Thomas Ross
INTRODUCTION
This publication looks at the ongoing subservience of Australia to Britain,
British institutions, and British politicians. While the nature of this subservient
relationship has changed, both in direction and in degree, it still continues.
The aim here is to give a broad background to Australia's subservient
relationship with Britain.
The British contribution to Australian society should also be acknowledged, as
the nation's foundation stone, but such acknowledgment is not the aim of this
document, and can be found in other publications. However, such positive
contributions should not act as a smokescreen to blot out the negative and/or
stifling aspects of the British legacy.
Australians need to be made aware of our subservient history; of the down-side
to our relationship with Britain; and that while earlier generations of
Australians often put Britain first, the reverse was not forthcoming.
This facts that follow clearly indicate that Australia can only rely on
Australian nationalists to look after our national interests. Thus, we must
free our nation from all foreign constraints (no matter whether these are
operational or symbolic). It is time for Australians to forge a National State
for the 21st century, incorporating political, economic and cultural
independence,
Australians must look to themselves if we are to find a basis for national
advancement.
As Henry Lawson wrote: "For the South must look to the South for strength
in the storm that is to come."(1)
Section 1. AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY
COLONY
OR NATION?
It would be untrue to say that the federation of the Australian colonies in
1901 gave birth to a nation. Australia was still called a "colony"
after 1901, albeit one of the "great colonies". Even the Commonwealth
of Australia Constitution Act stated that, for certain purposes, "the
Commonwealth shall be taken to be a self-governing colony";
and the Colonial Laws Validity Act applied to Australia right up
until 1942.(2)
Federation, rather than enabling the expression of nationalistic ideals,
actually became an expression of British Imperialist designs.
As Hudson and Sharp have spelt out:
"For reasons of administrative convenience, quite apart from what was
thought best for the colonies, the United Kingdom for long had looked kindly on
the notion of an Australian colonial federation".(3)
This view has been borne out by the words of the British politician Joseph
Chamberlain, who was Secretary of State for the Colonies, in his speech to the
British Parliament - when it was considering whether to grant the federation of
the Australia colonies, via the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Bill.
Chamberlain said that "federation... is a great and important step towards
the organisation of the British Empire" and that "we believe the
relations between ourselves and these colonies will be simplified... when we
have to deal with a single central authority instead of having severally to
consult six independent Governments".(4)
The parliamentary committee of the NSW Trade Labor Council recognised this
important distinction, when it campaigned in 1891 for "The Federation of
the Australasian Colonies upon a national, as opposed to an imperialistic,
basis". The Bulletin magazine also recognised this distinction, as
its stated "Australian National Policy" denounced "Imperial
Federation". Indeed, when federation was achieved in 1901, Australia
simply moved from limited colonial self-government to limited national
self-government.(5)
As Donald Horne has pointed out: "Even when these colonies federated it
was believed that Australia was still not a true nation. Economically,
strategically and culturally Australia was defined as part of the British
Empire", although it came to pass that "Decade after decade,
Australians slowly abandoned this explicitly colonial frame of mind".(6)
Later on - in 1907 - it was decided that the "great colonies"
(Australia, Canada, Cape Colony, Natal, New Zealand, and the Transvaal) should
no longer be called colonies "because that term confused their status with
that of crown (coloured) colonies lacking self-government". The Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom hosted a "Colonial Conference", with
the prime ministers of the "great colonies", where it was agreed that
"henceforth the Colonial Conferences would be called Imperial Conferences
and that the great white colonies should be styled `the self-governing
dominions beyond the seas' - which inevitably became shortened to `the
Dominions'."(7)
In nationalist terms, the Federation of the Australian colonies was largely a
farce. It did not lead to a new nation, but rather to "one big
colony" (which was therefore easier for Britain to administer, rather that
channelling all matters through six separate colonies).(8)
As E.M. Andrews has stated:
"Constitutionally, however, Australia remained tightly bound to Britain.
On 1 January 1901 the six Australian colonies coalesced into a federation, the
Commonwealth of Australia. The celebrations of the event naturally stressed
loyalty to the British monarchy and the `motherland', and lavishly praised
British parliamentary government as the basis of Australian freedom.
Nevertheless, Federation was granted by Britain through an Act of the British
parliament which did not include `independence'. Nor did it create a new
`nation'; for the official view was that `the British nation' spread across the
world, from the United Kingdom, through Canada and parts of Africa to the antipodes.
So in 1901 the governor-general of the new Commonwealth was appointed by the
Queen, on the advice of the British government, and was her representative in
the Commonwealth - as the colonial governors in the separate colonies had been
before him. Australian ministers had no direct access to her. The
governor-general would normally act on the advice of Australian federal
ministers, but was also responsible to the Colonial Office in London. Like the
colonial governors he was the agent of Britain, appointed primarily to protect
British interests, including commercial interests, not Australian.
"...it was only through the governor-general and the Colonial Office that
the Australian prime minister could communicate with the British government...
The British had everything to gain from allowing Australia local autonomy, but
absolutely nothing from encouraging her and the other Dominions to act more
independently, which would only complicate Britain's international problems.
`External affairs' were therefore probably only mentioned in the constitution
out of a British desire to give the federal government - rather than the States
- the monopoly of implementing imperial treaties and negotiating with London.
This simplified British administration, but the Australian government was
granted no control over foreign affairs as such. It therefore did not seek to
play a part in running the Boer War, nor a voice in the peace settlement.
"...The situation has been expressed with brutal frankness by Hudson and
Sharp:
`The colonies were at war when their sovereign, advised exclusively by United
Kingdom ministers, was at war, and they were at peace when their sovereign,
advised by United Kingdom ministers, was at peace.'
"In 1901 they had formed a separate entity, a federation, established by
the British government - nothing more. The Queen was still the sovereign; and
the old rules applied."(9)
Indeed, many nationalists opposed federation; not because they didn't want the
six colonies to unite, but because they realised that the form of federation
proposed at that time would mean that Australia would remain as a British
colony.
The 1891 New South Wales Labor election platform had thus included the aim of:
"The Federation of the Australasian Colonies upon a national, as opposed
to an imperialistic, basis".(10)
When Australia became a federated Commonwealth it was as a colonial
Commonwealth, not as an independent Commonwealth. The joining together of the
six colonies was seen as an expedient method of efficiency in the interests of
the British Empire.
The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (the British Act
establishing and encompassing Australia's Constitution) states that the
Commonwealth of Australia itself "shall be taken to be a self-governing colony"
(emphasis added). So, Australia simply moved from being six colonies into being
a single colony (thus ensuring ease of administration for the British
Government).(11)
THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE PRIVY COUNCIL
The Australian Constitution (which had been approved by the Australian people
voting by referenda) was interfered with, and changed, by the British
Government. The clause in the Constitution regarding the avenue of legal appeal
to the Privy Council in Britain (known as "The Queen in Council") was
opened far wider by the British Government, in order to "satisfy British
commercial interests". The British were able to demand such a change,
because the legal creation of the Australian Constitution was in the hands of
the British government - it came into being only as part of a British law: The
Commonwealth of Australian Constitution Act.(12)
F.W. Eggleston later testified to a Royal Commission that Joseph Chamberlain
(Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies) "did not want the appeal
in private cases stopped, because he said that the big shipping companies and
mercantile interests desired the right of appeal to the Privy
Council".(13)
Hudson and Sharp have explained why this "right of appeal" was
wanted:
"United Kingdom investment in the colonies had been heavy, and it was
feared in London that United Kingdom investors would be at a disadvantage in
cases settled in Australia... it was an issue on which the United Kingdom
intervened decisively to squash colonial tendencies towards greater autonomy".(14)
Note: The Australian Parliament passed laws in 1968 and 1975 to stop appeals
from federal courts to the Privy Council, and - with the consent of the states,
and that of the British Government - passed the Australia Act in 1986 to stop
appeals from state courts.(15)
FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
Tom Keneally and John Craig have concisely pointed out the realities of
Australia's early standing as regards foreign affairs: "In the earlier
stages of Federal Australia's existence, Australia was not seen as independent
enough to communicate directly with foreign governments".(16)
"Up to 1927 communication between the Australian Government and the
British Government was conducted via the Australian Governor-General".(17)
These early years saw that Australian prime ministers still could not
communicate directly with British prime ministers and that Australian
communications "could be addressed no higher than the Colonial Secretary
via the governor-general's office".(18)
For foreign affairs, the rules still applied in like manner as had been laid
down in 1894 by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon:
"A foreign Power can only be approached through Her Majesty's
Representative, and any agreement entered into with it, affecting any part of
Her Majesty's Dominions, is an agreement between Her Majesty and the Sovereign
of the foreign State, and it is to Her Majesty's Government that the foreign
State would apply in case of any question arising under it".(19)
For example, in 1907,
"Prime Minister Deakin wanted to communicate his concern about the
transportation of French convicts to New Caledonia to the French government. He
was not able to speak to the French Ambassador in London or to go to Paris and
speak to the French government, or even send them a cable directly... so he had
to ask the Colonial Office to inquire of the Foreign Office whether they would
ask the United Kingdom's Ambassador in Paris to inquire into the matter".
The answer (that France had no intention for such a penal settlement) had to
come back via all those same channels - thus it took almost three months for
Deakin (Australia's Prime Minister) to receive a response to his question.(20)
Indeed, when Deakin had spoken to the Japanese Consul in 1905 "he was
chastised by London for improper dealings with a foreign power".(21)
Hudson and Sharp give another example:
"in 1907 and 1908, to raise public interest in naval defence, to register
concern about United Kingdom naval policy in the Pacific and to show his wish
for a stronger United States naval presence in the Pacific as a balance for
growing Japanese strength, Deakin directly approached the United States
ambassador in London and consul-general in Melbourne to arrange a visit to
Australian ports of an American fleet, the Great White Fleet, during a proposed
world cruise. Deakin subsequently asked London to issue the formal invitation,
but in the meantime the United States had reacted favourably and publicly to
his feelers. Although the United Kingdom had no choice but to accept the fait
accompli, Whitehall was appalled by this colonial interference in its
diplomacy. The Foreign Office was especially outraged, and the Foreign
Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, demanded that Deakin be reminded that `invitations
to foreign governments should not be given except through us'."
Because of such treatment of Australia by Britain, "in federal circles
there was some resentment at the extent to which the Colonial Office still
could involve itself in Australian affairs".(22)
In 1911, Australia was forced to protest "at the commitment of the
Dominions to international treaties entered into by the UK without
consultation".(23)
The Colonial Office channel was changed in 1918 to allow direct communications
between the Prime Ministers of Britain and Australia.(24)
However, it was not until after the First World War that, largely at Canada's
instigation, the British "surrendered control over the diplomacy of the
dominions" ("In 1923 the dominions had been given their diplomatic
independence").(25)
But even that "diplomatic independence" can be questioned, when
Declarations of War are considered (see relevant section in this publication).
Section 2. AUSTRALIAN LAWS: SUBJECT TO BRITAIN
POWERS
OVER COLONIAL AUSTRALIA
From 1788 to the 1820s the legislation of Britain provided all of
the laws governing Australia.
In 1823, the main Australian colony - New South Wales - was permitted to
establish its own legislature, (the Legislative Council) so that some
laws were locally produced (although proper democracy was yet to come). Local
legislatures were created in the other, and ensuing, colonies over later years,
thus adding to the extent of local laws created.(26)
A great number of laws were subsequently passed by the governments of the
several colonies in Australia. However, doubt arose as to the validity of such
laws. To rectify the situation, the Imperial Parliament in Britain passed the Colonial
Laws Validity Act 1865.
This Act ensured the legal validity of colonial laws which were:
1) Held to be against ("repugnant to") Imperial Acts relating to the
colony (only those sections of a colonial law held to be repugnant were void,
while the rest of the colonial law was deemed valid).
2) Held to be repugnant to fundamental principles of English law.
3) Passed without being reserved by the colonial Governor (only if contrary to
instructions received by the Governor, but not if contrary to Letters Patent,
etc.).
4) Passed, in accordance with existing law, in respect to the colonial
legislature's Constitution, powers, or procedures.(27)
However, the Colonial Laws Validity Act did make clear the already
existing legal principle that if any laws were passed in Australia which were
at odds with a relevant Imperial law, then the British law would override the
Australian law.(28)
Also, the Australian colonial parliaments had other limitations placed upon
them. Some kinds of legislation (for example, constitutional amendments) could
not be approved by the British-appointed local Governors, and "had to be
reserved for royal assent on the advice of United Kingdom ministers". As
well as which, "any colonial legislation, even if approved by governors,
could be disallowed by the sovereign within a specified period on advice of
United Kingdom ministers". These controls, however, were used sparingly;
indeed, "by the end of the century only fifteen New South Wales bills, for
instance, had been reserved for royal assent, and all had received it; of all
the bills passed by all the colonial legislatures in Australia to that time,
only five had been disallowed". These control devices "were used
sparingly because London had no interest in unnecessarily provoking the
colonies, but also because, by and large, the colonial parliaments had no wish
to provoke London". That is, the colonial parliaments self-muzzled their
own legislative independence, because they realised that the British government
could override any colonial law that they considered to be disagreeable or
against the perceived interests of the British Empire.(29)
REJECTING
PROPOSED LAWS (BILLS) OF COLONIAL AUSTRALIA
All proposed laws (Bills) passed by the Parliaments of the Australian colonies
did not actually become law until approved by the
British-appointed Governor.
However, "the Queen" (in actual practise, the British Government)
could disallow (i.e. veto) any law passed by any colonial parliament and its
Governor. Alternatively, the Governor could reserve a Bill for "Royal
Assent", and if the Assent was not given, then the Bill would lapse (that
is, it would not become law) even though it had not actually been disallowed as
such (in other words, a sneakier kind of veto). The power to
"Reserve" Bills was also sometimes used in order to force colonial
parliaments to re-word or re-draft Bills. As well as this, prior reserving of
Bills, of withholding Assent, and of disallowance (as well as official
communications and instructions from Britain) were enough to enforce Imperial
will upon Australian parliaments (both before and after Federation) as the
elected parliamentarians knew that they had to frame their proposed laws in
such a way so that they would not be stopped by the British Government, or by
its local vice-regal representatives. The Australian immigration laws (those of
the separate colonies, and those of the new Commonwealth) are a good example of
this (see relevant section in this publication).
Not only was the act of reserving Bills used many times in Australia, but - on
five separate occasions - Bills which had been passed into law by the
Australian colonial parliaments and had been assented to by the local colonial
Governors were afterwards disallowed by Britain:(30)
1860 - Victorian law re. regulation and discipline on armed vessels.
1862 - South Australian law re. marriage.
1863 - Tasmanian law re. prisoners.
1864 - South Australian law re. the Marine Board.
1864 - South Australian law re. transportation of convicts.
So, using their powers of reservation and disallowance, the British Government
- and the British-appointed Governors - stopped various Australian Bills from
becoming law (even though these bills had been agreed to and passed by Australia's
elected representatives).
Indeed; the Australian Constitution of 1901 (which was only brought into force
via an Act of the British Parliament) specifically included two sections to
enable the Monarchy to "disallow" any law passed by the Australian
Parliament. Section 58 gives the Governor-General the power not to pass a Bill
into law (i.e. he can withhold Assent). Section 59 gives the Queen the power to
disallow any law passed by Parliament, if done "within one year" of
the law having received the Governor-General's Assent.(31)
At the time of federation it was envisaged that "the reserve power of
disallowance will be wisely and sparingly exercised... except in
cases involving Imperial and international relations". But, nonetheless,
it was envisaged that Britain's power to reserve Australian laws (all in the
name of "the Queen", of course) would quite possibly be used. After
all, such an action was possible because the Commonwealth of Australia was not
an independent and sovereign nation. As was stated in 1901 by John Quick and
Robert Garran (who were both involved with the framing of the Australian
Constitution): "the Commonwealth is only quasi-sovereign... and the
amending power - the highest legislature of the Commonwealth - is a colonial
legislature".(32)
Quick and Garran's words of 1901 deserve repeating:
"the Commonwealth is only quasi-sovereign... and... the highest
legislature of the Commonwealth - is a colonial legislature".
These words remained undeniably true up until the passing of the Statute of
Westminster in 1931 (passed by the Commonwealth of Australia in 1942),
still being relevant until the passing of the Australia Act in 1986; and
- in a technical sense - arguably still true today.
The bureaucrats in the British government's Colonial Office (in London) had
proposed an alternative section to be put into the Constitution whereby
"the Crown should list in the Constitution the sorts of bills which would
be reserved for Royal approval". Actually, the Constitution in section 74
does give one such example of this, regarding the limiting of appeals to the
Privy Council ("The Queen in Council"): "proposed laws containing
any such limitation shall be reserved by the Governor-General for Her Majesty's
pleasure". This was the case for the Privy Council (Limitation of
Appeals) Act 1968 and the Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court)
Act 1975; as well as the Australia Act 1986.(33)
POWERS
OVER THE AUSTRALIAN COMMONWEALTH
Even after the Australian colonies federated in 1901, thus creating the
Commonwealth of Australia, "the UK parliament retained its sovereign power
to enact laws that applied in Australia". Indeed, the Colonial Laws
Validity Act continued to be "regarded as binding the Commonwealth
Parliament".(34)
In the years following federation, "at the state level, governors still
were appointed by London, still were instructed by London, still reported to
London and still compromised the sole channel for communication between the state
capital and London".(35)
In 1908 London forced a compromise between the Australian federal government
and the NSW state government in a matter of trade representation; and in 1914
London moved to limit the exercise of power of the Governor of Tasmania. The
point being made here is that Britain was able to authoritatively intervene in
Australian internal affairs.(36)
As W.G. McMinn has stated:
"the degree to which Australian governments and legislatures were
subordinated to Downing Street had been greatly lessened by the early 1900s,
but the fact of ultimate imperial supremacy remained. Both the Commonwealth and
the States were frequently reminded of their inferior status. In the years before
World War I, for example, efforts by the Commonwealth government, particularly
under the Prime-Ministership of Deakin, to communicate directly with the
British government rather than through the Governor-General and the Colonial
Office were repeatedly rebuffed. Neither the States nor the Commonwealth were
permitted to legislate with extra-territorial effect until after 1930: not
until the Statute of Westminster was passed in 1930 was the Commonwealth
granted the right, an indispensable attribute of sovereignty, to legislate
fully for its citizens wherever they might be; not until 1933 did a Privy
Council decision give the States power to apply any legislation
extra-territorially, and even then it remained necessary to show the connection
between the law being applied and the State's territorial rights. Moreover the
Crown refused, despite the fact that the Constitution gave the Commonwealth
power over `Trade and commerce with other countries' and despite vehement
protests, to acknowledge the right of the federal Parliament to legislate in
terms inconsistent with imperial shipping Acts. As late as 1925 the
Commonwealth found certain provisions of its Navigation Act of 1913 voided by
the High Court because of repugnancy to the British Merchant Shipping Act of 1910."(37)
Following pressure, mainly from the Irish Free State and South Africa, at the
Imperial Conferences held in 1926 and 1930, the British government passed the Statute
of Westminster 1931, which "stated that no United Kingdom law would in
future apply to a Dominion unless that Dominion requested and consented to the
law".(38)
The Statute of Westminster was not adopted by the Australian Government
straight away. However, it was finally adopted in 1942 "when various
technical inconveniences brought about by World War II made it expedient to do
so. The adoption was then back-dated to the outbreak of war". Hudson and
Sharp have stated that "the cause was less nationalistic fervour than a
need to expedite the implementation of merchant shipping legislation and to
remove doubts about some of the government's activities under the National
Security Act."(39)
Al Grassby says that the reason for the adoption of the Statute of Westminster
"was because a couple of homosexuals in the Australian Navy were convicted
of murder, and sentenced to death, while the navy's flagship Australia
was on duty in the Coral Sea. The Australian Government and courts were unable
to intervene because the ships were under the control of the British Admiralty.
When the Curtain government sought to intervene they were told by the British
Prime Minister's office that the lack of sovereignty was all due to Australia
failing to ratify the Statute of Westminster of 1931. Curtin lost no time in
doing so and back-dated the ratification to 1939. The sailors did not die but
were paroled after eight years."(40)
Reasons for Australia not immediately adopting the Statute of Westminster were
varied; such as "the states were loath to accept an immense boost to the
status of the federal authority", many politicians wanted to maintain
"the London connection", and some politicians thought that
"votes might be gained from an ultra-loyalist posture". Robert
Menzies, as the then Attorney-General, put forward adoption bills in 1936 and
1937 in order to enact the Statute, but these "were let lapse by a
government which gave them no priority on parliamentary business
papers."(41)
When it was finally enacted, the Statute "put an end to the arrangement by
which the Governor-General's chief role was that of representative of Imperial
interests", so that the Governor-General's role was from then on meant to
be solely in looking after Australia's interests.(42)
However, "the Australian states preferred not to have the Statute of
Westminster applied to them. As a result the (Imperial) Colonial Laws Validity
Act of 1865 continued to apply to Australian states thus creating odd
situations including the continued application of laws repealed in Britain. The
Australia Act of 1986 ended this situation".(43)
THE
AUSTRALIA ACT OF 1986
Even though the Statute of Westminster gave a lot more independence to
Australia at the national level, at the state level many legislative and
constitutional links with Britain remained (often rendering the Australian
states as subject to Britain). This was all changed with the passing of the Australia
Act in 1986.
Until the passing of the Australia Act:
1) The laws of the Australian states could be disallowed on the formal advice
of the Ministers of the British Government.(44)
2) Appointment of state governors were subject to British approval, or at least
had to be appointed by using the British government as intermediary.(45)
3) State governors were required, under Royal Instructions, to seek approval
from Britain before approving certain categories of bills (such as regulation
of coastal trade, which "could adversely affect British trade and
shipping").(46)
4) Appeals could be made, over matters relating to state law, to the Privy
Council in Britain (i.e. "The Queen in Council").(47)
The Australia Act 1986 became law only after all of the Australian
states agreed to it, along with the Australian federal government; but also,
only after the British Government agreed to pass a "mirror" Australia
Act; and even then only after the Queen personally assented to
both versions of the Australia Act (in the UK, and during her visit to
Australia; although the Australian Governor-General could have assented to the
Australian version, but did not do so, as it had been arranged for the Queen to
do so while she was in Australia).(48)
The Australia Act 1986 could never have become law in Australia unless
it was passed by the British Government. If just the Australian Parliament had
passed it, it would have been an invalid piece of legislation;
that is, the Australian Government did not have the power to pass the law
unless it was agreed to by the British Government.
"Since the enactment of the Australia Act 1986, an Act of
Parliament of a State that has been assented to by the Governor of the State is
no longer subject to disallowance by the Queen or suspension pending
signification of the Queen's pleasure".(49)
On a national level, "The power of the British Crown to disallow
Australian legislation remains in our Constitution (s.58 and s.59) although it
would seem politically impossible to invoke it". However, it is important
to realise that, in this case, "seem" is the pertinent word; as, if
an extraordinary or controversial Australian Government (especially a
"radical" one), were to pass laws wholly at odds with the British
Establishment (or even at odds with the Australian Establishment) or was to
pass laws which were totally against the liberal-internationalist ideology
currently dominating world affairs, sufficient pressure could be brought upon
the British Monarch to disallow such laws (perhaps a tactical move by the
Establishment, which could be used as a prelude to a "constitutional"
coup).(50)
The fact is that such a disallowance carried out personally by
the Queen could happen in unusual and/or extreme circumstances, despite any
prattle about "conventions" or "agreements" (such as those
arising from the 1930 Imperial Conference). The Queen, and the
Governor-General, still have the Constitutional power to disallow Australian
legislation.(51)
With the passing of the Australia Act 1986, it has been stated that
"the United Kingdom Parliament now has no legislative authority whatsoever
in respect of Australia".(52)
However, it has been maintained by some that the British Parliament could
repeal the Australia Act 1986 (the version passed in the U.K.), the Statute
of Westminster 1931, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900,
and even the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865; as well as repealing any
other Acts it saw fit; and thus regain legislative authority over Australia.
However doubtful and esoteric this suggestion may be, it makes the point that
Australia can never be a fully independent nation until it becomes a properly
constituted Republic, established from a basis of national sovereignty (rather
than from a basis of "sovereignty" granted by a British government).
It would be relevant to note here that various Imperial (British) laws still
apply to Australia, albeit that the Australian State and Federal governments
(as applicable) now have the power to repeal such laws.(53)
STILL
A COLONY?
In some ways, the status of Australia is still regarded as being situated
underneath Britain:
1) The Australian Constitution - the legal document that established, and
defines, the Commonwealth of Australia - states in its Preamble that the
"colonies" (now the "states") of Australia "have
agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" (emphasis
added). 2) The Oath of Allegiance, as set out in the Schedule to the Australian
Constitution, declares that Allegiance is to be sworn to "the King or
Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland" (of course, such
an Oath is to be given in relevant form, as it was recognised that the name of
the Monarch may be changed "from time to time"). The Schedule sets
out the Oath thus: "I, A.B., do swear that I will be faithful and bear
true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria, Her heirs and successors according
to law. SO HELP ME GOD!".
3) The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act's Section 8 (part of
the Preamble to the Constitution) states that the Commonwealth of Australia may
be regarded as a "self-governing colony" (emphasis
added). Australia's status has changed from a collection of several actual
colonies to the status of a self-governing dominion to the status of a
basically independent country. However, the above law still exists, and - in a
technical sense - the "form" of our constitutional structure is still
somewhat colonial, in that Australia still comes under the "rule" of
"the King or Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland".
4) Despite any protestations about the Queen being Australian, or about on
whose advice her actions are made, it is the Queen of England (legally, the
Queen of the United Kingdom) who formally appoints the Governor-General of
Australia and the Governors of the Australian States. It is this same Queen who
forms an integral part of the Parliament of Australia (see section 1 of the
Australian Constitution), and in whom the "executive power of the
Commonwealth is vested" (see section 61). Indeed, we are not seen as
independent citizens, but (as Section 117 of the Constitution shows) merely
rather as "subjects of the Queen".(54)
5) It has been pointed out that, by our very own Constitution, Australia is
regarded as "British". Section 44 refers to the fact that no-one can
become a Senator or a Member of the House of Representatives (MHR) if he/she is
"a subject or citizen... of a foreign power". This clearly does not
apply to Britain, as all Senators and MHRs were British subjects at least right
up to 1949, and a certain number still were right up until the 1990s. This
section of the Constitution was actually designed to be applied in regards to
all non-British countries. As long as this section remains in the Constitution
then it is - in effect - a constitutional fact that since Britain is not
regarded as a "foreign power", that Australia must therefore be regarded
as a "British country".
6) British laws still have "force and effect" in Australia.
United Kingdom legislation still applies in Australia as established under law,
for example:
Australian Capital Territory: Imperial Acts Application Act 1986 (reprinted
as at 17 December 1993).
New South Wales: Imperial Acts Application Act 1969 (updated l December
1994).
Queensland: Imperial Acts Application Act 1984.
Victoria: Imperial Acts Application Act 1980.
Interestingly, the existence of such Acts came to the fore following the
implementation of anti-gun laws in 1996. Various pro-gun, sporting, and
shooting organisations commenced pro-gun campaigns, often basing their
arguments upon imperial law and common law, especially sections of the Magna
Carta and the Bill of Rights, citing the Imperial Acts Application
Acts.(55)
Published correspondence to one such pro-gun organisation from the Attorney
General's department of New South Wales states that "I have carefully
noted your inquiry, and I can assure you that the 1688 enactment remains part
of the law of New South Wales. Section 6 of the Imperial Acts Application Act
1689, specifically provides that the Bill of Rights remains part of our law.
That same Act also provides that the Magna Carta of 1297 remains part of the
law of New South Wales. However, as I am sure you are aware, the Magna Carta,
the Bill of Rights, and all the legislation in force in New South Wales, is
subject to legal and judicial interpretation by our courts. How the Bill of Rights
impacts upon the daily administration of the State and upon members of our
community remains an issue of legal interpretation".(56)
In addition, the Act of Settlement 1701 and the Bill of Rights 1689
determine who shall succeed to the British Throne - and therefore determine who
shall be Australia's Head of State.(57)
Note: In this publication, the common usage of "Parliament" is
retained, referring to the Houses of Parliament (the Senate and the House of
Representatives). In technical legal fact, "Parliament" also includes
the Queen of the United Kingdom (or her local representative, as applicable).
Note: Section 1 of the Australian Constitution states that the "Federal
Parliament... shall consist of the Queen, a Senate and a House of
Representatives". This means that one-third of the Australian Parliament
is unelected - and this is utterly undemocratic.
Section 3. RULERS: REGAL AND VICE-REGAL
GOVERNOR-GENERALS
Following the Federation of Australia in 1901, the role of each
Governor-General was as "the principal representative of the British
Government in Australia and, as such, was a protector of British and imperial
interests". The position of Governor-General was viewed as a
"quasi-diplomatic agent of the British Government".(58)
So, therefore, the role of the Governors-General to Australia - at least in the
early years of the Australian Commonwealth - was to look after British
interests (not Australian interests). On several occasions, these
Governor-Generals acted against Australia's national interest, and sought to
pursue the interests of Britain instead. This was shown by the actions of
several Governor-Generals: putting pressure on Australian Governments to change
immigration laws (1901), withholding documents from Australian Governments
(1903), lobbying for Australia to donate a dreadnought (battleship) to Britain
(1909), pressuring the Australian Government to "automatically" put
the Australian Navy under British control in time of war (1909), encouraging
the British Government to extract more debt repayments than the Australian
Government was offering (1918), and encouraging the British Government to
deploy British Secret Service agents into Australia (1919).(59)
It was not until 1926 that an Imperial Conference resolved that the role of
Governor-General was simply to be a "representative of the Crown",
and to no longer be "the representative or agent of His Majesty's Government
in Great Britain".(60)
In 1930 the Australian Government decided to appoint an Australian-born judge,
Sir Isaac Isaacs, to the position; but, as the Governor-General was now viewed
as the "representative of the monarch in his personal capacity", King
George V insisted that he should be able to make the choice of Governor-General
himself - "subject of course to the concurrence of the British Prime
Minister".(61)
The King wanted to appoint Lord Birdwood to the position, but the Australian
Prime Minister, James Scullin, fought against George V's view that "it was
not desirable to appoint a local (Australian) man". After much battling,
delays, and stonewalling by the King and the British Government, Scullin won -
and Isaac Isaacs was appointed as the first Australian-born Governor-General,
taking office in 1931.(62)
There was a similar occurrence in 1945-46 when the Labor Premier of New South
Wales, William McKell, became determined to appoint an Australian-born person
to the position of Governor of N.S.W., while the British government was
determined not to appoint an Australian. McKell submitted to the Dominion
Office in London that Captain J.M. Armstrong, of the cruiser HMAS Australia,
be appointed. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs countered this with a
suggested list of fifteen British generals, admirals, and air vice-marshals.
Correspondence went back and forth between the two opposing camps, for several
months. McKell finally submitted the name of Australia's General John
Northcott, who had just been appointed as Commander of the British Commonwealth
Occupation Force in Japan. In January 1946, the British countered McKell by
informing him that "with the King's approval... His Majesty would be
prepared to make available for this appointment the Queen's brother, the
Honourable Michael Bowes Lyon". McKell replied that this suggestion was "unacceptable".
McKell then asked the then Australian Prime Minister, Joseph Chifley, to
intervene directly with the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and at the
same time to release Northcott from his duties in Japan in order to avoid
British obstruction. Following this, Northcott's appointment as Governor of New
South Wales was announced on the 1st of April 1946.(63)
Prior to 1926, all of Australia's Governor-Generals were nominated by the
British Government, and therefore all of them were British - in fact, almost
every one was a British Baron or Earl (except one - who later became a
Viscount). Following the end of Isaacs' term in 1936, up until the appointment
of Lord Casey in 1965, every Governor-General was British (with the one
exception of an Australian ex-politician), every one of which was a British
Baron, Viscount, or General (and including one British Prince). However, even
the Australian-born Lord Casey was not considered as "truly
Australian" by some, as he had "served the British Government in a number
of important positions and held an English peerage".(64)
It is apparent that, at least up until 1965, the general intention (of the
British government, then of the Australian government) was to ensure that the
position of Governor-General was being used to represent the
"Britishness" of the State; to reflect the "British
mind-set".(65)
Also, it should be noted that the influence of Britain still remained; for
instance, in regards to the appointment of the Duke of Gloucester (Prince
Henry) to the position of Governor-General (1945-1947), "the Labor
Government of the day did not want to appoint him, but did so under pressure
from the British Government".(66)
From 1965 (or from 1969 if we exclude Lord Casey) all of
Australia's Governor-Generals were - finally - not part of the
"British" representation of the State (but even then, that is only if
we don't exclude those post-1965 Governor-Generals who carried British Knighthoods
- which was most of them).
Note: The plural form of Governor-General may be given as Governor-Generals or
as Governors-General.(67)
Note: The first Governor-General of the Commonwealth of Australia was the Earl
of Hopetoun (also referred to as Lord Hopetoun). However, Sir Charles FitzRoy
(Governor of New South Wales from 1851 to 1855) and Sir William Denison
(Governor of New South Wales from 1855 to 1861) "bore for a time the
additional title Governor-General because their jurisdiction extended also to
other colonies than New South Wales. Subsequently each colony was granted its
own Governor and the title Governor-General was not revived until the
establishment of the Commonwealth in 1901."(68)
SIR
PHILIP GAME AND SIR JOHN KERR
Both before, and after, Federation in 1901, the British-appointed Governors and
Governor-Generals, and even the British Government itself, were known to
interfere in Australian political matters. The King and His Dominion
Governors, by H.V. Evatt, gives several instances of this.(69)
One example of British interference, from as late as 1976, was that - in that
year - "the Queen acting on the advice of the British Parliament
rejected the Sovereign State of Queensland's recommendation for its
Governor".(70)
Also, in 1906 the South Australian premier sought to have a South Australian
appointed as the next state governor, but the British government refused to
co-operate.(71)
However, the most significant of such Vice-Regal actions in Australia were
those of Sir Philip Game and Sir John Kerr:
In 1932 the New South Wales Governor, Sir Philip Game, sacked Jack Lang's NSW
Labor Government, following a serious political crisis between the NSW and
Federal governments during which Lang advocated "a moratorium on the
payments of overseas interest debts".(72)
W.G. McMinn, in his highly regarded book, A Constitutional History of
Australia, summarised the situation:
"In 1930, during the worst period of the Great Depression, a Labor
government led by J.T. Lang was returned to office with a large majority and a
financial policy which, if hardly radical in terms of later economic thinking,
was both unorthodox and, for financial interests inside and outside the State,
quite alarming. Lang proceeded to raise the political temperature by making his
second attempt to abolish the Upper House. While his legislation on this matter
was under challenge in the courts he went ahead with his financial programme.
He tried to force a lowering of the interest rate on the State debt; when he
failed he defaulted on interest payments. But the Financial Agreement of
1927... had given the Commonwealth overall responsibility for the management of
the debt of the States. Accordingly the federal government paid the amounts
owing by New South Wales and then sought to reimburse itself by putting through
Parliament four Financial Agreement Enforcement Acts authorizing the seizure of
the State's revenues. By this time Lang's actions - or rather, perhaps, his
words, for his denunciations of bond-holders and moneyed men in general were
remarkably inflammatory - and the hysterical reaction of some of his opponents
(including a lunatic fringe of quasi-fascists) had produced a real atmosphere
of crisis ... the Governor, Sir Philip Game, was subjected to pressure to take
action which would have been quite unconstitutional while the government remained
within the law, as up to this time it had, however muchts opponents might
accuse it of acting immorally. But the Commonwealth government had forced Lang
against the wall of legality: he had either to surrender or make a breach in
it. He tried various means of evading the provisions of the Acts sequestering
his revenues, which were held valid by the High Court under Ss. 105A and 109 of
the Constitution. The Commonwealth seized the State's balances at the banks. He
then ordered his officers, in contravention of both the State Audit Act and
proclamations made under the federal Financial Agreement Enforcement Acts, to
accept payments only in cash and not to pay moneys received into banks. The
definitive order to this effect was issued on 10 May 1932. Two days later Game
wrote formally to Lang in words which implied a request for his resignation:
`The position as I see it is that Ministers are committing a breach of the law
... Your case as I understand it is, that Ministers are determined on their
action in order to carry on the essential services of the State. Into the
aspect of justification it is not, as I conceive it, my province to enquire. My
position is that if my Ministers are unable to carry on essential services
without breaking the law my plain duty is to endeavour to obtain Ministers who
feel able to do so.'
"Lang replied curtly that the government would not resign. The next day he
was dismissed. Game commissioned the leader of the opposition and dissolved
Parliament on his advice. In the election which followed the Labor Party was
defeated.
"On 11 May Lang had rushed through Parliament a Bill to put a ten per cent
tax, payable within fourteen days, on all mortgages. For this reason, and
because the fate of Governor Strickland who had supported the Labor Party in a
constitutional crisis sixteen years before was well remembered, Lang's
supporters believed that the Governor had acted probably under instructions
from London, in order to protect British bond-holders."(73)
It may also be of interest to note that as early as March 1931 the Governor of
South Australia was urging Game to dismiss Lang.(74)
In 1975 the Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, sacked Gough Whitlam's federal
Labor Government, following a crisis brought about by the refusal of the Liberal
Opposition to pass (in the Senate) the Supply Bills that were necessary to
finance the operations of all Government services and departments.
Again; W.G. McMinn has succinctly summarised the situation:
"By the spring of 1975,... [the Labor] government, its political standing
seriously eroded by the loans affair and by what was seen as a dismal failure
to deal with serious inflation and rising unemployment, was faced by an
opposition obviously prepared to go to extraordinary lengths to dislodge it.
The crisis which had been looming for some time was touched off by further
revelations concerning the overseas loan negotiations which culminated in the
resignation of another senior minister. The opposition, alleging that popular
confidence in the government had now been completely destroyed, acted to force
a dissolution with a Senate refusal to pass necessary supply Bills until the
government agreed to an election.
"The leader of the opposition, J.M. Fraser, announced his parties'
decision to refuse supply on 15 October and the Senate passed the necessary
amendment that afternoon; later in the day the Prime Minister announced his
decision to stand firm. In the fortnight which followed the two leaders
jockeyed for public support, and in the process manoeuvred themselves into
positions from which it would be very difficult to retreat. On 21 October the
Governor-General, Sir John Kerr, began attempts to produce a compromise, but it
was already too late. By the end of the month it was clear that the opposition
would continue to use its Senate majority to defer supply Bills no matter how
frequently they were introduced, and the government, still refusing to advise a
dissolution and faced with the need to find money for its public service and
contractors, began to look for ways round the impasse. Its decision to do so
sealed its fate. A request to the banks to provide the necessary funds on
credit was rejected by them after consulting counsel: it appears that the
Governor-General had already formed the opinion that raising money in this way
would be a breach of the law and that he would therefore not be justified in
signing the necessary documents. Early in the afternoon of 11 November he came
to the conclusion that only by an exercise of the reserve powers of the Crown
could the crisis be resolved: he withdrew Whitlam's commission as Prime
Minister and commissioned Fraser to form a `caretaker government', having
previously ascertained that Fraser could secure the passage of the blocked
supply bills and would then advise a double dissolution." In the
subsequent election, Fraser's Liberal-National coalition was voted into
government.(75)
In all fairness, it should be noted that an elected Australian in Game's or
Kerr's position may have acted the same way. It should also be
noted that Kerr was appointed to the office of Governor-General on the advice
of an Australian government (ironically, it was Whitlam's Labor
government).(76)
However, it may be of further interest to note that the possibility has been
raised that both Game and Kerr were acting in favour of foreign interests: Game
at the behest of Britain's banks; Kerr at the behest of the CIA (the Central
Intelligence Agency, of the USA). Whether these claims are just
"conspiracy theories" or actual fact may never be known for
certain.(77)
POINTS
OF INTEREST
Some points of interest may also be noted here:
1) In 1916 the NSW Governor, Sir Gerald Strickland, attempted to dismiss the
NSW Premier (that is to say, he tried to sack the NSW Government).(78)
2) In 1914 the Tasmanian Governor, Sir William Macartney, attempted to dissolve
the Tasmanian Parliament, against the wishes of the Government and the
Assembly. Premier Earle (Labor Party) had been commissioned by the Governor,
subject to certain conditions. Earle, upon taking office in April 1914, had
breached his undertaking to the Governor by refusing to hold an immediate
election as he had promised. Instead, the Labor Party used its Assembly
majority to refer the matter to the Colonial Office, which then repudiated the
Governor's conduct.(79)
3) Supply Bills have been blocked prior to the 1975 crisis; for example:
The Verran government (Labor Party) in South Australia was forced into an
election in 1912 following the rejection of a supply bill (however, it should
be noted that the Labor government had attached to the Supply Bill a proposal
to establish a state brickworks).(80)
The Labor government of John Cain (senior) in Victoria was forced into an
election in November 1947, following the blocking of supply in the Legislative
Council (by the Liberal Party and Country Party) in October 1947. The Labor
Party lost government, and almost half of their seats, in the ensuing
election.(81)
In Tasmania in 1948 the Cosgrove Labor Government was subject to a blocking of
supply by the Liberal Party in the Legislative Council. The Labor Party was
able to form a new government following the subsequent election, although three
independents in the Legislative Assembly held the balance of power.(82)
In Victoria in 1952 a majority in the Legislative Council, comprised of the
Labor Party as well as dissident Liberals, blocked supply against the Country
Party government of J.G.B. McDonald.(83)
In Queensland in April 1957, the Australian Labor Party's state executive
expelled from the party its then leader, Premier Gair. Gair, with 15
backbenchers and all of his ministry (except one) then formed the Queensland
Labor Party. When parliament resumed in April 1957, the ALP joined with the
Liberal and Country parliamentarians in blocking supply against the Gair
government. After the subsequent election, a new coalition government was
formed by the Liberal and Country parties.(84)
It is ironic to note, regarding the federal events of 1975, that the latter two
instances were brought about by the Labor Party.
4) In what "may be described as one of the most flagrantly
unconstitutional acts in Australian constitutional history" occurred in
1924 "when the Governor of Tasmania with the general approval of the
Secretary of State for the Colonies assented to a money bill which had not been
passed by the Legislative Council which had requested amendments to
it."(85)
5) The use of the Governor-General's powers had been alluded to prior to the
1975 crisis. For instance, "In 1972... Governor-General Sir Paul Hasluck
gave a clear warning that those powers can and will be used. Hasluck threatened
to dissolve Parliament if the Labor Government attempted to introduce policies
for which it has no mandate, in particular the abolition of preferential voting
and its replacement by first-past-the-post".(86)
THE
QUEEN: AN UNACCEPTABLE HEAD OF STATE FOR AUSTRALIA
Australia does not have a truly Australian Head of State. Our
Head of State is an English Queen, who "is not an Australian, does not
live in Australia and, worst of all in terms of our national dignity, has her
principal loyalty and commitment to another country (her country, the United
Kingdom)".(87)
Also, the position of the British Monarch (and therefore that of Australia's
Head of State) is founded upon five principles which are repugnant to
Australian society, and which would never be accepted as the basis for any
reorganisation of the position of our national Head of State (nor for any other
public position).
The five principles are:
1) Unelected representation - "our" unelected Queen is not just an
appointed Officer of the people (like most public servants), but is supposedly
Representative of the People (an unelected representative, to be exact). The
Australian ethos demands that our "representatives" are
democratically elected.
2) Hereditary succession - where a person takes on a public office, not because
he/she is good at it, but because he/she is the heir of the previous office
holder. This is against the Australian ethos.
3) Sexual discrimination - where males receive preference over females; for
instance, sons of the Monarch receive preference in succession to the Throne,
over daughters of the Monarch. This is an outmoded concept in Australia.
4) Religious discrimination - only an Anglican can succeed to the British
Throne. This criteria for public office would be abhorred in Australia.
5) Lack of national sovereignty - most Australians do not believe that the
sovereignty of our nation resides in the Crown - our national sovereignty
resides within the Australian people.
Section 4. DEFENCE
DEFENCE
AND INDEPENDENCE
Britain put Australia's defence interests as a far second to her own. It was
this attitude which fuelled Australian moves towards independence. As E.M.
Andrews explained:
"This desire for independence was reinforced by defence matters, in which
Australia and Britain had divergent interests. British leaders' eyes were on
Britain, Europe and India; while Australians were vitally concerned with the
Pacific.
"This had been seen as early as the 1880s when Gladstone ignored the
colonists' wishes over German and French moves in New Guinea and the
Pacific."(88)
These defence concerns were felt in earlier decades; for instance, "the
establishment of a French convict settlement in the New Hebrides (1864) caused
temporary alarm".(89)
In 1883, it was rumoured that Germany was contemplating the annexation of New
Guinea. The colony of Queensland sent a magistrate to formally take possession
of the territory (and the adjacent islands) in April 1883; but this action was
disallowed by the British Prime Minister, Gladstone, who had been
"officially assured that Germany had no designs in the
neighbourhood". The incompetence of the British action was shown when
Germany annexed Papua and Samoa in the following year.(90)
As E.M. Andrews stated:
"At a public meeting in Sydney in 1885 Sir Henry Parkes, ex-premier of New
South Wales, had moved a resolution of loyalty to Britain, but protested
against the `apathy and unconcern evinced by the Imperial Government in respect
to the interests of these colonies'. The British attitude, on the other hand,
was expressed by the prime minister, Lord Salisbury, two years later when he
remarked that the Australians were
`the most unreasonable people I have ever heard or dreamt of. They want us to
incur all the bloodshed and the danger, and the stupendous cost of a war with
France... for a group of islands which to us are as valueless as the South
Pole.'
"The fact was that `neither the Pacific, the New Hebrides nor Australia
were that important' to Britain. It is not surprising therefore that
Chamberlain's suggestion at the 1897 conference for imperial federation and a
coordinated army met with a blank response in Australia.
"...The Australian response in the years before the war [World War One]
was to support Britain for emotional and security reasons, but at the same time
to try to influence imperial policy to suit Australia's own needs.
"...The British government was preoccupied with the strategic situation in
Europe, so when it spoke about `imperial' foreign and defence policy, it really
meant `British'".(91)
"...The Colonial Defence Committee also believed in a centrally planned
army for the Empire, and viewed Australian problems from a British perspective.
Like Winston Churchill in 1942, it was prepared to sacrifice temporarily what
were to it peripheral areas - such as Australia - to protect the centre.(92)
"...In Britain, the review of imperial defence for the House of Commons by
A.J. Balfour, Prime Minister in 1905, made concentration `at the centre of the
Empire' the basis of general strategy.(93)
"...A special Imperial Defence Conference was held during July and August
1909. Here, it was finally agreed that the Australian government would create a
naval unit, controlling the ships, while the discipline would be that of the
Royal Navy. In time of war or emergency they would come under the
Admiralty.(94)
"Meanwhile, the Naval Defence Act of 1910 brought the Australian
Navy completely under British naval discipline."(95)
"In 1911 the Admiralty renegotiated its naval agreement, allowing the
Dominions to have their own navies. The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) was to be
regarded as a `sister member' of the King's navy, with which its training and
discipline were to be `generally' uniform, as officers and men were to be
largely interchangeable. It was to be under the control of the Australian
government, except in time of war, when it came under the Admiralty, and was
liable for service anywhere in the world... Moreover, as a result of the
agreement the RAN became closely tied to the Royal Navy, while the purchase of
equipment from Britain and the recruiting of British officers `contributed...
subtly to Australian dependence upon the Mother Country'."(96)
At the onset of World War One, on 10 August 1914, the Australian government,
abiding by its prior arrangement, placed the Australian Navy under the control
of the British Admiralty. "From that date, all ships, officers and seamen
of the Commonwealth Naval Forces became an integral part of the Imperial
Navy", a situation which lasted "for the duration of the war".
This was an act of national subservience, rather than an act of national
sovereignty.(97)
OUR
JAPANESE PROTECTORS?
The British dismissal of Australia's interests was such that, after providing
naval protection for Australia for quite some years, Britain passed the
responsibility for Australia's forward naval defence into the hands of the
Japanese!!! This was arranged under the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1904.
Of these arrangements - organised on Australia's behalf by our "Mother
Country" - one poet at the time aptly wrote:(98)
The war drums beat! The scene is changed!
The brown man is a brother.
Alas for dear Australia White!
The Japs are pals of Mother!
E.M. Andrews has explained the British government's attitude:
"The British, however, were worried by their declining world position
after the unification of Germany. Britain wanted a greater contribution from
the white colonies towards their own defence; to withdraw from `unnecessary'
commitments overseas - including what they called `the Far East' - and to make
a series of agreements with foreign nations to protect her colonies. These
policies presented problems for Australia. While the British were negotiating
the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the second half of 1901, the Australians were
formulating their Immigration Restriction Act - against Japanese as well
as other Asian nationalities. G.F. Pearce, later Australian Minister for
Defence, remarked at the time that the British government might `not always
have the best interests of this part of the Empire at heart'. It could hardly
have been expected to, for the interests of Britain and Australia simply did
not coincide."(99)
...[When Britain's] "General Sir Ian Hamilton was insensitive enough to
suggest in December 1903 that the Australians contribute 3000-4000 mounted
troops to help the Japanese (then preparing for the Russo-Japanese War) against
Cossacks, the response was predictable."(100)
"The Round Table demanded that Britain maintain greater naval power
in the Pacific, in face of `Japan's rapidly increasing industrial, naval and
military strength' - a Japan which it `identified as the real menace to
Australia'."(101)
In 1908, Australia's Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, in view of the British
concentrating their naval forces in Europe, "then engineered, before
informing the British, the visit of the American `Great White Fleet' in
August-September that year - to a rapturous reception in Australia".(102)
This move was designed to show Australia's potential enemies the military might
of our "American friends"; however, this move towards the USA was not
popular with the British government (who believed that Australia should remain
within Britain's sphere of influence, not America's).(103)
Following the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905, and Britain's 1909 hysteria
regarding being out-gunned by the German's new naval strength,
"Australians... were not comforted when British officials and politicians,
such as Winston Churchill, pointed to the Anglo-Japanese alliance as the
protector of British interests in the Pacific. The alliance was with
Australia's main perceived potential enemy."(104)
"In his long career Churchill never understood, let alone sympathised
with, Australasian needs or fears. In his naval estimates on 17 March 1914 he
criticised the idea of separate Dominion navies and reverted to his concept of
an `imperial' naval squadron, to which the Dominions would contribute their
heavy ships. He had apparently sidestepped the naval agreement by putting
obsolescent ships on the China station, and restressing the Anglo-Japanese
Alliance. He insisted on the orthodox doctrine, that `The situation in the
Pacific will be absolutely regulated by the decision in European waters.'
"Not surprisingly, the Australian press was up in arms, while its
government sought British assurance that the naval agreement was still in
force. It was so incensed that the Minister for Defence, Senator E.D. Millen,
tabled in federal parliament a memorandum which included `the sharpest
criticism of the British made by any Australian politician, in public or
private, since Federation'. It accused the Admiralty of abandoning the 1909
agreement, sabotaging the basis for the RAN, ignoring Australian needs and
views (especially over the treaty with Japan), and totally failing to consult,
or even notify, the Dominions. As in the 1940s, Australians doubted Churchill's
assurances of a speedy despatch of a British battle fleet. The Australian
government therefore pressed on with the development of its own fleet.
"...Churchill's unilateral abandonment of the 1909 naval agreement
revealed his Anglocentric attitude to the Empire".(105)
It has been remarked that "This formidable indictment of Admiralty policy
was perhaps the most significant in the history of the emergence of the
dominions from imperial tutelage". E.M. Andrews says that such a comment
"probably exaggerates", but adds that "It would have been
significant, if World War I had not turned attention to Europe and obscured the
lessons of the crisis, which had to be learnt all over again in the
1940s."(106)
AUSTRALIAN
WAR DEAD
Another aspect of the "downside" to Australia's adherence to the
British Empire was that this imperial relationship committed Australia to
numerous wars, in which we should've had no part.
For example:
- The Boer war.
The result: 588 Australians dead, and 573 casualties.(107)
- The First World War.
The result: 60,284 Australians dead, and 586,581 casualties; also, this war
directly cost Australia the massive amount of £376,993,052 (including indirect
costs, by the mid-1930s this figure rose to £831,280,947). British bungling in
the Dardanelles campaign (which included Gallipoli) cost us 8,418 dead, and
83,480 casualties.(108)
- The Second World War (European theatre).
The result: 9,572 Australians dead, and 9,480 casualties; and still more
foreign debt.(109)
Note: Boer War and World War One figures are combined battle and non-battle
casualties, World War Two figures are battle casualties only.
Note: In the war against Japan (1941-1945) Australia suffered 17,501 dead, and
13,997 wounded/injured (these figures are battle casualties only); while 21,467
were made Prisoners Of War (POWs).(110)
British bungling over Singapore cost us some 17,000 Australians being made
Prisoners Of War by the Japanese, of which massive numbers were to die in
captivity: Of the 7,289 Australian men and women made POWs by the Germans and
Italians, 234 (3%) did not survive to be repatriated; however, of the 21,467
Australians made POWs by the Japanese, some 7,602 (35%) were to die as
POWs.(111)
Note: The war against Germany and Italy is commonly referred to as the
"European theatre", however, reference to this war against Germany
and Italy (and other nations) also includes actions in North Africa and the
Middle East.
WAR
CASUALTIES
(112)
Battle Non-Battle Total
Boer
War
Dead 274 314 588
Other
casualties 538 35 573
Total 812 349 1163
World
War One
Dead 53,884 6,400 60,284
Other
casualties 155,133 431,448 586,581
Prisoners
Of War 4,044 n/a 4,044
Total 213,061 437,819 650,909
World
War Two
(against
Germany and Italy)
Dead 9,572
Other
casualties 9,480
Prisoners
Of War 7,289
Total 26,341
The ramifications of these useless wars are enormous.
World War One saw the loss of the cream of a young generation of Australians.
In general, it was the strong, brave, worthy, and patriotic men who
"joined up" to fight in this country's military forces; and - while
there were many who were not allowed to join up (such as those deemed medically
unfit), or who objected to the war for nationalist reasons - the cowards and
unpatriotic formed a sizeable proportion of those who stayed behind. It should
make us wonder if it is the offspring of the latter group that now rule
Australia.
As David McNicoll once said: "Gallipoli and France in World War I, Malaya
and the islands in World War II, plus navy and airforce, saw the flower of our
manhood lost. Who knows? If those tens of thousands of Australians had
returned, they would have bred more of their kind to retain traditions in which
they believed and prevent their country ending up the multicultural shambles it
has become".(113)
WORLD
WAR ONE
Under international law, Australia had no option but to enter the First World
War, as E.M. Andrews has explained:
"...legally Australia had no option. Internally, under the Commonwealth
Act of 1901 she was a `self-governing colonial federation', but externally
she was part of the British Empire, and ruled by the King of England, George V.
When her king was at war, under international law Australia was also at war -
and legally part of the prize if British forces were defeated."(114)
"Australia as a British colony would have suffered serious consequences if
Britain had been defeated. At the very least she could expect that Britain,
from whom she gained the bulk of her investment, would have been financially
drained, and Germany would gain all of New Guinea and the British islands in
the Pacific. At the worst she might have been obliged to accept German settlers
and financial domination as well. For, as a New Zealand historian has noted,
`colonies had a nasty habit of changing hands as part of peace settlements.
Racial disaffinity was no barrier to incorporation in another empire, as the
French-speaking parts of Canada attested.'"(115)
The fact is, the First World War should have been irrelevant to Australia.
As an independent nation, Australia would've had no business in entering a war
of European politics (and losing 60,284 Australians, as well as incurring
586,581 other casualties). That Australia was tied to Britain legally,
politically, and by social culture ensured our entry into this needless war,
and the ensuing loss of "the cream of Australia's youth". Australia's
development was set back by uncountable years by the killing and maiming of
some of the best of our nation's upcoming new generation.
WORLD
WAR TWO
During
the Second World War, Britain developed a "Beat Hitler first" policy,
whereby the fight against the Japanese became a secondary consideration.
However, Australia's Prime Minister, John Curtain, put our national interests
first, and recalled our troops back from North Africa - despite the attempts of
Winston Churchill (Britain's wartime Prime Minister) to stop him. Those troops
were badly needed to defend Australia against the expected Japanese invasion
(while other allied troops were available to take their place in North
Africa).(116)
DECLARATIONS
OF WAR
When Britain declared war on Germany in 1914 (the First World War) and in 1939
(the Second World War), it was taken for granted that this meant that Australia
was automatically at war too.(117)
It has been pointed out by W.G McMinn that, in regards to the First World War,
"whatever the constitutional theory of the Empire might be, the fact
remained that in international law Australians - and Canadians, South Africans
and New Zealanders - were British subjects, and therefore as much at war on 4
August 1914 as British subjects domiciled in Yorkshire".(118)
K.H. Bailey says, regarding the Second World War,
"when war broke out between Germany and Great Britain, the view taken by
the then Prime Minister, Mr Menzies, was that by virtue of His Majesty's
declaration of war at Westminster all his subjects in the Dominions were
automatically at war".(119)
Later, under the following Labor Government, the Prime Minister, John Curtain,
and the Minister for External Affairs, Dr. H.V. Evatt, arranged for "Royal
instruments" to confer upon the Governor-General the power to declare
"a state of war with Japan, Finland, Hungary and Romania" (the
proclamation of which was to be countersigned by the Australian Prime
Minister). So, Australia declared war upon Japan by itself, but only - in
effect - following Royal (i.e. British Government) permission to do so.(120)
Section 5. IMMIGRATION AND RACE
COLONIAL
AUSTRALIA
Over the span of several years the British Government interfered with the
attempts of the Australian colonial governments to institute a colonial White
Australia Policy. Also, following the federation of the colonies into the
Australian Commonwealth in 1901, the British Government interfered (and made
attempts to interfere) with the national Australian Government as regarding
immigration policy.
As Bill Murray has noted,
"A major reason why Great Britain did not want Australia to institute an
overtly racist immigration policy was that this night upset the Japanese, with
whom she wanted to develop good economic relations".
Also, Britain did not want to upset the non-European parts of her Empire
(especially India), who could be offended by Australia's immigration policies.
So, although Australia wanted to establish a clear and unashamed White
Australia Policy, she was stopped from doing so by Britain. As so often
happened: British interests came first, Australian interests came a poor
second.(121)
The Victorian Parliament, in 1855, and the NSW Parliament, in 1861, passed laws
to restrict the massive influx of Chinese immigration. These laws were not
disallowed by the British Government, although Britain's then Colonial
Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, was not pleased - and stated "that exceptional
legislation, intended to exclude from any part of Her Majesty's dominions the
subjects of a State at peace with Her Majesty, is highly objectionable in
principle". Later on, as the influx of Chinese abated, these laws were
then found to be unnecessary and were therefore repealed.(122)
In 1876 the Queensland Parliament passed a Bill to amend the Gold Fields Act
of 1874 which levied a higher gold licence fee upon Asians - in order to
discourage their immigration into Australia. The British-appointed Governor of
Queensland reserved the Bill, and the British Government supported his actions
- thus the Bill did not become law.(123)
In 1896 an intercolonial conference was held where the question of Chinese
immigration was discussed, whereupon the colonies decided that "the
further restriction of Chinese immigration is essential to the people of
Australasia". Accordingly, during 1896, Coloured Races Restriction Bills
were passed in New South Wales, South Australia, and Tasmania (and an Asiatic
Restriction Bill in New Zealand). These Bills were reserved, and "did not
receive Her Majesty's assent"; hence, they did not become law.(124)
In December 1900, the Queensland parliament passed an amendment to the Sugar
Works Guarantee Act 1893 to 1895 which would stop the employment of any
"natives of Asia, Africa, or of the Pacific Islands" in any sugar
mill subsidised by the Government. This Bill was reserved for the Royal Assent,
which the British Government refused to give; and so, the Bill did not become
law.(125)
It was known that the Australian people were determined to stop Asiatic
immigration, so in 1897 the Japanese Government specially asked that an effort
should be made to induce the Australasian Colonies to adopt the same course as
the Government of Natal, and thus "in deference to these representations
Mr Chamberlain once more brought the question before the Colonies".(126)
Joseph Chamberlain, Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies, therefore
suggested to the Australian colonies that they copy the Immigration
Restriction Act of 1897 that had been passed in Natal (South Africa). This
law could be used to stop non-European immigration in a "roundabout"
fashion, by admitting only those who could pass a dictation test - which could
be given to non-Europeans in a foreign language so that they would fail, and
therefore could not enter Australia as migrants.(127)
This Natal Act tactic, was opposed by many Australians for being "underhand";
but, faced with Britain's opposition to the specific exclusion of
non-Europeans, this was the only course open to the Australian parliaments
(unless they were to declare some form of republican independence). Therefore,
Natal-like immigration laws were passed by several Australian colonies.
FEDERATED
AUSTRALIA
When the Australian colonies federated in 1901, the national parliament also
copied the principles of the Natal law as the basis for its Immigration
Restriction Act of 1901 (the first major piece of legislation passed by the
parliament) - it did so in order to follow Britain's wishes, and so that the
Act would not be stopped from becoming law by the British Government. The then
prime minister of Australia, Edmund Barton, alluded to the problem in his
speech to the parliament: "It is not a desirable thing in our legislation
to make racial discriminations which will complicate the foreign relations of
the Empire".(128)
Many still opposed this Natal-like method, such as H.B. Higgins (Member of
Parliament), who said during the debate over the Immigration Restriction Act of
1901 that "I have no hesitation in expressing my preference for the direct
method. I wish to know whether this Federal Parliament is to be dictated to...
by any authority outside... we should speak out plainly to the Imperial
authorities". Higgins further complained that "One of the
difficulties we had in the Victorian Assembly was that we were always told not
to pass certain Bills, in a certain form because they would be thrown out in
another place" (that is, Britain had made it plain that it would quash any
Bills that any Australian parliament might pass against Asian or non-European
immigration).(129) In the debates over the introduction of the Immigration
Restriction Act, the Labor Party sought straight-out prohibition, seeking
an amendment to exclude "any person who is an aboriginal native of Asia,
Africa or of the island's thereof", but when the amendment failed, the
Labor Party then supported the overall legislation.(130)
But still the British Government continued to interfere:
"when restrictive immigration legislation was brought down in the federal
parliament in 1901, with the exclusion device to be a dictation test in
English, the Colonial Office told the Governor-General, Lord Hopetoun, to press
his ministers [i.e. the Australian Government] to extend the test to any
European language and, if he failed, to reserve the bill. Hopetoun persuaded
his ministers to make the change, and approved the legislation. Faced nevertheless
with Japanese protests, the Colonial Office told Hopetoun to defer approval,
but its instructions came too late and, much as the United Kingdom was anxious
not to offend Indian subjects or Japanese allies, it shrank from provoking
Melbourne by disallowing the legislation."
(Note: The use of "Melbourne" here refers to the Australian
government, as the national parliament was situated in Melbourne until 1927,
when a new Parliament House was opened in Canberra).(131)
It is interesting to note that Governor-General Hopetoun considered using his
powers of reserving (i.e. stopping) legislation "under section 58 of the
Commonwealth Constitution in connection with the Immigration Restriction Act,
but eventually decided to assent to the controversial legislation himself,
rather than reserve it for the King".(132)
Pressure was being brought to bear upon Britain by non-European countries,
especially India and Japan, regarding Australia's laws pertaining to race:
In September 1905 the Secretary of State for India complained about Western
Australia's Factories Act which placed heavy limitations upon Asiatics
being "the owner or occupier of a factory".(133)
Britain had forged a military and naval alliance with Japan, and the Japanese,
seeing themselves as the champion of equality of Asians, objected strongly to
"the white settler society in Australia trying to limit or prohibit Asian
(predominantly Chinese) immigration". Following such pressure, in November
1905, the Colonial Office in London instructed all Australian State Governors
and the Governor-General to reserve for Royal Assent (i.e. for the assent of
the British government) any legislation aimed to restrict Asian
immigration.(134)
The November 1905 instructions were sent to all colonies, and - upon receiving
them - New Zealand's Prime Minister planned to make "a public protest
against the circular on the grounds that it was an unacceptable limitation of
colonial constitutional independence". The premiers of the Australian
states also protested at the Imperial instruction. On top of all this; the
Australian Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, "protested so loudly at this
interference in matters seen as domestic and vital that the instruction was
withdrawn".(135)
Later on, "the Indian government protested at amendments to Australia's
Immigration Restriction Act in March 1906, and requested that the Royal Assent
be withheld" - but India was persuaded by Britain "not to press its
objection".(136)
The Customs Tariff (British Preference) Bill, which was introduced into
the Australian parliament in September 1906, gave tariff preference to goods
imported into Australia by British vessels. The Bill was amended to give tariff
preference only if such vessels "were manned exclusively by white seamen".
Under pressure from Britain, the Australian Prime Minister had to get the
Governor-General to reserve assent, and it therefore never became law.(137)
THE
COCOS ISLANDS AFFAIR
In the 1950s the Cocos Islands were transferred from British rule to Australian
rule. This almost didn't happen, because "Australian officials drew
particular exception to British demands that Cocos Islanders be given
sympathetic consideration for settling in this country". A compromise was
drawn up, by giving the Islanders sympathetic consideration "to
enter" (not to "settle in") Australia. Once again, the British
were attempting to interfere with the White Australia Policy.(138)
SECTION SIX MISCELLANEOUS
IMPERIAL
FEDERATION
In the late 1800s there were, in the United Kingdom and in the colonies, small
and sometimes influential groups of imperial federationists who wanted "a
genuinely imperial parliament, with the United Kingdom and the colonies as its
electorate, and limiting Westminster [i.e. the British Government] to a domestic
role". Such an Imperial Federation, with its Imperial Parliament, would've
smothered Australia's interests - as we would have been only a very small
minority in such a arrangement.(139)
As E.M. Andrews wrote,
"Indeed, one section of British opinion wanted to... formally bind the
Dominions in `imperial federation'. This roused the hostility of Canada and
South Africa, but all planning broke down anyway over the extent of
representation to be given to each component part of the Empire. Chamberlain
[Prime Minister of Britain] was an avid supporter of the idea, and at the 1897
Colonial Conference had looked forward to a time when the colonies would share
in the management of the Empire `which we like to think is as much theirs as it
is ours', but was unwise enough to add that that would involve responsibility
and `some form of contribution towards the expense' and talked of the
interchangeability of British and colonial armies. Few remarks could have been
more injudicious, especially as he also suggested that the white settlement
colonies and Britain be given representation in proportion to their population
- which meant that Britain would dominate the organisation. He flatly rejected
an Australian proposal for equal representation for each part of the Empire -
which would have given the various colonies the ability to outvote Britain.
"In Australia, there were fears that the country would be dragged into
Britain's innumerable wars, which led even the Sydney Morning Herald in
1900, when Australia was supporting Britain in the Boer War, to oppose joining
an imperial federation. The Australian Defence Act of 1903 therefore did
not change colonial legislation, but - against the wishes of the British
government which wanted Australian troops in imperial wars - allowed
conscription only for the defence of Australia itself. Service overseas was
only on the basis of specific volunteering. Even so, support for imperial
federation by British and Australian conservatives still made the movement
suspect in the eyes of Australian nationalists and the left wing.
"Yet the idea dragged on. For a time the Imperial Federation League had
some influence, especially under the presidency of Alfred Deakin, three times
prime minister of Australia. Then in 1909 Lord Milner and members of his
`Kindergarten' in London formed the Round Table group, to organise influential
citizens in Britain and the self-governing colonies to discuss the future of
the Empire. Its journal, the Round Table, published anonymous reports
and commentaries on matters of imperial importance. But even in this, the most
imperialist of journals, the Australian commentators were keenly aware of
Australia's special security needs; and ready to criticise Britain and the
organisation itself if they were ignored. They also noted a reluctance on the
part of their fellow Australians to accept any diminution in their powers of
self-government. The Sydney Daily Telegraph spoke for them when it
chided Tennyson, on the eve of his departure from Australia in 1904, for hoping
for closer union with Britain, and described representation in an imperial
parliament as `a backward step on the road of British destiny'.
"Among the Australian public there was a deep apathy towards the dull and
intricate task of creating some form of imperial constitution. Most Australians
assumed that they were in a flexible empire, where their needs would be met.
There was no need to rush into formal - and dangerously novel - agreements.
They might consider the idea eventually, but in the meantime they were happy
with their measure of self-government, and did not want to lose it."(140)
Fortunately, despite the establishment of the Imperial Federation League in
1884, "there was never any serious likelihood that this body would succeed
in turning the Empire into a federal Super-State". The movement collapsed
in the 1890s. However, it is apparent that the movement had some success, in
that its activities apparently led many politicians to the conclusion that
there was a need for Imperial conferences.(141)
Imperial Federation was opposed by Australian Nationalists, who saw it as a
regressive step that would pull the Australian nation further away from the
goal of independence.
The scheme was also seen as a threat against White Australia as, due to the Empire's
trading interests and diplomatic ties with various non-European colonies and
countries, massive non-European immigration into Australia could have been
authorised by an Imperial Parliament which was dominated by Britain and which
would have had no reason to put Australia's interests first.
As Arthur Calwell stated,
"The Labor Party saw in the Campaign for Imperial federation, inaugurated
by Joseph Chamberlain, an attempt to break down the White Australia Policy, and
a threat to our infant secondary industries."(142)
The Australian Workers' Union pointed out that:
"A scheme of Imperial Federation under existing circumstances would mean
good-bye forever to our system of responsible government, and an attack on the
principles of a White Australia".(143)
THE
"REPUBLICAN RIOTS"
As part of the celebrations in 1887 to celebrate Queen Victoria's 50 years on
the throne, a Town Hall meeting "to declare loyalty to the Queen was
scheduled for 10 June". But at this meeting the growing republican and
radical sentiment was "expressed in cries of `three cheers for liberty'
which rang out louder than the `loyal cheers'." The conservative press
described the radical demonstration as the "republican riots".(144)
A subsequent meeting was held five days later to declare loyalty to the Queen.
The Empire Loyalists (the "British mind-set") ensured that this
meeting was held without any similar trouble: the meeting was held "under
the protection of several conservative groups including the undergraduates of
the University of Sydney, the Loyal Orange Institution, the Naval Brigade and
several rugby clubs"; as well as which "dissidents were banned"
from this second meeting.(145)
EXPULSIONS
FROM PARLIAMENT
In 1901, an article criticising King Edward VII was published in the Toscin
magazine (the article had earlier been produced in an Irish publication).
Edward Findley (the Labor member for Melbourne) although unaware of the article
before its printing, was the Toscin's nominal publisher. Peacock, the
Victorian premier, moved Findley's expulsion from State parliament. The motion
was passed.(146)
In 1920 when Hugh Mahon, Labor's Member for Kalgoorlie in the House of
Representatives, addressed a meeting of Irish patriots in Melbourne, he
"spoke of the death in British custody of the Lord Mayor of Cork... (and)
was reported to have expressed the hope that `the sob of the widow on the
coffin would one day shake the foundations of this accursed Empire'" and
made other statements about Britain's "bloody and accursed Empire". The
National Party's prime minister Billy Hughes organised Mahon's expulsion from
the Commonwealth Parliament for having made "seditious utterances
inconsistent with a parliamentarian's oath of office".(147)
CITIZENSHIP
Legally, "there was no such thing as Australian citizenship before 26
January 1949". Prior to this, all Australians were British Subjects, and
Australia was regarded as part of the British Empire.(148)
It was the Labor Government of Ben Chifley which made the change, via the Nationality
and Citizenship Act, which came into force on Australia Day 1949 (26
January 1949) and created the new category of Australian citizen. The Act also
enabled the creation of the Australian passport (prior to this, Australians
travelled by using "British" passports), but this new passport
creation was revoked by the incoming Menzies Government - so that Australians
then continued to travel overseas until 1973 with the words "British
Passport" emblazoned on the front of their passports".(149)
Section 7. CULTURE
AUSTRALIA'S
NATIONAL IDENTITY AND CULTURE
Our country's political position of being "under the rule" of the
British monarchy (whether in a symbolic sense or in a practical sense) has
stymied the development of Australia's national identity and culture.
As William Byrne has pointed out in Republic Vs. Monarchy:
"Heads of State can fulfil an important role in the national psyche. The
fact that Australia's Head of State is the Head of State of the United Kingdom
is not just an incident to be taken in isolation, it is just the "tip of
the iceberg" in the number of ways that Australia shows its cultural
servitude to Britain.
"The use, past and present, of the English Monarch as the symbol of
Australia in many facets of Australian life does not fail to imbue into many
people the impression, whether intended or not, that we are transplanted
Britons beholden to the "mother country" and its Monarchy. This means
that instead of naturally developing indigenous Australian ways of life and culture,
many look to Britain for ways of cultural expression. As Donald Horne pointed
out: "It is continued obsession with the monarchy that has helped preserve
remnants of a colonial mentality and a nostalgic Britishness".
"The psyche of Australia's culture is still impeded and undermined by
continual, but usually subtle, references to the English Monarchy, and the
institutionalised remains of British rule: various government bodies still
print all envelopes with the heading "O.H.M.S." (On Her
Majesty's Service); we are defended by the Royal
Australian Navy and the Royal Australian Air Force; many other
institutions bear the prefix "Royal", such as the R.S.P.C.A. (Royal
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals), Royal Flying
Doctor Service, Royal College of Nursing, etc.; our legal system
has Queen's Counsels, while our State takes on a royal persona
(e.g. "Smith versus The Queen", "Regina
versus Smith", with criminal cases being prosecuted by The Crown);
offenders are jailed in Her Majesty's Prisons; Royal
Commissions are appointed to investigate matters of importance; the Royal
assent is required to create new laws; Scouts promise to "do my duty to...
the Queen"; and the Australian flag, with the British flag
in pride of place, is seen probably every day (in one form or another) by most
Australians. To cap it off: every single coin used daily by the general public
has the English Queen starring on it, as well as which her portrait is on all
$5 notes (all made, of course, by the Royal Australian Mint).
"Although dismissed individually as trivial, these symbols, remains and
reminders of a "British Australia" actually appear everywhere and
everyday, so that collectively they have eroded the "Australianness"
of most Australians, and have infected them with a certain sense of being
"British" or "British-Australians", this manifesting itself
in a lack of true "Australianism" in our nation's culture. As one
commentator put it: "The subconscious of Australia's collective culture
has been extensively, but not irreparably, damaged by our still-continuing
subservience to British institutions and symbols". Despite any
protestations to the contrary, how can we develop a truly Australian culture
with one hand while we salute the Queen with the other?
"The continuing servility of having an English Monarch has enormous
ramifications for the continuing development of the Australian national
culture.
"Australia has an identity, but it is an identity that is constantly
stunted and stifled by our own political and cultural servitude. We should
acknowledge the important contribution that Britain, and British people, have
made to Australia. However, we have our own identity, culture, and way of life,
and for that to fully develop Australia needs to attain
independence."(150)
Australia's past emphasis on its "British connection" has also
fostered continual denigration of Australia's culture as "inferior"
to that of Britain, thereby creating the "cultural cringe".
In Australia's early years, the "British connection" created a social
and political climate where Britain was referred to as "the Home
Country" or "Home" (even by those Australian-born who had never
set foot in Britain), and where Australian children were taught "Loyalty
to the Empire", rather than "Loyalty to Australia, first and
foremost".(151)
Such happenings ensured that a substantial part of the Australian population
was pro-Britain in many ways; politically, culturally, and even economically.
This style of people have been referred to collectively by some as "the British
Brigade".
For at least the first 150 years since European settlement, this "British
Brigade" was predominant in Australia. It espoused a doctrine of
"British imperial patriotism", a widely held ideology, the large
support for which can be seen in the "jingoistic fervour" which was
aroused by the British Empire's involvement in the Sudan War in northern Africa
(1885), the second Boer War in South Africa (1899-1902), and the Boxer Rebellion
in China (1900).(152)
As Ross McMullin has noted, "nearly all Australians possessed a strong
pride in Britain's heritage; family links, educational influences and social
conditioning combined to make this inevitable."(153)
This "British mind-set" was reinforced in many areas of Australia's
national life, such as the commencement in 1905 of an annual Empire Day as a
"special festival for the schools", whereby children were taught that
patriotism meant "loyalty to both Australia and the Empire",
illustrated by the suggestion that "the cry `Australia for the Australians'...
should be `Australia for the Empire'."(154)
With nearly one in five Australians being born in the United Kingdom, and with
their affections for Britain being passed onto their children (most Australians
were of British descent), it is not surprising that many Australians regarded
Britain as "Home". However, during World War One, many Australian
soldiers fighting in Europe had visited England whilst on leave - and they were
disappointed with what they found - due to many small English annoyances and
differences (the ANZACs especially disliked the very obvious English class
system). One letter-writer wrote that he hated England, and that "they
ought to give England to Germany and apologise for the state it is in".
Due to the various cultural differences between the English soldiers and the
Australians, the ANZACs actually developed more of an affinity with the
Scottish troops, rather than with the English soldiers.(155)
Interestingly, rather than fighting for England or the Empire, many Australians
held the view that it was in Australia's best interest for Britain to prevail;
that is, "they were pro-British for Australia's sake, not for the sake of
blind fervour towards the Crown".(156)
Following the end of World War One, Australian troops returned to their native
land, which many now "saw with new eyes". Their experiences in
Britain had made them more "Australian" in their outlook.(157)
Australians can take pride in our nation's British heritage, however, we should
recognise it for what it is: It is only a part of our national
heritage; it does not comprise our entire national identity nor our national
culture (although it has provided a part of the basis for both).
REFERENCES
1. Henry Lawson. "In the Storm That Is To Come" (originally published
1904); in: Leonard Cronin (ed.) A Fantasy of Man: Henry Lawson: Complete
Works 1901-1922, Lansdowne, Sydney, 1984, pp. 220-221.
2. W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp. Australian Independence: Colony to Reluctant
Kingdom, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Victoria, pp. 25-26, 29.
3. E.M. Andrews. The ANZAC Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations During World
War I, Cambridge University Press, Oakleigh, Victoria, 1993, p. 15.
W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp. Australian Independence, pp. 25-26.
4. Hansards (United Kingdom): House of Commons. The Parliamentary Debates,
Vol. 83, 14 May 1900, pp. 46-47.
5. Ross McMullin, The Light On the Hill: The Australian Labor Party
1891-1991, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 1991, p. 21.
[New South Wales Labor Platform] Sydney Morning Herald, 7 April 1891;
cited in: Brian McKinlay, A Documentary History of the Australian Labor
Movement 1850-1975, Drummond, Richmond, Vic., 1979, p. 10.
Ailsa Thomson. "The Early History of the Bulletin", in Historical
Studies, May 1954, p. 124.
6. Donald Horne, The Coming Republic, Pan Macmillan, Chippendale, N.S.W.,
1992, p. 17 .
7. E.M. Andrews. The ANZAC Illusion, p. 21.
W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp. Australian Independence, pp. 46, 96.
8. Graham Freudenberg. Cause for Power: The Official History of the New
South Wales Branch of the Australian Labor Party, Pluto Press, Leichhardt,
N.S.W., 1991, pp. 208-210.
Hansards (United Kingdom): House of Commons. The Parliamentary Debates,
Vol. 83, 14 May 1900, pp. 46-47.
9. E.M. Andrews. The ANZAC Illusion, pp. 13-15.
10. [New South Wales Labor Platform] Sydney Morning Herald, 7 April
1891; cited in: Brian McKinlay (ed.) A Documentary History of the Australian
Labor Movement 1850-1975, p. 10.
11. Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, Section 8.
12. L.F. Crisp. Australian National Government, Longman Cheshire,
Melbourne, 1978 (fourth edition), pp. 29-30.
W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp. Australian Independence, pp. 29-30, 41-42.
Tom Keneally. Our Republic, William Heinemann, Port Melbourne, 1993, p.
235.
W.G. McMinn. A Constitutional History of Australia, Oxford University
Press, Melbourne, 1979, pp. 117-118.
See also:
Gordon Greenwood and Charles Grimshaw (eds.) Documents on Australian
International Affairs 1901-1918, Thomas Nelson, West Melbourne, 1977, pp.
LXII-LXV, 6-9, 13-21.
John Quick and Robert Garran. The Annotated Constitution of the Australian
Commonwealth, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1901, pp. 229-249.
13. F.W. Eggleston: Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1927-9, Evidence,
p. 734. Cited in : L.F. Crisp. Australian National Government, p. 30.
14. W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp. Australian Independence, pp. 29-30.
15. John Craig. Australian Politics: A Source Book (Second edition),
Harcourt Brace, Marrickville, N.S.W., 1993, p. 44.
W.G. McMinn. A Constitutional History of Australia, p. 118.
16. Tom Keneally. Our Republic, p. 145.
17. John Craig. Australian Politics: A Source Book (Second edition), p.
43.
18. W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp. Australian Independence, pp. 39-40.
19. W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp. Australian Independence, p. 16.
20. W.J. Hudson and M.P. Sharp. Australian Independence, p. 43-44.
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Ross McMullin, The Light On the Hill, p. 216.
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118. W.G. McMinn. A Constitutional History of Australia, p. 158.
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J.T. Lang. I Remember, p. 34.
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Gordon Greenwood and Charles Grimshaw (eds.) Documents on Australian
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157. E.M. Andrews. The ANZAC Illusion, p, 185.
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