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Friday, 23 March 2012 William M. Windsor
It is
important for those involved in court to understand what fraud upon the
court is so you can realize when it is happening to you.
Fraud
upon the court is important because orders and judgments may be set
aside at any time when fraud upon the court is proven. I have seen
cases where as many as 60 years later, a judgment was set aside.
The
good news is that the rules and case law provide a way to get relief
from wrongdoing. The bad news is that it requires a judge to make a
finding of fraud, and my experience is that the judges are all guilty,
and their fellow judges will cover for them.
I am not an attorney, and I am not offering legal advice. This article contains my legal research and my experience.
Fraud
upon the court is fraud committed by officers of the court. The
officers of the court are attorneys, judges, and judicial employees,
including the staff of the clerk of the court. In its simplest terms,
fraud upon the court is types of actions designed to interfere with the
proper functioning and decision-making of a court.
“Fraud
on the court should embrace only that species of fraud which does or
attempts to, subvert the integrity of the court itself, or is a fraud
perpetrated by officers of the courtâ€) (citation omitted); Kerwit Med. Prods., Inc. v. N. & H. Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833, 837 (11th Cir. 1980).
In my
experience, I have seren attorneys, judges, and the staff of the clerks
of the courts all commit fraud upon the court, and there was at the very
least a conspiracy between the judges and the clerk of the court's
office. All of this was part of unconscionable schemes designed to
improperly influence the courts in their decisions.
“Fraud
on the court must involve an unconscionable plan or scheme which is
designed to improperly influence the court in its decision . . . .†Davenport Recycling Assocs. v. C.I.R.,
220 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000) (alleged fraud on tax court).
“It has been found only in those instances where the fraud vitiates
the court’s ability to reach an impartial disposition of the case
before it.†Id.
In my
cases, there was fraud; there was fraud on the court; and there was a
conspiracy to defraud. This fraud was intentional. The fraud was
perpetrated by officers of the court.
Herring,
424 F.3d at 386. A judge is an officer of the court, as are all members
of the Bar. A federal judge is a federal judicial officer, paid by the
federal government to act impartially and lawfully. A judge is not the
court. People v. Zajic, 88 Ill.App.3d 477, 410 N.E.2d 626 (1980).
In my
cases, the fraud was directed at the judicial machinery itself. The
fraud subverted the integrity of the courts. The fraud was designed to
deceive the courts into believing facts that were not true. The courts
were unable to adjudicate the matter properly because the courts were
influenced by false information.
Chief
Justice John Marshall acknowledged that a court may grant relief from
judgment where a new matter “clearly proves it to be against
conscience to execute a judgment, and of which the injured party could
not have availed himself†before judgment. Marine Ins. Co. of Alexandria v. Hodgson,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 332, 336 (1813). He further emphasized that an
Article III court can grant relief where the “equity of the applicant
[is] free from doubt,†and where a judgment “would be against conscience for the person who has obtained it to avail himself.†Id. at 337 (emphasis supplied).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) and 60(d) as well as independent actions in equity may all be used to seek to vacate orders and judgments due to fraud upon the courts.
One of the essential elements of an independent action in equity is a showing of the absence of any adequate remedy at law. Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States,
423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court has further noted
that an independent action in equity should be available only to prevent
a grave miscarriage of justice. United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998). The absence of any adequate remedy at law.†In re Machne Israel, Inc., 48 F. App’x 859, 863 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Nat’l Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. State Bank of Humboldt,
120 F. 593, 599 (8th Cir. 1903)). “[A]n independent equitable action
for relief from judgment may only be employed to prevent manifest
injustice.†Id. at 863. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), and United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (1998), this Court’s leading recent discussions of fraud upon the court.
In my
cases, evidence was fabricated by the Plaintiffs' witnesses and
attorneys. The attorneys were knowing participants in the fraud on the
court. Bogus documents were placed into the record. Lies were told
under oath, at depositions and in affidavits, and in various filings
with the courts, and schemes were concocted to attempt to cover-up
certain falsehoods. Attorneys for the Plaintiffs were involved in all
of this.
The fabrication of evidence by a party in which an attorney is implicated, will constitute a fraud on the court." Id. at 1338 (citing to Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S.Ct. 997 (1944)).
Professor
Moore writes that Fraud on the court is limited to fraud that does, or
at least attempts to, “defile the court itself,†or that is
perpetrated by officers of the court “so that the judicial machinery
cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudicating
cases.†Moore’s Federal Practice 3d ¶ 60.21[4][a] (3d
ed. 2003). Thus, a “fraud on the court†is a fraud designed not
simply to cheat an opposing litigant, but to “corrupt the judicial
process†or “subvert the integrity of the court.†Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc. v. Expeditors Int’l, Inc., 127 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1997); Pumphrey v. K.W. Thompson Tool Co., 62 F.3d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Area Boliviana,
24 F.3d 457, 460 (2d Cir. 1994). It is marked by an “unconscionable
plan or scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in
its decisions,†Dixon v. Commissioner, No. 00-70858, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4831, at *11-12 (9th Cir. Mar. 18, 2003), amending 316 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2003), or by “egregious misconduct directed to the court itself.†Greiner v. City of Champlin, 152 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
Whenever any officer of the court commits fraud during a proceeding in the court, he/she is engaged in "fraud upon the court."
In Bulloch v. United States,
763 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1985), the court stated "Fraud upon the
court is fraud which is directed to the judicial machinery itself and is
not fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false statements
or perjury. ... It is where the court or a member is corrupted or
influenced or influence is attempted or where the judge has not
performed his judicial function --- thus where the impartial functions
of the court have been directly corrupted."
"Fraud
upon the court" has been defined to "embrace that species of fraud
which does, or attempts to, defile the court itself, or is a fraud
perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery
cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases
that are presented for adjudication." Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (1968); 7 Moore's Federal Practice,
2d ed., p. 512, ¶ 60.23. The 7th Circuit further stated "a decision
produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all,
and never becomes final."
It is also clear and well-settled law that any attempt to commit "fraud upon the court" vitiates the entire proceeding.
The People of the State of Illinois v. Fred E. Sterling,
357 Ill. 354; 192 N.E. 229 (1934) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every
transaction into which it enters applies to judgments as well as to
contracts and other transactions."); Allen F. Moore v. Stanley F. Sievers, 336 Ill. 316; 168 N.E. 259 (1929) ("The maxim that fraud vitiates every transaction into which it enters ..."); In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill.App.2d 393 (1962) ("It is axiomatic that fraud vitiates everything."); Dunham v. Dunham, 57 Ill.App. 475 (1894), affirmed 162 Ill. 589 (1896); Skelly Oil Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 338 Ill.App. 79, 86 N.E.2d 875, 883-4 (1949); Thomas Stasel v. The American Home Security Corporation, 362 Ill. 350; 199 N.E. 798 (1935).
Judge
Orinda D. Evans’ unconscionable scheme was to continually rule against
the Defendants in spite of the evidence. She then committed perjury in
her orders so the 11th Circuit would have to base their decision on the perjured “facts of Judge Orinda D. Evans.â€
Common examples of “fraud upon the court†include the “fabrication of evidence by counsel,†Greiner, 152 F.3d at 789, and the “insert[ion of] bogus documents into the record.†Oxxford Clothes, 127 F.3d at 578. But, “[b]ecause corrupt intent knows no stylistic boundaries, fraud on the court can take many forms,†Aoude v. Mobile Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989), and courts take each case on its facts. See Dictograph Products Co. v. Sonotone Corp., 230 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir. 1956).
While
Judge Orinda D. Evans was a victim of fraud on the court, Judge Orinda
D. Evans also perpetrated fraud on the court. Judge Orinda D. Evans
willfulness has been characterized by open defiance and reckless
disregard of my Constitutional rights. This willfulness is inextricably
related to, but exceeds mere error.
A civil
judgment may be set aside because of a litigant's fraud on the court
though no wrongdoing is ascribed to an attorney or other officer of the
court. a judgment obtained by fabricated evidence.
Tampering
with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown in
my case involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a
wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the
public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated
consistently with the good order of society. Surely it cannot be that
preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always wait
upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the
agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be
mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud. The judgment involves
an issue of great moment to the public.
This is
not simply a case of a judgment obtained with the aid of a witness who,
on the basis of after-discovered evidence, is believed possibly to have
been guilty of perjury. Here we find a deliberately planned and
carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the District Court but
also the Court of Appeals. To achieve their purposes, the officers of
the court created false evidence, deceived the court, answered
interrogatories under oath untruthfully, filed false affidavits and gave
perjured testimony, introduced altered exhibits, withheld important
evidence, and filed a corrupt brief on appeal. They frustrated
discovery of its fraud through the judicial processes through abuse of
the Rules of Civil Procedure. Witnesses engaged in a concerted effort
to present perjured testimony throughout the case.
The
fraud on the court in my case was that species of fraud that defiles the
court itself and was a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so
that the judicial machinery could not perform in the usual manner in its
impartial task of adjudicating cases.
Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b) and 60(d) are two means of seeking
relief. I believe that you must first file a Rule 60(b) action in the
court where the fraud took place. If relief is denied, you can them
file a Rule 60(d) action in another court (different judge); this is a
new civil complaint. Here is an example of one such action that I filed.
In Beggerly,
the Court reviewed amended Rule 60(b) and the independent action it
allows and concluded that such an action ‘‘should be available only
to prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.’’ 524 U.S. at 47. As
support for this proposition the Court pointed not only to Hazel-Atlas, but also to Pacific R. Co. v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 111 U.S. 505 (1884), and Marshall v. Holmes,
141 U.S. 589 (1891). Independent actions must, if Rule 60(b) is to be
interpreted as a coherent whole, be reserved for those cases of
"injustices which, in certain instances, are deemed sufficiently gross
to demand a departure" from rigid adherence to the doctrine of res
judicata. Id., 524 U.S. at 46 (citing Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co.,
322 U.S. 238, 244 (1944)). In other words, a Rule 60(b) independent
action in equity "should be available only to prevent a grave
miscarriage of justice." Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 47. Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891), a case cited by the district court and the Supreme Court in Beggerly as an example of a "grave miscarriage of justice." In Marshall, an independent action in equity was allowed to proceed because the underlying judgment was secured based on a forged document.
Under
Federal law, when any officer of the court has committed "fraud on the
court," the orders and judgment of that court are void, of no legal
force or effect.
Fraud on the court has been narrowly applied and is limited to the most egregious of circumstances involving the courts. Stonger,
776 N.E.2d at 357. Further, to prove fraud on the court, it is not
enough to show a possibility that the trial court was misled. Id. at
358. Rather, there must be a showing that the trial court’s decision
was actually influenced. Id. There must be a showing of egregious
misconduct directed to the court itself.†Greiner v. City of Champlin,
152 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “Proof of the
scheme, and of its complete success up to date, is conclusive.†Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 246.
In Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Court affirmed the conviction and internment
of Fred Korematsu, an American of Japanese ancestry. In 1983, Korematsu
filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis to vacate this conviction
based on government misconduct. That misconduct included evidence that
the government’s brief in this Court had been deliberately misleading
in setting out the facts upon which the government had relied in
ordering Korematsu and, petitioners believe, this case shows that where
the stakes warrant and the opportunity exists, fraud upon the court will
occur.
“Fraud upon the court†may take the form of a scheme or plan by a
litigant, wholly without the involvement of counsel, that is intended to
corrupt the court’s decision-making. See Toscano v. Commissioner, 441 F.2d 930, 934-36 (9th Cir. 1971)
There is no statute of limitations for bringing a fraud upon the court claim. Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 244. “A decision produced by fraud on the court is not in essence a decision at all and never becomes final.†Kenner v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 387 F.2d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1968).
The
provision of Rule 60(b) commonly known as the “savings clauseâ€
states: “This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or
proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally
notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a
judgment for fraud upon the court.†The fraud upon the court described
in the savings clause is distinct from the fraud described in Rule
60(b)(3), the latter of which allows a court to relieve a party of a
judgment upon the showing of “fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party.â€
A
fraud upon the court action must satisfy a very demanding standard to
justify upsetting the finality of the challenged judgment. The Third
Circuit has described the standard as follows: In order to meet the
necessarily demanding standard for proof of fraud upon the court we
conclude that there must be: (1) an intentional fraud; (2) by an officer
of the court; (3) which is directed at the court itself; and (4) in
fact deceives the court. We further conclude that a determination of
fraud on the court may be justified only by “the most egregious
misconduct directed to the court itself,†and that it “must be
supported by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence.†Id. at
386-87 (internal footnote and citation omitted). The court further
ruled that “the fraud on the court must constitute ‘egregious
misconduct . . . such as bribery of a judge or jury or fabrication of
evidence by counsel,’†id. at 390 (citation omitted), and that “perjury by a witness is not enough to constitute fraud upon the court,†id. This is consistent with Hazel-Atlas,
which noted that its facts presented “not simply a case of a judgment
obtained with the aid of a witness who, on the basis of
after-discovered evidence, is believed possibly to have been guilty of
perjury.†322 U.S. at 245. Rather, the court found “a deliberately
planned and carefully executed scheme to defraud not only the Patent
Office but the Circuit Court of Appeals.†Id
Whether
sovereign immunity precludes an independent action against the United
States for fraud upon the court is a question of first impression for
us. United States v. Timmons, 672 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), is one of the few cases to address this question. In Timmons,
the United States first brought an ejectment action against the
defendants, who maintained that a separate trial was necessary to
address their defense that the United States had improperly acquired the
property from the defendants' ancestors. The Eleventh Circuit
recognized that a court may "entertain an independent action in equity
for relief from judgment on the basis of its independent and substantive
equitable jurisdiction." Id. at 1378.
The power to vacate a judgment that has been obtained by a fraud on the court is inherent in all courts. Wright, Miller & Kane at § 2870 (citing Universal Oil Products Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946)). Almost all of the principles governing a claim of fraud on the court are derivable from Hazel-Atlas, supra. Wright, Miller & Kane
at § 2870. If it is found that there was a fraud on the court, the
judgment should be vacated and the guilty party denied all relief. Id.; Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 250-51. The entire cost of the proceedings, including attorneys' fees, may be assessed against the guilty party. Universal Oil Products, 328 U.S. at 580.
In
order to prevail on an independent action in equity to obtain relief
from judgment, the party against whom a judgment is entered is required
to establish: (1) the existence of a judgment which ought not, in equity
and good conscience, be enforced; (2) a valid defense to the alleged
claim upon which the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident or mistake
which prevented a party to the judgment from obtaining the benefit of
his defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence by the party seeking
relief from the judgment; and (5) no adequate remedy at law. McGinnity, supra; See also National Surety Company v. State, 120 F. 593 (8th Cir. 1903); Bankers Mortgage Company v. United States,
423 F.2d 73 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927, 90 S.Ct. 2242,
26 L.Ed.2d. 793 (1970). Accordingly, if these five (5) elements could
be established, a party could prevail on an independent action in equity
to obtain relief from judgment, despite the procedural limitations
embodied in the court rules and the other recognized means of providing a
party relief from judgment.
As
an "elementary" consideration before entertaining an independent action
in equity to obtain relief from judgment, the party seeking relief is
required to exhaust all his remedies at law. Kitzman, supra, at 586; Smeland, supra, at 987; Resaake,
supra, at 566. Similarly, where a party should have brought a motion
under the code of civil procedure for relief from judgment (see Kitzman, supra, at 586) or a party could have properly asked the court to invoke its inherent powers to vacate a judgment (see Smeland,
supra, at 987), the court could not entertain an independent action.
Conversely, where a party seeks relief from judgment by motion but does
not meet the mandates of the procedural rules, his appropriate remedy is
maintained through an equitable action for relief from that judgment. Resaake, supra, at 566.
An “‘independent action alleging fraud upon the court is completely distinct from a motion under [FRCP] 60(b).’†United States v. Burke, No. 05-5277, 2006 WL 2135044, *1 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Herring v. United States, 424 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2005)); see also United States v. Barbosa, No. 07-1292, 2007 WL 2050881, *1 (3d Cir. 2007)
The
standard the Sixth Circuit has announced for independent actions, for
example, requires conduct: 1. On the part of an officer of the court; 2.
That is directed to the ‘‘judicial machinery’’ itself; 3. That
is intentionally false, willfully blind to the truth, or is in reckless
disregard for the truth; 4. That is a positive averment or is
concealment when one is under a duty to disclose; 5. That deceives the
court. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 348 (6th Cir.
1993) This standard recognizes that fraud upon the court, unlike
perjury, need not be based on affirmative misstatements, but may be
based on nondisclosures, and need not be based on proof of subjective
knowledge of falsity, but may be founded on a showing of willful
blindness or reckless disregard for the truth.
Other circuits have adopted more general standards. See, e.g., Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st
Cir. 1989) (“fraud upon the court is an ‘‘unconscionable scheme
calculated to interfere with the judicial system’s ability impartially
to adjudicate a matter by improperly influencing the trier or unfairly
hampering the presentation of the opposing party’s claim or
defenseâ€); Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1989) (“fraud which seriously affects the integrity of the normal process of adjudicationâ€); Rozier v. Ford Motor Co.,
573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978) (“only the most egregious
conduct, such as bribery of a judge or members of the jury, or the
fabrication of evidence by a party in which an attorney is
implicatedâ€); Oxxford Clothes XX, Inc. v. Expeditors Int’l, Inc.,
127 F.3d 574, 578 (7th Cir. 1997) (“conduct that might be thought to
corrupt the judicial process itself, as where a party bribes a judge or
inserts bogus documents into the recordâ€); Greiner v. City of Champlin, 152 F.3d 787, 789 (8th Cir. 1998) (“egregious misconduct directed to the court itselfâ€); Dixon v. Commissioner,
No. 00-70858, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 4831, at *11-12 (9th Cir. Mar. 18,
2003), amending 316 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2003) (“unconscionable plan or
scheme which is designed to improperly influence the court in its
decisionâ€).
"Fraud
upon the court" as distinguished from fraud on an adverse party is
limited to fraud which seriously affects the integrity of the normal
process of adjudication. Gleason v. Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556, 559 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Area Boliviana,
24 F.3d 457, 460 (2d Cir., 1994). The concept of "fraud on the court"
embraces "only that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, defile
the court itself, or is a fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases." Kupferman v. Consol. Research & Mfg. Corp., 459 F.2d 1072, 1078 (3d Cir. 1972) (citations omitted). Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1325 (2d Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
The
Ninth Circuit has fashioned a slightly different definition, holding
that "to set aside a judgment or order because of fraud upon the court,
... it is necessary to show an unconscionable plan or scheme which is
designed to improperly influence the court in its decision." Bailey v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 98-CV-123-TUC-RTT (JMR), 1998 U.S. Dist. Lexis 21517 at *26 (D. Ariz. 1998) (citing Wright, Miller & Kane at § 2870 (quoting England v. Doyle, 21 F.2d 304, 309 (9th Cir. 1960)).
The
Fifth Circuit has defined fraud on the court to mean a "scheme by which
the integrity of the judicial process has been fraudulently subverted
by a deliberately planned scheme in a manner involving 'far more than an
injury to a single litigant.'" Addington v. Farmer's Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 650 F.2d 663, 668 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981) (citing, among other authorities, Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. at 245-46; Wright, Miller & Kane at § 2870).
Federal
courts have found that there are three ways to attack a judgment on
grounds of fraud on the court pursuant to this rule. See, e.g., United States v. Buck,
281 F.3d 1336, 1341-42 (10th Cir. 2002). One method is an independent
action for fraud on the court pursuant to the savings clause in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which provides that it “does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a
party from a judgment, order, or proceeding[.]†Buck, 281 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)).
To prove fraud on the court, it is not enough to show a possibility that the trial court was misled. Humbert, 655 N.E.2d at 607; K.M., 651 N.E.2d at 277; Pinter v. Pinter,
641 N.E.2d 101, 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). Rather, there must be a
showing that the trial court’s decision was actually influenced. G.H. Skala Const. Co. v. NPW, Inc., 704 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied.
The
movant must establish that an unconscionable plan or scheme was used to
improperly influence the court’s decision and that such acts
prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting its case or
defense. See In re Adoption of Infant Female Fitz, 778
N.E.2d 432, 437 (Ind. Ct App. 2002). Fraud on the court requires a
"scheme by which the integrity of the judicial process has been
fraudulently subverted by a deliberately planned scheme in a manner
involving'far more than an injury to a single litigant.`" Addington (Page 9) Farmer's Elevator Mutual Insurance, 650 F.2d 663, 668 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. 238, 245-46, 64 S.Ct. 997, 1002 (1944)). See Davenport Recycling Assocs. v. C.I.R.,
220 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000) (alleged fraud on tax court).
“It has been found only in those instances where the fraud vitiates
the court’s ability to reach an impartial disposition of the case
before it.†Id.
All
courts have the inherent equitable power to vacate a judgment that has
been obtained through the commission of fraud upon the court. Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Root Ref. Co., 328 U.S. 575, 580 (1946).
While
an attorney should represent his client with singular loyalty that
loyalty obviously does not demand that he act dishonestly or
fraudulently; on the contrary, his loyalty to the court, as an officer
thereof, demands integrity and honest dealing with the court. And when
he departs from that standard in the conduct of a case, he perpetrates a
fraud upon the court.
Hazel-Atlas
is a prime example of a situation for which the independent action was
preserved under amended Rule 60(b). 28 U.S.C. App., Fed R. Civ. P. 60,
Advisory Committee’s Notes on 1946 Amendment, at p. 795 (‘‘the
rule expressly does not limit the power of the court, when fraud has
been perpetrated upon it, to give relief under the saving clause. As an
illustration of this situation, see Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).’’). See also Beggerly,
524 U.S. at 46. The Court observed that the federal courts’ equitable
power to set aside a final judgment obtained by fraud was well
established and that, notwithstanding the ‘‘deep-rooted policy’’
of finality, ‘‘where the occasion has demanded, where enforcement
of the judgment is ‘manifestly unconscionable,’ they have wielded
the power without hesitation.’’ 322 U.S. at 244-45 (citations and
footnote omitted)
Realize
that the employees of the office of the clerk of the court are all
officers of the court. When the clerk's office fails to docket your
filings, changes docket entries, backdates docket entries, and issues
invalid orders that do not bear the signature of the clerk and the seal
of the court, these are all acts that are grounds for a finding of fraud
upon the court. I have been amazed at the extent of the fraud
perpetrated against me by the office of the clerk of the court.
This article focuses on federal court, but many states have similar statutes.
I will
always file actions attempting to set aside orders and judgments when I
can prove fraud upon the courts. Before you do so, realize that corrupt
judges will probably punish you by awarding massive legal fees
sanctions against you. My experience is that judges ignore the facts,
ignore the law, commit crimes regularly, and will do anything to damage
and stop anyone from attempting to prove fraud upon the court.
I,
William M. Windsor, am not an attorney. This website expresses my
OPINIONS. The comments of visitors or
guest authors to the website are their
opinions and do not therefore reflect my
opinions. Anyone mentioned by name in any article is
welcome to file a response. This website
does not provide legal advice. I do not give
legal advice. I do not practice law. This
website is to expose government corruption, law
enforcement corruption, political corruption,
and judicial corruption. Whatever this
website says about the law is presented in the
context of how I or others perceive the
applicability of the law to a set of circumstances
if I (or some other author) was in the
circumstances under the conditions discussed.
Despite my concerns about lawyers in general,
I suggest that anyone with legal questions
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