclair Investments</i>. It applied what
it considered to be orthodox Australian fiduciary law; it endorsed the policy
reasons informing the grant of proprietary
relief to sanction the corruption of
fiduciaries,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn16" name="fnB16">[15]</a></sup> and in so doing it
aligned Australian law on bribes and secret commissions with that of the United
States,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn17" name="fnB17">[16]</a></sup>
Canada,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn18" name="fnB18">[17]</a></sup>
Singapore<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn19" name="fnB19">[18]</a></sup> and New
Zealand.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn20" name="fnB20">[19]</a></sup> To revert to my opening
comments, this is the legal universe of Sir Anthony Mason, not Sir Owen
Dixon.<br />
The subject of divergence has attracted recent scholarly attention in this
country.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn21" name="fnB21">[20]</a></sup> However, it has been
the ongoing, sometimes strident, debate between the predominantly English
advocates of an encompassing law of
restitution and the predominantly Australian
defenders of equity against the extravagant claims of unjust enrichment which
has given
the subject its sharper
edge.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Ref364685160"></a><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn22" name="fnB22">[21]</a></sup>
<br />
My own interest is longstanding. Over 40 years ago, as a student in
Cambridge, I began to write an equity related textbook. Save for
the slight
marring caused by the need to refer to differing local statutory regimes in the
two countries, the equity I wrote about
appeared to be able to be described
properly as Anglo-Australian law. One matter was apparent to me at the time. A
very large part
of the English case law to which I referred was from the
19<sup>th</sup> century. The 20<sup>th</sup> century decisions — and they
were not voluminous — were primarily those of first instance judges. Save
for the first
decade or so of that century, House of Lords decisions were few
and far between and, as the century progressed, their reasoning appeared
more
problematic to Australian eyes. I would instance the two fiduciary decisions,
<i>Regal (Hastings) Ltd v
Gulliver</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn23" name="fnB23">[22]</a></sup> and <i>Boardman v
Phipps</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn24" name="fnB24">[23]</a></sup> to illustrate the
latter comment. By way of contrast, while late 19<sup>th</sup> century
Australian cases were reasonably represented in what I wrote, there was a
considerable number of 20<sup>th</sup> century cases, many of which were
important High Court contributions to Australia’s equity jurisprudence.
The significance
of this will later become apparent.<br />
Now let me move forward 40 years. I was again in England teaching in a course
on equitable intervention in commercial dealings. It
was presented on a
comparative basis using a number of other common law countries as comparators. I
was well aware that outside of
the law of
trusts<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn25" name="fnB25">[24]</a></sup> and the remedies of
specific performance and the injunction, the equity jurisprudence of England and
Australia had long since parted
company in significant respects. What surprised
me though, was that in relation to quite a number of equitable doctrines,
English
law stood apart (though not invariably) from most or all of the other
countries with which I was concerned. It had its own concerns
which were not
shared elsewhere (either to the same extent or else at all). I will mention four
of these.<br />
The <i>first </i>is the privileging of contract law as the all but exclusive
source of voluntarily assumed rights and obligations — hence, for
example,
the observation in the Court of Appeal denying relief to a person who was
excluded from the commercial exploitation of a
confidential business plan to
which he was a contributor: ‘Mr Murray’s lack of any remedy arose
from the undisputed fact
that his relationship with the other five members of
the original team was not regulated by
contract.’<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn26" name="fnB26">[25]</a></sup> Associated with
privileging contract is a corresponding reluctance to enlarge the scope of
equitable intervention in contracts. Relatedly,
there is a marked antipathy to
making relied upon voluntary promises and representations actionable.<sup>
</sup>The <i>second</i> concern is with property and with maintaining the
integrity of property law as such. Emblematic of this is Lord Neuberger’s
observation in <i>Sinclair Investments</i>:<br />
<blockquote>
Whether a proprietary interest exists or not is a matter of property law, and is
not a matter of discretion ... It follows that the
courts of England and Wales
do not recognise a remedial constructive trust as opposed to an institutional
constructive
trust.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn27" name="fnB27">[26]</a></sup></blockquote>
The
<i>third</i> concern, which infuses Lord Neuberger’s observation, is a
marked reticence in allowing judicial discretion to determine the
appropriate
type of equitable relief to be awarded. If there is to be a choice of remedy,
that is for a party to make.<br />
<i>Fourthly</i>, a constant refrain in the cases is the earnest to leave
commercial parties to fend for themselves — hence the sentiment: ‘In
a commercial context ... a degree of self-seeking and ruthless behaviour is
expected and accepted to a
degree.’<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn28" name="fnB28">[27]</a></sup> The assumption in
this, seemingly, is that commercial parties could and should look after their
own interests<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn29" name="fnB29">[28]</a></sup> and should bear
the risk of their failure to do so. Little by way of concession is to be made
for the possibility that a small or
medium business enterprise might be quite
vulnerable to exploitation by a large, well-resourced enterprise because of its
inexperience,
lack of power, urgent need,
etc.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn30" name="fnB30">[29]</a></sup><br />
These four concerns are by no means reflected either at all, or else in the
same degree, in Australian law, as will become apparent.<br />
Another unsurprising conclusion readily suggested
itself.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn31" name="fnB31">[30]</a></sup> Our law in its substance
bore close general affinities to that of major United States
jurisdictions<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn32" name="fnB32">[31]</a></sup> — even
though the Americans, to over-generalise, do not consider themselves now as
having a separate body of doctrine which
they call ‘equity’ and
notwithstanding that relatively few Australian judges resort regularly to United
States case law.<br />
As a prelude to illustrating (necessarily selectively) our divergence and to
provide some of the more obvious explanations for why
English and Australian law
are increasingly to be contrasted, not compared, it is necessary to begin with a
little legal history.
In England, the Judicature Acts<i> </i>of 1873 and 1875
brought together the administration of the common law and equity in a single
court. Some, including Maitland, anticipated
that over time the separate systems
would themselves coalesce. One hundred and thirty-seven years on, one can see
this happening
in the United
Kingdom.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn33" name="fnB33">[32]</a></sup> Relatedly, the law of
trusts and equitable remedies apart, one can see as well the progressive demise
of significant parts of an
enfeebled equity jurisprudence often unable to
withstand the imperialism of restitution — an essentially common law
invention
as presently conceptualised.<br />
In Australia, the story has been very different. In the colonial period, the
Judicature Act system was quickly adopted in all of the
colonies save New South
Wales. There the separate systems remained. And so things stood until 1970 when
the Judicature Act system
was adopted, although it did not come into force until
1972.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn34" name="fnB34">[33]</a></sup><br />
This almost century long New South Welsh exceptionalism had profound effects.
It produced generations of practising lawyers, judges
and educators who were
masters of equity jurisprudence. I mention only Sir Frederick Jordan, Sir Frank
Kitto, Sir Kenneth Jacobs,
Sir Anthony Mason and Sir William Deane. The legacy
of this in turn was that Australia alone of the Commonwealth countries was to
have some number of large, well-known textbooks devoted to equity, or to
specific aspects of it (to the exclusion of trusts and property
law). I note in
contrast that the last significant equity textbook as such in England —
<i>Ashburner’s Principles of
Equity</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn35" name="fnB35">[34]</a></sup> — fell from
grace not long after the publication of its second edition in
1933.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn36" name="fnB36">[35]</a></sup><br />
A related development in New South Wales was also significant. The pre-1973
Equity Division developed a commercial jurisdiction —
aided by the ability
from 1965 to use the declaration in commercial
matters.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn37" name="fnB37">[36]</a></sup> An obvious consequence
was that commercial disputes were being argued by equity lawyers. As is pointed
out in <i>On Equity</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn38" name="fnB38">[37]</a></sup> perhaps
a little extravagantly, the thinking used to solve commercial disputes was the
thinking of equity.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn39" name="fnB39">[38]</a></sup> Nonetheless,
here again the contrast with England is marked. Perhaps it goes some way to
explain the apparent differences in emphasis
in the following two comments.
First, Sir Peter Millett: ‘It is of the first importance not to impose
fiduciary obligations
on parties to a purely commercial
relationship’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn40" name="fnB40">[39]</a></sup> Secondly,
Sir Anthony Mason: ‘it is altogether too simplistic, if not superficial,
to suggest that commercial transactions
stand outside the fiduciary
regime’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn41" name="fnB41">[40]</a></sup><br />
I do not for one moment suggest that a knowledge of equity was, and remains,
the peculiar province of New South Wales lawyers. Far
from it. Victoria’s
role call is equally impressive: Sir Leo Cussen, Sir Owen Dixon, Sir Wilfred
Fullagar and Sir Douglas Menzies.
What I do suggest, though, is that the failure
to adopt a Judicature Act system for so long had large consequences for the
orientation,
preoccupations and methodologies of Australian law.<br />
This takes me back to a theme I have foreshadowed. Across the first seven
decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the High Court of Australia dealt
regularly with cases involving equitable doctrines and, to a lesser extent,
trust principles.
That period was one of measured and orderly development of the
law and one in which Sir Owen Dixon was a long and influential presence.
Importantly, the contemporary significance and reach of doctrines evolved in
England in earlier centuries were reaffirmed and elaborated.
This provided the
intellectual foundations for what was to come in the 1980s.<br />
What needs emphasis is that the relatively large number of High Court
decisions created for us a distinctive corpus of equity jurisprudence
on which
we could build, and have built. Outside of mainstream trust law and equitable
remedy, there was no parallel English development.
The doctrines then dealt with
by the High Court — and I mention these without elaboration —
included the unconscionable
dealings
doctrine,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn42" name="fnB42">[41]</a></sup> undue
influence,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn43" name="fnB43">[42]</a></sup> fiduciary
obligations,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn44" name="fnB44">[43]</a></sup> the law of
assignments and the rule in <i>Milroy v
Lord</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn45" name="fnB45">[44]</a></sup> the constructive trust
in its myriad of manifestations,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn46" name="fnB46">[45]</a></sup>
trusts of money receipts,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn47" name="fnB47">[46]</a></sup>
contribution,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn48" name="fnB48">[47]</a></sup> statutory
trusts,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn49" name="fnB49">[48]</a></sup> and directors’
duties and judicial review of board
decisions.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn50" name="fnB50">[49]</a></sup><br />
Now to the 1980s. The first truly creative burst in the rethinking of
Australian law began in 1983. Almost predictably given what
I have said so far,
its focus was in the main on equitable intervention in contract and commercial
dealings. In the ensuing decade
it travelled far beyond equity, but that is not
my present concern. One need only go to the Commonwealth Law Reports of 1983 and
1984 to appreciate the dimensions of the change that was on
foot.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn51" name="fnB51">[50]</a></sup> The equity cases are
well-known. I will mention only three by name: <i>Commercial Bank of Australia v
Amadio</i>
(‘<i>Amadio</i>’),<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn52" name="fnB52">[51]</a></sup>
<i>Taylor v Johnson</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn53" name="fnB53">[52]</a></sup><i>
</i>and <i>Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation
</i>(‘<i>Hospital
Products</i>’).<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn54" name="fnB54">[53]</a></sup> Much more
was to come.<br />
Here, in contrast to the earlier period, resort was made to basal principle
and to organising ideas. It was necessary. This was a
time of evolution and
adaptation. And in revealing their mastery of equity jurisprudence, Justices
Mason and Deane took us back far
more explicitly to ‘unconscionable
conduct’. They were using language more than half forgotten in England,
but not so
in Australia or the United
States.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn55" name="fnB55">[54]</a></sup><br />
How the concept of unconscionable conduct has been used both historically and
in Australian law is often misunderstood by English
judges and
scholars,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn56" name="fnB56">[55]</a></sup> increasingly to the
point of criticism, rejection or
abandonment.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Ref364687542"></a><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn57" name="fnB57">[56]</a></sup>
Forgetting, though, is as much a characteristic of legal memory as is <br />
remembering.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn58" name="fnB58">[57]</a></sup><br />
Largely, I venture, as a response to English inspired criticisms, the High
Court has on several occasions explained how the unconscionable
conduct formula
is used in Australian equity. So, for example, in <i>Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd
v Cauchi</i> the plurality commented:<br />
<blockquote>
The terms ‘unconscientious’ and ‘unconscionable’ are ...
used across a broad range of the equity jurisdiction.
They describe in their
various applications the formation and instruction of conscience by reference to
well developed principles.
Thus, it may be said that breaches of trust and
abuses of fiduciary position manifest unconscientious conduct; but whether a
particular
case amounts to a breach of trust or abuse of fiduciary duty is
determined by reference to well developed principles, both specific
and flexible
in character. It is to those principles that the court has first regard rather
than entering into the case at that higher
level of abstraction involved in
notions of unconscientious conduct in some loose sense where all principles are
at large.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn59" name="fnB59">[58]</a></sup></blockquote>
So far
I have told only the Australian story. However, it needs to be said that outside
of the mainstream of trust law, breach of
confidence and equitable remedy, there
is little by way of an English counterpart story to narrate. House of Lords
decisions have
been few indeed until the near end of the 20<sup>th</sup>
century. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there was a progressive
decline of equity jurisprudence from the early 20<sup>th</sup> century until a
rebirth or, perhaps more accurately, a re-imagining of sorts began in the 1980s.
This obviously is a crude oversimplification
but it will suffice for present
purposes.<br />
With the benefit of hindsight one can venture some possibly controversial
suggestions to explain this. Relatively speaking, the 20<sup>th</sup> century in
England can properly be described as the century of the common law. For much of
it the pre-eminent Law Lords were, generally,
common and commercial
lawyers.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn60" name="fnB60">[59]</a></sup> Save for its early
years,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn61" name="fnB61">[60]</a></sup> it was not a Chancery
lawyer’s century.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn62" name="fnB62">[61]</a></sup> One very
obvious manifestation of this was to be seen in the shaping of English contract
law. That certainty should triumph over
fairness became an almost unchallenged
and unchallengeable creed<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn63" name="fnB63">[62]</a></sup> and
made the more so because, unlike in Australia, the United States, Canada and New
Zealand, statute did little to redress the imbalance
between certainty and
fairness. The misnamed <i>Australian Consumer
Law</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn64" name="fnB64">[63]</a></sup> (and its
predecessor)<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn65" name="fnB65">[64]</a></sup> has no British
counterpart. Yet, it has federal and state reflections in the United States, in
the Canadian province of Ontario and
in New Zealand.<br />
In the last 40 years there have been obvious changes in the constitutional,
social and legal concerns of the two countries. I would
instance simply one
legal concern which is of present consequence because of its impact on equity
jurisprudence in England. That
is the fascination with the law of restitution or
unjust enrichment.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn66" name="fnB66">[65]</a></sup> How much over
time it will be invoked to explain, rebadge or replace in England what in this
country is longstanding equitable doctrine
remains to be seen. There are some
intimations it is happening
already.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn67" name="fnB67">[66]</a></sup><br />
Let me turn now to a few specific doctrines and principles to illustrate what
I have been saying. There is quite a number from which
I could have chosen.<br />
<h2 align="center">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc367804176"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading123"></a>II THE UNCONSCIONABLE
DEALINGS DOCTRINE </h2>
It is this doctrine which precludes a person from taking advantage of a
person in a position of special disadvantage. The doctrine
itself had its modern
genesis in the mid-18<sup>th</sup> century decision of Lord Hardwicke in <i>Earl
of Chesterfield v Janssen</i>.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn68" name="fnB68">[67]</a></sup>
Quite some number of the earlier cases involved the exploitation of that now all
but extinct species, the expectant heir. By the
19<sup>th</sup> century many of
the cases involved the improvident sale of land by an ignorant vendor whose only
advice came from the purchaser’s
solicitor. The last reported English case
of that century was <i>Fry v Lane </i>in which the following formulation of the
law was given:<br />
<blockquote>
The result of the decisions is that where a purchase is made from a poor and
ignorant man at a considerable undervalue, the vendor
having no independent
advice, a Court of Equity will set aside the
transaction.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn69" name="fnB69">[68]</a></sup></blockquote>
Consistent
with what I am going to say, after <i>Fry v Lane</i> the English version of this
doctrine went into hibernation for almost 90
years.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Ref364690169"></a><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn70" name="fnB70">[69]</a></sup>
There was, not for the first time, an historical discontinuity. As reborn, the
doctrine now required the conduct in question to be
‘morally
reprehensible’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn71" name="fnB71">[70]</a></sup> This is
quite some distance from what in Australia is required to establish
unconscionable conduct.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn72" name="fnB72">[71]</a></sup> It was
later confirmed in England that this particular jurisdiction had very limited
availability.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn73" name="fnB73">[72]</a></sup><br />
The Australian 20<sup>th</sup> century story was markedly different.
Beginning with <i>Dowsett v
Reid</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn74" name="fnB74">[73]</a></sup> in 1913, the High Court
by mid-century considered the doctrine on some number of
occasions.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn75" name="fnB75">[74]</a></sup> In that process the
simple formulation of <i>Fry v Lane </i>had become the authoritative exposition
of Fullagar J in <i>Blomley v Ryan</i>:<br />
<blockquote>
The circumstances adversely affecting a party, which may induce a court of
equity either to refuse its aid or to set a transaction
aside, are of great
variety and can hardly be satisfactorily classified. Among them are poverty or
need of any kind, sickness, age,
sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness,
illiteracy or lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation where
assistance
or explanation is necessary. The common characteristic seems to be
that they have the effect of placing one party at a serious disadvantage
vis-à-vis the other. It does not appear to be essential in all cases that
the party at a disadvantage should suffer loss or
detriment by the
bargain.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn76" name="fnB76">[75]</a></sup></blockquote>
The
concluding ‘common characteristic’ identified by Fullagar J is of no
little importance. The platform had been laid
for the landmark decision of the
High Court in <i>Amadio</i>.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn77" name="fnB77">[76]</a></sup> It
is unnecessary to elaborate here upon <i>Amadio</i> other than to say it
signalled an enlarging of the reach of the doctrine in the fashion suggested by
Fullagar J. The issue it left
open was the extent to which the doctrine could
have any purchase in commercial dealings. Both United States and Canadian courts
have acknowledged it can, albeit in unusual
circumstances.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn78" name="fnB78">[77]</a></sup> The High Court
has shown diffidence in this
regard,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn79" name="fnB79">[78]</a></sup> although it is hard to
see why, in appropriate circumstances, the doctrine should not be able to be so
invoked by vulnerable small
business parties. The Canadian cases in particular
are testament to this.<br />
The final point to be emphasised, and this has real contextual significance
now, is that in Australia, the United States and Ontario,
but not in the United
Kingdom, the equitable doctrine (or the common law in the United States) is
reinforced by significant statutory
provisions.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn80" name="fnB80">[79]</a></sup><br />
<h2 align="center">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc367804177"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading145"></a>III UNDUE INFLUENCE</h2>
A like, though more complex, story could be told of the fates of the law of
undue influence in 20<sup>th</sup> century Australia and England. As was
emphasised both by Mason J and Deane J in <i>Amadio</i>, unconscionable dealing
and undue influence are closely related but are
distinct.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn81" name="fnB81">[80]</a></sup> Again against the
background of 19<sup>th</sup> century English cases, the course of Australian
law was set: first in the 1936 decision of <i>Johnson v Buttress</i>,<i> </i>and
particularly in the reasons of Dixon J which gave relational undue influence a
fiduciary (or abuse of trust and confidence)
orientation;<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn82" name="fnB82">[81]</a></sup> and, secondly, in
<i>Bank of New South Wales v
Rogers</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn83" name="fnB83">[82]</a></sup><i> </i>in 1941 which
extended liability to a third party who knowingly dealt with the person subject
to influence. English law again parted
company from ours in the 1985 House of
Lords decision of <i>National Westminster Bank Plc v
Morgan</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn84" name="fnB84">[83]</a></sup> when, unexpectedly,
the law was given a new foundation. Any fiduciary connection was discarded. Put
inexactly, undue influence was
now to be tied to victimisation resulting in
manifest disadvantage. So conceived, it appears to be subsuming much of what
potentially
fell within the unconscionable dealings doctrine which, as I have
noted, is now near to lifeless.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn85" name="fnB85">[84]</a></sup>
<br />
It was no matter for surprise that Lord Browne-Wilkinson, an eminent Chancery
lawyer, was later to question the requirement of ‘manifest
disadvantage’ and the unexplained departure from long established
principle.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn86" name="fnB86">[85]</a></sup> I will not refer
further to this other than to say that English law cannot sensibly be a subject
of comparison with our
doctrine.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn87" name="fnB87">[86]</a></sup><br />
<h2 align="center">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc367804178"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading156"></a>IV AUSTRALIAN FIDUCIARY
LAW</h2>
The principles which inform this body of law date back some centuries, but
the calls made upon it grew exponentially from the late
19<sup>th</sup> century
with the rise of new business forms and relationships, the proliferation of
types of agency relationship, the increasing
utilisation of advisers and the
value and advantage that could be given by the possession of non-public
information <br />
or the awareness of a yet unexploited opportunity. Given the nature and size
<br />
of the Australian economy in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, it is almost
counterintuitive <br />
to suggest that we earlier developed a more defined and coherent fiduciary
<br />
law than other Commonwealth countries including the United
Kingdom.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Ref364700255"></a><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn88" name="fnB88">[87]</a></sup>
Yet we did.<br />
I would ascribe this to the phenomenon I have been discussing — the
regularity with which fiduciary cases came to the High Court
and the equity
scholarship brought to bear on them. I note first those cases concerned with
setting the standards of conduct to be
imposed on fiduciaries — standards
which find their ultimate expression in the two themes of ‘conflict of
duty and interest’
and ‘misuse of fiduciary position’
identified by Deane J in <i>Chan v
Zacharia</i>.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn89" name="fnB89">[88]</a></sup> The roll call is
impressively long. I merely note the following: <i>Birtchnell v Equity Trustees,
Executors & Agency Co
Ltd</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn90" name="fnB90">[89]</a></sup> <i>Furs Ltd v
Tomkies</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn91" name="fnB91">[90]</a></sup><i> Peninsular and
Oriental Steam Navigation Co v
Johnson</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn92" name="fnB92">[91]</a></sup><i> Keith Henry and
Co Pty Ltd v Stuart Walker and Co Pty
Ltd</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn93" name="fnB93">[92]</a></sup><i> Hospital
Products</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn94" name="fnB94">[93]</a></sup><i> Chan v
Zacharia</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn95" name="fnB95">[94]</a></sup><i> United
Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty
Ltd</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn96" name="fnB96">[95]</a></sup><i> Breen v
Williams</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn97" name="fnB97">[96]</a></sup><i> </i>and
<i>Pilmer v Duke Group Ltd (in
liq)</i>.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn98" name="fnB98">[97]</a></sup><br />
To these may be added those decisions concerned with judicial review of the
exercise of fiduciary powers, especially by directors
— and I instance
such decisions as <i>Mills v
Mills</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn99" name="fnB99">[98]</a></sup> and <i>Thorby v
Goldberg</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn100" name="fnB100">[99]</a></sup> — and,
finally, those concerned with the remedies available against defaulting
fiduciaries as, for example, <i>Warman International Ltd v
Dwyer</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn101" name="fnB101">[100]</a></sup> and <i>Hospital
Products</i>.<br />
It is fair to say that the principles of modern Australian fiduciary law have
anticipated and so provide the benchmarks of orthodoxy
both in doctrine and for
remedy against which the law of other Commonwealth countries, including England,
is to be measured.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn102" name="fnB102">[101]</a></sup> This said,
and save in relation to remedy, English fiduciary law more closely approximates
to our own.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn103" name="fnB103">[102]</a></sup> A likely reason
for this is the regard that has been had both to High Court decisions, in
particular both to Mason J’s judgment
in <i>Hospital Products</i> and
Deane J’s in <i>Chan v Zacharia</i>,<i> </i>and to Australian legal
scholarship.<br />
<h2 align="center">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc367804179"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading179"></a>V ESTOPPEL IN EQUITY</h2>
This provides much the most important but complex illustration of divergence.
For present purposes I will focus primarily on those
aspects of estoppel which
give rise to a cause of action in equity. Their 19<sup>th</sup> century
development was tortuous and confused. Four strands in the modern emergence of
what I will call ‘cause of action (or
equitable) estoppel’ warrant
note.<br />
Historically, two of these related exclusively to property. If I encouraged
you to believe my property was or would be yours, or if
I acquiesced in your
mistaken belief that my property was yours, and if, in either case you acted in
reliance on that assumption,
I could be compelled to make the assumption good or
else make good your loss because of your reliance on it. These two forms of
estoppel,
which have differing requirements, themselves give rise to causes of
action. They are often referred to collectively as ‘proprietary
estoppel’. They have survived in England and Australia to this day, though
again both experienced a long hibernation in the
first half of the
20<sup>th</sup>
century.<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Ref365038457"></a><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn104" name="fnB104">[103]</a></sup><br />
A third species of estoppel, which applied both to representations of fact
and, importantly, of intention, could in some circumstances
require a
representation to be made good or else compensation be paid for loss arising
from detrimental reliance. That is, it could
give rise to a cause of action.
This jurisdiction was emasculated by a series of House of Lords decisions in the
second half of the
19<sup>th</sup>
century.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn105" name="fnB105">[104]</a></sup> Estoppel by
representation in equity was limited to representations of fact. And only
fraudulent representations were actionable.
At the centre of these developments
was the sentiment expounded by Lord Cranworth in <i>Jorden v
Money</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn106" name="fnB106">[105]</a></sup><i> </i>that to be
enforceable, a representation of intention had to be contractual in character.
Contract and the doctrine of consideration
were driving equity from the field.
That proprietary estoppel escaped the scythe of <i>Jorden v Money</i> (to the
extent proprietary estoppel would enforce reliance upon gratuitous promises) was
probably due to its being totally overlooked
in England in the first half of the
20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn107" name="fnB107">[106]</a></sup><br />
A fourth species of estoppel involved a slight retreat from <i>Jorden v
Money</i>. If a person represented how they would exercise their right against
another, and that other relied upon that, he or she could use
estoppel
defensively so as to prevent the right being exercised otherwise than as
represented, or at <br />
least only after giving reasonable notice that the representation was no <br />
longer operative. It is this species of estoppel that Lord Denning
resurrected <br />
in 1947 in <i>Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House
Ltd</i>,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn108" name="fnB108">[107]</a></sup><i> </i>and which the
High Court in <i>Legione v
Hateley</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn109" name="fnB109">[108]</a></sup> incorporated into
Australian law as ‘promissory estoppel’ in 1983. <i>Legione v
Hateley</i>, I would note in passing, was the herald of the equity revolution in
Australia which commenced in that year.<br />
The first seven decades were wholly unremarkable for equitable estoppel in
Australia. This body of law had its long sleep as in England.
And when
‘promissory estoppel’ and then ‘proprietary estoppel’
were resurrected we followed English law.
However, there were in the interim
three important extraneous developments that require notice.<br />
The first resulted from two landmark judgments on common law estoppel,
<i>Thompson v Palmer</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn110" name="fnB110">[109]</a></sup><i>
</i>and<i> Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd
</i>(‘<i>Grundt</i>’).<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn111" name="fnB111">[110]</a></sup><i>
</i>In them, Dixon J exposed the essential unity of the manifestations of
estoppel by conduct at common law. Their rationale lay in not
permitting
‘an unjust departure by a party from an assumption of fact which he has
caused another party to adopt or accept
for the purpose of their legal
relations’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn112" name="fnB112">[111]</a></sup> The trigger
to this species of estoppel (which was not a cause of action) was that:<br />
<blockquote>
That other must have so acted or abstained from acting upon the footing of the
state of affairs assumed that he would suffer a detriment
if the opposite party
were afterwards allowed to set up rights against him inconsistent with the
assumption.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn113" name="fnB113">[112]</a></sup></blockquote>
A
foundation had been laid for the rejuvenation of estoppel in equity.<br />
The second development occurred in the United States. At the turn of the
20<sup>th</sup> century there were marked similarities in presently relevant
equity jurisprudence between United States jurisdictions and the United
Kingdom.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn114" name="fnB114">[113]</a></sup> Nonetheless, there
was real appreciation in the United States that in a number of disparate areas
of the law, the courts were enforcing
relied upon gratuitous promises and that
this was apparently anomalous given that United States contract law was premised
on a bargain
theory. A promisee’s unsolicited reliance on a promise would
not constitute consideration precisely because it was not bargained
for. To give
several examples, apart from gratuitous promises to convey land, charitable
subscriptions were enforced as were promises
to abandon existing rights —
the very thing that, in <i>Jorden v Money</i>, the House of Lords refused to
do.<br />
These disparate
strands<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Ref365041560"></a><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn115" name="fnB115">[114]</a></sup>
provided the underpinning for the ‘Promissory Estoppel’ doctrine
propounded by the American Law Institute in § 90
of <br />
the first <i>Restatement of the Law of Contracts</i> in
1932.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn116" name="fnB116">[115]</a></sup> In its present form,
<br />
§ 90 provides:<br />
<blockquote>
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action
or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does
induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise.
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn117" name="fnB117">[116]</a></sup></blockquote>
To make the obvious observation, this eliminated the need to find a bargain.
It did not require consideration to hold a person liable
on his or her promise.
A real and early issue for § 90 was whether its reach would be extended by
the courts beyond what I will
call donative promises (or proposed gifts) to
gratuitous promises made in commercial
transactions.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn118" name="fnB118">[117]</a></sup> Could
promissory estoppel be used as a substitute for a bargain in a commercial
setting, especially where a later contract was contemplated?
There was initial
resistance to this but a number of originally controversial decisions broke the
opposition.<br />
There were three particularly noteworthy cases all of which involved
precontractual negotiations in which representations of intention
as to entry
into a future contract were made and relied
upon.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn119" name="fnB119">[118]</a></sup> The representations in
each case were relied upon but not honoured. In each case damages were awarded
for reliance losses. I only
mention one of these cases by name —
<i>Drennan v Star Paving
Co</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn120" name="fnB120">[119]</a></sup><i> </i>— for
reasons which will next appear. I should add that the <i>Restatement</i>’s
provision and this subsequent case law were the subject of debate in Australia
in the 1980s.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn121" name="fnB121">[120]</a></sup><br />
The third development passed unnoticed. It was a decision of the <br />
Supreme Court of India in 1978 in <i>Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co Ltd v
State of Uttar Pradesh</i>.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn122" name="fnB122">[121]</a></sup>
India was the first Commonwealth country to adopt what we in this country now
call ‘equitable estoppel’ as a cause of
action. Voluntary or
gratuitous promises or representations made and assurances given, if reasonably
relied upon, were actionable,
if resiled from to the detriment of the reliant
party. The Supreme Court reached that conclusion by drawing together the English
law of proprietary and promissory estoppel, Dixon J’s judgment in
<i>Grundt</i>, § 90 of the
<i>Restatement</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn123" name="fnB123">[122]</a></sup><i> </i>and
the decision in <i>Drennan v Star Paving Co</i>.<br />
Then, in 1987 in <i>Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher
</i>(‘<i>Waltons
Stores</i>’),<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn124" name="fnB124">[123]</a></sup> the High
Court began Australia’s journey down the same path — a path against
which England has resolutely turned its
back. While our estoppel waters have
been muddied unhelpfully by a regression by some judges of the New South Wales
Court of Appeal
to an earlier prescriptive formalism more suited to English
law,<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn125" name="fnB125">[124]</a></sup> the High Court has not
subsequently disavowed the views of Mason CJ and Wilson J, and Brennan J, in
<i>Waltons Stores</i>, that cause of action estoppel (ie equitable estoppel) is
not limited to what in England is now designated as ‘proprietary
estoppel’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn126" name="fnB126">[125]</a></sup><br />
That there was no reason in principle for so limiting equitable estoppel was
adverted to explicitly by Brennan J in <i>Waltons Stores</i>:<br />
<blockquote>
If it be unconscionable for an owner of property in certain circumstances to
fail to fulfil a non-contractual promise that he will
convey an interest in the
property to another, is there any reason in principle why it is not
unconscionable in similar circumstances
for a person to fail to fulfil a
non-contractual promise that he will confer a non-proprietary legal right on
another?<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn127" name="fnB127">[126]</a></sup></blockquote>
Thus,
the majority in <i>Waltons Stores</i> reached a conclusion similar to that of
United States judges who, for example, could find no rational basis for
distinguishing a
relied upon non-contractual promise to give a franchise from
one to give an interest in
property.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn128" name="fnB128">[127]</a></sup><br />
In both the United States and now Australia this development has given
equitable estoppel a real salience in commercial settings —
the very
domain which the English wish to keep immunised from ‘fiduciary
obligations and equitable
estoppel’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn129" name="fnB129">[128]</a></sup> This in turn
provides their justification for limiting equitable estoppel to cases of
proprietary estoppel.<br />
The difference between English and Australian jurisprudence here is stark and
is acknowledged in England to be so. <i>Baird Textile Holdings Ltd v Marks and
Spencer Plc</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn130" name="fnB130">[129]</a></sup><i>
</i>demonstrates this. In that case, the Court refused to invoke equitable
estoppel where a long-term business relationship involving
large scale
investment was terminated peremptorily after 70 years. The relationship was
conducted designedly without any contract
being entered into, but with
assurances that it would only be terminated upon the giving of reasonable
notice. There being no question
of proprietary estoppel, it was recognised that
such development as would be necessary to make Baird’s reliance loss
actionable
could only ‘now take place in the highest
court’<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn131" name="fnB131">[130]</a></sup> although
<i>Waltons Stores</i> was raised to point up ‘the road to development of
English law’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn132" name="fnB132">[131]</a></sup> It was
acknowledged that Baird could well have fared differently in Australia. There
was no appeal.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn133" name="fnB133">[132]</a></sup><br />
<h2 align="center">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc367804180"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading232"></a>VI THE CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUST</h2>
Now let me turn briefly to the constructive trust and particularly to its use
<br />
as a remedy. I have already referred to Lord Neuberger’s recent
observation <br />
in <i>Sinclair Investments</i>: ‘the courts of England and Wales do not
recognise <br />
a remedial constructive trust as opposed to an institutional constructive
trust’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn134" name="fnB134">[133]</a></sup> As is
well-known, the remedial versus institutional constructive trust debate was
silenced in Australia by the landmark judgment
of Deane J in <i>Muschinski v
Dodds</i>.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn135" name="fnB135">[134]</a></sup><i> </i>As Deane J
observed: ‘for the student of equity, <br />
there can be no true dichotomy between the two
notions.’<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn136" name="fnB136">[135]</a></sup> He went on to
<br />
comment:<br />
<blockquote>
Indeed, in this country at least, the constructive trust has not outgrown its
formative stages as an equitable remedy and should
still be seen as constituting
an in personam remedy attaching to property which may be moulded and adjusted to
give effect to the
application and interplay of equitable principles in the
circumstances of the particular case. In particular, where competing common
law
or equitable claims are or may be involved, a declaration of constructive trust
by way of remedy can properly be so framed that
the consequences of its
imposition are operative only from the date of judgment or formal court order or
from some other specified
date. The fact that the constructive trust remains
predominantly remedial does not, however, mean that it represents a medium for
the indulgence of idiosyncratic notions of fairness and justice. As an equitable
remedy, it is available only when warranted by established
equitable principles
or by the legitimate processes of legal reasoning, by analogy, induction and
deduction, from the starting point
of a proper understanding of the conceptual
foundation of such
principles.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn137" name="fnB137">[136]</a></sup></blockquote>
So
much so has this been accepted in this country that the debate has moved on to
the place of the constructive trust in equity’s
remedial scheme. Here,
there is an interplay between considerations of ‘appropriateness’
and the requirement ‘to
do what is practically
just’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn138" name="fnB138">[137]</a></sup> The High Court
has stressed on a number of occasions now that: ‘before the court imposes
a constructive trust as a remedy,
it should first decide whether, having regard
to the issues in the litigation, there are other means available to quell the
controversy.’<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn139" name="fnB139">[138]</a></sup><br />
The recent decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in
<i>Grimaldi</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn140" name="fnB140">[139]</a></sup> illustrates
the application of this. The facts were quite complex. The following is only an
abbreviated version of them. Directors
of Company A (Chameleon) misappropriated
$150 000 which they paid to Company B thus enabling it to meet an instalment of
the purchase
price of $1.1 million for the Iron Jack iron ore tenements in
Western Australia. These were later acquired. Company B was found for
<i>Barnes
v Addy</i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn141" name="fnB141">[140]</a></sup> purposes to have
been a knowing recipient. Company A claimed that it was entitled to a
proportionate interest in the tenements which
Company B held for it on a
constructive trust. The Iron Jack tenements were developed into an operating
iron ore mine exporting to
China. Around $400 million was spent in exploration
and the development of the mine. At the trial it was suggested the value of the
mine was in the order of $1 billion.<br />
On orthodox principles a constructive trust was an available
remedy.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn142" name="fnB142">[141]</a></sup> But was it an
appropriate one? The Court said no and ordered an account of profits or
compensation at Company A’s election.
It referred to quite a number of
factors to explain why it exercised its discretion as it did. These included:
<br />
<blockquote>
a) the money paid was part of outlays being made for a projected mining
operation;</blockquote>
<blockquote>
b) that operation required an enormous contribution of debt and equity
finance, ie third parties were involved;</blockquote>
<blockquote>
c) the development required enterprise, expertise and risk-taking to which
Company A did not contribute or was not exposed;</blockquote>
<blockquote>
d) to give Company A a proportionate interest would be to thrust the parties
into a business relationship in which comity and mutual
confidence were likely
to be lacking;</blockquote>
<blockquote>
e) the increase in value of the tenements was brought about in large measure
by the contributions etc of Company B and its investors
and financiers; and</blockquote>
<blockquote>
f) the award of a constructive trust in such circumstances would be a
punitive measure against Company B and would result in its liability
becoming a
vehicle for Company A’s unjust enrichment.</blockquote>
As the Court concluded: ‘Proprietary relief in the form of a
constructive trust is in the circumstances an inappropriate remedy.
It goes well
beyond “the necessities of the
case.”’<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn143" name="fnB143">[142]</a></sup> For those
who strongly oppose judicial discretion in remedy — a prevalent view in
English writings — this conclusion
cannot be said to reflect ‘the
formless void of individual moral
opinion’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn144" name="fnB144">[143]</a></sup><br />
<h2 align="center">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc367804181"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading256"></a>VII THE STATUTORY
CONTEXT</h2>
Left to last is what today is probably the most significant catalyst to our
divergence from England. It is the legislative environment
in which our common
law and equity exist, evolve and do their work. In Australia, as in the United
States<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn145" name="fnB145">[144]</a></sup> and to some degree in
Canada and New Zealand, generally-cast statutes proscribe unfair trade
practices, unconscionable conduct and
deceptive or misleading conduct in trade
or commerce. For present purposes, I need only refer to our misnamed
<i>Australian Consumer Law </i>and to its predecessor the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/">Trade Practices Act
1974</a> </i>(Cth) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/index.html#p4a">pts IVA</a> and V (‘<i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/">Trade Practices Act</a></i>’).
Matching this is specifically focussed legislative regulation of particular
commercial relationships, for example, franchisor
and
franchisee.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn146" name="fnB146">[145]</a></sup><br />
Such legislation is without any substantial counterpart in the United
Kingdom. In consequence, and given the state of English equity
jurisprudence, it
is essentially contract law and tort that are to be called on to provide relief,
if at all, against a perceived
wrong or injury suffered in commercial and other
relationships and dealings. The significance of this becomes apparent once one
appreciates
that many failed contract cases in the United Kingdom — and
there are some spectacular
examples<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn147" name="fnB147">[146]</a></sup><i> </i>— would
have been likely to have been actionable in Australia under either the old <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/index.html#p4a">pt
IVA</a> or <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/s52.html">s 52</a> of the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/">Trade Practices Act</a> </i>and their equivalents in the
<i>Australian Consumer Law
</i>today.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn148" name="fnB148">[147]</a></sup> But probably they
would also have succeeded in equity. And this goes to the heart of the
matter.<br />
It has for some decades now been acknowledged that many of Australia’s
major developments in equity from the 1980s involved
conduct which would have
been actionable under legislation such as the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/">Trade Practices Act</a></i> in any
event. <i>Amadio </i>and <i>Waltons Stores </i>are conspicuous examples. In the
age of statutes, the influence of statute upon such as remains of the common law
may often be no
more than osmotic. Nonetheless, as statements of prevailing
public policy and of appropriate standards to be adhered to in commercial
and
consumer dealings, they provide both a context in which judicial law making will
take place and a measure against which it may
be judged.<br />
The High Court has on some number of occasions acknowledged the possibility
of the common law adapting itself to a ‘consistent
pattern of legislative
policy’.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn149" name="fnB149">[148]</a></sup> The <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/">Trade
Practices Act</a></i> and the <i>Australian Consumer Law</i>, and their State and
Territory equivalents, surely provide just such a pattern. It is more than
likely that with these statutory
analogues so close to hand, and with the Bar
slowly awakening to this matter, our equity jurisprudence will continue to
mutate in
ways that are consistent with the policy of fair dealing in commercial
and consumer dealings which is fundamental to that
legislation.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn150" name="fnB150">[149]</a></sup> A related impact
of this legislation is that it mandates flexibility in the award of appropriate
remedies. As with equitable remedy
in Australia, so also in our statutes,
discretion, appropriateness and practical justice are encouraged. Thus, the
seeming inevitability
of continuing divergence in remedy as
well.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn151" name="fnB151">[150]</a></sup><br />
<h2 align="center">
<a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="_Toc367804182"></a><a href="https://www.blogger.com/null" name="Heading268"></a>VIII CONCLUSION</h2>
It may seem to you that I have spoken as though I was equity’s champion
and an admirer of its separateness. I am not. As in
the United States, we could
get along well enough without equity. What we could not do without, though, are
the animating ideas of
our equity jurisprudence. These, in large measure, temper
our judge-made law. They mitigate the rigours and inflexibilities of the
common
law and stand ready to supplement its deficiencies. Often enough they control
the abuse of power in our relationships and
dealings, commercial and otherwise.
Characteristically, one of their major functions is to promote fair dealing. And
in the award
of remedies, they often seek more than simply rough justice. As
Roscoe Pound long ago recognised, it is these ideas and not a separate
body of
equity as such that a legal system
requires.<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fn152" name="fnB152">[151]</a></sup> The extent to which
such ideas are acknowledged and respected necessarily requires balances to be
struck and often enough between
certainty and fairness. Different countries for
differing reasons will strike their balances differently as the English and we
have
done — hence ‘divergences’ and this lecture.<br />
<hr />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB1" name="fn1">[*]</a></sup> BA, LLB (UQ); LLM (Lond); PhD
(Cantab). Professorial Fellow, Melbourne Law School, The University of
Melbourne; Former Justice of
the Federal Court of Australia. This lecture was
originally presented by the author as ‘Common Law Divergences’
(Speech
delivered at Allen Hope Southey Memorial Lecture, Melbourne Law School,
21 November 2012).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB2" name="fn2">[1]</a></sup> Sir Owen Dixon, ‘Two
Constitutions Compared’ in Sir Owen Dixon, <i>Jesting Pilate: And Other
Papers and Addresses</i> (Law Book, 1965) 104. This address was originally
presented on 26<sup>th</sup> August 1942.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB3" name="fn3">[2]</a></sup> This cast of mind was highly
formalistic and largely unquestioning of the law’s policies and purposes.
It was reflected in
the style of legal education for much of the 20<sup>th</sup>
century.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB4" name="fn4">[3]</a></sup> Sir Anthony Mason,
‘Future Directions in Australian Law’ <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MonashULawRw/1987/6.html" title="View Case">[1987] MonashULawRw 6</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281987%29%2013%20Monash%20University%20Law%20Review%20149" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1987) 13 <i>Monash University
Law Review </i>149</a>, 154.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB5" name="fn5">[4]</a></sup> <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/lajlaa1988342/">Law and Justice Legislation
Amendment Act 1988</a> </i>(Cth) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/lajlaa1988342/s41.html">s 41.</a> The reference in <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ja1903112/s80.html">s 80</a> of the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ja1903112/">Judiciary Act
1903</a> </i>(Cth) to the ‘common law of England’ was deleted and
replaced with the ‘common law in Australia’.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB6" name="fn6">[5]</a></sup> James Allsop, ‘Some
Reflections on the Sources of Our Law’ (Speech delivered at the Supreme
Court of Western Australia
Judges’ Conference, 18 August 2012) 7 [20]
<<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://nswca.jc.nsw.gov.au/courtofappeal/Speeches/allsop180812.pdf">http://nswca.jc.nsw.gov.au/courtofappeal/Speeches/allsop180812.pdf</a>>
.
I am grateful to his Honour for providing me with a copy of this important
piece.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB7" name="fn7">[6]</a></sup> See Mark Leeming,
‘Subrogation, Equity and Unjust Enrichment’ in Jamie Glister and
Pauline Ridge (eds), <i>Fault Lines in Equity</i> (Hart Publishing, 2012) 27,
especially 29–33.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB8" name="fn8">[7]</a></sup> Roger J Traynor,
‘Statutes Revolving in Common Law Orbits’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281968%29%2017%20Catholic%20University%20Law%20Review%20401" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1968) 17 <i>Catholic
University Law Review</i> 401</a>, 409.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB9" name="fn9">[8]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2012/6.html" title="View Case">[2012] FCAFC 6</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282012%29%20200%20FCR%20296" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2012) 200 FCR 296.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB10" name="fn10">[9]</a></sup> Including the United Kingdom
Supreme Court decision in <i>Revenue and Customs Commissioners v Holland
</i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2010/51.html" title="View Case">[2010] UKSC 51</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2010%5d%201%20WLR%202793" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2010] 1 WLR 2793:</a> see ibid 318–19 [51]–[53] (Finn, Stone and
Perram JJ).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB11" name="fn11">[10]</a></sup> <i>Grimaldi</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2012/6.html" title="View Case">[2012] FCAFC 6</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282012%29%20200%20FCR%20296" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2012) 200
FCR 296</a>, 320–1 [59] (Finn, Stone and Perram JJ). This matter was not
explored by counsel.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB12" name="fn12">[11]</a></sup> Ibid.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB13" name="fn13">[12]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281890%29%2045%20Ch%20D%201" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1890) 45 Ch D 1.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB14" name="fn14">[13]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2012%5d%20Ch%20453" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2012] Ch 453.</a> This
decision was widely, but not universally, acclaimed in England by academic
commentators: see, eg, Graham Virgo, ‘Profits
Obtained in Breach of
Fiduciary Duty: Personal or Proprietary Claim’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282011%29%2070%20Cambridge%20Law%20Journal%20502" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2011) 70 <i>Cambridge Law
Journal</i> 502.</a> Cf David Hayton, ‘Proprietary Liability for Secret
Profits’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282011%29%20127%20Law%20Quarterly%20Review%20487" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2011) 127 <i>Law Quarterly Review</i> 487.</a> See also, since
<i>Grimaldi</i>, Lord Peter Millett, ‘Bribes and Secret Commissions
Again’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282012%29%2071%20Cambridge%20Law%20Journal%20583" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2012) 71 <i>Cambridge Law Journal</i> 583</a>; <i>FHR European
Ventures LLP v Mankarious</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/17.html" title="View Case">[2013] EWCA Civ 17</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2013%5d%203%20WLR%20466" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2013] 3 WLR 466.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB15" name="fn15">[14]</a></sup> <i>Attorney-General for
Hong Kong v Reid</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1993/2.html" title="View Case">[1993] UKPC 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1994%5d%201%20AC%20324" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1994] 1 AC 324.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB16" name="fn16">[15]</a></sup> <i>Grimaldi </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2012/6.html" title="View Case">[2012] FCAFC 6</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282012%29%20200%20FCR%20296" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2012) 200
FCR 296</a>, 422 [582] (Finn, Stone and Perram JJ).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB17" name="fn17">[16]</a></sup> <i>United States v
Carter</i>, <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.worldlii.org/us/cases/federal/USSC/1910/115.html" title="View Case">[1910] USSC 115</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=217%20US%20286" title="View LawCiteRecord">217 US 286</a> (1910).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB18" name="fn18">[17]</a></sup> <i>Insurance Corporation of
British Colombia v Lo</i> (2006) 278 DLR (4<sup>th</sup>) 148.<br />
<i> </i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB19" name="fn19">[18]</a></sup><i> Sumitomo Bank Ltd
v Tharir </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1993%5d%201%20SLR%20735" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1993] 1 SLR 735 (Singapore</a> High Court).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB20" name="fn20">[19]</a></sup> <i>Attorney-General for
Hong Kong v Reid</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1993/2.html" title="View Case">[1993] UKPC 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1994%5d%201%20AC%20324" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1994] 1 AC 324.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB21" name="fn21">[20]</a></sup> See, as recent examples,
Justice James Douglas, ‘England as a Source of Australian Law: For How
Long?’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282011%29%2086%20Australian%20Law%20Journal%20333" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2011) 86 <i>Australian Law Journal</i> 333</a>; Jamie Glister and
Pauline Ridge (eds), <i>Fault Lines in Equity </i>(Hart Publishing, 2012);
Allsop, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/13.html#_Ref364442639">5</a>.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB22" name="fn22">[21]</a></sup> See, eg, Joachim Dietrich,
‘Unjust Enrichment Versus Equitable Principles in England and
Australia’ in Jamie Glister
and Pauline Ridge (eds), <i>Fault Lines in
Equity </i>(Hart Publishing, 2012) 1; Andrew Burrows, ‘The Australian Law
of Restitution: Has the High Court Lost Its Way?’ in Elise
Bant and
Matthew Harding (eds), <i>Exploring Private Law </i>(Cambridge University Press,
2010) 67; Peter Birks, ‘Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in
Taxonomy’ <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UWALawRw/1996/1.html" title="View Case">[1996] UWALawRw 1</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281996%29%2026%20University%20of%20Western%20Australia%20Law%20Review%201" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1996) 26 <i>University of Western Australia Law Review</i> 1</a>;
Justice W M C Gummow, ‘<i>Moses v Macferlan</i>: 250 Years On’
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282010%29%2084%20Australian%20Law%20Journal%20756" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2010) 84 <i>Australian Law Journal</i> 756.</a> See also <i>Roxborough v Rothmans
of Pall Mall Australia Ltd </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282001%29%20208%20CLR%20516" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2001) 208 CLR 516.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB23" name="fn23">[22]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1942/1.html" title="View Case">[1942] UKHL 1</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1942%5d%201%20All%20ER%20378" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1942] 1 All ER 378</a>; [1967]
2 AC 134. For an excellent account of the course of this problematic litigation,
see Richard Nolan, ‘<i>Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver </i>(1942)’
in Charles Mitchell and Paul Mitchell (eds), <i>Landmark Cases in Equity
</i>(Hart Publishing, 2012) 499.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB24" name="fn24">[23]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1966/2.html" title="View Case">[1966] UKHL 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1967%5d%202%20AC%2046" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1967] 2 AC 46.</a> I obviously
exempt Lord Upjohn from the criticism implicit in what I have said.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB25" name="fn25">[24]</a></sup> I leave out of
consideration the bewildering English preoccupation with the proper taxonomy of
trusts. For recent examples in this
genre, see Ying Khai Liew,
‘<i>Rochefoucauld v Boustead </i>(1897)’ in Charles Mitchell and
Paul Mitchell (eds), <i>Landmark Cases in Equity </i>(Hart Publishing, 2012)
423; William Swadling, ‘Understanding Resulting Trusts’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282008%29%20124%20Law%20Quarterly%20Review%2072" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2008) 124
<i>Law Quarterly Review</i> 72.</a><br />
<i> </i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB26" name="fn26">[25]</a></sup><i> Murray v
Yorkshire Fund Managers Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/1997/2958.html" title="View Case">[1997] EWCA Civ 2958</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1998%5d%201%20WLR%20951" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1998] 1 WLR 951</a>, 960 (Schiemann LJ). For, to
Australian eyes, a stunning example, see <i>Baird Textiles Holdings Ltd v Marks
and Spencer Plc </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/274.html" title="View Case">[2001] EWCA Civ 274</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2002%5d%201%20All%20ER%20%28Comm%29%20737" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB27" name="fn27">[26]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2012%5d%201%20Ch%20453" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2012] 1 Ch 453</a>, 470
[37].<br />
<i> </i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB28" name="fn28">[27]</a></sup><i> Vercoe v Rutland
Fund Management Ltd </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2010/424.html" title="View Case">[2010] EWHC 424 (Ch)</a> (5 March 2010) [343] (Sales
J).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB29" name="fn29">[28]</a></sup> Including by taking legal
advice if necessary.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB30" name="fn30">[29]</a></sup> By way of contrast, the law
in the United States, Canada and Australia is more alert to this possibility as
the case law on franchises
attests: see, eg, <i>Goodman v Dicker</i>,<i> </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=169%20F%202d%20684" title="View LawCiteRecord">169
F 2d 684 (DC</a> Cir, 1948) (United States); <i>A & K Lick-a-Chick Franchises
Ltd v Cordiv Enterprises Ltd </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281981%29%20119%20DLR%20%283d%29%20440" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1981) 119 DLR (3d) 440 (Canada)</a>; <i>Burger
King Corporation v Hungry Jack’s Pty Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2001/187.html" title="View Case">[2001] NSWCA 187</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282001%29%2069%20NSWLR%20558" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2001) 69 NSWLR 558
(Australia).</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB31" name="fn31">[30]</a></sup> I say
‘unsurprising’ for this reason. For some time now, the citation of
United States texts on equity and trusts in
decisions of the High Court has been
the commonplace: see, eg, <i>Andrews v Australia and New Zealand Banking
Group </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2012/30.html" title="View Case">[2012] HCA 30</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282012%29%20247%20CLR%20205" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2012) 247 CLR 205</a>; <i>Aid/Watch Incorporated v Commissioner of
Taxation</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282010%29%20241%20CLR%20539" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2010) 241 CLR 539.</a> I would instance specifically Joseph Story and
Melville M Bigelow, <i>Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: As Administered in
England and America</i> (Little, Brown, and Co, 13<sup>th</sup> ed, 1886); John
Norton Pomeroy and Spencer W Symons,<i> A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence: As
Administered in the United States of America</i> (Bancroft-Whitney,
5<sup>th</sup> ed, 1941), Austin Wakeman Scott, William Franklin Fratcher and
Mark L Ascher, <i>Scott and Ascher on Trusts</i> (Aspen, 5<sup>th</sup> ed,
2006); American Law Institute, <i>Restatement (Third) of the Law of Trusts</i>
(2003). On the regular recent resort to Story’s work, see Chief Justice
French, ‘Home Grown Laws in a Global Neighbourhood:
Australia, the United
States and the Rest’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282011%29%2085%20Australian%20Law%20Journal%20147" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2011) 85 <i>Australian Law Journal</i> 147</a>, 153. See
also Allsop, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/13.html#_Ref364442639">5</a>, 14–15
[39]–[41].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB32" name="fn32">[31]</a></sup> Explaining the reasons for
the similarities is for another day.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB33" name="fn33">[32]</a></sup> In the latest edition of
Michael A Jones and Anthony M Dugdale (eds), <i>Clerk & Lindsell on
Torts</i> (Sweet <i>&</i> Maxwell, 20<sup>th</sup> ed, 2010), for example,
the action for breach of confidence and privacy has its own chapter: ch 27.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB34" name="fn34">[33]</a></sup> <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/sca1970183/">Supreme Court Act</a></i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/sca1970183/">
<i>1970</i></a> (NSW). For an interesting account of the developments in New South
Wales, see Mark Leeming, ‘Equity, the Judicature Acts and
Restitution’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282011%29%205%20Journal%20of%20Equity%20199" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2011) 5 <i>Journal of Equity</i> 199.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB35" name="fn35">[34]</a></sup> Walter Ashburner and Denis
Browne, <i>Ashburner’s</i> <i>Principles of Equity</i> (Butterworth,
2<sup>nd</sup> ed, 1933).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB36" name="fn36">[35]</a></sup> In saying this, I do not
mean to demean John McGhee (ed), <i>Snell’s Principles of Equity
</i>(Sweet <i>& </i>Maxwell, 32<sup>nd</sup> ed, 2010).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB37" name="fn37">[36]</a></sup> See Justice Peter W Young,
‘Foreword’ in Kanaga Dharmananda and Anthony Papamatheos (eds),
<i>Perspectives on Declaratory Relief</i> (Federation Press, 2010) v; <i>Forster
v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1972/61.html" title="View Case">[1972] HCA 61</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281972%29%20127%20CLR%20421" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1972) 127 CLR 421</a>, 435 (Gibbs J).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB38" name="fn38">[37]</a></sup> Peter W Young, Clyde Croft,
Megan Louise Smith, <i>On Equity </i>(Thomson Reuters, 2009) 51–2
[1.550].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB39" name="fn39">[38]</a></sup> The Common Law Division, I
should note, operated a Commercial List until 1 January 1987: <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/sca1970183/">Supreme Court
Act 1970</a> </i>(NSW) s 56, as repealed by <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/sca1970183/">Supreme Court Act</a> (Commercial
Division) Act 1985</i> (NSW) sch 1 item 5.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB40" name="fn40">[39]</a></sup> Sir Peter Millett,
‘Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20114%20Law%20Quarterly%20Review%20214" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 114 <i>Law
Quarterly Review</i> 214</a>, 217. See also, to like effect, <i>Cobbe v
Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2008/55.html" title="View Case">[2008] UKHL 55</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2008%5d%201%20WLR%201752" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2008] 1 WLR 1752</a>, 1785–6 [81] (Lord
Walker).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB41" name="fn41">[40]</a></sup> <i>Hospital Products Ltd v
United States Surgical Corporation</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/64.html" title="View Case">[1984] HCA 64</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281984%29%20156%20CLR%2041" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1984) 156 CLR 41</a>, 100.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB42" name="fn42">[41]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Blomley v Ryan
</i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1956/81.html" title="View Case">[1956] HCA 81</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281956%29%2099%20CLR%20362" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1956) 99 CLR 362.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB43" name="fn43">[42]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Johnson v
Buttress </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1936/41.html" title="View Case">[1936] HCA 41</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281936%29%2056%20CLR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1936) 56 CLR 113.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB44" name="fn44">[43]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Furs Ltd v
Tomkies </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1936/3.html" title="View Case">[1936] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281936%29%2054%20CLR%20583" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1936) 54 CLR 583.</a> The cases involving fiduciary obligations are
numerous.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB45" name="fn45">[44]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/1862/J78.html" title="View Case">[1862] EngR 951</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281862%29%20De%20GF%20%26%20J%20264" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1862) De GF <i>&</i> J
264</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=45%20ER%201185" title="View LawCiteRecord">45 ER 1185.</a> See, eg, <i>Anning v Anning </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1907/13.html" title="View Case">[1907] HCA 13</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281907%29%204%20CLR%201049" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1907) 4 CLR 1049.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB46" name="fn46">[45]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Birmingham v
Renfrew </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1937/52.html" title="View Case">[1937] HCA 52</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281937%29%2057%20CLR%20666" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1937) 57 CLR 666</a> (mutual wills); <i>Black v S Freedman & Co
</i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1910/58.html" title="View Case">[1910] HCA 58</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281910%29%2012%20CLR%20105" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1910) 12 CLR 105</a> (stolen property).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB47" name="fn47">[46]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Palette Shoes
Pty Ltd (in liq) v Krohn </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1937/37.html" title="View Case">[1937] HCA 37</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281937%29%2058%20CLR%201" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1937) 58 CLR 1.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB48" name="fn48">[47]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Albion
Insurance Co Ltd v Government Insurance Office (NSW)</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1969/55.html" title="View Case">[1969] HCA 55</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281969%29%20121%20CLR%20342" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1969) 121 CLR 342</a>,
348–52 (Kitto J).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB49" name="fn49">[48]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Fouche v
Superannuation Fund Board</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1952/1.html" title="View Case">[1952] HCA 1</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281952%29%2088%20CLR%20609" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1952) 88 CLR 609.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB50" name="fn50">[49]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Mills v Mills
</i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1938/4.html" title="View Case">[1938] HCA 4</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281938%29%2060%20CLR%20150" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1938) 60 CLR 150</a>; <i>Thorby v Goldberg </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1964/41.html" title="View Case">[1964] HCA 41</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281964%29%20112%20CLR%20597" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1964) 112 CLR 597.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB51" name="fn51">[50]</a></sup> See Paul Finn,
‘Commerce, the Common Law and Morality’ <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/1989/5.html" title="View Case">[1989] MelbULawRw 5</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281989%29%2017%20Melbourne%20University%20Law%20Review%2087" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1989) 17 <i>Melbourne
University Law Review</i> 87.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB52" name="fn52">[51]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/14.html" title="View Case">[1983] HCA 14</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281983%29%20151%20CLR%20447" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1983) 151 CLR 447.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB53" name="fn53">[52]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/5.html" title="View Case">[1983] HCA 5</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281983%29%20151%20CLR%20422" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1983) 151 CLR 422.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB54" name="fn54">[53]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/64.html" title="View Case">[1984] HCA 64</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281984%29%20156%20CLR%2041" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1984) 156 CLR 41.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB55" name="fn55">[54]</a></sup> Explicit reference was made
to such conduct: see, eg, <i>Uniform Commercial Code </i>§ 2-302 (2012)
(‘UCC’).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB56" name="fn56">[55]</a></sup> An egregious example is to
be found in Birks, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/13.html#_Ref364685160">21</a>,
16–17.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB57" name="fn57">[56]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Royal Brunei
Airlines Sdn Bhd v Tan</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1995/4.html" title="View Case">[1995] UKPC 4</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1995%5d%202%20AC%20378" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1995] 2 AC 378</a>, 392 (Lord Nicholls) (‘<i>Royal
Brunei</i>’); <i>Twinsectra Ltd v Yardley</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2002/12.html" title="View Case">[2002] UKHL 12</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2002%5d%202%20AC%20164" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2002] 2 AC 164</a>; <i>Barlow
Clowes International Ltd (in liq) v Eurotrust International Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/2005/37.html" title="View Case">[2005] UKPC 37</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2006%5d%201%20WLR%201476" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2006] 1 WLR
1476</a>; Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Fusion’ in Simone Degeling and James
Edelman (eds), <i>Equity in Commercial Law</i> (Lawbook, 2005) 15; George
Spence, <i>Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery</i> (Lea and
Blanchard, 1846) vol 1, 411; <i>National City Bank of New York v Gelfert</i>, <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=29%20NE%20%282d%29%20449" title="View LawCiteRecord">29
NE (2d) 449</a>, 452 (Loughran J for Lehman CJ, Loughran, Finch, Rippey, Sears
and Conway JJ) (1940). I have attended quite some number of lectures
and
seminars in England where Australian equitable doctrine has been subjected to
misguided and ahistorical criticism precisely because
of its fidelity to the
idea of ‘conscience’ as a fundamental precept of equity.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB58" name="fn58">[57]</a></sup> To take but one example.
Speaking in the context of accessorial liability in equity in <i>Royal Brunei
</i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1995/4.html" title="View Case">[1995] UKPC 4</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1995%5d%202%20AC%20378" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1995] 2 AC 378</a>, 392, Lord Nicholls observed:<br />
Unconscionable is a word of immediate appeal to an equity lawyer ... It must
be recognised, however, that unconscionable is not a
word in everyday use by
non-lawyers. If it is to be used in this context, and if it is to be the
touchstone for liability as an accessory,
it is essential to be clear on what,
<i>in this context</i>, unconscionable <i>means</i>. If unconscionable means no
more than dishonesty, then dishonesty is the preferable label. If unconscionable
means something different,
it must be said that it is not clear what that
something different is. Either way, therefore, the term is better avoided in
this
context.<br />
Given the less than distinguished sequel to this invocation of
‘dishonesty’, one cannot be altogether surprised at Sir
Anthony
Mason’s later wry comment: ‘So much for the superior claims of
“dishonest” conduct over “unconscionable”
conduct in the
search for certainty’: Sir Anthony Mason, ‘Fusion’, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/13.html#_Ref364687542">56</a>, 15.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB59" name="fn59">[58]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2003/57.html" title="View Case">[2003] HCA 57</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282003%29%20217%20CLR%20315" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2003) 217 CLR 315</a>, 324
[20] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Heydon JJ). The judgment went on to
acknowledge that<br />
the phrase ‘unconscionable conduct’ tends to mislead in several
respects ... [I]t encourages the false notion that (i)
there is a distinct cause
of action, akin to an equitable tort, wherever a plaintiff points to conduct
which merits the epithet ‘unconscionable’;
and (ii) there is an
equitable defence to the assertion of any legal right, whether by action to
recover a debt or damages in tort
or for breach of contract, where in the
circumstances it has become unconscionable for the plaintiff to rely on that
legal right:
at 325 [23]–[24].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB60" name="fn60">[59]</a></sup> As, for example, Lords
Atkin, Wright, Radcliffe, Devlin and Diplock.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB61" name="fn61">[60]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Nocton v
Ashburton </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1914%5d%20AC%20932" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1914] AC 932</a>; <i>Vatcher v Paull </i>[1916] AC 372; <i>Cook v
Deeks </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1916/1916_10.html" title="View Case">[1916] UKPC 10</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1916%5d%201%20AC%20554" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1916] 1 AC 554.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB62" name="fn62">[61]</a></sup> One must nonetheless
mention Lord Upjohn and Lord Wilberforce.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB63" name="fn63">[62]</a></sup> The efforts of Lord Denning
MR to ameliorate this state of affairs were often flawed and were largely
unsuccessful as, for example,
the proposed principle of inequality of bargaining
power. Even where they served purposes that have been embraced in other
jurisdictions,
eg mistake in equity, they have suffered reverses and abandonment
in England: see, eg, <i>Great Peace Shipping Ltd v Tsavliris Salvage
(International) Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2002/3.html" title="View Case">[2002] EWCA Civ 1407</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2003%5d%20QB%20679" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2003] QB 679</a>; cf <i>Chwee Kin
Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.commonlii.org/sg/cases/SGCA/2005/2.html" title="View Case">[2005] SGCA 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282005%29%201%20SLR%20502" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2005) 1 SLR 502 (Singapore</a> Court
of Appeal).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB64" name="fn64">[63]</a></sup> <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/caca2010265/">Competition and Consumer
Act 2010</a></i> (Cth) sch 2.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB65" name="fn65">[64]</a></sup> See <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/">Trade Practices Act
1974</a></i> (Cth) <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/index.html#p4a">pts IVA</a>, V.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB66" name="fn66">[65]</a></sup> Even the correct
nomenclature has produced a battleground.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB67" name="fn67">[66]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Banque
Financière de la Citè v Parc (Battersea) Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1998/7.html" title="View Case">[1998] UKHL 7</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1999%5d%201%20AC%20221" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1999] 1 AC 221</a>,
231, where Lord Hoffman asserted that equitable subrogation belongs to unjust
enrichment. See also Burrows, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/13.html#_Ref364685160">21</a>. Cf
<i>ENE Kos 1 Ltd v Petroles Brasiliere SA [No 2] </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKSC/2012/17.html" title="View Case">[2012] UKSC 17</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2012%5d%202%20AC%20164" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2012] 2 AC 164.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB68" name="fn68">[67]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/EngR/1750/119.html" title="View Case">[1750] EngR 119</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281750%29%202%20Ves%20Sen%20125" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1750) 2 Ves Sen 125</a>,
155–6; <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.worldlii.org/int/cases/EngR/1750/25.html" title="View Case">[1750] EngR 25</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=28%20ER%2082" title="View LawCiteRecord">28 ER 82</a>, 100.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB69" name="fn69">[68]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281889%29%2040%20Ch%20D%20312" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1889) 40 Ch D 312</a>, 322
(Kay J).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB70" name="fn70">[69]</a></sup> See David Capper,
‘The Unconscionable Bargain in the Common Law World’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282010%29%20126%20Law%20Quarterly%20Review%20403" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2010) 126
<i>Law Quarterly Review</i> 403.</a> Its limp resuscitation occurred in <i>Cresswell
v Potter </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1978%5d%201%20WLR%20255" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1978] 1 WLR 255</a>, in which no High Court decision, of which there
were now a number, was cited.<br />
<i> </i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB71" name="fn71">[70]</a></sup><i> Multiservice
Bookbinding Ltd v Marden </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1979%5d%20Ch%2084" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1979] Ch 84</a>, 110 (Browne-Wilkinson J). See also
<i>Boustany v Pigott </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKPC/1993/1993_17.html" title="View Case">[1993] UKPC 17</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281995%29%2069%20P%20%26%20CR%20298" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1995) 69 P <i>&</i> CR 298</a>, 303–4 (Lord
Templeman for Lords Templeman, Lowry, Mustill and Slynn).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB72" name="fn72">[71]</a></sup> See <i>Amadio </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/14.html" title="View Case">[1983] HCA 14</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281983%29%20151%20CLR%20447" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1983)
151 CLR 447</a>, 478 (Deane J).<br />
<i> </i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB73" name="fn73">[72]</a></sup><i> Portman Building
Society v Dusangh </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2000%5d%202%20All%20ER%20%28Comm%29%20221" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2000] 2 All ER (Comm) 221.</a> In a comparative piece, a
British scholar, David Capper, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/13.html#_Ref364690169">69</a>,
408, concluded:<br />
It is quite clear that the doctrine applied by the English courts during this
period of reincarnation for the unconscionable bargain
is significantly
different from that applied by courts in other common law jurisdictions. ...
[W]hat is more curious is that English
developments equally clearly reject the
English doctrine of the late 19<sup>th</sup> century.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB74" name="fn74">[73]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1912/75.html" title="View Case">[1912] HCA 75</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281912%29%2015%20CLR%20695" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1912) 15 CLR 695.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB75" name="fn75">[74]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Wilton v
Farnworth </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1948/20.html" title="View Case">[1948] HCA 20</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281948%29%2076%20CLR%20646" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1948) 76 CLR 646</a>; <i>Blomley v Ryan </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1956/81.html" title="View Case">[1956] HCA 81</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281956%29%2099%20CLR%20362" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1956) 99 CLR 362.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB76" name="fn76">[75]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1956/81.html" title="View Case">[1956] HCA 81</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281956%29%2099%20CLR%20362" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1956) 99 CLR 362</a>, 405.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB77" name="fn77">[76]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/14.html" title="View Case">[1983] HCA 14</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281983%29%20151%20CLR%20447" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1983) 151 CLR 447.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB78" name="fn78">[77]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Construction
Associates Inc v Fargo Water Equipment Company</i>, <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=446%20NW%202d%20237" title="View LawCiteRecord">446 NW 2d 237</a> (1989),
especially 242 (Erickstad CJ); <i>Harry v Kreutziger</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281978%29%2095%20DLR%20%283d%29%20231" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1978) 95 DLR (3d) 231</a>;
<i>A & K Lick-a-Chick Franchises Ltd v Cordiv Enterprises Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281981%29%20119%20DLR%20%283d%29%20440" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1981) 119
DLR (3d) 440.</a> See also the provocative dissent of Frankfurter J in <i>United
States v Bethlehem Steel Corporation</i>, 315 US 281 (1941), especially at
326.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB79" name="fn79">[78]</a></sup> See <i>Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282003%29%20214%20CLR%2051" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2003)
214 CLR 51</a>; <i>Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2013/25.html" title="View Case">[2013] HCA 25</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282013%29%20298%20ALR%2035" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2013) 298 ALR 35.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB80" name="fn80">[79]</a></sup> See <i>Australian Consumer
Law</i> <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/index.html#p2">pt 2</a>-<a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/num_act/tpa1974149/index.html#p2">2</a>; UCC § 2-302 (US). On Canadian law, see generally
G H L Fridman, <i>The Law of Contract in Canada</i> (Carswell,
5<sup>th</sup> ed, 2006) ch 9.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB81" name="fn81">[80]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/14.html" title="View Case">[1983] HCA 14</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281983%29%20151%20CLR%20447" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1983) 151 CLR 447</a>, 461
(Mason J), 474 (Deane J).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB82" name="fn82">[81]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1936/41.html" title="View Case">[1936] HCA 41</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281936%29%2056%20CLR%20113" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1936) 56 CLR 113</a>,
134–6.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB83" name="fn83">[82]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1941/9.html" title="View Case">[1941] HCA 9</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281941%29%2065%20CLR%2042" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1941) 65 CLR 42.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB84" name="fn84">[83]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1985/2.html" title="View Case">[1985] UKHL 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1985%5d%201%20AC%20686" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1985] 1 AC 686.</a><br />
<i> </i><sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB85" name="fn85">[84]</a></sup><i> </i>John McGhee
(ed), <i>Snell’s Equity </i>(Sweet <i>&</i> Maxwell, 32<sup>nd</sup>
ed, 2010) treats undue influence over 25 pages, and unconscionable dealing over
9 but 3 of which are devoted to money lending statutes:
at 251–85
[8-008]–[8-042].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB86" name="fn86">[85]</a></sup> See <i>CIBC Mortgages Plc v
Pitt</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1993/7.html" title="View Case">[1993] UKHL 7</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1994%5d%201%20AC%20200" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1994] 1 AC 200</a>, 209 where his Lordship observed:<br />
The difficulty is to establish the relationship between the law as laid down
in [<i>National Westminster Bank Plc v</i> <i>Morgan</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/1985/2.html" title="View Case">[1985] UKHL 2</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1985%5d%20AC%20686" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1985] AC 686]</a> and the
long standing principle laid down in the abuse of confidence cases viz the law
requires those in a fiduciary position who
enter into transactions with those to
whom they owe fiduciary duties to establish affirmatively that the transaction
was a fair one.
The abuse of confidence principle is founded on considerations
of general public policy, viz that in order to protect those to whom
fiduciaries
owe duties <i>as a class</i> from exploitation by fiduciaries <i>as a class</i>,
the law imposes a heavy duty on fiduciaries to show the righteousness of the
transactions they enter into with those to whom they
owe such duties. This
principle is in sharp contrast with the view of this House in <i>Morgan</i> that
in cases of presumed undue influence (a) the law is not based on considerations
of public policy and (b) that it is for the
claimant to prove that the
transaction was disadvantageous rather than for the fiduciary to prove that it
was not disadvantageous.
Unfortunately, the attention of this House in
<i>Morgan</i> was not drawn to the abuse of confidence cases and therefore the
interaction between the two principles (if indeed they are two separate
principles) remains obscure (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB87" name="fn87">[86]</a></sup> A lengthy account of why
this is so is to be found in Rick Bigwood’s critique: Rick Bigwood,
‘From <i>Morgan</i> to <i>Etridge</i>: Tracing the (Dis)Integration of
Undue Influence in the United Kingdom’ in Jason W Neyers, Richard Bronaugh
and Stephen G A
Pitel (eds), <i>Exploring Contract Law</i> (Hart Publishing,
2009) 379.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB88" name="fn88">[87]</a></sup> See, eg, Charles Hollander
and Simon Salzedo, <i>Conflicts of Interest</i> (Sweet <i>&</i> Maxwell,
4<sup>th</sup> ed, 2011) 1–2 [1-001].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB89" name="fn89">[88]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/36.html" title="View Case">[1984] HCA 36</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281984%29%20154%20CLR%20178" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1984) 154 CLR 178</a>,
198–9.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB90" name="fn90">[89]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1929/24.html" title="View Case">[1929] HCA 24</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281929%29%2042%20CLR%20384" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1929) 42 CLR 384.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB91" name="fn91">[90]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1936/3.html" title="View Case">[1936] HCA 3</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281936%29%2054%20CLR%20583" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1936) 54 CLR 583.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB92" name="fn92">[91]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1938/16.html" title="View Case">[1938] HCA 16</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281938%29%2060%20CLR%20189" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1938) 60 CLR 189.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB93" name="fn93">[92]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1958/33.html" title="View Case">[1958] HCA 33</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281958%29%20100%20CLR%20342" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1958) 100 CLR 342.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB94" name="fn94">[93]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/64.html" title="View Case">[1984] HCA 64</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281984%29%20156%20CLR%2041" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1984) 156 CLR 41.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB95" name="fn95">[94]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1984/36.html" title="View Case">[1984] HCA 36</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281984%29%20154%20CLR%20178" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1984) 154 CLR 178.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB96" name="fn96">[95]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/49.html" title="View Case">[1985] HCA 49</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281985%29%20157%20CLR%201" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1985) 157 CLR 1.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB97" name="fn97">[96]</a></sup> (1996) 186 CLR 71.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB98" name="fn98">[97]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2001/31.html" title="View Case">[2001] HCA 31</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282001%29%20207%20CLR%20165" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2001) 207 CLR 165.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB99" name="fn99">[98]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1938/4.html" title="View Case">[1938] HCA 4</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281938%29%2060%20CLR%20150" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1938) 60 CLR 150.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB100" name="fn100">[99]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1964/41.html" title="View Case">[1964] HCA 41</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281964%29%20112%20CLR%20597" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1964) 112 CLR 597.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB101" name="fn101">[100]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1995/18.html" title="View Case">[1995] HCA 18</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281995%29%20182%20CLR%20544" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1995) 182 CLR 544.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB102" name="fn102">[101]</a></sup> See, eg, P D Finn,
‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed), <i>Equity, Fiduciaries
and Trusts</i> (Carswell, 1989). See also Hollander and Salzedo, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/13.html#_Ref364700255">87</a>, 1–2 [1-001].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB103" name="fn103">[102]</a></sup> It is appropriate though
to mention that what has become known in England as the rule in <i>Pallant v
Morgan</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1953%5d%20Ch%2043" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1953] Ch 43</a> seems to be a superfluous invention so far as Australian
law is concerned. It has been referred to but, seemingly, never applied
here.
The rule, as later described in <i>Holiday Inns Inc v Broadhead </i>(Unreported,
Court of Chancery, Megarry J, 19 December 1969), as quoted by Chadwick LJ in
<i>Banner Homes Group Plc v Luff Developments Ltd </i>[2000] Ch 372, 391, is
that:<br />
if A and B agree that A will acquire some specific property for the joint
benefit of A and B on terms yet to be agreed and B in reliance
on A’s
agreement is thereby induced to refrain from attempting to acquire the property
equity ought not to permit A when he
acquires the property to insist on
retaining the whole benefit for himself to the exclusion of B.<br />
That is, a constructive trust arises. I merely note that in Australia that
problem would be dealt with either as a breach of fiduciary
duty or on the basis
of equitable estoppel. It needs no separate rule. The English rule is explicable
though. It dates from 1953
and thus predates modern English developments both in
fiduciary law and equitable estoppel. See the unsuccessful attempt by Etherton
LJ to bring <i>Pallant v Morgan </i>within the fiduciary regime in <i>Crossco No
4 Unlimited v Jolan Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/1619.html" title="View Case">[2011] EWCA Civ 1619</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2012%5d%202%20All%20ER%20754" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2012] 2 All ER 754.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB104" name="fn104">[103]</a></sup> Their reinvigoration
commenced in New Zealand in 1956: <i>Thomas v Thomas</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1956%5d%20NZLR%20785" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1956] NZLR 785.</a> This
was followed quickly, but often confusingly so, in England: see P D Finn,
‘Equitable Estoppel’ in P D Finn (ed),
<i>Essays in Equity</i> (Law
Book, 1985) 59.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB105" name="fn105">[104]</a></sup> On this jurisdiction and
its emasculation, see generally Michael Lobban, ‘Part Two —
Contract’ in William Cornish
et al, <i>The Oxford History of the Laws of
England</i> (Oxford University Press, 2010) vol 12, 366–72, 416–17.
See also Finn, ‘Equitable Estoppel’, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/13.html#_Ref365038457">103</a>, 62–5.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB106" name="fn106">[105]</a></sup> (1854) 5 HLC 185, 216;
10 ER 868, 882.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB107" name="fn107">[106]</a></sup> There were some number
of Indian Privy Council appeals in the early decades of the century which had no
apparent influence in England.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB108" name="fn108">[107]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1947%5d%20KB%20130" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1947] KB 130.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB109" name="fn109">[108]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1983/11.html" title="View Case">[1983] HCA 11</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1983%5d%20152%20CLR%20406" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1983] 152 CLR 406.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB110" name="fn110">[109]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1933/61.html" title="View Case">[1933] HCA 61</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281933%29%2049%20CLR%20507" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1933) 49 CLR 507</a>, 547
(Dixon J).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB111" name="fn111">[110]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1937/58.html" title="View Case">[1937] HCA 58</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281937%29%2059%20CLR%20641" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1937) 59 CLR 641</a>,
674–5 (Dixon J).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB112" name="fn112">[111]</a></sup> Ibid 674.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB113" name="fn113">[112]</a></sup> Ibid.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB114" name="fn114">[113]</a></sup> So much so that
Story’s <i>Equity Jurisprudence</i> then had an English edition: Justice
Joseph Story and W E Grigsby, <i>Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence:
First English Edition</i> (Stevens and Haynes, 1<sup>st</sup> ed, 1884).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB115" name="fn115">[114]</a></sup> Outlined in Samuel
Williston and Richard A Lord, <i>A Treatise on the Law of Contracts</i> (Lawyers
Cooperative Publishing, 4<sup>th</sup> ed, 1992) 38–70, § 8:4.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB116" name="fn116">[115]</a></sup> The title
‘promissory estoppel’ has since been adopted in United States
jurisprudence — it is not used in the <i>Restatements</i> — to
differentiate estoppels relating to assumptions of fact and those relating to
promises or assurances as to future conduct.
With the promulgation of the first
<i>Restatement</i> the promissory estoppel doctrine began to flourish. As
Williston notes, the extent to which the courts made use of the doctrine
inspired
the drafters of the <i>Restatement (Second) of Contracts </i>(1981) to
expand dramatically the applicability of promissory estoppel: Williston and
Lord, above n <a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/13.html#_Ref365041560">114</a>, 48. The story of the
evolution of the two <i>Restatements of Contracts</i> is outlined in, amongst
other places, Jay M Feinman ‘Promissory Estoppel and Judicial
Method’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281983%29%2097%20Harvard%20Law%20Review%20678" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1983) 97 <i>Harvard Law Review</i> 678</a>, 679–96.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB117" name="fn117">[116]</a></sup> American Law Institute,
<i>Restatement (Second) of Contracts </i>(1981).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB118" name="fn118">[117]</a></sup> By gratuitous promises I
here mean no more than promises not supported by consideration.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB119" name="fn119">[118]</a></sup> Two cases related to the
proposed grant of a franchise: <i>Goodman v Dicker</i>,<i> </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=169%20F%202d%20684" title="View LawCiteRecord">169 F 2d 684 (DC</a>
Cir, 1948); <i>Hoffman v Red Owl Stores Inc</i>, <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=133%20NW%202d%20267" title="View LawCiteRecord">133 NW 2d 267 (Wis</a>, 1965); the
other to a subcontractor’s bid: <i>Drennan v Star Paving Co</i>,<i>
</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=333%20P%202d%20757" title="View LawCiteRecord">333 P 2d 757 (Cal</a>, 1958).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB120" name="fn120">[119]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=333%20P%202d%20757" title="View LawCiteRecord">333 P 2d 757 (Cal</a>,
1958).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB121" name="fn121">[120]</a></sup> See, eg, K C T Sutton,
‘Promises and Consideration’ in P D Finn (ed), <i>Essays on
Contract</i> (Law Book, 1987) 35, 65–9; P D Finn, ‘Equity and
Contract’ in P D Finn (ed), <i>Essays on Contract</i> (Law Book, 1987)
104, 112, 119–20, 122.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB122" name="fn122">[121]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.liiofindia.org/in/cases/cen/INSC/1978/254.html" title="View Case">[1978] INSC 254</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1979%5d%202%20SCR%20641" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1979] 2 SCR 641.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB123" name="fn123">[122]</a></sup> American Law Institute,
<i>Restatement of the Law of Contracts</i> (1932).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB124" name="fn124">[123]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1988/7.html" title="View Case">[1988] HCA 7</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281988%29%20164%20CLR%20387" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1988) 164 CLR 387.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB125" name="fn125">[124]</a></sup> The principal exponent
of this manoeuvre is the Hon Ken Handley: see, eg, Justice
K R Handley, <i>Estoppel by Conduct and Election</i> (Sweet
<i>&</i> Maxwell, 2006) 180–1 [11-030], 220–4
[13-037]–[13-042]; Justice K R Handley, ‘The Three High Court
Decisions
on Estoppel 1988–1990’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282006%29%2080%20Australian%20Law%20Journal%20724" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2006) 80 <i>Australian Law
Journal</i> 724</a>; <i>DHJPM Pty Ltd v Blackthorn Resources Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWCA/2011/348.html" title="View Case">[2011] NSWCA 348</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282011%29%20285%20ALR%20311" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2011) 285 ALR
311</a>, 333–9 [92]–[143].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB126" name="fn126">[125]</a></sup> See Michael Bryan
‘Almost 25 Years On: Some Reflections on <i>Waltons v Maher</i>’
<a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282012%29%206%20Journal%20of%20Equity%20131" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2012) 6 <i>Journal of Equity </i>131.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB127" name="fn127">[126]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1988/7.html" title="View Case">[1988] HCA 7</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281988%29%20164%20CLR%20387" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1988) 164 CLR 387</a>, 426.
See also Mason CJ and Wilson J’s judgment, which is consistent with
Brennan J’s views: at 403–8.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB128" name="fn128">[127]</a></sup> The landmark franchise
cases in the US were <i>Goodman v Dicker</i>, <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=169%20F%202d%20684" title="View LawCiteRecord">169 F 2d 684 (DC</a> Cir, 1948) and
<i>Hoffman v Red Owl Stores Inc</i>, <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=133%20NW%202d%20267" title="View LawCiteRecord">133 NW 2d 267 (Wis</a>, 1965).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB129" name="fn129">[128]</a></sup> See <i>Cobbe v
Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2008/55.html" title="View Case">[2008] UKHL 55</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2008%5d%201%20WLR%201752" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2008] 1 WLR 1752</a>, 1785 [81] (Lord
Walker).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB130" name="fn130">[129]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/274.html" title="View Case">[2001] EWCA Civ 274</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2002%5d%201%20All%20ER%20%28Comm%29%20737" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2002] 1 All ER (Comm)
737.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB131" name="fn131">[130]</a></sup> Ibid [91].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB132" name="fn132">[131]</a></sup> Ibid [95].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB133" name="fn133">[132]</a></sup> The limiting effect of
the proprietary interest requirement is demonstrated in the contrast of the
decision of the House of Lords
in <i>Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management
Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2008/55.html" title="View Case">[2008] UKHL 55</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2008%5d%201%20WLR%201752" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2008] 1 WLR 1752</a> and that of White J in the Supreme Court of New South
Wales in <i>E K Nominees Pty Ltd v Woolworths Ltd </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/nsw/NSWSC/2006/1172.html" title="View Case">[2006] NSWSC
1172</a> (16 November 2006). They have relevantly similar factual settings.<br />
<i>Cobbe</i> <i>v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd</i> was a property
development case where, in anticipation of a contract for the sale to Cobbe of
Yeoman’s property which was to
be developed and sold on a proceeds sharing
basis, Cobbe took steps to obtain planning permission as it was commonly assumed
he would.
Both parties proceeded on the understanding that the contract would
only be entered into if planning permission was obtained, although
its core
terms had been agreed including as to price and proceeds sharing. Three months
before the permission was granted, Yeoman’s
decided to resile from the
understanding. It did not tell Cobbe until after permission had been given. He
made a claim based on equitable
estoppel. Put shortly, it was held he had, and
he knew he had, no contract. He took the risk of it not eventuating.
Yeoman’s
may have behaved unconscionably, but there could be no
proprietary estoppel. Cobbe lost. This said, but with little explanation,
he was
awarded a quantum meruit payment for his services in obtaining regression to the
planning permission by formalism on the ground
of unjust enrichment.<br />
In <i>E K Nominees v Woolworths Ltd </i>in contrast, Woolworths in
falsifying a similar assumption upon which precontract action was taken, was
held liable for E K’s
reliance losses. It might have borne the risk of no
contract being able to be successfully negotiated. It did not bear the risk of
the assumption being falsified on which it was encouraged to act — ie a
contract was to be negotiated. See also the decision
of the Delaware Chancery
Court in <i>Pharmathene Inc v Siga Technologies Inc</i> (Del Ct Ch,
2627-VCP, 22 September 2011) (Parsons V-C).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB134" name="fn134">[133]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2012%5d%201%20Ch%20453" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2012] 1 Ch 453</a>, 470
[37].<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB135" name="fn135">[134]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/78.html" title="View Case">[1985] HCA 78</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281985%29%20160%20CLR%20583" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1985) 160 CLR 583</a>,
614.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB136" name="fn136">[135]</a></sup> Ibid.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB137" name="fn137">[136]</a></sup> Ibid 615.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB138" name="fn138">[137]</a></sup> <i>Erlanger v New
Sombrero Phosphate Co </i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281878%29%203%20AC%201218" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1878) 3 App Cas 1218</a>, 1278–9 (Lord Blackburn).
See also <i>Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd </i>(1995) 184 CLR 102,
113–14 (Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB139" name="fn139">[138]</a></sup> <i>Bathurst City Council
v PWC Properties Pty Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1998/59.html" title="View Case">[1998] HCA 59</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281998%29%20195%20CLR%20566" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1998) 195 CLR 566</a>, 585 [42] (Gaudron, McHugh,
Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). See also <i>Giumelli v Giumelli </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1999/10.html" title="View Case">[1999] HCA 10</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%20196%20CLR%20101" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 196
CLR 101</a>, 113–14 [10] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Callinan JJ) (an
equitable estoppel case); <i>John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City
Tennis Club Ltd </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2010/19.html" title="View Case">[2010] HCA 19</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282010%29%20241%20CLR%201" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2010) 241 CLR 1</a>, 45–6 [128]–[129] (French CJ,
Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ) (an alleged breach of fiduciary duty
case).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB140" name="fn140">[139]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2012/6.html" title="View Case">[2012] FCAFC 6</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282012%29%20200%20FCR%20296" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2012) 200 FCR 296.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB141" name="fn141">[140]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281874%29%20LR%209%20LRCh%20App%20244" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1874) LR 9 Ch App
244.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB142" name="fn142">[141]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Paul A
Davies (Aust) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Davies</i> <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b1983%5d%201%20NSWLR%20440" title="View LawCiteRecord">[1983] 1 NSWLR 440.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB143" name="fn143">[142]</a></sup> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2012/6.html" title="View Case">[2012] FCAFC 6</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282012%29%20200%20FCR%20296" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2012) 200 FCR 296</a>, 442
[681] (Finn, Stone and Perram JJ), quoting <i>John Alexander’s Clubs
</i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/2010/19.html" title="View Case">[2010] HCA 19</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%282010%29%20241%20CLR%201" title="View LawCiteRecord">(2010) 241 CLR 1</a>, 46 [129] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel
JJ).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB144" name="fn144">[143]</a></sup> <i>Muschinski v Dodds
</i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1985/78.html" title="View Case">[1985] HCA 78</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281985%29%20160%20CLR%20583" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1985) 160 CLR 583</a>, 616 (Deane J).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB145" name="fn145">[144]</a></sup> In the main this is in
state legislation: see, eg, Mass Gen Laws ch 93A, a statute which declares
unlawful (§ 2) and renders
actionable (§ 9) ‘[u]nfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any
trade
or commerce’.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB146" name="fn146">[145]</a></sup> Such exists in Australia
(<i>Trade Practices (Industry Codes — Franchising) Regulations 1998</i>
(Cth)), the United States and a majority of the Canadian provinces.<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB147" name="fn147">[146]</a></sup> See, eg, <i>Baird
Textiles Holdings Ltd v Marks and Spencer Plc</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/274.html" title="View Case">[2001] EWCA Civ 274</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2002%5d%201%20All%20ER%20%28Comm%29%20737" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 737</a>;
<i>Cobbe v Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd</i> <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2008/55.html" title="View Case">[2008] UKHL 55</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%5b2008%5d%201%20WLR%201752" title="View LawCiteRecord">[2008] 1 WLR 1752.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB148" name="fn148">[147]</a></sup> <i>Australian Consumer
Law</i> s 18 (misleading and deceptive conduct), pt 2-2 (unconscionable
conduct).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB149" name="fn149">[148]</a></sup> See especially <i>Esso
Australia Resources Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation </i><a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/HCA/1999/67.html" title="View Case">[1999] HCA 67</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281999%29%20201%20CLR%2049" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1999) 201 CLR
49</a>, 61–3 [23]–[28] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ). See also
Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common Law: The Continuing
Story’ in
Suzanne Corcoran and Stephen Bottomley (eds), <i>Interpreting Statutes</i>
(Federation Press, 2005) 61–2; Paul Finn, ‘Statutes and the Common
Law’ <a class="autolink_findcases_inserted" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UWALawRw/1992/1.html" title="View Case">[1992] UWALawRw 1</a>; <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281992%29%2022%20University%20of%20Western%20Australia%20Law%20Review%207" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1992) 22 <i>University of Western Australia Law Review</i> 7.</a><br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB150" name="fn150">[149]</a></sup> A like story could be
told of the impact of the <i><a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/">Corporations Act 2001</a> </i>(Cth) (and its
predeccessors) and its symbiotic relationship with judge-made law. The treatment
of de facto directors and officers
in <i>Grimaldi</i> is testament to this: at
314–26 [28]–[76] (Finn, Stone and Perram JJ).<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB151" name="fn151">[150]</a></sup> By way of an aside I
would simply ask, for example, whether, despite our agonising over the
justifications for, and scope of, a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in
contract law, we already have the essence of such a duty in <a class="autolink_findacts" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s21.html">s 21</a> of the
<i>Australian Consumer Law</i>?<br />
<sup><a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html#fnB152" name="fn152">[151]</a></sup> Roscoe Pound, ‘The
Decadence of Equity’ <a class="autolink_findcases" href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/LawCite?cit=%281905%29%205%20Columbia%20Law%20Review%2020" title="View LawCiteRecord">(1905) 5 <i>Columbia Law Review </i>20</a>, 35.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/MelbULawRw/2013/20.html" target="_blank">TO READ THIS LEARNED OPINION ON THE ORIGINAL SITE PLEASE CLICK HERE</a>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-57164473105042145172015-09-29T01:27:00.001-07:002016-02-22T23:01:37.185-08:00PUBLIC NOTICE: MIKIVERSE LAW IS NOW MIKIPEDIA LAW BLOG<u><b><span style="font-size: x-large;">PUBLIC NOTICE: MIKIVERSE LAW IS NOW MIKIPEDIA LAW BLOG</span></b></u><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">Hopefully you all know that with the establishment of www.mikipedia.com.au to house all of my various mikiverse pages, this page ceased to be a working function approximately 15 months ago.<br /><br />The aim was to redress the inability of people to grab particular pieces of info and posts quickly, as well as to have my own site for the work that i have devoted the past six or seven years to on top of the research that i have been doing for years before that. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">i also felt that the nature of my work is such, that coupled with the 'global darkening' that is taking place, pressure may be placed on blogger/blogspot to remove my posts in their entirety.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">Best of all, i was able to post pdf's of the thousands of law books that in the past, i had to go to great lengths just to share a portion thereof. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-large;">As i learn and develop my coding skills, i am building my mikipedia site to better reflect my vision and shall, forthwith, be renaming Mikiverse Law, Mikipedia Law Blog, and (as you probably imagine) shall be using this space as a blog that will feature on the new site that i am building. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">This should, give a good balance between info on particular topics of relevance, as well as coverage and analysis of the day to happenings in our world.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">For those of you that don't know, i left the cistern in 2009 and have lived 'on the streets' ever since, originally in a 1992 Mazda 121 'bubble car', followed by a 1983 Holden Commodore Station Wagon, and presently, a 1992 Mitsubishi Starwagon that i lovingly dub my vansion. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">i have never received payment for my work as i see it as the duty of those that know something valuable to assist those that know less, or are still sleeping in their pods.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">That said, one day, i would like to leave these streets and be able to buy a farm in order to provide for myself and the family that i still dream of one day being a part of. It may never come to be, so in that instance, i simply trust that i can make a small contribution to helping us to understand the problem and implementing a cure whilst respecting free will. To that end, i am building a school that will in the future serve this purpose alongside the new website.<br /><br />Humbly, and sincerely i thank all of you for your support, especially if you were able to gain a nugget that has helped you on your journey.<br /> </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">With the greatest honour, respect and love</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">miki.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">PS. Facebook has recently censored and closed my mikipedia (formerly mikiverse) page down until i submit ID which i don't possess. This happened once before, last november, and upon sending a meme in lieu of ID, it was restored, and they approved the change to mikipedia.</span><br />
<table align="center" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" class="tr-caption-container" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto; text-align: center;"><tbody>
<tr><td style="text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZf5ZauShCPhQMo_4kNZHC8nuVKRYTyBDk0h-XQC7D9rYMVx6KCQUO44s4rqMJ7CvspPIkLXUjeG3lIHdd6a0qWclUhT6MOp1yNurFmLtJcfak2o8ZPB4jAp26kHK8-GIyFx6lAO06As8/s1600/Slide1.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: auto; margin-right: auto;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiZf5ZauShCPhQMo_4kNZHC8nuVKRYTyBDk0h-XQC7D9rYMVx6KCQUO44s4rqMJ7CvspPIkLXUjeG3lIHdd6a0qWclUhT6MOp1yNurFmLtJcfak2o8ZPB4jAp26kHK8-GIyFx6lAO06As8/s640/Slide1.jpg" width="640" /></a></td></tr>
<tr><td class="tr-caption" style="text-align: center;"><span style="font-size: large;">This is the meme that i sent farcical book in lieu of ID last November</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
<span style="font-size: x-large;">If you were connected with me and haven't reconnected yet, you can connect with me @</span><br />
<br />
<a href="https://www.facebook.com/catherine.aragon.7921"><span style="font-size: x-large;">https://www.facebook.com/catherine.aragon.7921</span></a><br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg70IJr_jvZGpWpG2VDE6TbeSDD6deYRXRN0LY8D_qIZHBEivUChH2AUqFDkfSA4nE9p4ZYc2E1HRA-8nYaukPhZ-w4J5TMJ2WErzWRYtp5ygqKUnzEeb7X5T-DbXfri5Yx9ytJC_wSqNI/s1600/12698559_922502104482538_7271707660300160750_o.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="480" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg70IJr_jvZGpWpG2VDE6TbeSDD6deYRXRN0LY8D_qIZHBEivUChH2AUqFDkfSA4nE9p4ZYc2E1HRA-8nYaukPhZ-w4J5TMJ2WErzWRYtp5ygqKUnzEeb7X5T-DbXfri5Yx9ytJC_wSqNI/s640/12698559_922502104482538_7271707660300160750_o.jpg" width="640" /></a></div>
<br />
Unknownnoreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-12367231970349341092015-09-29T00:45:00.001-07:002016-02-22T23:14:18.570-08:00POLITICAL PRISONER STEVEN OF THE HOUSE OF SPIERS IS IN CESSNOCK CORRECTIONAL CENTRE THANKS TO DAVID HELPMAN<span style="font-size: x-large;">Steven Spiers is presently being held as a political prisoner @ the Cessnock Correctional Centre in country New South Wales.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">He is there because his principles and political beliefs clash with the political cistern that advertises itself as being fair, reasonable & just.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">Steven is in jail despite the fact that the so-called independent arbitrator annulled the charges.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-large;">You may be asking yourself how this can be, and it is because Steven refused to identify with the name Steven Spiers.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">So, a man is in jail, because a criminal named David Helpman deemed it to be so.<br /><br />Steven has requested that everyone send him a post card to; <br /><b>Steven of the house of Spiers,<br />555364 Cessnock Correctional centre,<br />Po box 32 Cessnock NSW 2325</b></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">Please be aware that even if you send one, it may be censored or thrown in the bin so if you do send one then please note it in the comments section below so when he is released, Steven will have a chance to compare notes so to speak upon release.</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><br />i hope & pray that Steven has a safe three months and is released unharmed. </span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">i have tremendous respect for a man that stands on his principles.</span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;">Steven's own thoughts are articulated below. i do not know who transcribed, but i thank them for doing so.</span><br />
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/LxC4mYwXgGA?feature=player_detailpage" width="100%"></iframe> <br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><b><u><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.0.$end/=1$text4/=010">Transcription</span></span></u></b><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text1/=010" /><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text3/=010" /><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text4/=010">"I
am Steven Spiers I've been sentenced to 3 months gaol. I'm incarcerated
at Cesnock correctional centre under mental health segregation for being
under hunger striking. I was sentenced 3 months by David Helpman in a
local court without having a hearing; I was sentenced without having
entered a plea. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text4/=010">David Helpman had me arrested upon entering court so
legal aid could enter a plea on my behalf by applying for an appeal. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text4/=010">I've then entered the district court before judge Murphly Wells to
appeal sentencing albeit never having a hearing. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text4/=010">I had to withdraw the
appeal in the district court to reenter the local court before David
Helpman for an annulment process. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text4/=010">David Helpman stated that he had
overstepped his authority having heard the hearing ex parte in my
absence. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text4/=010">David Helpman then stated I was free to return home as long as i
agreed that i was the person.</span><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text5/=010" /><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text7/=010" /><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text8/=010">I
asked for David Helpmans oath and bond under penalty of perjury, was
denied and was subsequently removed from the court and put into custody.</span><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text9/=010" /><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text11/=010" /><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text12/=010">I
am currently serving sentence created in my absence that was annulled
only on condition of forced agreeance that I am the person. I quoted
James 2:9 KJV "But if ye have respect to persons, ye commit sin, and are
convinced of the law as transgressors." and was taken into custody.</span><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text13/=010" /><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text15/=010" /><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text16/=010">If
I had agreed to being Steven SPIERS the person I would be at home right
now, but because I chose to stand with God (the Truth) I am in gaol.
Now consider if I am not the person Steven SPIERS being free to go home
having successfully annulled the matters whom have they incarcerated? A
nameless man being now forced the person inside gaol. I've been given a
prison number 555364 under SPIERS, STEVEN the person a direct
contradiction to the decisions of David Helpman.</span><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text17/=010" /><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text19/=010" /><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text20/=010">Grafton
Correctional Centre have refused to process my bail applications,
denied legal aid, failed to post for me and an 14th and 19th of August
refused to put my bail applications in. The ombudsman refuses to take a
complaint from me. I am left in no mans land leaving me no choice but to
go on hunger strike. I am asking the Attorney's General of NSW and the
Commonwealth to treat this matter as a serious misjustice; and ask the
Governor of NSW why am i being left in no man's land.</span><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text21/=010" /><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text23/=010" /><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text24/=010">I
am being held under conditions that would be considered a deprivation
of liberty and torture while under conditions of false imprisonment. I
am in a cell locked in 21 hours of the day with an hour and a half
release to a small yard with other prisoners. I am in an enclosed cell
with no air flow, in a cell that goes hot and cold with doctored
heating. I am currently in a mental health unit with no staff, being
told only a controlled room is watching. I have been left in a fully lit
cell all night. This to me is considered torture.</span><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text25/=010" /><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text27/=010" /><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text28/=010">I
am currently falsely imprisoned and on hunger strike suffering torture
and deprivation of liberty. I should be free right now. If I am not the
person free whom is actually incarcerated. I appeal to the Governor
General's both State and Commonwealth to address this matter immediately
and thoroughly as indemnity for these actions will be forthcoming.</span><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text29/=010" /><br data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text31/=010" /><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text32/=010">Please publish share and send to the AG GG Governor and whoever else is nexurious discussion."</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text32/=010">You can connect with Steven on Facebook @</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<a href="https://www.facebook.com/Drexxle?fref=ts"><span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text32/=010">https://www.facebook.com/Drexxle?fref=ts</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></a><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text32/=010">or be a part of a community that wants to assist those that go to court by going to</span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<a href="https://www.facebook.com/groups/606270789435992/"><span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text32/=010">https://www.facebook.com/groups/606270789435992/</span></span></span></span></span></span></span></a><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text32/=010">or me @ </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text32/=010"><a href="https://www.facebook.com/catherine.aragon.7921">https://www.facebook.com/catherine.aragon.7921</a> </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text32/=010">mikipedia (prev mikiverse) is presently off line due to farcical book censorship. </span></span></span></span></span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body"><span class="UFICommentBody _1n4g" data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0"><span data-reactid=".6z.1:5.0.1:$comment10207516683545297_10207821457924466/=10.0.$right.0.$left.0.0.1.$comment-body.0.3.0.$end/=1$text32/=010"> </span></span></span></span></span></span> </span>Unknownnoreply@blogger.com4tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-51971941080600183072014-07-21T19:46:00.000-07:002014-07-21T19:46:04.381-07:00BAR MEMBERS<br />
<br />
<br /><iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/JnRJ8R7ccy8?list=PLtfDJdWNxgpkuhxTl6bjJNCviuTxl0RUA" width="560"></iframe>
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-74002960437367578162014-07-17T20:21:00.000-07:002014-07-17T20:21:06.933-07:00YOUR NAME BELONGS TO THE CROWN? POPPYCOCK!<span style="font-size: x-large;"><span data-ft="{"tn":"K"}">Robert Menard<br /> <br />
Do not let those who are not members of the government make claims
which disempower you, and somehow magically empower the government. It
is ignorant fear mongering, and is simply false information being
spread.<br /> <br /> It began with your parents giving you YOUR name.
Before it ever existed on any piece of paper, it was given to you. It
existed then, and you<span class="text_exposed_show"> were the first owner, holder, and user. <br /> <br />
The act of registration does not ''give it' (hand over) to the Crown.
It is true the act of registration establishes an association, which the
identifier points to. It is used as an identifier and establishes
that there exists a person with certain rights and duties. This does
not mean that its use will always identify that same person. An ‘arrow
sign’ does not create a destination. It can point to it, if it already
exists, but it does not create one if it doesn’t. A sign saying ‘Carson
City 20 Miles’ planted in the middle of nowhere will not cause a city
to magically pop up 20 miles distant. The city must exist first, then
you can point to it. <br /> <br /> The government has never claimed they own
our names, and when asked will deny it. Why disempower yourself by
claiming that what is clearly YOURS, belongs to someone else, when they
have never made that claim? Nanny CAN’T FLY, and your name is not
somehow their magical property.<br /> <br /> Both the name and the human named, pre-existed the person created by registration.<br /> <br />
When you were a child your name was one thing. Your parents used it,
your schools and friends used it. The government used it. Now that you
are an adult, those people who once had authority over you, can still
use your name, but they can’t claim that because you are using the same
name, they have the same level of authority over you. It is ludicrous
to claim otherwise. Of course, if you went back to school as a student,
AND MAINTAINED YOUR ASSOCIATIONS, they would have that same level of
authority. The name itself does not create the association.<br /> <br />
Saying “I am not that name!” to avoid duties and responsibilities when
there is still an association, is very childish. One can keep their
name, and change their associations, thus their duties and obligations. <br /> <br />
My name is Robert Arthur Menard. That is what my name was when I was a
child of the Province. It is what my name is now that I am a
Freeman-on-the-Land. Using my name does not automatically make me one or
the other. Although others have the same name as I do, I own mine, and
no government agent or operator has ever tried to claim any ownership
over it. I have heard others who claim the government owns our names,
if they were used for registration, but they have never brought any
proof. People in the government have clearly rejected the concept that
they own everyone’s names, and do not act as owners of them. But still
people ignorantly spread this concept.<br /> <br /> The confusion arises
because of a basic logical fallacy. The name is used to identify
someone, and is one thing, and is used to point to their status or
associations. Their person. Which is another thing. Which in most
cases identifies a child of the Province. A ward. Use of the name
does not establish the association, nor does denying the name break it
if it already exists. Denying the name when there is still an
association is very childish. It is akin to closing one’s eyes and
saying “You can’t see me.”. The goal is to change our associations so
that the name (the exact same name) no longer points to a bonded child
of the Province, but to a Freeman. You do not accomplish that by
abandoning the very thing you were given as an infant by your parents to
facilitate that. Just because a name is needed to establish an
association, does not mean use of that name establishes one.<br /> <br /> If
I wanted to disempower the people of the Freedom movement, I would
share ideas that are untrue but are seemingly justified on the surface,
and cause them to abandon those things which could actually empower
them. I would try to get them to abandon their names and persons, as
they would then be abandoning their wealth others are holding in trust.
I would get them to believe the name itself creates the person and
evidences an association, instead of just being an identifier thereof. I
would present to them a wholly useless tactic, like denying being ‘the
name’, which does not change their status as a child or ward, merely
identifies them as a petulant, ignorant and belligerent one. I would
not get them looking at the associations created, and how to change
those, while keeping their name. No I would ask they abandon that
first. Many would fail to distinguish between the person (the rights
and duties created by association) and the name (the identifier of the
person created with the association) and will try unsuccessfully to
avoid the latter by abandoning the former. They will be like travellers
on a road, who think they can avoid a distant city by simply taking
down the sign which points to it. <br /> <br /> If you believe that the
government owns your name, and you have NO PROOF that the government has
ever made that claim; if you believe you can avoid duties and
obligations established by associations merely by abandoning the name
but not changing your associations and status as a child of the
province; if you do not distinguish between a person and its name, or a
thing and its name; then you are not a force of empowerment for the
people. The ideas you share are harmful, false and wrong.<br /> <br />
When you were registered as an infant the government put you in diapers.
Good thing for an infant, but not needed as an adult. You can remove
them, but you need to learn to use the toilet and wipe your arse. You
need to be able to prove you can do that, and Magical Nanny will stop
trying to nanny you. However removing your diaper all by yourself,
(abandoning your name and rejecting the person) without learning to use
the toilet and wipe your arse, (establish a new person with greater
rights and duties as a Free adult) means you will still be seen as a
child, and Nanny can and will put you back in a diaper, lest you start
smearing your faeces all over the common walls. <br /> <br /> There are
some absolutely ludicrous arguments floating around, the idea of
government owning our names being near the top of the list. It would be
so easy to prove. Simply make a public claim that you own your name,
and see if ANYONE disputes it, and if they don’t, establish sole
ownership as a function of law. You will find no one in the government
will dispute that claim. They will not seek to claim ownership, for the
simple reason that they do not own it, and they do not need to own it,
nor have you accept it, in order to hold you accountable to the person
identified by it. <br /> <br /> Deny the name all you want. The association
which identifies you as a child of the province will still be in
existence, and your tactic identifies you as someone worthy of being
treated as a child. You will be shooting yourself in your own foot. <br /> <br />
Stop making claims that disempower yourself. If the people in the
government want to claim they own your name, LET THEM DO IT! Do not do
it for them like it is a fait accompli.</span></span></span><br />
<br />
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Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-62613624589038440052014-07-10T22:42:00.000-07:002014-07-10T22:42:35.307-07:00"NAME" AS DEFINED IN A DICTIONARY OF LAW, CONSISTS OF JUDICIAL DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS OF WORDS, PHRASES, AND MAXIMS, AND AS EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
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<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-22079220613854556822014-07-07T19:39:00.000-07:002016-02-23T00:00:29.944-08:00FREEDOM SUMMITS 2014 – THE DOUBLE EDGED SWORD OF THE LAW WITH JERRY PRUS<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/rtbApsJVZmg" width="100%"></iframe> <br />
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<br />Unknownnoreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8548201906264999507.post-35034431294607258282014-07-01T00:11:00.001-07:002016-02-23T00:09:19.945-08:00FREE MANNice
little clip featuring mika, a man that, similar to me, lives on the land outside of the predatory control mechanism.<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="400" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/ONjw3fQBvKI" width="100%"></iframe><br />
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