Monday, September 30, 2013


Robert Menard’s movement has captured the headlines and the justice system’s attention because members reject government, its laws ... and its taxes.

Robert Arthur Menard is a leader of the controversial Freeman-on-the-Land movement.
They are the “unconsenting and ungoverned.” They avoid paying income taxes, don’t carry documents such as a health card or driver’s license and “embrace the law” to fight the law.
They are the members of the loosely knit Freemen on the Land movement, which hit the headlines last week after Calgary tenant Andreas Pirelli allegedly declared a pensioner’s property his sovereign “embassy.”
Freemen insist online, however, the movement is not about doing harm to others. It’s “spiritual libertarianism,” the belief that everybody is equal in the eyes of God.
Robert Menard, 50, has been called a “guru” and “poster boy” for the Freemen. A former standup comic and construction worker, he served four years in the Royal Canadian Regiment because he “loves” Canada. This is an edited version of a lengthy email exchange:
Q: Your title is Director of Freemen on the Land but it’s counterintuitive to have a hierarchy, no?
A: We (have) more of a level field with folks accepting responsibility for various duties as they feel the need arise. It is more like a voluntary relay race. We are way too unorganized to have a hierarchical structure.
Q: How did this all start?
A: For me it started when a government agent denied me access to the courts by threatening an infant with harm. I felt deeply betrayed by the government of the country I was willing to put my life on the line for. So I started studying the law.
Q: Could you, briefly, describe what the movement is all about?
A: It is based upon embracing the rule of law, which states that we are all equal. Because of equality, no one may lawfully govern another without consent. Through misrepresentation, outright lies, propaganda, the public is told that we hate our country when we love it. They are told we are anti-government when we are pro-good government. They are told we think we are above the law when we actually simply refuse to accept that those in power are. They are told we refuse to pay our share when we demand an accounting.
Q: Do you really number 30,000?
A: That is not the number we put out there. The government has done that.
Q: Why not Free People?
A: Freeman is a gender neutral term, just like “human.” It is from the Bible, where we are told there are only three statuses which people can hold: slave, bonded (indentured) and freeman. Average citizens now, through application for social benefits such as ID, welfare, EI, and CPP become bonded and are not freemen.
Q: Your movement has been denounced by at least one judge and law society as being “vexatious litigants” while its leaders profit from selling followers the tools to represent themselves in court.
A: I laugh at the idea of lawyers and judges crying about how the people they impose their “services” upon are no longer playing along but instead are questioning their claim to authority. All these acts and statutes and regulations, who do you think crafts them if not lawyers? So we have essentially a private society, to which neither you nor I belong, and from which most if not all judges are drawn, claiming the right to exercise a monopoly on the creation of these words, in a language all its own (legalese), which they then claim we cannot understand, but which they call “The Law.” To understand these words, it is suggested you “seek legal advice” by talking to a lawyer for $200. That’s per hour! The judges then claim a monopoly on the interpretation of those words.
I make all my videos and books available for free on the internet. Shows are usually by donation. Packages are available online at the World Freeman Society, but that goes to supporting operations. (My) goal is educating people.
Q: Why should Freemen get a free ride?
A: We do not want a “free ride “at all. We also do not want services imposed upon us which we do not desire. We do not wish to be tricked into becoming wards of the state. We have a fundamental right of association; this includes being associated with a SIN. I have chosen to not have one. This means I give up the benefits of having one, such as welfare, EI, CPP and other federal benefits. That is as much my right as your right to decide to have one. Since I do not have one, I also do not have an account with Canada Revenue Agency. Since I have no account with them, I have no obligations to them.
Q: What about guns?
A: I believe we have a right to own firearms for lawful purposes. These include hunting for sustenance. I do not believe we should have unfettered access to automatic weapons or weapons of war. I do not believe people should be walking around armed, unless they are in bear country.
Q: Do you see the movement growing?
A: Yes. Because the government is growing, and (has) forgotten who works for whom.


It may not prove unlawful, but the challenge to the annual service in Westminster Abbey raises important concerns
Joshua Rozenberg Thursday 26 September 2013
Westminster Abbey Host Annual Service For Judges
The service dates back to the middle ages, when judges prayed for guidance at the start of the legal term Photograph: Peter Macdiarmid/Getty Images
The challenge to the judges' annual service in Westminster Abbey by two self-styled secularists raises important issues. As my colleague Owen Bowcott disclosed here, a former Conservative parliamentary candidate and a former civil servant at the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) wrote this week to the justice secretary, Chris Grayling, suggesting that the service should be discontinued.
Failing that, they said very politely, there might be a legal challenge based on apparent bias. In cases that involve religious bodies or beliefs, they argue, a judge who has attended the abbey service "may appear to have prejudged the religious issue by publicly appearing to support particular beliefs which may be at odds with the religious belief, or lack of it, of the criminal defendant, civil party or witness".
I have never been invited to the service or the lunchtime reception that follows it, which is known as the lord chancellor's breakfast. But for many years I used to stand in the street, next to a photographer, identifying individual judges as they walked in procession from Westminster Abbey to the Houses of Parliament. Although several of the details have changed in recent years, it remains the only opportunity to get pictures of the judges and lawyers wearing wigs and gowns of the type that you never see in a working court.
As the judges' website explains, the service dates back to the middle ages, when judges prayed for guidance at the start of the legal term. Conducted by the Dean of Westminster, it includes prayers, hymns, psalms and anthems.
But what significance, if any, is there in the attendance of an individual judge? There always used to be a handful of Roman Catholic judges who would go instead to a "red mass" at Westminster Cathedral while the abbey service was taking place, arriving in time for the breakfast. But many of the judges who will be attending the abbey service next week are not Anglicans or even Christians. In recent years, they were led by Jewish chief justices, including Lord Taylor of Gosforth and Lord Woolf.
Attendance at a religious service – whether a wedding, a funeral, a memorial service or a civic service – does not require or even imply adherence to the faith in which that service is conducted. You simply turn up appropriately dressed, sit down or stand up along with everyone else, and make a point of not joining in the prayers.
Of course, the position may be a little different if a judge professes adherence to a particular religion. Even then, judges should be perfectly able to put their personal views to one side. In 2010, for example, Lord Justice Laws dismissed an application supported by Lord Carey, the former archbishop of Canterbury, on behalf of a marriage guidance counsellor who had been sacked for refusing to give psycho-sexual therapy to same-sex couples. Yet nobody would regard Laws as anti-Christian and he is married to a distinguished theologian. I cannot see how an application for judicial review could succeed in bringing the abbey service to an end. Attendance is not compulsory. How can it be unlawful for the lord chancellor to invite judges to a religious service or for the dean to conduct it? And how can it be unlawful for a judge to go to church?
On the other hand, I do rather share the concerns raised by the two secularists, Peter Fisher, recently retired from the MoJ, and John Butcher, now a Surrey councillor. Much though I enjoy legal traditions of all kinds, I do wonder whether it is still appropriate for judges of many faiths and none to pray together for guidance. It is not very edifying to see independent judges taking part in religious rites which are, at best, meaningless to them and, at worst, offensive to their actual beliefs.
And there are significant disadvantages. I don't know how the expense is shared between the abbey and the government but I do know that the whole thing costs a lot of money. It's not just the cost of the using the abbey, the cost of security, the cost of the reception and the cost of hiring limousines to take the judges to and from the law courts (they used to walk). The whole event takes place during the working day. That means the abbey loses a morning's entry fees and the courts lose a morning's work.
By all means keep the reception. But let's move the party, and the judges' private prayers, to a time when the courts would not otherwise be sitting.


Rights group seeks six-month statutory maximum as 40 remain on bail in operations Elveden and Tuleta after two years
Phone hacking claims
The Metropolitan police conceded there had been slow progress in operations Tuleta and Elveden. Photograph: Dominic Lipinski/PA
The human rights group Liberty is calling for a six-month limit on the time people can be kept on police bail, as some suspects arrested in the Metropolitan police's linked inquiries into alleged bribes and computer hacking approach the second anniversary of being kept under investigation with no charges laid.
The delays in the sprawling investigation have been so long that the Met has conceded that it is concerned about the time taken for a decision to be made on whether or not to charge. In a statement given to the Guardian, the force said it was regrettable that there had been "slow progress in some cases".
James Welch, legal director of Liberty, said: "Bail is a crucial police tool, but, with no time limit, people's lives are being put on hold and ruined by onerous bail conditions with no end in sight. A simple six-month statutory backstop would end the uncertainty and anxiety of having possible prosecution hanging over you indefinitely – and encourage prompt, efficient police investigations."
Forty people, including journalists, public officials and private individuals, are still on police bail after being arrested over the past 24 months by detectives working on Operations Elveden and Tuleta, part of the Met's £40m investigation into alleged criminality by journalists and others.
None of the 21 people arrested by officers under Operation Tuleta, the investigation into alleged computer hacking by media organisations and others, has been charged. Two individuals have been told no further action is to be taken against them, with 19 people remaining on police bail awaiting further questioning or a decision on whether they will be charged.
A 52-year-old man arrested in Milton Keynes in November 2011 was the first person to be detained by Tuleta detectives and, as he approaches the second anniversary of his arrest, there is no sign of a decision on whether he should be charged, or released without further action.
Sources familiar with the investigations talk of a backlog of information piling up as the individuals concerned return repeatedly to answer their police bail, only to be sent away to return at another date.
Although there is ordinarily a maximum of 24 hours that an arrested person can be questioned without charge, separate sessions of questioning not exceeding a total of 24 hours can be spread out over an unlimited period of time.
In a rare acknowledgement of the criticism levelled against it, a Metropolitan police spokeswoman said: "There is genuine concern on our part about the length of time that some of those arrested have been on bail. We are doing all we can to conclude matters as quickly as possible but it should be appreciated that the delays are the result of the complex nature of these inquiries. There have been millions of emails, documentation, complex comms data and trails of financial transactions that require painstaking analysis as evidence has gradually emerged. However, it is regrettable that there has been slow progress in some cases."
Twenty-one journalists and public officials arrested by detectives under Operation Elveden, the Met's inquiry into alleged bribes paid to public officials by journalists, also remain on police bail. Some were first arrested 16 months ago but have still not been charged or released from the ongoing inquiry.
However, some others facing the Elveden investigation have been charged. Last month, for example, nine individuals were charged in relation to alleged illegal payments to public officials.
The Tuleta and Elveden investigations are part of the linked £40m inquiries into phone hacking and other alleged criminality by journalists that developed from work begun in 2011 as the Operation Weeting investigation into alleged phone hacking by former employees of the News of the World. A trial of Rebekah Brooks, the former chief executive of News International and former editor of the Sun and the News of the World, is due to begin at the end of October. Other defendants in that case include her successor as News of the World editor, Andy Coulson.
Up to 185 detectives are working on the investigations and arrests are still being made. Detectives from Operation Elveden arrested their 74th individual last week.


l-r Vivian, Robbie, Mark & Ronald
Hear Mark McMurtrie and Robbie Thorpe discuss Aboriginal Sovereignty and associated matters.
 Audio file 3CR's 'Fire First' Podcast Complete 'Fire First' program
 Audio file [1 of 2] 13217k, [2 of 2] 13118k - MP3 Downloads
'Fire First' - A critical analysis of Aboriginal affairs and the political movement for Land Rights, Treaty, Sovereignty, and Genocide presented each Wedneday by Robbie Thorpe and Clare Land. Joining them in the program on 15th February, 2012 is Vivian Moore, Wurundjeri Elder Ronald Terrick and Mark McMurtrie.
Mark McMurtrie has 20 years experience in uncovering the fraud of the Crowns' claim to Sovereignty or dominion over the land and Tribes of this continent. Mark has a broad and in depth knowledge of how the parliaments of the UK and Australia have fraudulently tried to claim ownership over Tribal lands and people and has been instrumental in exposing the actions of the Crown Corporations' enslaving of Australians without Australians even knowing by using legal processes such as Capitus Dominutio Maxima 


Only in America? Remember when it tried to describe itself as 'the land of the free'?


Saturday, September 28, 2013


Am working my way through this bill, highlighting aspects for your awareness. Will add items as time moves on so bookmark this one for your records so you pop back and keep abreast of this one that may well be the thin edge of the wedge.


2013-09-29 CasualCandidConversations - Ep1 854x470 from Dean Clifford on Vimeo.





  26 August 2013

The G20 (Safety and Security) Bill 2013 (Qld) [PDF] is starting to attract attention from privacy specialists and civil society advocates.

The proposed legislation is to provide police officers and 'appointed persons' with special powers to -
 1. protect the safety or security of persons attending any part of the Group of Twenty (G20) meeting, which is comprised of the G20 leaders’ summit in Brisbane in 2014, and the G20 Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ meeting in Cairns in 2014, any official meeting of sherpas in Queensland in 2014 and any other G20 event; and
2. ensure the safety of members of the public from acts of civil disobedience in relation to any part of the G20 meeting; and
3. protect property from damage from civil disobedience in relation to an part of the G20 meeting; and
4. prevent acts of terrorism directly or indirectly related to the any part of the G20 meeting; and
5. regulate traffic and pedestrian movement to ensure the passage of motorcades related to any part of the G20 meeting is not impeded. 
The two most important of the meetings "under the general G20 umbrella" will be the 15-16 November 2014 Heads of State/Government meeting in Brisbane and the Finance Ministers’ meeting  in Cairns on 20-21 September of that year. The Queensland Police Service is responsible for providing security to G20 delegates and for all meeting and accommodation venues, motorcade routes and any other event associated with a G20 meeting. It is also responsible for "ensuring that members of the public and their property come to no harm as a result of any illegal activities that may be planned by people opposed to the G20 meeting". The Bill seeks to enhance "limited powers" available under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (Qld).

The Bill provides for establishment of 'inner and outer security areas' and 'motorcade security areas', ie 'restricted areas' covering venues for meetings and accommodation, access roads during the time required for the safe movement of the Leaders’ motorcade, and 'an outer security buffer zone' characterised as a declared area. Access to different security areas will be limited or conditional under the Bill.

From a law enforcement and privacy perspective the Bill  provides for
additional powers of search, powers to prohibit or exclude persons from security areas, powers in relation to prohibited items and the creation of specific offences under the Bill. 
It includes -
  • establishment of a prohibited persons list by the commissioner of the Queensland Police Service; 
  • requiring a person’s personal particulars and reasons for entering or being in a security area; 
  • searching persons and vehicles seeking to enter a restricted area or a motorcade area, including specific searches, as required;
  • enter and search premises within a restricted area;
  • restricting possession of prohibited items; 
  • removing obstruction items including a vehicle that might be left abandoned on a potential motorcade route; 
  • forfeiture to the State of prohibited items and obstruction items seized during the G20 meeting; 
  • discretion to close roads, private accesses and waterways;
  • limited right for motorcade drivers to disobey the Transport Operations (Road Use Management) Act 1995
  • creation of new offences applicable to the G20 meeting and events; 
  • presumption against bail for the limited period of the G20 meeting; 
  • appointment by the commissioner of non-State police officers to perform duties during the G20 period; 
  • appointment by the commissioner of appointed persons to assist with security arrangements for the G20 meeting; 
  • provision for confidentiality of information; and 
  • authorising limited disclosure of information by the commissioner. 
The Explanatory Memo [PDF] for the Bill notes that "there a number of provisions of the Bill that are not consistent with fundamental legislative principles".

Presumption against bail

Clause 82 provides for a presumption against bail for particular types of offences if committed during the G20 period in a security area or at any G20 meeting. The onus is on the accused to show cause why detention in custody is not justified. The presumption effectively allows for the detention of a person who has not yet been proven guilty of an offence.

The Memo comments that
The presumption against bail relates only to G20 related offences where an element of violence such as assault or damage to property is associated with the offence or the offence results from a person’s efforts to disrupt a G20 event. In these cases the person must show cause to the court or police officer that they will not commit another offence. Additionally, if the person is released on bail they will be required to enter an undertaking not to attempt to enter a security area or commit another offence against the Bill.
The clause is aimed at ensuring the safety and security of G20 delegates and members of the public against needless violence and to ensure that a person intent on committing acts of violence is not automatically granted bail so that he or she can continue to commit these acts. The presumption against bail lasts only for the G20 period, which in the main will be the 3 days before 17 November 2014. Following the expiry of the Act on 17 November 2014, the presumption against bail ends and a person refused bail may again apply for bail. 
Some persons unable to enter security areas

Clause 51 provides that prohibited persons (those who may pose a serious threat to the safety or security of persons or property in a security area; disrupt any part of the G20 or may, by the person’s actions opposing any part of the G20 meeting, cause injury to persons or damage to property outside a security area) must not enter any security area.

Clause 56 provides that excluded persons (those who by their actions indicate an intention to pose a threat to, or disrupt, the G20 meeting) are excluded from all or part of a security area. That exclusion "may involve a significant impact on a person’s ability to engage in employment, commerce, social activities or other activities". In the case of a prohibited person who is normally resident within a security area, alternative accommodation will be provided at State expense for the period of the G20.

The Memo states that
A person will not be excluded from a security area until their actions come within those described in clause 55 of the Bill. Nevertheless, provision is made in the Bill for an excluded person who may reside, for example, in the outer areas of a declared area to remain living at their residence provided they access their residence by the shortest route from outside the declared area. 
Although the employment and social activities of these persons will be affected if they are normally employed within, or socialise in, a security area, the period during which they will be affected will be minimal and may amount only to the 3 day meeting which occurs on a public holiday and a weekend. 
Warrantless Searches 

Part 4, Division 1 of the Bill provides for extensive searches of the person without warrant, including strip searches.

The Memo states that
A person is not normally searched with the authority [of] a warrant but rather by virtue of a statutory provision. In this case the Bill provides statutory provisions to allow for the search of persons in defined circumstances. Again those circumstances are restricted by precursors in the legislation and appropriate safeguards apply to a search. A basic search of a person will, in effect, be similar to those searches conducted prior to a person being permitted to enter a departure area at an airport. ... A specific search is a search of all
clothing worn by a person, a strip search of a person and/or a medical x-ray of the person.
Basic searches are nonintrusive and do not adversely affect the dignity of a person. They are necessary to ensure that prohibited items are not unlawfully possessed within security areas where they could be used to harm a G20 delegate or a spectator at a G20 event. Due to the large number of persons who could be subject to a basic search when entering a particular area, the imposition of safeguards to non-intrusive searches would create unnecessary delays in the movement of these persons.
A frisk search involves the search of a person conducted by quickly running the hands over the person’s outer clothing and examining anything worn or carried by the person if it is conveniently and voluntarily removed by the person. A frisk search can only be undertaken by a police officer of the same sex as the person searched. If a frisk search is to be conducted in a declared area, a police officer must first have a reasonable suspicion that the person may be in possession of a prohibited item, is a prohibited person or is an excluded person.
A specific search of a person is an intrusive search. However, there are legislative limitations as to when such a search can be made. In the case of a restricted area, the person must be unlawfully in the area and a police officer must reasonably suspect that the person may be unlawfully in possession of a prohibited item.
In a declared area, the police officer must reasonably suspect a person is unlawfully in possession of a prohibited item or is a prohibited person or an excluded person. The police officer must either have first conducted a frisk search and still hold a reasonable suspicion a prohibited item is in the possession of the person or must reasonably believe a frisk search will not locate a prohibited item. In the case of a motorcade area, a specific search may only be conducted if the person is unlawfully in the area or a police officer holds a reasonable suspicion that the person is unlawfully in possession of a prohibited item.
A specific search must be conducted by a police officer of the same sex as the person to be searched and must be conducted at a place where there is reasonable privacy for the person unless there is an immediate serious threat. 
Searches of Premises

The Bill provides for the power to enter and search premises in a restricted area without a warrant, with a police officer being authorised to enter and search any premises in a restricted area. The officer must use only the amount of force that is reasonably necessary in the circumstances.

The Memo notes that
a police officer is only authorised to enter a part of premises being used for residential purposes with the consent of the occupier of the part, under the authority of a search warrant or written law or if the police officer reasonably suspects that an offence may be committed within or from the premises that will endanger the safety of a person. For example, a police officer can enter a restaurant in a restricted area and walk an explosive detection dog through the restaurant. However, if the restaurant had an adjoining residence upstairs, the police officer could only search the residence with the consent of the occupier of the residence, under the authority of a search warrant or written law or if the police officer reasonably suspected that an offence may be committed within or from the residence that will endanger the safety of a person.
.... a police officer or an appointed person may use a dog trained for a weapons or explosives detection purpose to detect weapons or explosives in relation to a security area. The dog can be used in relation to a person, a building or other structure, a place, a vehicle and any other thing. The police officer or appointed person may take the detection dog into any place or onto any premises. For example, a police officer and detection dog may enter the underground car park of a building, whether it is commercial or residential, adjacent to a G20 accommodation venue and walk through that area to enable the dog to detect explosives that may have been placed in the car park.
Declaration without public notice

Under clause 13(2)(b)(i), a declaration may be made urgently because of a threat against the life of a G20 participant. The existence and content of such a declaration may not become  publicly known until the declaration is tabled in the Assembly. The Bill provides that a person can not be convicted of an offence involving the declaration until it is published or made known to the person.  The Memo comments that
the subclause is exceptional in that it can only have effect if a direct threat has been made to the life of a G20 delegate. In this case, alternate accommodation may need to be found for the delegate and the new venue not publically advertised for security purposes. In all other cases notification of additional security areas will be published on the police website and the declaration later tabled in Parliament by the Minister. As stated, the Bill provides that a person can not be convicted of an offence involving the declaration until it is published or made known to the person. 
Restrictions on normal activities

The Bill imposes restrictions on activities in a security area, "including a prohibition on possessing items commonly found in residences (e.g. kitchen utensils, baseballs and children's toys that make a loud noise)".

The Memo states that
There are no express safeguards to prevent an undue restriction on a person's ordinary activities in his or her own home. The person must prove a lawful excuse for the possession of a prohibited item or the carrying out of certain activities. ... Schedule 6 of the Bill provides a list of items which will be prohibited items in security areas. However, enforcement action cannot be taken with respect to a prohibited item unless it is left unattended in a security area or a person has possession of the item without lawful excuse. Clause 63(3) provides a number of examples of what may amount to a lawful excuse to possess a prohibited item.
From the examples it can be clearly seen that a person going about their lawful business will generally not be affected by the provision. For example, a family having a barbeque at South Bank Parkland may still possess and use a knife for the purpose of that barbeque. Likewise, a child playing with a radio controlled toy car in their backyard will not be affected nor will a resident within a security area who has possession of normal household items within their residence. Therefore, everyday activities within a home may continue without concern that an offence is being committed. Conversely, clause 63(3) lists what may not amount to a lawful excuse for possessing a prohibited item.
The examples indicate the type of activity which could pose a threat to the G20 meeting. For example, a person about to fire arrows into the Brisbane River from a longbow; a person discharging a blood coloured liquid into a restricted area; or a person electronically operates a model plane in a way that it could enter a restricted area. These types of activities could pose a threat to the safety of a delegate in that they could be injured by any of the items described. The examples give a good cross sectional indication of what may be possessed, the manner in which it may be possessed and what amounts to a lawful excuse. However, a lawful excuse could exist in countless other scenarios. A person possessing a prohibited item knows why they have the item and is therefore in the best position to offer a lawful excuse. For example, should a police officer stop a person carrying a knife in a declared area, only that person would be aware of why they are carrying the knife. 
Disclosure of personal details by a person

Under clauses 37 and 38, a person may be required to disclose personal details as a condition of entry to a security area or if a person is in a security area. Failure to comply with the requirement, without lawful excuse, will be an offence and may result in the person’s exclusion from the area. The Memo somewhat drily comments that the "requirement may be perceived as significantly impacting on a person’s privacy" before stating
the provision applies only to security areas. In order to ensure the safety and security of G20 delegates and members of the public, it may be necessary at times to identify a particular person within a security area to establish whether the person may pose a threat to delegates or members of the public. Obtaining the person’s personal details such as name and address is the best method of being able to check against a security database whether a person may pose a threat. The provision will be in operation for a limited period and is restricted to G20 purposes. 
Clause 38 provides that an officer has the power to stop a person and require the person to disclose personal details if the officer reasonably suspects the person has committed, or is about to commit, an offence that is intended to, or may, disrupt a G20 event or is posing or may pose a serious threat to the security of a G20 event. Importantly, this power can be exercised by a police officer outside a security area and the person can be detained for as long as is reasonably necessary for the purposes of the clause. An officer who gives a requirement to a person to disclose the person’s personal details must, if reasonably practicable, warn the person that failure to comply with the requirement is an offence for which the person may be arrested. It further provides that the police officer may also require the person to remove the person’s headwear and if the person refuses to do so, remove any headwear the person is wearing.


Clause 50 allows the Police commissioner to compile a prohibited persons list, ie a list of persons who should not be permitted entry into any security area. The list may include identifying details and a photo of a person whose name is on the list. An individual may be listed if the commissioner is reasonably satisfied that the person may pose a serious threat to the safety or security of persons or property in a security area, may by the person’s actions opposing any part of the G20 meeting cause injury to persons or damage to property outside a security area or may disrupt any part of the G20 meeting. If the Commissioner places a person’s name on the prohibited persons list and it is reasonably practicable to do so, the person must be personally served with a notice stating that the person’s name is on the list, that the person must not enter any security area until the end of 17 November 2014 and that, if the person believes the person’s name should not be included on the list, the person may make a written submission to the commissioner by a stated date about the inclusion. If the person makes a written submission to the commissioner by the stated date, the commissioner must consider the written submission and make a decision to either retain the person’s name on the list or to remove the person’s name from the list.

The Memo states that
In circumstances when it is not reasonably practicable to personally serve a person with a notice as mentioned in clause 51(1), the commissioner may publicly publish a notice stating the person is a prohibited person and the person’s photo and description. Public publication is further explained in subclause (3). It is not generally intended that a prohibited person’s details will be publicly released. The clause recognises that while a prohibited person may pose a threat to a G20 event, the person may not have been convicted of a G20 related offence.
As such subclause (4) confirms that the prohibited persons list is not required to be made publicly available by the commissioner. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that subclause (4) would not preclude an application under the RTI Act. However, it is highly unlikely that such a list would be released, for example to the media, if an RTI application was made, as the information would consist of an individual’s personal information, disclosure of which would be contrary to the public interest. [T]he prohibited persons list may be circulated by the commissioner to a police officer, an appointed person, any person or agency providing security for any part of the G20 meeting including providing security for a G20 participant, the Commonwealth G20 Taskforce and the department of the Commonwealth in which the Migration Act 1958 is administered. Subclause (6) further provides that if under clause 51 the commissioner decides to remove a person’s name from the prohibited person’s list, the commissioner must give written notice to any person or agency to whom that list was circulated.
... Clause 57 provides a power for a police officer, who excludes a person from a security area under clause 56, to take a photo of the person and detain the person for a reasonable time for that purpose. A photo taken under subclause (1) may be circulated to a police officer, an appointed person, the department of the Commonwealth in which the Migration Act 1958 is administered or a person or agency involved in providing security or intelligence for any part of the G20 meeting. 
Disclosure of a person’s personal details by the commissioner

Under clause 86, the Commissioner may disclose any information in the possession of the police service to various State, Commonwealth and foreign bodies if the disclosure relates to the safety or security of the G20 meeting. The information may include private information about an individual such as the person’s criminal history.

The Memo indicates that disclosure of information must be for a purpose relating to the safety and security of the G20 meeting, eg disclosure of an intelligence document about a person who intends to commit an act of violence at a G20 event or it may be the disclosure of an intelligence report, criminal history or information relating to the background and associates of a person who is to hold a Commonwealth accreditation or access approval. Disclosure can only be made to a Queensland government agency; the Commonwealth G20 Taskforce; an agency of the Commonwealth, another State or a foreign government; or the police service or police force of the Commonwealth, another State or a foreign government. Each of those agencies have involvement in security of the G20 meeting or employing persons to provide security at the meeting.
It would be ludicrous to suggest that the commissioner could not advise the Commonwealth that a security company it may employ was operated by organised criminals with a history of violence. Equally, the provision of security to G20 participants and members of the public would be seriously impaired if the commissioner could not exchange information with security agencies such as ASIO or with police services or forces regarding persons who may pose a serious threat to a G20 delegate or indirectly to a member of the public.


By Tim Tufuga, 6th Sept. 2013.
Prepare a security briefing on possible threats to the security of the upcoming G20 Summit in Brisbane in 2014. By Tim Tufuga sn 43311792
Submitted: 6th September, 2013.


The security synopsis for the G20 summit meeting in Brisbane in 2014 will test the security integrity and organisational mettle of the Australian national security community. This event would easily be considered as the most critically concentrated security effective zone more so than the Baghdad Green Zone. The security community will be likened to an iceberg metaphor of coordination, monitoring, surveillance, and information sharing that will view at the prominent face of Australia’s national security being the Queensland Police service,on behalf of the Queensland government, to provide the G20 security. Submerged from the surface is the complex web and intricate networks of the Australian National Security community at the hub of which lies the Australian Intelligence Community. The Brisbane G20 summit meeting will be considered as a near to a ‘Titanic’ Australian National Security integrity challenge for not only the Queensland government, but, for Australia’s global reputation.

Legislative and executive powers pertaining to the G20 summit meeting.

The G20 (Safety and Security Bill) 2013.

The Queensland police, and affected law enforcement agencies, both within Australia and New Zealand, as well as, the G20 respective member nation’s security detail, will be specifically given relevant privileges, and or special powers, during the G20 summit event in Brisbane under law.

Special discretionary police powers will be legislated under the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000 (PPRA), which will allow for the police to discretionary direct, order, search, and or detain, any person, property, or vehicle, without warrant. More specifically, such powers will include the exclusion, and, or the prohibition, of certain persons from being within the designated exclusion and security zones during the G20 event in Brisbane in November 2014. Therefore, blacklisting of persons of interest, as Excluded and Prohibited persons, during the G20 summit meeting, as legislated under the G20 (Safety and Security Bill) 2013, will be a peculiar feature of this temporary law.

Overall, the objective of the legislation is:

1. To protect the safety or security of persons attending any part of the G20 meeting.
2. Ensure the safety of the public from acts of civil disobedience in relation to the G20 meeting
3. Prevent acts of terrorism, and finally,
4. Regulate traffic and pedestrian movement.
G20 Security Detail:

Prima facie, the G20 security detail within Brisbane will be the specific responsibility of the Queensland government. Jurisdictionally speaking, the Queensland Police Service will be the primary source for the overall G20 Security. The Assistant Commissioner Katarina Carroll has been appointed as the head of the Brisbane G20 security detail. The G20 taskforce will articulate security matters from the Prime Minister and Cabinet Department, the respective security agencies within the Australian Intelligence Community, the Australian Federal Police, Australia Crime Commission, the Australian Defence Force, the respective state police services, including the New Zealand Police service. Externally from the immediate security detail is the adjunct coordination and cooperation with other local, State, and Federal government, and non-government, emergency service providers, who will all be part of the security contingency with their specific respective responsibilities before, during, and after, the 2014 G20 Summit meeting in Brisbane.

Externally, the coordination of security matters to other G20 member nations will be the through the advisement from the Australian Sherpa. The respective government’s will be duly advised and will work with the Australian domestic law enforcement, and intelligence community.

Geo-Spatial security zones for G20 Summit in Brisbane November 14th-17th, 2014.

The primary focus of this security brief will focus on the geo-spatial vulnerabilities of the Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre (BCEC) and the proximity approaches to and from the centre by the motorcades of the respective political leaders. The schematic of the BCEC will demonstrate the transparency vulnerabilities for holding a G20 conference in such a public accessible and transparent institute.

(Brisbane Courier Mail)


Potential sources of disruptive behaviour:
As the Saint Petersburg’s example has revealed the Russian G20 Summit had been disrupted only slightly by demonstrators protesting Russian anti-Gay Discrimination laws. In Brisbane, however, the most likely regional concern may emanate from the Anti-whaling lobby who may try to put a word in edgewise. The likely source of these potential disruptions are from the usual suspects of the disgruntled politically disaffected, the disenfranchised, and the specific political agenda setting lobby groups as sourced from the Indigenous people lobby groups; the Nationalist Anarchists; or, from the left wing neo-Marxist elements; as well as, current expected anti-war protestations, and other usual thematic political demonstrations, most protestors will likely be university and other tertiary institute students and unemployed politically charged people; and, finally, at the lowest ebb, the odd miscreant rabble rouser; all of which will aggregate, and converge, into Brisbane come November 14th through till the 17th, 2014.
Therefore, Brisbane, will undoubtedly, entice many and varied numbers of potential security threats. Once again to reiterate the theme that at the highest level of the critical threat matrix is a critical infrastructural terrorist event, and at the lowest level and the most probable expectation would be the street protest marches, all of which will expose many security vulnerabilities for Brisbane, and Australia’s national security strategy.

Modus operandi for anti-G20 protestation, and the Queensland Police Service’s Police Public Safety Response Team (PPSRT).

The primary threat to the G20 Summit meeting in Brisbane will most likely be in the form of protest marches. If the protest become potentially virulently violent, similar to the Toronto riots in the G20 Summit Meeting, in 2010, then the modus operandi for the protest organisers will be particularly noted. The Black Bloc tactics was initiated by the protest organisers and this form of organisation is considered as the most likely tactic to be initiated by professional rabble rousers.

The QPS PPRST, in response, will be trained accordingly in order to initiate the tried and tested method of kettling tactics. Conversely, the Black Bloc tactics methods will be spontaneously adopted by the Protestors. The strategy is not dissimilar to the Chinese strategic game of ‘Go’.

The objective of the strategic game seems straight forwardly simple in that the process of encircling an opponent, or in escaping an entrapment, will be initiated by protestors, and the kettling tactics, as the response by the police. In actuality, the police will encircle and corral the protest marches whereas the marches will endeavour to break the mustering cordon.

The challenge gauntlet has been given for the Australian National security integrity and the Queensland and Australian people will respond as effectively as well.

Tim Tufuga SN. 43311792
6th September, 2013.

Queensland Government, G20 (Safety and Security) Bill, 2013,

Queensland Government, Police Powers and Responsibilities Act, 2000,

Queensland Government, Op.cit.

Queensland Government, Queensland Police Media release, July, 23, 2013.

Occupy Brisbane,,

Brisbane Convention and Exhibition Centre (BCEC),

Associated Press, ABCNews, September 5th, 2013.

Occupy Brisbane, Op.cit.

Queensland Government Op.cit.

Wikipedia, Black Bloc Tactics,

Wikipedia, Kettling Tactics,, Kettling tactics in Glasgow Student protests, December 10, 2010,

Wibble, Kettling,


Thursday 12 September 2013 @ 11.35 a.m. | Legal Research

The G20 (Safety and Security) Bill 2013 (the Bill) (currently at Committee Stage after its first reading on 20 August 2013) has, in the words of an ABC's news report, . . . "lawyers concerned people will be locked away in prison without bail".

Background to the G20 in 2014

The 2014 meeting of the Group of Twenty (known as the G20) is to be hosted by Australia, specifically in Queensland. A G20 meeting consists of a number of meetings under the general G20 umbrella. The two most important meetings are the Heads of State/Heads of Government meeting (the Leaders’ Summit) to be held in Brisbane on 15 and 16 November 2014 and the Finance Ministers’ meeting to be held in Cairns on 20 and 21 September 2014.

About the Bill

The policy objectives of the Bill as stated by the Queensland government when introducing it are to provide police officers and appointed persons special powers to:
  1. protect the safety or security of persons attending any part of the G20 meeting, which iscomprised of the Group of Twenty leaders’ summit in Brisbane in 2014, and the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers’ and Central Bank Governors’ meeting in Cairns in 2014, any official meeting of sherpas in Queensland in 2014 and any other G20 event; and
  2. ensure the safety of members of the public from acts of civil disobedience in relation to any part of the G20 meeting; and
  3. protect property from damage from civil disobedience in relation to an part of the G20 meeting; and
  4. prevent acts of terrorism directly or indirectly related to the any part of the G20 meeting; and
  5. regulate traffic and pedestrian movement to ensure the passage of motorcades related to any part of the G20 meeting is not impeded.

Criticism of the Proposed Law

Firstly, it should be understood that around 10,000 homes and businesses in Brisbane will be enclosed inside the security perimeter created by the Bill during mid-November 2014. Considering this  then as the ABC reports the Bill, now before State Parliament, would allow police to arrest and detain anyone deemed a threat without giving them bail for at least the week of the summit. The Bill further allows them to search people on the spot and publicly broadcast the names and photos of people listed as "prohibited" from the city.
The changes proposed by the Bill are described as drastic and a breach of basic rights. The ABC quotes Peter Shields from the Queensland Law Society as saying . . . "It is a bill which has not been properly thought through, and there are going to be innocent members of the public who will find themselves in custody . . .".
The ABC also reports criminal lawyer Bill Potts saying that for the summit period normal rights expected by citizens will be "suspended and abrogated in the most draconian way".
Examples given of the draconian nature of the legislation are that it makes it an offence to be in possession of prohibited items and that such items can include eggs, cans of baked beans, model cars, model aircraft and all sorts of things which may be used as projectiles even though they have a simple, ordinary and legal use as well. Along with these powers, police will be allowed to publish the names and photographs of anyone they decide should be prohibited from entering the secured inner-city zone.
Another issue raised by critics is where detained persons under the legislation will actually be detained - the ABC report points out that Toronto's G20 riots in 2010 saw more than 1,000 people arrested while south-east Queensland cannot handle even half of that number in their police watch-houses.

Expected timetable to enactment

It is reported further that the Law Society and Queensland Police Service are to present their submissions to the parliamentary committee considering the legislation in the coming week. The committee chairman has said that "the committee has yet to give the Bill any detailed consideration and the committee has not formed any views on the Bill, as yet."
The Bill is due to be debated by the end of October and the powers it enacts could come into effect in Cairns from the third week of next February 2014.
TimeBase is an independent, privately owned Australian legal publisher specialising in the online delivery of accurate, comprehensive and innovative legislation research tools including LawOne and unique Point-in-Time Products.



POLICE say they are surprised at calls on a Facebook page that supports a proposal to increase the speed limit on the Hume Highway to 130km/h.
The page, described by its creators as a petition to raise the speed limit, received more than 30,000 likes in 24 hours.
Albury highway patrol officer Sgt Matt Zemaitis said those who had commented on or liked the page were lacking knowledge of the dangers of increasing the speed limit on the highway.
“Why people would like it I would think is in relation to reducing their travel time but they aren’t taking into account the safety factors,” he said.
“It would lead to worsened consequences for everyone involved.”
Sgt Zemaitis said a speed limit of 130km/h would see drivers’ reaction times fall and potentially intensify the results of an impact.
“Obviously my concerns are vehicles that travel that much quicker have greater risk of having an accident with serious injuries,” he said.
“This would increase the road toll as a result.”
The Facebook page argues “increase the speed, lower fatigue” and Sgt Zemaitis said there was no evidence to show travelling more quickly would reduce drivers’ fatigue level.
“It’s not a matter of time, it’s a matter of getting to the destination safely and being able to see those family and friends,” he said.
RoadSafe North East road safety officer Robert Allen agreed there was no research to support the premise that an increased speed limit lowered fatigue.
“Fatigue is caused by tiredness and if a person is tired then common sense would say no matter what speed they are going, it is still likely they would fall asleep at the wheel,” he said.
Mr Allen said if a speed limit of 130km/h had any positive impact on the road toll, it would be researched.
“People are supporting this campaign because social media has an impact on how people think but they’d be better supporting experts than a Facebook page,” he said.