Tuesday, October 18, 2011

ARTICLE 109-AGREEMENT


Article 109-Agreement        
Canon 2144           
An Agreement, is any mutual oath, vow, deed, covenant, will or pact between two or more Persons through valid Document Form to do or refrain from doing certain Acts or obligations.           
Canon 2145           
By definition an Agreement is only valid when it is registered into a Great Register of a Ucadian Society.           
Canon 2146           
Agreements may be defined by two main types as defined by the way the primary relationship between the parties is formed in agreement: (1) unilateral and (2) bilateral:            
(i) A bilateral agreement , is an agreement in which each of the parties to the contract makes a promise or promises to the other party; and           
(ii) A unilateral agreement , is where only one party to the contract makes a promise.           
Canon 2147           
An Agreement is neither valid nor enforceable unless it complies to the following nine (9) essential elements:           
(i) Conformity and Accordance in form and content to these canons and the most sacred covenant Pactum De Singularis Caelum; and
(ii) Independent Minds being two or more parties with each possessing an independent mind having the powers of cognition, free will and intention; and
(iii) Good Faith being the clear intention by all parties to act ethically and fairly to reach an agreement; and           
(iv) Clean Hands being the clear intention to avoid any unethical behavior or failure to disclose a pecuniary or conflicting interest, some significant flaw or unfair advantage; and            
(v) Competency and Authority that both parties are mentally competent to enter into an agreement and possess the authority to do so; and
(vi) Legitimate Offer made by one party to the other; and
(vii) Valuable Consideration made by the receiving party to the legitimate offer; and
(viii) Remedy and Relief for all parties in the event of some disagreement or breach; and           
(viii) Penalties and Charges proposed by one or the other party in the event of some disagreement or breach; and
(ix) Mutual assent, also known as mutual agreement and concurrence of wills (consensus ad idem) being a meeting of the minds.
Canon 2148           
In the interpretation of an Agreement against the rules of general validity, the following general guidelines are to be followed:           
(i) The common intention of the parties rather than adherence to the literal meaning of the words shall be sought in interpreting a contract; and           
(ii) In interpreting a contract, the prime form of the contract and the common interpretations given to it by statute, previous court decision and use are to be taken into account; and           
(iii) Each clause of an agreement is interpreted in light of the others so that each is given the meaning derived from the contract as a whole; and           
(iv) A clause is given a meaning that gives it some effect rather than one that gives it no effect; and           
(v) Words susceptible of two meanings shall be given the meaning that best conforms to the subject matter of the agreement; and           
(vi) A clause intended to eliminate doubt as to the application of the contract to a specific situation does not restrict the scope of a contract otherwise expressed in general terms; and           
(vii) The clauses of an agreement cover only what it appears that the parties intended to include, however general the terms used; and           
(viii) In case of doubt, an agreement is interpreted in favour of the person who made the consideration and accepted the obligation and against the person who stipulated it. In all cases, it is interpreted in favour of the adhering party or the consumer.           
Canon 2149           
While the rules of general validity must be met for an Agreement to be valid, the rule of consent is such that it requires further detail. The following elements if one or more are identified void consent:           
(i) That the person did not not give consent, but the other party commited a fraud by indicating consent was given through forgery; or           
(ii) That the person making consent was not authorized to make such consent; or           
(iii) That the person making consent was not competent at the time to make such a consent; or           
(iv) That the person making consent did so under clear pressure and/or duress; or           
(v) That the person making consent did so under threat of harm or injury to other person or property.           
Canon 2150           
An Agreement creates obligations and, in certain cases, modifies or extinguishes them.           
Canon 2151           
Valid Agreements must be kept.           
Canon 2152           
An Agreement between inferior persons cannot abrogate, modify, supercede or replace an Agreement between superior persons. Therefore, no Agreement claimed by a Roman society or its agents can claim to be superior to an Agreement issued in accordance with these canons.           
Canon 2153           
As any claimed Agreement by a Roman society cannot abrogate, modify, supercede or replace an Agreement between superior persons, any Agreement entered into through a Roman society shall have no force of law, binding nor validity when challenged in accordance with these canons.           
Canon 2154           
A Breach of agreement is a legal cause of action in which a binding agreement or bargained exchange is not honored by one or more of the parties to the contract by non-performance or interference with the other party’s performance.           
Canon 2155           
There are primarily three classes of breaches of agreements: Minor, Material and Fundamental:           
(i) A minor breach, also known as a partial breach occurs when the non-breaching party is only entitled to collect the actual amount of damages and not for any order for performance of obligations; and           
(ii) A material breach is any failure to perform that permits the other party of the agreement to either compel performance or collect damages because of the breach; and              
(iii) A fundamental breach is a breach so fundamental that it permits the aggrieved party to terminate performance of the agreement, in addition to entitling that party to sue for damages.           
Canon 2156           
Proof of fraud in construction, disclosure or performance of an Agreement constitutes a fundamental breach.           
Canon 2157           
An agreement founded on fraud is null and void.

Monday, October 17, 2011

LAWYERS PROHIBITED FROM SITTING IN PARLIAMENT


By Undisclosed SOS Subscriber
In 1828, before the lawyers became numerous like fleas on a dog, or stick-fast fleas on a chicken, which kill the chicken, the Bible and the Imperial Acts arising from it were the LAW. Yes you may pass it on and thank you. Two party communism is still democracy, but Christianity, under a Sovereign, is the basis of our legal system, and while republics have all perished or are heading that way, this system, based on mercy, has survived since 1297. We have never lost a war against the Roman Catholics Kings or republics, or Islam. That is why they took Jesus out and killed him. The difference was in the individual heart of the soldier. The other were brave, but we prevailed. The email sent listed below.
NOTICE UNDER SECTION 46 Australian Constitution 
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46 Penalty for sitting when disqualified Until the Parliament otherwise provides, any person declared by this Constitution to be incapable of sitting as a senator or as a member of the House of Representatives shall, for every day on which he so sits, be liable to pay the sum of one hundred pounds to any person who sues for it in any court of competent jurisdiction. 
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From (SOS Subscriber name withheld) 
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To John Winston Howard Member for Bennelong. House of Representatives Canberra. 
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15th November 2005. 
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Dear Sir, 
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BE WARNED: You are disqualified from Parliament by the Imperial Act attached to this letter, and are given a chance to resign forthwith, or face prosecution under Section 46 Australian Constitution. There are 32 lawyers in the House of Representatives, or almost one quarter of the House, and 22 (twenty two) in the Senate, and all held or could hold an office of profit under the Crown, as officers of the Supreme Court and High Court in their respective States. This means an automatic disqualification from being elected. Since employers are usually the only ones who can regularly access legal advice at the prices lawyers charge, the lawyers in parliament are a member of a class of people who receive a pecuniary benefit from the laws they pass.
This mischief was addressed and cured in this year, by an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament, of exactly the same standing as the Australian Constitution, the Imperial Act under which Parliament is constituted. This is the text. 46 Edward III AD 1372 Description: http://www.essentialsecurity.com.au/pics/para.gif
80. Lawyers and Sheriffs excluded from Parliament 
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WHEREAS men of the law who follow divers businesses in the king's courts on behalf of private persons, with whom they are, do procure and cause to be brought into parliament many petitions in the name of the commons, which in no wise relate to them, but only the private persons with whom they are engaged; also sheriffs who are common officers for the people, and ought to be abiding in their office, for the doing right to every one, are named, and have heretofore been and returned to parliament knights of the shires, by the same sheriffs; it is accorded and assented in this parliament, that hereafter no man of the law following business in the king's court, nor any sheriff for the time that he is sheriff, be returned nor accepted knights of the shires; nor that they who are men of the law and sheriffs now returned to parliament have any wages; but the king willeth that knights and sergeants of the most worthy of the county be hereafter returned knights in parliament; and that they be elected in full county.
Now that you know about this enactment, which by reference to Section 143 (1) (a) , Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) is strictly proved once presented in any court, you can take no further part in any proceedings in parliament, and neither can any of the other 32 lawyers in the House of Representatives, and 22 in the Senate. It would appear that by reference to this Act, legislation passed recently is invalid, and was obtained by a fraud on the Constitution.
If you resign immediately, you will probably retain your pension and entitlements, unless the new Parliament strips them from you, however, for every day you continue to sit, you are liable to a penalty of $100. Your salary must also stop immediately.
Imperial enactments came to Australia in the Australian Courts Act 1828, and evidence may be found in the Australia Act 1986, in Section 11, that this legislation remains un-repealed. Much fraudulent legislation has been enacted by Parliaments that have had lawyers participating, and much work will need to be done to repair the damage. Most Courts created by the Parliament since 1970, are fraudulently constituted with your fellow lawyers as absolute power-mongers in control.
The Constitution, in Section 108, prohibits the States from repealing Imperial enactments, and Section 118 brings in all the Imperial Acts forming part of the law in 1900. Lawyers have a genetic fault in their makeup, which allows them to listen, but not hear. Section 128 Constitution prohibits Her Majesty ELIZABETH THE SECOND from assenting to such laws, without a referendum, because they are the matrix on top of which the Constitution sits like a jewel. The Imperial Acts are the foundation stones on which justice has been built.
Luke 11 Verses 46 and 52, of the Gospels that Her Majesty ELIZABETH THE SECOND, has taken an oath to uphold, as set out on the 1 Will and Mary C 6 (Coronation Oath) (1688) deals with lawyers, and the description is pertinent today as it was 2000 years ago. 46 Says: "Woe unto you ye lawyers, for ye lade men with burdens grievous to be borne, and ye yourselves touch not the burdens with one of your fingers." And Verse 52 says: "Woe unto you lawyers! For ye have taken away the key of knowledge: ye entered not in yourselves , and them that were entering in ye hindered." The Parliament of the United Kingdom in 1372, passed judgment upon you, and it remains in force to this day.
By Section 61 Constitution the Governor General as a military man, and the Queen's representative in Australia is obliged to withdraw your commission, on being satisfied, on the evidence that you were a lawyer, before entering Parliament, because he is responsible for upholding the Constitution and the laws that are conditions precedent to its enactment, from the British Constitution. In Section 62 Constitution the Governor General has an absolute discretion to dismiss you, at his pleasure, and he must be displeased, at the dirty deeds you are attempting to have him consent to. He must reserve these Bills, under S 58 Constitution, and may suggest amendments under the same section.
Before the Queen may allow these fundamental changes to the Australian Constitution she must withhold Her pleasure until a referendum is held under section 128 Constitution.
This is the warning you are entitled to as a Christian from Matthew Description: http://www.essentialsecurity.com.au/pics/para.gif
18 Verse 15, but should you not heed it, then you may expect further action promptly. 
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Yours sincerely 
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(Name withheld by SOS) 
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Carbon Copies to: 
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The Governor General of Australia 
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The President of the ACTU 
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The Secretary of the ACTU 
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. The Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions. 
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The Chief of the Federal Police. 
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The Australian Broadcasting Commission. 
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The Electoral Commission. 
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Chief Justice of the High Court. 
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A further email sent to Ian Harris:You might like to email Mr Harris also, and have as many as possible tell him what we think of lawyers. Click Here to send an email


Mr Ian Harris 
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Clerk of the House of Representatives 
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. Canberra 2600 
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18th November 2005 
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Dear Mr Harris,
I am delighted your background is not as a lawyer, but that you have followed an honest career.
You may not be aware of the destruction of the rule of law in New South Wales. It has come about because in 1969, the lawyers mounted a coup d'etat in New South Wales and took power away from the parliament and into their own hands. They did this in two ways. The first was enacting Section 6 Supreme Court Act 1970. That was possible because they had purported to repeal Imperial Acts in 1969, when in fact this is not possible. Section 108 Australian Constitution forbids it.
As a result many became very wealthy, selling indults, or licences to break the law to big corporations, taxing the little people to an obscene degree, and not taxing corporations. There is a plethora of self serving legislation, that lawyers have persuaded the Parliament of the Commonwealth to enact, which should never have been assented to. Not the least of which is the COMMON INFORMERS (PARLIAMENTARY DISQUALIFICATIONS) ACT 1975,which materially alters the Australian Constitution without the benefit of a referendum. It diminishes the Queen's authority, to act through and of Her Courts. It tends to bring Her authority into disrepute. By giving the High Court exclusive authority, a Court that has never sat without lawyers as judges of both fact and law, contrary to Section 79 Australian Constitution, the Parliament of the Commonwealth has cemented corruption into place.
Lawyers were banned from Parliament from 1372 AD, and should never have been allowed to sneak back into its sacred halls. The law against them being there is still on foot, and may be found in the law library at the University, in Chitty's Statutes. I append it. Hiding the law is a favourite lawyers trick, and unfortunately this law has been hidden, and some of this banned class of people have wormed their way into Parliament. They must be removed and peace restored to the community.
46 Edward III AD 1372 Description: http://www.essentialsecurity.com.au/pics/para.gif
80. Lawyers and Sheriffs excluded from Parliament
WHEREAS men of the law who follow divers businesses in the king's courts on behalf of private persons, with whom they are, do procure and cause to be brought into parliament many petitions in the name of the commons, which in no wise relate to them, but only the private persons with whom they are engaged; also sheriffs who are common officers for the people, and ought to be abiding in their office, for the doing right to every one, are named, and have heretofore been and returned to parliament knights of the shires, by the same sheriffs; it is accorded and assented in this parliament, that hereafter no man of the law following business in the king's court, nor any sheriff for the time that he is sheriff, be returned nor accepted knights of the shires; nor that they who are men of the law and sheriffs now returned to parliament have any wages; but the king willeth that knights and sergeants of the most worthy of the county be hereafter returned knights in parliament; and that they be elected in full county.
It is sedition, within the definition of sedition, in Section 24A Crimes Act 1914 for any lawyer to sit in Parliament as a member. Because they are excluded from Parliament by an Act that is binding on the Sovereign, reproduced above, and on them, they have been adjudged incompetent to take part in Parliament. There are a number of persons currently members of the House of Representatives not entitled to be there, and you should firstly consult the Governor General who has absolute jurisdiction over this particular area of the law, by reference to section 61 Constitution and by Section 62 has an absolute discretion as to which members can hold commissions. You should then order the security at Parliament house to exclude them from the House.
The proposed Industrial Relations Legislation is seditious. It has already promoted feelings of ill-will and hostility between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects so as to endanger the peace order and good government of the Commonwealth of Australia. Your fellow Clerk, Harry Evans should do the same in the Senate. Notwithstanding the Common Informers Act 1975, an indictment may be laid without the consent of the Attorney General, who is a lawyer and must be excluded, under Section 24E Crimes Act 1914.
I would ask that you do this promptly, and exclude the 32 lawyers who currently sit and vote in the House without lawful authority.
Yours sincerely (Name withheld by SOS)
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Governor General 
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ACTU Melbourne

Friday, October 14, 2011

TRANSPORT REGULATION ACT 1958 & 1983

TRANSPORT REGULATION ACT 1958.
 An Act to consolidate the Law relating to the Transport Regulation Board and Commercial Passenger Vehicles.
[30th September, 1958.]
3. (1) In this Act unless inconsistent with the context or subject-matter—
" Motor car " means motor car within the meaning of the Motor Car Act 1958.
" Operate" means (in the case of any vehicle) carry passengers for hire or reward or for any consideration or in the course of any trade or business whatsoever, and " operation " has a corresponding interpretation.
" Owner " includes every person who is the owner or the joint owner or part owner of a commercial passenger vehicle and any person who has the use of any vehicle under a hiring or hire purchase agreement, and includes any person in whose name a vehicle is registered under the Motor Car Act 1958, but does not include an unpaid vendor of a vehicle under a hire purchase agreement.
" Passenger " does not include driver or conductor.
" Public highway" means any street road lane bridge public thoroughfare or place open to or used by the public for passage with vehicles.
(2) A motor car shall be deemed to operate as a commercial passenger vehicle if any offer is made to carry passengers therein for hire or reward or for any consideration or in the course of any trade or business whatsoever.
An Act to amend the Transport Regulation Act 1958, and for other purposes.
[6th December, 1977.]
1. (1) This Act may be cited as the Transport Regulation (Amendment) Act 1977
(2) In this Act the Transport Regulation Act 1958 is called the Principal Act. 
2. After section 3 (2) of the Principal Act there shall be inserted the following sub-section :—
" (3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2)—
{a) a motor car is not a commercial passenger vehicle by reason only of the fact that it is used or intended to be used for carrying passengers for a consideration consisting only of the right of the owner or driver thereof or a member of the family of the owner or driver thereof residing in the same household with him to be carried on any occasion as a passenger in another motor car without charge ; and
(b) a motor car shall not be deemed to operate as a commercial passenger vehicle by reason only of the making of an offer to carry passengers therein for a consideration consisting only of the right of the owner or driver thereof or a member of the family of the owner or driver thereof residing in the same household with him to be carried on any occasion as a passenger in another motor car without charge.
" Transport Act 1983 No. 9921
An Act to Re-enact with Amendments the Law relating to Transport including the Law with respect to Railways, Roads and Tramways, to repeal the Country Roads Act 1958, the Melbourne and Metropolitan Tramways Act 1958, the Ministry of Transport Act 1958, the Railway Lands Acquisition Act 1958, the Railways Act 1958, the Road Traffic Act 1958, the Transport Regulation Act 1958, the Melbourne Underground Rail Loop Act 1970, the Recreation Vehicles Act 1973, the Railway Construction and Property Board Act 1979 and certain other Acts, to make consequential amendments to various Acts and for other purposes.
[Assented to 23 June 1983]
Part VI.—Traffic Regulation, Registration and Licensing ss. 86-207.
Division 1 —General Provisions ss. 86-91. Division 2—Traffic Regulation ss. 92-97,
Division 3—Recreation Vehicles ss. 98-118.
Division 4—Road Transport Licensing Tribunal ss. 119-137.
Division 5—Commercial Passenger Vehicles ss. 138-162.
Division 6—Private Omnibuses ss. 163-166,
Division 7—Hire and Drive Omnibuses ss. 167-170.
Division 8—Tow Trucks ss. 171-185.
Division 9—Commercial Goods Vehicles ss. 186-197.
Division 10—Passenger Ferry Services ss. 198-207.
Part VII.—Prosecutions, Enforcement and Penalties ss. 208-230.
Division I—Interpretations s. 208.
Division 2—Infringements ss. 209-215.
Division 3—Enforcement Provisions ss. 216-220,
Division 4—Offences and Penalties ss. 221-228.
Division 5—Prosecutions and Evidentiary Provisions ss. 229-230,
DIVISION 2—TRAFFIC REGULATION 92.
In this Division unless inconsistent with the context or subject- matter—
"Owner", in respect of a vehicle—
(a) where the vehicle is a motor car, means the person in whose name the motor car is registered under the Motor Car Act 1958 or any Act or Ordinance of any State or Territory of the Commonwealth corresponding to that Act (whether the property in the motor car is vested in him or not); and
(b) where the vehicle is not a motor car, includes a sole owner, joint owner or part owner of the vehicle or any person who has the possession and use thereof under or subject to a hire-purchase agreement or bill of sale or like instrument.
93. (1) The Governor in Council may make regulations for or with respect to the regulation and control of vehicular animal or pedestrian traffic on streets or roads and any matter incidental or related thereto and in particular without affecting the generality of the foregoing for and with respect to—
(a) prescribing rules to be observed [does not say obey] by persons driving or in charge of vehicles or animals and by pedestrians and maximum speeds for vehicles;
(b) prescribing standard warning and operative signs and safety devices and the siting thereof and regulating the installation and maintenance thereof;
(c) prescribing marks for use on the surface of streets or roads;
(d) prescribing the legal effect of any such signs devices or marks and the evidence that shall be sufficient to prove the existence of any such sign device or mark;
(e) eliminating causes of danger and of congestion of traffic;
(f) delegating—
(i) to a municipal council or any officer of a municipal council;
(ii) to a prescribed public authority or any other officer of a prescribed public authority; or
(iii) to any other prescribed person— any authority, discretion or power in relation to the regulations subject to any conditions or restrictions that the Governor in Council thinks fit;
(g) regulating bicycle racing or speed trials on any highway;
(h) prescribing penalties not exceeding 8 penalty units for any breach of the regulations; and
(i) generally prescribing any matter or thing authorized or required to be prescribed by this Division.
(2) Any such regulation may be general or may be restricted in operation as to time place vehicles persons or circumstances whether any such time place vehicle person or circumstance is determined or ascertainable before at or after the making of the regulation. (3) Regulations made under sub-section (1) shall have full force and effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any regulation or by-law made under this Act or under any other Act.
(4) Any provisions of any regulation or by-law made under any other Part of this Act or under any other Act which are inconsistent with any regulation made under sub-section (1) or any by-law which limits the speed at which vehicles may be driven shall be of no force or effect.
(5) The Governor in Council may by Order at the request of any public authority or other person prescribed for the purposes of this section extend the application of the provisions of this Division to any land or premises vested therein or under the control thereof and thereupon the provisions of this Division and the regulations made hereunder shall extend and apply to the land or premises so far as applicable and with such modifications as are necessary in all respects as if the land or premises were a street or road and, in particular, with the modification that in any such regulations any reference to a highway authority shall be read and construed as including the public authority or other person in which the land or premises is vested or by which the land or premises is controlled (as the case requires).
(6) The Governor in Council may by Order at the request of the Minister of Public Works extend the application of the provisions of this Division to any land or premises used for or in connexion with any public offices of the Crown and thereupon the provisions of this Division and any regulations made hereunder shall extend and apply to the land or premises so far as applicable and with such modifications as are necessary in all respects as if the land or premises were a street or road and, in particular, with the modification that in any such regulation any reference to a highway authority shall be read and construed as including the Minister of Public Works. 
(7) Any person or body corporate having authority pursuant to the regulations made under this Division so to do may, without unduly obstructing the thoroughfare, install and maintain in or upon any street or road any standard warning or operative sign or safety device or mark, parking area, traffic island, or other device or thing prescribed or authorized by such regulations for the regulation and control of vehicular animal or pedestrian traffic.
(8) The mere presence on any street or road of any such installation or of any pole barrier stand or other device used in connexion therewith or for the support thereof shall not of itself constitute the installation or any such pole barrier stand or other device an unlawful obstruction of or interference with any such street or road or the use thereof Where any such installation or any barrier pole flag or other device operated or used in connexion therewith requires or is authorized to be operated or used by some person to be effective for the regulation and control of vehicular animal or pedestrian traffic the operation or use thereof in accordance with the regulations shall not for any purpose be regarded as an unlawful obstruction of or interference with any such street or road or the use thereof. 95. Any person guilty of an offence against this Division or who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of the regulations made under this Division for which no other penalty is provided shall be liable to a penalty of not more than 8 penalty units. 96. Any member of the police force may without warrant arrest any person who within his view commits any offence against this Division or against any regulation made under this Division and who upon being requested to give his name and address refuses or fails to do so or gives a name or address which the member of the police force reasonably suspects to be false.
DIVISION 1—INTERPRETATIONS
208. In this Part unless inconsistent with the context or subject-matter—
"Authorized officer" means a person who may take proceedings for any breach of regulations made under section 93 pursuant to section 97(l) or 97(2).
"Infringement" means a parking infringement, a traffic infringement or a transport infringement.
"Motor Car" means a motor car within the meaning of the Motor Car Act 1958 and includes a trailer.
"Owner"—
(a) where the vehicle is a motor car, means the person in whose name the motor car is registered under the Motor Car Act 1958 or any Act or Ordinance of any State or Territory of the Commonwealth corresponding to that Act (whether the property in the motor car is vested in him or not); and
(b) where the vehicle is not a motor car, includes a sole owner, joint owner or part owner of the vehicle or any person who has the possession and use thereof under or subject to a hire-purchase agreement or bill of sale or like instrument.
"Prosecution officer" means a person appointed for the purposes of this Part by the Chief Commissioner of Police or a person who may take proceedings for any breach of a regulation made under section 93 pursuant to paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of section 97(1). 
DIVISION 2—INFRINGEMENTS
209. (1) When any parking infringement occurs in relation to any vehicle the person who at the time of the occurrence of the parking infringement is the owner of the vehicle shall by virtue of this section be and be deemed to be guilty of an offence against the Act by-law rule or regulation concerned in all respects as if he were the actual offender guilty of the infringement unless the court is satisfied that the vehicle was a stolen vehicle or a vehicle illegally taken or used.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall affect the liability of the actual offender, but where the full amount of any penalty has been paid by the actual offender or owner in relation to any parking infringement (whether pursuant to section 210 or upon the order of a stipendiary magistrate or Magistrates' Court) no further penalty shall be imposed on or recovered from the owner or actual offender in relation thereto.
(3) Notwithstanding anything in sub-sections (1) or (2) no owner of the vehicle shall by virtue of this section be guilty of an offence if—
(a) before or within fourteen days after the service on him of a summons in respect of the parking infringement concerned he supplies in a sworn statement in writing to the informant the name and address of the person who was in charge of the vehicle at the relevant time; or
(b) he satisfies the court that he did not know and could not with reasonable diligence have ascertained such name and address.
(4) Any statement purporting to be made under sub-section (3) (a) if produced in any proceedings against the person named therein and in respect of the parking infringement concerned shall be prima facie' evidence that such person was in charge of the vehicle at all relevant times relating to such parking infringement.

ACCEPT THE DEED AND BE THE OWNER

Thursday, October 13, 2011

DR. MICHAEL LABOSSIERE INTERVIEW, “LOGICAL FALLACIES: THE CRITICAL THINKING MEME″ – #062

January 25, 2010 Posts by Jan Irvin

What would happen if everyone in society received an immunization against all of today’s media and political propaganda? Is there a simple, logical process to arm ourselves against such attempts at mind manipulation and control? What if you had the ability to quickly and easily break down words and sentences to identify lies and untruths and propaganda? What do grammar and rhetoric have to do with logic and critical thinking, or, for that matter, marketing, PR and propaganda spin, and more importantly, exactly how can they help you? If someone presents evidence of a claim, do you have a mental duty to study it before you attack it? How can we make our minds sharper? Is it possible to level the playing field against corporate and government propaganda by creating a critical thinking meme? Today we launch the critical thinking meme into society and I ask for your help to spread it, to share today’s talk with all you know: friends, co-workers, family, business associates and school mates. If you want to help make an immediate change in your own and other people’s lives for the better, today’s show is one of the primary ways to do it. We’re going to continue our study of the trivium with Dr. Michael Labossiere who is here to discuss logical fallacies. Micheal will be back in the next week or two to also discuss the subject and predicate. This show is being released on Monday, January 25, 2010. My interview with Michael Labossiere was recorded on January 09, 2010. Michael LaBossiere is a guy from Maine who went to school in Ohio and ended up in Florida. Professionally he is a philosophy professor at Florida A&M University. He started teaching there in the Fall of 1993 and greatly enjoy his choice of careers. He teaches a wide variety of classes that range from Aesthetics (theories of art and beauty) to Theory of Knowledge. His first philosophy book, What Don’t You Know? hit the shelves in the spring of 2008. He also blogs for The Philosophers’ Magazine and has numerous academic publications. In addition to his love of wisdom, he has a great love of running. Michael started running at the age of fifteen. He tried out for the basketball team, but sucked badly. The coach told him that the track team had to take anyone and suggested that he become a runner. It turned out to be a great choice. He ran in high school and then ran in college. He kept running in grad school and still runs today, mostly to combat the effects of pie consumption. He is a member of the Gulf Winds Track Club, the local running club in Tallahassee. Michael also enjoys the martial arts, specifically tae kwon do. He started training in grad school at Ohio State and still practices today. He enjoys the physical and mental training. Plus, hitting a punching bag is a great way to burn off stress. It also makes it possible to survive committee meetings. He started gaming (Dungeons & Dragons) when he was 15 and fell in love with the idea of creating worlds and stories and ended up writing professionally for several game companies. Yes, gaming is for nerds- he freely accept his nerdtastic ways. He also enjoys computer and console gaming. Despite playing far too much World of Warcraft, he claims he is not obsessed with games and alleges that reality is still much better than virtual reality. He is very fond of animals and has two cats (Ash & Zax) and a hyper husky (Isis). Here are the links My philosophy blog:http://aphilosopher.wordpress.com/ The Philosophers’ Magazine Blog: http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/ My website:www.opifexphoenix.com Gulf Winds Track Club: www.gulfwinds.org/

Monday, October 10, 2011

ACCC CALLS FOR HARSHER PENALTIES FOR CARTEL



PM - Friday, 2 November , 2007  Reporter: Alison Caldwell

MARK COLVIN: The head of the competition regulator has urged the Federal Government to bring in criminal sanctions for companies guilty of cartel behaviour.

The ACCC Chairman Graeme Samuel said Australia should fall in line with other countries to impose criminal sanctions, including jail terms, for those who engage in cartel activities.

He was responding to the news that the packaging giant Visy had been fined $36-million for a four-year price-fixing and cartel scheme with rival company Amcor.

Visy's billionaire chairman Richard Pratt wasn't in court today, and he escaped a personal penalty.

Alison Caldwell reports.

ALSION CALDWELL: Ironically enough, the ACCC first heard reports of price-fixing and cartel behaviour in the cardboard packaging industry during an international conference on, of all things, cartel activity in November 2004.

That's when Amcor executives approached the ACCC and admitted their role in a price-fixing deal with rival Visy.

Bob Alexander was one of the ACCC's lead investigators in the case.

BOB ALEXANDER: We were quite surprise being notified of a cartel at a cartel conference. And it was quite appropriate, but from that day, we've had a lot of work to do to bring it to this stage.

ALSION CALDWELL: Three years later, paper giant Visy has been fined $36-million. Former CEO Harry Debney, who resigned last week, was fined $1.5-million, and the former general manager Rod Carroll was fined $500,000.

Visy was also ordered to pay the ACCC's legal fees, possibly as much as $6-million.

Handing down his judgement today, Federal Court Justice Peter Heerey said Visy's behaviour was unprecedented.

PETER HEEREY: This was the worst cartel to come before the court in the 30 plus years in which such conduct has been illegal in Australia.

ALSION CALDWELL: From the outset, Visy denied any wrongdoing.

But last month, as a lengthy trial loomed, Visy chairman Richard Pratt admitted his company had broken the law and expressed regret for any concerns of customers or staff.

Today Justice Heerey was scathing about the behaviour of Visy's executives. The cartel went on for almost five years. Had it not been accidentally exposed, he said, it would probably still be flourishing.

"It was run from the highest level in Visy, it was carefully and deliberately concealed, and it was operated by men who were fully aware of its seriously unlawful nature", the Judge said.

He said Visy's contrition probably has a substantial element of regret at being found out.

"Richard Pratt's one and only meeting with Amcor's CEO at an inner city hotel was of major importance to the operation of the cartel", Justice Heerey said. "Pratt gave his personal sanction to the obviously unlawful arrangement and it wouldn't have continued without his approval".

Under the Federal laws as they are today, Justice Peter Heerey couldn't impose a criminal sanction against Visy's executives.

In his judgment he points out that Australia is far behind many other countries, including the US, Canada and the UK, where criminal sanctions including jail terms can be imposed on those who engage in cartel activities.

Describing cartels as a cancer on the Australian economy and an insidious attack on consumers by well dressed thieves, the ACCC's Graeme Samuel said criminal penalties should be imposed on those found guilty.

GRAEME SAMUEL: Australia must fall in line with other jurisdictions by imposing criminal sanctions, that include jail terms for executives who engage in cartel activities. Let me be clear, nothing concentrates the mind of an executive contemplating, creating or participating in a cartel more than the prospect of a criminal conviction and a stretch in jail.

When monetary penalties and damage to reputation are the only risks, some gritty executives will run the gauntlet. But a criminal conviction, coupled with jail time for executives who, to mediate, to meditate on their actions, would in my mind provide the greatest deterrent.

ALSION CALDWELL: The ACCC's chairman disputed Visy's long held claims that it was unaware of Australia's anti price-fixing laws.

GRAEME SAMUEL: The companies involved were long established. It beggars belief that their executives were not well aware of the business laws under which they operated. Whether they were privately owned or publicly listed, this case is a warning to those involved in cartels or thinking of it. That the ACCC's immunity policy works.

ALSION CALDWELL: Graeme Samuel said that as a result of the ACCC's immunity policy, individuals are now coming forward at a staggering rate.

GRAEME SAMUEL: Our immunity policy has been so effective that probably at the rate of about one a month. We've had people coming to us seeking to, at least out a marker down for immunity. Markers are situations where individuals or companies will come in, sometimes through their lawyers, and will say, "We think we have a problem, we think we are involved in a cartel, we want to investigate it. Can we put ourselves in a queue?"

ALSION CALDWELL: Quick to defend and even praise Richard Pratt last month, politicians had little to say about the case today. Labor leader Kevin Rudd was the only exception.

KEVIN RUDD: When it comes to criminalising the law, when it comes to cartel behaviour, we have had that as longstanding policy. Mr Costello says he support it, but two years down the track in parliament, has done nothing about it. I believe that if the Government was fair dinkum about it, they would criminalise. We intend to criminalise because it affects so many people out there in the economy and by way of general consumers as well.

ALSION CALDWELL: Visy and Amcor are being sued in a class action brought against them by 17,000 customers.

Visy has apologised and says it respects the courts decision.

MARK COLVIN: Alison Caldwell.

AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION v GEORGE WESTON FOODS LIMITED [2004] FCA 1093 25 AUGUST 2004


Last Updated: 25 August 2004

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Australian Competition & Consumer Commission v George Weston Foods Limited [2004] FCA 1093

TRADE PRACTICES – contravention of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – penalty – factors to consider in determining penalty – attempt to induce price fixing – attempt made secretly by executive director of corporation on behalf of corporation – attempt not successful – prior contraventions by corporation – corporation maintained serious and well-designed compliance program – compliance program implemented following prior contraventions – guilty director aware of compliance obligations – proceedings against guilty director discontinued – employment of guilty director terminated upon discovery of contraventions – fact of termination for contraventions not publicised – guilty director subsequently re-engaged by corporation as consultant – weight to be given to ACCC submission

TRADE PRACTICES – contravention of Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – attempted price fixing – remedies – injunctions – whether negative injunction appropriate remedy in circumstances – whether positive injunction appropriate remedy in circumstances – factors to consider in determining whether to grant negative or positive injunction

Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), ss 4545A7680
ACCC v J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 5) (1998) ATPR 41–628 referred to
BMW Australia Ltd v ACCC [2004] FCAFC 167; (2004) 207 ALR 452 cited
Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 72; (2004) ATPR 41-993 cited
Rural Press Ltd v ACCC [2002] FCAFC 213(2002) 118 FCR 236 cited
AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION v GEORGE WESTON FOODS LIMITED (ACN 008 429 632) AND PAUL BENEDICT LONERAGAN
N 1295 OF 2002

GYLES J
25 AUGUST 2004
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1295 OF 2002

BETWEEN:
AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION
APPLICANT
AND:
GEORGE WESTON FOODS LIMITED (ACN 008 429 632)
FIRST RESPONDENT

PAUL BENEDICT LONERAGAN
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE OF ORDER:
25 AUGUST 2004
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The first respondent George Weston Foods Limited pay to the Commonwealth of Australia a pecuniary penalty under s 76 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in the sum of $1,500,000 within 60 days of the date of this order.
2.The first respondent George Weston Foods Limited (whether by its directors, servants or agents or otherwise howsoever) be restrained for a period of four years, from making, attempting to make or inducing or attempting to induce the making of or arriving at or giving effect to any contract, arrangement or understanding between competitors, for the sale at retail or wholesale of wheaten flour in Australia, or any part thereof, which contains a provision that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of fixing, controlling or maintaining, or providing for the fixing, controlling or maintaining of, the prices offered or charged for wheaten flour in Australia, or any part thereof, by the said competitors, or by one or more of them.
3.The first respondent George Weston Foods Limited pay the applicant’s costs.

Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1295 OF 2002

BETWEEN:
AUSTRALIAN COMPETITION & CONSUMER COMMISSION
APPLICANT
AND:
GEORGE WESTON FOODS LIMITED (ACN 008 429 632)
FIRST RESPONDENT

PAUL BENEDICT LONERAGAN
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:
GYLES J
DATE:
25 AUGUST 2004
PLACE:
SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
1 This is a proceeding brought by the applicant Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) in relation to admitted breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974(Cth) (the Act) in attempting to contravene s 45 (incorporating s 45A) of the Act. The ACCC seeks negative and positive orders and the imposition of a penalty against George Weston Foods Limited (Weston). The proceedings against Paul Benedict Loneragan (Loneragan) were discontinued at the conclusion of argument on this hearing. In November 1999 Weston was a manufacturer and supplier of wheaten flour within a division of its business known as Weston Cereal Industries. Loneragan was the Divisional Chief Executive of Weston Cereal Industries, which included the flour milling division. His duties included responsibility for the final approval of the price of flour and other products. Loneragan was also a director of Weston from 1997.
2 In short summary, the contravening conduct consisted of Loneragan telephoning Mr John Gary Honan (John Honan), the Marketing Manager for the Manildra Group of companies, associated with Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (Manildra), and Mr Peter Simpson (Simpson), Manildra’s General Manager, in an attempt to fix the price of flour.
3 Manildra was at that time a competitor of Weston in the wholesale supply of wheaten flour in south-east Queensland, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria. The approximate market shares for the flour milling industry in Australia at the relevant time were: Goodman Fielder 46 per cent, Weston 31 per cent, Manildra 8 per cent and a number of independent flour millers (in total) 15 per cent. Turnover of the flour milling industry exceeded $1.37 billion in 1999–2000. Flour is the fundamental building block for much of the food industry. The turnover of bread, cake and pastry and biscuit sectors alone exceeded $3.4 billion in the same financial year. The revenue from the sale of goods by Weston for the year ended 31 July 2000 was $1,556,174,000. The operating profit before abnormal items and income tax was $68,104,000.
PENALTY
4 The main issue debated has been the appropriate level of penalty. The ACCC submits that the appropriate penalty is $1.5 million. The relevant provision of s 76 of the Act is that:
‘the Court may order the person to pay to the Commonwealth such pecuniary penalty, in respect of each act or omission by the person to which this section applies, as the Court determines to be appropriate having regard to all relevant matters including the nature and extent of the act or omission and of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the act or omission, the circumstances in which the act or omission took place and whether the person has previously been found by the Court in proceedings under this Part ... to have engaged in any similar conduct.’
The maximum penalty for each act or omission is $10 million in the case of a body corporate.
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE ACT OR OMISSION AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE ACT OR OMISSION TOOK PLACE
5 On or about 24 November 1999, Loneragan went to a public telephone box at Kirribilli and telephoned Simpson, whose duties included the implementation of flour pricing. The call was received on Simpson’s mobile phone whilst in his car and he took the call on the hands-free speaker function. John Honan was in the car. Loneragan told Simpson that Weston intended to increase the price of flour and asked what Manildra intended to do about prices. He probably suggested that it should co-operate. Simpson’s response was that they would need to talk to Dick Honan about prices. That was a reference to Mr John Thomas Honan Jnr (Dick Honan), who was the Chairman of Manildra. Simpson and John Honan reported the approach from Loneragan to Dick Honan, who instructed them not to return the call. A couple of weeks later, Loneragan rang John Honan at his office at Auburn and again stated that Weston was putting up the flour price and that it was looking for co-operation from Manildra. The response again was that it would need to be passed on to Dick Honan. It was passed on and the instruction was not to call Loneragan back.
6 Loneragan gave evidence that his intention in making these calls was an attempt to achieve an agreement with Manildra that it would put up its price for flour and maintain the price as he was concerned that, if Weston and Goodman Fielder put up their prices of flour, the price may not be sustainable unless Manildra also raised its price. He made the telephone call from the public telephone box because he knew that he should not be telephoning a competitor in that way. Loneragan was well aware of the relevant provisions of the Act. It is also noteworthy that Loneragan says that, at the time of the calls, he understood that Goodman Fielder had either decided to or was proposing to put up the price of flour charged to its customers, that understanding being derived from discussions he had had with a Mr McDowell from Goodman Fielder, who had told him that this was the intention of Goodman Fielder.
7 On 24 January 2000, Dick Honan called upon Mr John Pascoe (Pascoe), the Chairman of directors of Weston, by prearrangement. He raised a commercial issue concerning gluten with Pascoe and went on:
‘I said: "John, I am also here on another matter which is more serious. If you don’t take action on this gluten thing, I am going to see the ACCC about this other matter."

Pascoe said: "What is this other matter?"
I said: "Paul Loneragan has rung our office seeking our co-operation to increase the price of flour."

Pascoe said: "Dick, I have to bring in another director."

Mr Pascoe excused himself from the room and came back with a colleague who he introduced as Mr Forgie. Mr Pascoe invited me to repeat the point I had just raised. I briefly repeated the gluten issues and continued the conversation in words to the following effect:
I said: "Let me come to the point. Paul Loneragan called my son on two occasions and I have two employees who would swear an affidavit that Loneragan called them seeking Manildra’s co-operation to raise the price of flour. Unless you call me by 5 pm this afternoon, I will go to the ACCC about Loneragan calling our office."

Both Mr Pascoe and Mr Forgie expressed shock and surprise at this. Mr Pascoe used strong language to express his shock and surprise. The conversation continued in words to the following effect:
Pascoe said: "He knows that he cannot do that, he will have to be fired."

I said: "I didn’t come here to get anyone fired; I came to see you about stopping the importation and re-export of gluten; otherwise I am going to the ACCC with this information."’

Later that day, Pascoe informed Honan that the commercial matter was resolved in the manner sought by Honan.
8 Pascoe has not given evidence and Loneragan was not cross-examined. What happened between Loneragan and Pascoe emerges from examinations of each of them pursuant to s 155 of the Act, from certain documents and from some hearsay evidence.
9 It appears that Pascoe interviewed Loneragan concerning Honan’s allegations on 25 January, having already obtained legal advice. Loneragan admitted the substance of Honan’s allegation, although he backed and filled to some extent as to the subject matter, apparently claiming at one stage that he was concerned with prices for toll milling in Queensland. Loneragan persisted with that version in the course of his s 155 examination. Pascoe was not satisfied with his explanation. As he said, nobody would believe that a conversation from a public telephone box at Kirribilli with a competitor was innocent. It is of some significance that no notes were taken of the meeting between Pascoe and Loneragan. Pascoe considered whether the company should make disclosure to the ACCC but elected not to do so.
10 Pascoe met Loneragan on 4 February and told Loneragan that he could no longer continue his employment with the company as his conduct was something that could not be accepted in the case of a director of the company.
11 On 14 February 2000 Pascoe wrote to Loneragan as follows:
‘As you know, the Company has resolved to terminate your employment for serious misconduct. However, to allow you to exit from the Company with dignity, we are prepared to allow you to work out one month’s notice.
I want to make it absolutely clear that, although you will retain your title of Divisional Chief Executive of Weston Cereal Industries, you have no authority to make executive decisions on behalf of the Company or to represent that you have authority to bind the Company during the month of notice. Mr. Douglas Forgie or myself will assume responsibility for all executive decisions relating to Weston Cereal Industries with immediate effect. You may not make any financial decision in relation to any matter with a value or cost to the Company which exceeds Twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00). In addition, you are not to communicate with any competitor of the Company during the notice period.

If you have any doubt at all as to how this direction should be interpreted, please discuss it with me immediately before you take any decision. I need to make it absolutely clear that any breach or disregard of this direction will result in the summary termination of your employment without compensation.’
12 On 16 February Pascoe distributed the following notice to certain senior executives:
PAUL LONERAGAN

Paul Loneragan has indicated an intention to leave the Company at the end of March. He has previously resigned as a Director.

Paul has had a long and distinguished career in the milling and baking industries. He was responsible for the significant growth in George Weston Foods Limited’s cereals business.

I am sure all those who have worked with Paul wish him every success in his next endeavours. His departure is most regrettable.’
13 A Deed of Release was entered into between Weston and Loneragan dated 29 March 2000. Amongst other things, this involved the payment of a gross amount of $461,787 to Loneragan. That was said to be the equivalent of one year’s salary.
14 Later, Loneragan was (through his company) engaged by Weston as a consultant from April 2000 at ‘the two day rate equivalent to your salary on resignation and expenses’. Although the evidence is not very satisfactory, that arrangement appears to have continued in one form or another until at least October 2003, notwithstanding that Pascoe said in his s 155 examination that the practice had ceased by late 2001.
15 No evidence was led as to the basis upon which Loneragan had been remunerated in his role as Executive Director in charge of Cereals Division and, in particular, there is no evidence as to any incentive payments depending upon profit levels achieved, notwithstanding the fact that I indicated that that was, or might be, a relevant consideration. There was no written contract of employment between Weston and Loneragan and no contractual duration of employment.
OTHER CONTRAVENTIONS
16 In 1981 Weston was ordered to pay a penalty of $50,000 in relation to a contravention of s 45 of the Act involving fixing the price of liquid glucose. It is of some significance that glucose is a by-product of flour milling and that, taking account of industry rationalisation since, much the same parties were involved in that case as are involved in this case. In fact, the price war which formed the background to that case was sparked by the entry of Manildra into the market. The circumstances are sufficiently outlined in Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (No 4) (1981) 37 ALR 225; 60 FLR 1 and the decision in relation to penalty (which was an agreed penalty with the Trade Practices Commission) is reported as Trade Practices Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty Ltd (1981) ATPR 40-252. The amount of the penalty was one-fifth of the statutory maximum penalty at that time. The equivalent today is $2 million. The contravening conduct had taken place in 1976, which was in the very early days of the operation of the Act. The evidence indicates that Pascoe was appointed a director of Weston on 12 May 1981. The penalty was imposed by Sheppard J on 7 October 1981. Pascoe gave evidence at the s 155 examination that he had been the solicitor for Weston for some years before joining it.
17 On 30 May 1997 Goldberg J imposed penalties upon Weston in respect of two contraventions of the Act involving price fixing and three contraventions of the Act involving resale price maintenance. The combined penalty for the price fixing contraventions was $750,000. The total penalty for the resale price maintenance contraventions was $500,000. The circumstances are set out in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Australian Safeway Stores Pty Ltd (1997) 75 FCR 238. The price fixing was somewhat unusual in that it involved Weston succumbing to pressure from a large retail chain and agreeing to fix prices in relation to a particular retail outlet. The contravening conduct took place in 1995.
18 On 25 May 2000 Goldberg J imposed a fine of $900,000 in respect of price fixing involving biscuits supplied to retailers in Tasmania. It concerned an arrangement with two retailers which ended a price war and effectively fixed the price of biscuits so far as those competing retailers were concerned. The contravening conduct occurred three days after the imposition of penalties by Goldberg J on 30 May 1997. The circumstances are set out in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (2000) ATPR 41-763.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
19 As the attempt here was not successful, there was no actual loss or damage occasioned by it. However, the potential loss and damage to the public was very great. The industry is large and strategic as it affects staple foods.
20 I have been provided with a plethora of authority as to the considerations which are said to be relevant going beyond those specifically identified in s 76. Those authorities are very useful but cannot fetter the statutory discretion being exercised. I have considered the written and oral submissions of counsel and the evidence. There is no need to recite all of these. I will indicate those matters which I regard as of particular relevance in this case.
21 It is necessary to say something about the litigation itself. I have referred to the fact that a very early decision was made not to approach the ACCC. On the contrary, until recently, Weston had defended the case with some determination, including a serious interlocutory skirmish concerning legal professional privilege (Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd [2003] FCA 601(2003) 129 FCR 298). That position only changed after the filing by the ACCC of affidavits by Loneragan, which effectively admitted the contravention. In my opinion, Weston is entitled to very little consideration on account of the ultimate admission of contravention. It was perfectly apparent that, for good reason, Pascoe did not accept the prevarications of Loneragan at the first interview. The first-hand evidence of each of the Honans and Simpson, together with the admission by Loneragan of his telephoning Simpson and Honan twice, on the first occasion from the public telephone box, made it virtually inevitable that the ACCC would succeed if the matter were to proceed to trial. The affidavits from Loneragan confirmed the obvious.
22 One aspect of the course of the proceedings which needs to be considered is the discontinuance by the ACCC against Loneragan. Counsel for Weston has placed considerable emphasis upon that result in circumstances where there is no evidence that any other person was involved in the contravention apart from Loneragan. That feature of the case is unexplained. The mere fact of his giving evidence for the ACCC could hardly have justified that course. However, it is not a function of the Court to second guess or supervise the decision of the ACCC in that respect. I can only assume that the decision was properly taken, having regard to factors which are not limited to this proceeding. It is, however, a factor to be taken into account in imposing a penalty upon the corporation.
23 Weston has led a body of evidence as to the development of its trade practices compliance program following the criticisms of Goldberg J in 1997. I am satisfied that the program is a serious and well-designed endeavour to ensure compliance with the Act. The problem is that it has little to do with the conduct exemplified by this case, namely, the deliberate action of an executive director of the company. In my opinion, the evidence called on behalf of Weston does not adequately come to grips with that issue. The only witness called had no personal involvement in the discussions with Loneragan or with the commercial background to the matter. It is no disrespect to him to say that he was outranked by both Pascoe and Loneragan. No explanation is proffered as to why Loneragan would have acted in this way. It is not to be assumed that he simply took leave of his senses. Something in his arrangements with the company must have motivated him to act as he did. An alternative hypothesis, of course, is that this kind of activity was commonplace in a tightly organised oligopoly and that this incident only came to light because of Dick Honan’s desire to play it as a card in a collateral commercial dispute. The evidence given by Loneragan as to his discussion with the officer of Goodman Fielder is to be noted. Neither side seems to have been concerned to examine the circumstances in any depth in this case. All I need say is that I am not satisfied that this was simply an isolated act of madness by Loneragan. It was an act done for and on behalf of Weston by an officer at the highest level. On the other hand, I cannot make any positive findings which account for Loneragan’s conduct.
24 It is possible to assess the manner in which Weston dealt with the issue once it was raised. Dismissing Loneragan was correct. However, there are some unsatisfactory features about what occurred. There was apparently no official disclosure of the fact that he had been dismissed to any other employee of Weston. The opportunity was not taken to demonstrate what would occur in the event of breach of the Act by a senior employee and director. That would have been more effective than any compliance program. Loneragan was generously treated in relation to severance pay. He was dismissed for gross misconduct. He had no written contract of employment or any guaranteed term of employment. These decisions are sought to be justified by the receipt of legal advice as to defamation on the one hand and an action for wrongful dismissal on the other. That legal advice has not been tendered and no author has been called. Weston has gone to considerable lengths to avoid any disclosure of that legal advice in the course of these proceedings. In the absence of that evidence and in the light of the circumstances, I do not take that explanation seriously.
25 I am fortified in declining to do so by the fact that Loneragan was virtually immediately re-employed as a consultant on a two day a week salary basis on his existing rate. That decision cannot be justified on the basis of legal advice. It is sought to be justified on the basis of his particular skills and knowledge and on the basis that he was in no position to influence pricing. No evidence from any relevant decision maker in this respect has been called. Hearsay evidence, which is not objected to, may be admissible but is not entitled to any real weight on an issue like this. My concern is underlined by the evidence given by Pascoe at his s 155 examination. He plainly disagreed with the decision to engage Loneragan as a consultant and apparently thought that it had ended during 2001. Pascoe had been the Chief Executive Officer and Deputy Chairman of Weston until December 1999 when he became Non-Executive Chairman. Apparently he continued to act as Chief Executive until his successor, Mr Weinman, took over in about March or April of 2000. His evidence included the following:
‘Q. What was the reason for your opposition to Mr Loneragan’s employment as a consultant?
A. I thought it sent the wrong message.
Q. Was he in fact engaged as a consultant?
A. He was engaged as a consultant, yes.
Q. Is he still engaged as a consultant?
A. No.
Q. When did he cease his consultancy role?
A. To the best of my knowledge he’s no longer a consultant. When Mr Jackson was out here on his last visit I raised the issue of Mr Loneragan with him and said that I objected very strongly to him continuing as a consultant, and that any skills that he had that the company lacked should have been well and truly covered, and I spoke to Mr Weinman after speaking to Mr Jackson and said that the arrangements with Mr Loneragan should be brought to an end.
Q. I’m just looking at your diary, I think it accounts with we have a record of at least a visit by Mr Jackson. I’m sorry, I’m looking at your diary for February 1999 when apparently Mr Jackson visited but obviously the occasion you’re thinking of is - -
A. Yes. Mr Jackson visited Australia – can I look at these to see if I can find any record of it. He did visit Australia within the last - - 
Q. I don’t think we have a record of it, Mr Pascoe. 
A. Sorry. I probably – I don’t seem to either but he was in Australia and - - 
Q. Are you speaking of this year?
A. Yes, I am. I think it would have been within the last three or four months.
Q. So had Mr Loneragan been employed as a consultant from about April 2000 until about three or four months ago?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you in fact know whether Mr Weinman complied with your direction to him to cease engaging Mr Loneragan as a consultant?
A. I believe that he did. He told me that he did.
Q. It would be easy enough for you to find out whether that was right or wrong, wouldn’t it?
A. Yes. I mean I can ask Mr Weinman again.
Q. Do you have any reason to suspect Mr Weinman might not have complied with your direction?
A. No. I think because it had Mr Jackson’s backing I believe he would comply with it.
GREISS: Q. Mr Pascoe, you said earlier that it would send the wrong message to keep Mr Loneragan on board. Could you just explain that please?
A. I felt that Paul Loneragan’s employment had to be terminated. I was happy for him to work out a notice period because the company was going through a very difficult period with a lot of instability at the time. But although I felt really sorry for him, because I thought he’d been stupid, the reality was he had engaged in conduct that had put the company at a serious risk and I felt that he had been treated appropriately and the company didn’t owe it to him to keep him on as a consultant and that the company needed to move on and, you know, there must be other people in the market with whatever skills Paul Loneragan had.
Q. So you thought it would send the wrong message to whom?
A. I thought it sent the wrong message to Paul. I thought it sent the wrong message to Marvin Weinman and I thought that, in the event that this ever became public, it sent the wrong message to everyone in the company.
Q. So it wasn’t so much a message to the company that you were concerned about at the time, the other employees of the company?
A. I thought it was just totally inappropriate for him to be there.
OSLINGTON: Commissioner, you might like to mark the letters of 8 and 9 February.
A. I think if I could say, bearing in mind that one of the things that I didn’t say was, when Dick Honan saw me and originally said what was happening with Paul he made the comment that he thought the commission might be aware of what had happened anyway.
GREISS: Q. But the matter hadn’t been made public insofar as the other employees of the company were concerned, by anyone?
A. No.’
Pascoe continued as Chairman of Weston until very recently.
26 It is not quite clear from the evidence when the ACCC first communicated any interest in the matter to Weston. It is plain from Pascoe’s evidence that it was reasonable to assume that there would be some interest. Documents were being provided by Weston to the ACCC by June 2000. The s 155 examinations took place towards the end of 2001. It is obvious from the s 155 examinations that the subject matter of those investigations extended well beyond the particular conduct in issue in this proceeding. This proceeding was commenced on 5 December 2002. On the evidence before me the conclusion is open that Weston was keeping Loneragan ‘on side’ during the ACCC investigations. Whether that is so or not, there is much concerning the contravening conduct and its aftermath which has not been satisfactorily explained.
DECISION ON PENALTY
27 The objective circumstances show a deliberate attempt to breach the most fundamental prohibition in Pt IV of the Act at the highest level of a very substantial corporation with a very poor record of prior contraventions. What is more, the conduct is typical cartel behaviour, very similar in substance to that in which the company was involved in the glucose price fixing case. Such behaviour is notoriously difficult to detect. In those cases where it is detected, deterrence demands a heavy penalty.
28 In my opinion, the suggested penalty of $1.5 million is very much at the low end of the range in this case. I indicated to counsel during the hearing that I did not regard myself as in any way bound to limit myself to that figure. Nonetheless it is in the range. I am prepared to give weight to the submission by the ACCC, although not as much as in the case of a joint submission (cf Minister for Industry, Tourism and Resources v Mobil Oil Australia Pty Ltd [2004] FCAFC 72; (2004) ATPR 41-993). Taking all matters into consideration, I fix the penalty at $1.5 million.
NEGATIVE INJUNCTION
29 The ACCC seeks an injunction against similar contravention for a period of four years. That is opposed and reference is made to remarks by Heerey J in ACCC v J McPhee & Son (Australia) Pty Ltd (No 5) (1998) ATPR 41–628 at 41,629.
30 In my opinion, the injunction sought is appropriate in this case. This is the fourth contravention by Weston. Injunctions are routinely granted in relation to breaches of the Act. Section 80 is deliberately framed to give maximum flexibility to the Court. I see every reason for making an order in relation to contravention of one of the most important prohibitions in Pt IV of the Act. It is difficult to see the reason for a time limit in relation to a properly framed injunction, bearing in mind s 80(3). However, the order sought will be made.
POSITIVE INJUNCTION – COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
31 I am not persuaded that the orders sought concerning a compliance program should be made in this case. I have said that I am satisfied that the existing compliance program is serious and well designed. No compliance program can effectively deal with deliberate breaches by those at board level. There is also a question as to the form of the program that is proposed (Rural Press Ltd v ACCC [2002] FCAFC 213(2002) 118 FCR 236 at [173]BMW Australia Ltd v ACCC [2004] FCAFC 167; (2004) 207 ALR 452 at [42]–[52]).
COSTS
32 Weston will be ordered to pay the costs of the ACCC.

I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Gyles.


Associate:

Dated: 25 August 2004

Counsel for the Applicant:
I Faulkner SC; D Godwin


Solicitor for the Applicant:
Australian Government solicitor


Counsel for the First Respondent:
IM Jackman SC


Solicitor for the First Respondent:
Allens Arthur Robinson


Solicitor for the Second Respondent:
Thomson Playford


Date of Hearing:
16 August 2004


Date of Judgment:
25 August 2004