COURT OF QUEEN’S BENCH OF ALBERTA CITATION: MEADS V. MEADS, 2012 ABQB 571 PART 4

c. Subject Jurisdiction
[362] A superior court of inherent jurisdiction has a special general jurisdiction in substantive as well as procedural law. It is a clear and well-understood principle of Canadian law that where a person has a right in law, there must exist some tribunal where that right may be exercised and defended. If no other court has been assigned authority to address a particular kind of legal action or subject matter, then that authority falls to the superior courts of inherent jurisdiction.
[363] The Supreme Court of Canada considered this inherent substantial jurisdiction of provincial superior courts in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626 at para. 32:
The notion of “inherent jurisdiction” arises from the presumption that if there is a justiciable right, then there must be a court competent to vindicate the right ... the doctrine of inherent jurisdiction requires that only an explicit ouster of jurisdiction should be allowed to deny jurisdiction to the superior court.
[Emphasis added.]
[364] The Privy Counsel, then the highest court of Canada, commented on the authority of the precursor to the present Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench in Board v. Board, [1919] A.C. 956 (P.C.). At pp. 962-963 the Court concluded:
... a well-known rule makes it plain that the language there used ought to be interpreted as not excluding the jurisdiction. If the right exists, the presumption is that there is a Court which can enforce it, for if no other mode of enforcing it is prescribed, that alone is sufficient to give jurisdiction to the King's Courts of justice. In order to oust jurisdiction, it is necessary, in the absence of a special law excluding it altogether, to plead that jurisdiction exists in some other Court. This is the effect of authorities . . . [The Alberta] Act set up a Superior Court, and it is the rule as regards presumption of jurisdiction in such a Court that, as stated by Willes J. in London Corporation v. Cox ((1867) L.R., 2 H.L. 239, 259), nothing 83 shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of a Superior Court, but that which specially appears to be so. [Emphasis added.]
[365] Canada’s constitution authorizes the Provincial and the Federal governments to create courts in addition to the superior courts ‘inherited’ from the period of direct British rule. The Tax Court of Canada, the various provincial courts, the military courts, and the federal courts are examples of these ‘statutory’ courts. In certain instances a statutory court has been granted sole jurisdiction for a particular subject or a part thereof, such as authority granted in the Tax Court of Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-2. The Tax Court of Canada:
... has exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine references and appeals to the Court on matters arising under ... the Income Tax Act ... where references or appeals to the Court are provided for in those Acts. [Emphasis added.]
That means the Tax Court of Canada is the Court that interprets the Income Tax Act, and determines the amount that a taxpayer owes. Other tax-related processes, such collection of outstanding tax and criminal prosecution for evasion of income, fall into the jurisdiction of the superior courts, see for example: Porisky Trial Decision.
[366] Assigning jurisdiction to a statutory court has the effect of removing that aspect of this Court’s general authority, see Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net for a more detailed review of this concept. Suffice to say that a person’s right to approach a Canadian court for recourse is generally not a question of “is there a court?” but rather “which court can hear this subject?”
[367] There are, nevertheless, certain limits. Some subjects are simply not justiciable, for example government policy decisions: Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481.
[368] The inherent jurisdiction of Canadian courts cannot be defeated by Parliament and the provincial legislatures. Administrative tribunals are sometimes ‘protected’ by what are called “privative clauses”, legislative provisions that say that all or part of a decision of that tribunal is final. For example, in Pasiechnyk v. Saskatchewan (Workers' Compensation Board), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 890, 149 D.L.R. (4th) 577 the Supreme Court of Canada evaluated the effect of a privative clause that read:
The decision and finding of the board under this Act upon all questions of fact and law are final and conclusive and no proceedings by or before the board shall be restrained by injunction, prohibition or other proceeding or removable by certiorari or otherwise in any court.
[369] That did not stop the courts. As Justice Sopinka observed at para. 16: A legislature cannot completely insulate a tribunal from the superintending and reforming power of the superior courts.
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See also Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 at para. 31.
[370] This fact is why the majority of OPCA arguments can never succeed. There is always a
court, though perhaps not this one, that has jurisdiction over these litigants and their activities.
They cannot opt out. All arguments that invoke ‘immunity’ and indeed any schemes that claim a
person can possess or acquire a status that allows them to ignore court authority are incorrect in
law. I note this authority is a phenomenon that flows from the historical development of
constitutional government, and is therefore an aspect of the common law so often stressed by
OPCA litigants and gurus.
[371] As is made expressly clear in Board v. Board and Canada (Human Rights Commission)
v. Canadian Liberty Net: for every injury there is a forum to grant the appropriate remedy. A
superior court of inherent jurisdiction, such as the Court of Queen’s Bench, has the jurisdiction
to address any Alberta matter that has not been delegated to another statutory court. The inherent
authority of a provincial Superior Court is therefore very broad indeed.
[372] OPCA litigants also fail to appreciate that this inherent jurisdiction is adaptive, and
‘expands’ into any aspects of Canadian legal existence that are not explicitly allocated to another
court. In Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. Canadian Pacific Ltd., [1996] 2
S.C.R. 495, 136 D.L.R. (4th) 289 McLachlin J. (as she then was) confirmed at para. 5 that
provincial superior courts had authority to grant an interlocutory injunction in labour disputes,
even though labour agreements are considered a complete code, and even where that injunction
did not relate to a cause of action that would be heard in a provincial superior court (at para. 17).
Justice McLachlin observed that this authority flows from that fact that the labour agreement
provided “no adequate alternative remedy” (at para. 6), and it was this gap in an otherwise
complete scheme that gave the court inherent jurisdiction.
[373] This adaptive facet of inherent jurisdiction goes so far as to allow this Court to intrude,
when necessary, into domains that would appear to have been allocated to a statutory court. The
Alberta Court of Appeal in 783783 Alberta Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ABCA 226
at paras. 24-28, 322 D.L.R. (4th) 56 concluded this Court had jurisdiction to interpret and apply
the Income Tax Act, if that was necessary for a given case. Similarly, Thomas J. concluded he
may examine Indian band counsel activities, despite the jurisdiction assigned to the Federal
Court by the Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 18: 1985 Sawridge Trust v. Alberta
(Public Trustee), 2012 ABQB 365 at paras. 50-54.
d. Inherent Jurisdiction vs. OPCA Strategies and Concepts
[374] The inherent jurisdiction of Canada’s superior courts defeats almost all OPCA
pseudolegal strategies. No person can claim to be outside court authority because they are
subject to no court or law, or a restricted kind of law. No ‘magic hat’ can ever create an
exemption from court supervision. All these arguments are defective and fail as a consequence.
[375] For a moment, let us imagine that an OPCA guru were to discover some new realm or
aspect of law. Novel developments are not unknown. For example the last quarter century has
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seen many innovations with potentially profound legal effects, including the advent of electronic
communications and genetic material as form of property. What would be the effect? Once
identified, that legal domain would necessarily become a part of the jurisdiction of some
Canadian court, and typically that would mean that the jurisdiction of this court would
necessarily expand to include this new facet or aspect of law, unless and until it was statutorily
grants to another court.
[376] I am aware of one attempt by an OPCA guru, Frank O’Collins, to ‘invent’ a new and
total code of law. This person, whom I understand is an Australian, has published what he calls
“Divine Canon Law”, the law that governs persons in the “One Heaven Society of United Free
States of Spirits”. At least one Alberta OPCA litigant has claimed to be subject to only this
“Divine Canon Law”. Does this defeat the inherent jurisdiction of the Alberta Court of Queen’s
Bench? Of course not. While I strongly question that a person could bind themselves and society
to abide by some distinct legal scheme that trumps the common law and statute, success would
still leave that person subject to the scrutiny and supervision of this court.
[377] In summary, when a litigant claims he or she has found themselves in the wrong court,
then that is a potentially valid question of jurisdiction. However, a litigant is wrong in law if they
say that, at this time, they choose to not be subject to any Canadian court, unless they claim that
the subject in dispute is the jurisdiction of another tribunal, such as an arbitrator, or the courts of
a different national or provincial jurisdiction. A defence with that basis may be struck without
further analysis. A denial of court authority on that basis should be ignored.
[378] The nature and jurisdiction of Canadian courts, globally, defeats all the OPCA strategies
and concepts identified and reviewed in these Reasons, including the ‘obligation requires
agreement’, ‘double/split person’, and ‘unilateral agreements’ categories discussed below. The
exceptions are the ‘money for nothing’ schemes that I will review at a later point. The superior
court’s inherent jurisdiction is a single basis that may be adopted and applied by any Justice who
faces a novel OPCA strategy, if that argument, at its core, reduces, subverts, or denies court
authority.
B. Obligation Requires Agreement
[379] A second common OPCA litigation category is grounded in a belief that all legally
enforceable rights require that a person agree to be subject to those obligations. This strategy
takes two closely related forms:
1. every binding legal obligation emerges from a contract, and
2. consent is required before an obligation can be enforced.
[380] Persons who advance this concept extend it to interactions between state actors, including
Canada and the provinces, and individual persons. This is a kind of ‘magic hat’; the OPCA
litigant says he or she has not agreed to be governed or subject to court authority, and the OPCA
litigant is therefore allegedly immune.
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[381] Sometimes OPCA litigants and gurus express this global concept as that they only
engage in commerce; this seems to be an attempt to declare that any interaction between persons
and/or state actors is a contract. This may explain the curious but common manner in which I
find myself addressed in OPCA correspondence, “John Rooke, carrying out business as
Associate Chief Justice John Rooke”.
1. Defeating Legislation
[382] A necessary first step in any ‘everything is a contract’ or ‘consent is required’ scheme is
that the OPCA litigant develop a mechanism that denies a unilateral obligation can arise from
legislation.
[383] Some OPCA litigants argue they have opted out of legislated obligations: Sydorenko v.
Manitoba, 2012 MBQB 42 at paras. 17-18. Others simply claim consent is required, otherwise
legislation is a set of optional guidelines: Waterloo (Regional Municipality) v. Bydeley, 2010
ONCJ 740 at para. 56, affirmed 2011 ONCJ 842, affirmed [2011] O.J. No. 6282 (QL) (Ont.
C.A.); Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 29.
[384] Another OPCA approach is to argue that a court or government actor is a corporation and
therefore only has the rights of a corporation: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC
1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309. The result is a claim that legislation has no more special
meaning than any unilateral declaration. A telltale indication of this scheme is that a litigant files
corporate registry documents for Canada, a province, or a municipality. For some reason, many
OPCA litigants claim Canada is a “municipal corporation domiciled in the District of
Columbia”.
[385] Others wear a ‘magic hat’ that they say makes them immune from legislation, and only
subject to the common law (which, as noted above, is often an aberrant definition of that
category of law). In Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 39, 60
B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 the ‘magic hat’ was being a “free will full liability person” under “Anglo-
Saxon Common Law”. Freemen-on-the-Land take a similar approach: Harper v. Atchison, 2011
SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15, 369 Sask.R. 134, see also Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted
Police), 2011 BCSC 696, and Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008
NSSC 112 at paras. 14, 18, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Summerland (District) v. No Strings
Enterprises Ltd., 2003 BCSC 990 at para. 19, 124 A.C.W.S. (3d) 39, leave denied 2004 BCCA
360, 131 A.C.W.S. (3d) 994.
[386] Similarly, Detaxer gurus such as Warman and Lindsay have argued the that Magna Carta
operates in a constitutional manner and invalidates legislation: R. v. Lindsay, 2008 BCCA 30 at
paras. 19-21, 250 B.C.A.C. 270; see also R. v. Warman, 2001 BCCA 510 at paras. 9-10, 13-14.
[387] Of course, any other ‘magic hat’ or alleged defect that negates state authority would have
the same effect. That is a reason why OPCA litigants have often focussed on some arcane flaw
that collapses state authority, for example the alleged defect in Queen Elizabeth II’s coronation
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oath (R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at paras. 31-32, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011]
S.C.C.A. No. 265), or a flaw in the appointment of Governor Generals after passage of the 1931
Statute of Westminster (R. v. Dick, 2001 BCPC 275; R. v. Lindsay, 2004 MBCA 147 at para. 32,
187 Man.R. (2d) 236).
2. Everything is a Contract
[388] An OPCA litigant may argue he or she has no obligation unless the litigant has explicitly
formed a contract for that obligation. In Canada this argument has frequently been advanced in
an income tax context: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at para. 31, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused
[2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265; R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 12-13, 21, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308;
Banilevic v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2002 SKQB 371 at para. 10, 117
A.C.W.S. (3d) 549; Bruno v. Canada, 2000 BCSC 190 at para. 34, [2000] 2 C.T.C. 16, affirmed
2002 BCCA 47, 162 B.C.A.C. 293; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 5, 8; Sandri
v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at paras. 6,13, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.); Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th)
309.
[389] An interesting variation on this approach was made by Porisky, who at trial argued that if
he did not want any government services, then he ought not be obliged to pay income tax:
Porisky Trial Decision at para. 66. Though not expressed in quite that manner, Porisky seems to
argue that he should not be bound in the ‘income tax contract’ as he has not received any
consideration from the government.
[390] In yet another variation of the ‘everything is a contract’ concept, a person attempt to
sever all ‘contractual relationships’ with the state; success would presumably defeat all
government authority. R. v. Pinno, 2002 SKPC 118 at paras. 22, [2003] 3 C.T.C. 308 provides
an example where an OPCA litigant sent the Canada Revenue Agency a “constructive notice”
that included this statement:
... I further learned that I have been deceptively induced by Revenue Canada's
propaganda into making a supposed contract by filing an income tax return, thus
changing my status to "taxpayer" which makes me subject to the income tax by
that supposed contract. ...
The litigant then ‘revoked and voided’ the income tax contract, and demanded a refund: para. 13.
[391] R. v. Sargent, 2004 ONCJ 356 at paras. 40-41, [2005] 1 C.T.C. 448 and Dempsey v.
Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 report a similar
strategy. A similar scheme appears to have been advanced by a Freeman-on-the-Land in R. v.
McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288 to withdraw from a “social contract” with the state: paras. 28-32.
[392] An OPCA litigant may also attempt to use the right of contract as a shield. For example,
in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 9, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309 an
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OPCA litigant challenged the court’s authority to refuse representation by an OPCA guru
because:
The court has no jurisdiction to interfere or make void any private agreement I
may have with other men for such is my inalienable right as a free man.
[393] The OPCA litigant in Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General), 2009 CanLII 44282 at para.
10, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) took his defence one step further:
I (the Plaintiff) state and the fact is that according to Contract Law there is no
Queen who has any authority over me; however, I have complete authority over
the aforesaid monarch by Contract Law. I am lord. The aforesaid monarch has
authority only over those who give her authority and in turn, all those who have
done so, by default give me authority. I am ONLY a beneficiary to the contracts
that compose the Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982. It is a TRUST and the “queen”
therein stated is my lieutenant, or in other words, my helper. By law, she is
compelled to obey me.
[394] Sometimes OPCA litigants claim that their interaction with the court is a contract. For
example, the OPCA litigant in Borkovic v. Laurentian Bank of Canada, 2001 BCSC 337 at
paras. 4-12, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700 argued he had ‘purchased’ a trial date by paying a court
filing fee. The litigant then purported to direct court procedure: paras. 13-16.
[395] OPCA litigants who adopt this scheme tend to identify practically any state document,
even a driver’s license or a birth certificate, as a contract. CERI members explain that is the
reason why they do not use driver’s licenses or license plates. They argue, in effect, that they do
not wish to be in a contract with the state, and should be able to engage in activities, for example
operation of a motor vehicle, without being bound to the state in that manner.
[396] These persons go to great lengths to scour away all ‘contractual’ links, expecting that at
some point the state’s authority will evaporate. The ‘everything is a contract’ concept may also
emerge in a court context in another way. A OPCA litigant may, for example, demand to know
whether the court is offering to enter into a contract with a litigant, or the terms of the contract
between the court and the OPCA litigant.
[397] Mr. Meads clearly adheres to the ‘everything is a contract’ concept. In his March 3, 2011
“""Good Faith Notice"" in the Nature of an Affidavit”, Mr. Meads says that a telephone call and
a follow-up email from an Audrey Hardwick, who seems to have been the assistant to Ms.
Meads’ then counsel, was an “Enticement into Slavery”. I am presuming here that ‘enticement
into slavery’ is simply a particularly dramatic expression for contract obligation. Notice how
simple receipt of communications is interpreted as a potential contract.
[398] Later in the same document Mr. Meads adds:
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Please take “Notice”” that should you Audrey Hardwick/AUDREY HARDWICK
and or Audrey Hardwick/AUDREY HARDWICK make the any or the all attempt
at a “Novation” of this “Good Faith Notice” will be accepted as an admission of
your “Attempt at Enticement into Slavery by you and yourselves and that of the
LAW FIRM “RESOLVE LAW” [sic]
Now Mr. Meads is attempting to diffuse the possibility that his reply letter could form a contract
in some manner.
[399] Still later on in this same document is the following:
“Using a Notary Public with this document does not create an adhesion contract
with the any-state /province, nor does it alter my status in any manner for the
claim is for the use only-for the verification of the identification-purposes, therefor
this ““Good Faith Notice”” is the Nature of an Affidavit is with the lack of the
claim of the foreign jurisdiction.” [sic.]
[400] Once again, Mr. Meads is attempting to pre-empt formation of a contract. An analogous
disclaimer in materials my office has received from an OPCA litigant read:
Attention: {The use of a Notary is for attestation and verification purposes only
and does not constitute a change in status, entrance, or acceptance of foreign or
domestic jurisdiction.} [Emphasis in original.]
[401] Interestingly, this seems to be the only instance where Mr. Meads saw notarization in this
potentially dangerous light. Many of Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 documents also have been
notarized, and some are directed to specific government officials, but Mr. Meads does not
include the March 3, 2011 disclaimer. Consistency is not a strong point in OPCA litigant
conduct.
[402] The August 27, 2012 filings by Mr. Meads continue this theme. He states that Ms.
Reeves has made “... an offer to Contract and/or Enticement of Slavery (Title 18 United States
Code and/or Article 4 Universal Declaration of Human Rights) ...”.
[403] Similarly at the June 8 hearing, when I made proposals to address disclosure by Ms.
Meads, Mr. Meads responded with alarm: “You are enticing me into slavery.”
[404] Earlier he alleged the same in response to activities by Ms. Reeves:
I do not want to be enticed into slavery, sir. She contacts me, her other lawyer
contacted me, they are enticing me into contract. And I do not want to go there. I
just want to be left alone.
3. Consent is Required
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[405] A second common variant of the ‘obligation requires agreement’ category is a belief that
a person is immune if they simply say they have not consented to be subject to the law and the
courts. Of course, this concept has not met with success: R. v. Jennings, 2007 ABCA 45 at para.
6; Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at paras. 25, 29;
see also Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at paras. 14,
18, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696 at
paras. 17, 45.
[406] Sometimes this motif emerges in documentary form. For example, this Court has
received issued court orders stamped and returned with various messages, such as:
*** ALL CONSENT DENIED ***
RETURNED FOR CAUSE
OFFER REJECTED FOR
1. THIRD PARTY INTERFERENCE
2. BREACH OF CONTRACT
3. BREACH OF TRUST
4. BREACH OF CRIMINAL CODES OF CANADA
5. COMMERCIAL IMPROPRIETY
6. EXTRA JURISDICTIONAL
7. DEEMED UNLAWFULLY VEXATIOUS
8. DEEMED WITH MALICE AFORETHOUGHT
Of course, that had no effect.
[407] Various ‘magic hats’ may allegedly provide a basis for that declaration of immunity.
Courts have encountered claims that Freeman-on-the-Land status (Harper v. Atchison, 2011
SKQB 38 at paras. 6, 15, 369 Sask.R. 134; Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police),
2011 BCSC 696), or the Magna Carta (Harper v. Atchison, 2011 SKQB 38 at paras. 9-15, 369
Sask.R. 134; R. v. Jebbett, 2003 BCCA 69, 180 B.C.A.C. 21; Winningham v. Canada) nullifies
government or court authority.
[408] In R. v. McCormick, 2012 NSSC 150 at para. 9 an OPCA litigant argued the Freemanon-
the-Land ‘magic hat’ immunized against criminal sanction; see also R. v. McCormick, 2012
NSSC 288 at paras. 28-32. Naturally, that did not work. As Justice Moir observed in R. v.
McCormick, 2012 NSSC 288 at para. 32: “[t]his teaching is not only wrong in the sense that it is
false. It is wrongful. That is, it is full of wrong.”
[409] A foisted unilateral contract can be an alleged basis for non-consent. One this Court has
received concluded:
NULL APPEARANCE. As a private non-belligerent without the Canada or
United States, I do not consent to a general appearance now and/or in
perpetuity, and none can be assumed without a conversion of personal
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liability. No grant of in rem or in personam jurisdiction is expressed or implied.
No chose in action is expressed or implied on behalf of the Defendant/Debtor or
any legal fiction, juristic personality or ens legis artificial person. I do not intend,
nor will I, argue the merits, facts or law, represent the Defendant/Debtor, request
any action that would imply a cause is properly pending, or engage in any
controversy. [Emphasis in original.]
The cryptic “without the Canada or United States” language relates to an alleged earlier deeming
provision that set the litigant outside those countries, even when he was physically inside those
countries. See also R. v. Boisjoli, 2012 ABQB 556 at paras. 44-48.
[410] As with the ‘all relationships are contracts’ variant, OPCA litigants seem to see ‘consent’
emerging from very mundane activities. They may, for example, refuse to advance past the bar
in a courtroom because that would ‘consent’ to court authority: Canada v. Galbraith, 2001
BCSC 675 at paras. 25-29, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009]
O.J. No. 783 at para. 8, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). The same reasoning leads this
category of OPCA litigant to refuse to plead guilty or not-guilty, or to disobey an instruction to
sit or stand.
4. Conclusion - Obligation Requires Agreement
[411] A claim that the relationship between an individual and the state is always one of contract
is clearly incorrect. Aspects of that relationship may flow from mutual contract (for example a
person or corporation may be hired by the government to perform a task such as road
maintenance), but the state has the right to engage in unilateral action, subject to the Charter,
and the allocation and delegation of government authority.
[412] Similarly, my authority over this dispute is not subject to the agreement or consent of
either party. It flows from the inherent authority of this court, as shaped by legislation.
[413] Either branch of the ‘obligation requires agreement’ OPCA strategy category seeks
unsuccessfully to deny court authority, and operationally is an attempt by an OPCA litigant to
restrict the scope of state and court jurisdiction.
5. Court Misconduct by ‘Everything is a Contract’ and ‘Consent is Required’
Litigants
[414] OPCA litigants who use ‘consent’ and ‘contract’ approaches are often difficult courtroom
participants. These persons may be highly disruptive as they attempt to avoid any step or action
that they apparently fear might create a contract, or acknowledge consent. They may refuse to
comply with practically any request by a judge or court official on that basis. That is a possible
explanation for Mr. Meads’ premature exit. If he had waited until I completed the hearing, he
arguably would have ‘consented’ to my authority. This kind of belief is not atypical of the
distorted perspective of ‘obligation requires agreement’ OPCA litigants.
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[415] ‘Non-consent’ may be indicated by a mantra-like non-reply to all court comments, for
example the curious Moorish Law phrase “I accept that for value and consideration and honour”
(see Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138), see also:
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 51, 2009 CanLII 9368
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)). Mr. Meads’ did not engage in a ‘mantra response’, but still showed a clear
apprehension that our exchange in the June 8 hearing could result in what he appeared to believe
would be a contract.
[416] There is no obvious or simple way to address persons who believe obligation may
emerge from the most trivial of conduct, other than to perhaps emphasize the inherent
jurisdiction of the courts means that the OPCA litigant is subject to court authority, no matter
what the litigant may think or say. Admittedly, that explanation will not likely be welcomed, and
may well fall on deaf ears. However, the failure of an OPCA litigant to obey the Court’s lawful
orders cannot be a judicial excuse to not grant and enforce the law.
C. Double/Split Persons
[417] A strange but common OPCA concept is that an individual can somehow exist in two
separate but related states. This confusing concept is expressed in many different ways. The
‘physical person’ is one aspect of the duality, the other is a non-corporeal aspect that has many
names, such as a “strawman”, a “corporation”, a “corporate entity”, a “corporate fiction”, a
“dead corporation”, a “dead person”, an “estate”, a “legal person”, a “legal fiction”, an “artificial
entity”, a “procedural phantom”, “abandoned paper work”, a “slave name” or “slave person”, or
a “juristic person”.
[418] Many OPCA nomenclature schemes relate to this duality. For example, the ‘lower case’
vs. ‘upper case’ name pairs indicates the ‘physical person’ and ‘non-corporeal aspect’,
respectively. When “::Dennis-Larry: Meads::” says he acts “on behalf of DENNIS LARRY
MEADS (juristic person)”, he appears to indicate he believes he has two separate aspects, and
that the man in the courtroom (“::Dennis-Larry: Meads::”) is representing his other half
(“DENNIS LARRY MEADS (juristic person)”). Other times OPCA litigants say they are
“agents”, “trustees”, “owners”, “representatives” or “secured party” for their other aspect: Hajdu
v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835; Canada v. Galbraith,
2001 BCSC 675 at paras. 26-28, 54 W.C.B. (2d) 504; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at
paras. 5-6; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th)
309; Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at para. 27,
340 F.T.R. 150; Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 9; Services de
financement TD inc. c. Michaud, 2011 QCCQ 14868 at para. 6; this proceeding.
[419] A particularly surreal variation on this theme is reported in Dempsey v. Envision Credit
Union, 2006 BCSC 750 at para. 92, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 204, where the ‘physical litigants’
purported to intervene in the action against their ‘non-corporeal aspects’. Justice Garson
classified that attempt as “unintelligible” and struck the associated counterclaim: para. 93.
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[420] The ‘dash colon’ and ‘family/clan/house of’ motifs uniformly indicate the ‘physical
person’ half of these double/split individuals. Other times the ‘physical person’ is called a
“natural person” or is described as being “flesh and blood”: Porisky Trial Decision; R. v.
Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99, 302 B.C.A.C. 76, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 265;
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct.
J.); Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at para. 24, 2009 CanLII 9368
(Ont. Sup. Ct. J.)). Mr. Meads adopts the latter kind of language, he (the physical litigant) is “the
living flesh and blood sentient-man”.
[421] There are different explanations for the non-corporeal similarity. Some OPCA gurus
promote the idea that this aspect is created by the state, burdened with legal obligations, then
‘shackled’ to the physical person. Other OPCA gurus present the non-corporeal aspect as a part
of a person that can be split away, and then burdened with obligations and debts.
[422] Of course, either approach is legally ineffectual. Canadian law does not provide for a
person to have two aspects - this entire concept is yet another ‘magic hat’. This fundamental
misapprehension was eloquently explained by Justice Gauthier in Canada (Minister of National
Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield, 2009 FC 99 at paras. 17, 27, 340 F.T.R. 150:
... Mr. Camplin in the above-mentioned case seems to have argued, in the same
fashion as the respondent, that he had two capacities, one which he characterised
as being his "private capacity as a "natural person" for my own benefit" and the
other as his capacity as "legal representative of the taxpayer". Here, the
respondent characterises his purported capacities as being (1) as a natural person,
and (2) as a taxpayer. The deletion of the words "legal representative" from the
latter purported capacity does not render this case distinguishable from the one at
bar. The whole notion of their being a second capacity distinct from the one of a
natural person or human being is a pure fiction, one which is not sanctioned by
law. One can describe nothing in any terms one wishes; it still remains nothing.
...
Cory Stanchfield’s attempt to argue before this Court that his body comprises two
persons which act in different capacities is of one of two things: (1) an
inadmissible division of his indivisible entity, or (2) an attempted creation of a
second entity in a fashion which is not recognized by law, the result of which
amounts to nothing in the eyes of the law. It is an attempt at the impossible and
the respondent cannot do the impossible. Therefore, “Cory Stanchfield (the
Respondent)” and “Cory Stanchfield, in his capacity as a natural person (the
Witness)” is but one person, with one single capacity ...
[Emphasis added.]
See also Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Camplin; M.N.R. v. Camplin,
2007 FC 183 at paras. 8-9, [2007] 2 C.T.C. 205; R. v. Lindsay, 2006 BCCA 150 at para. 3, 265
94
D.L.R. (4th) 193; Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at paras. 40, 44-
45, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.); Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 6, 8;
Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at paras. 24-29;
Ontario (Director, Family Responsibility Office) v. Boyle, [2006] O.J. No. 2181 (QL) at paras.
3-5, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 127 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
[423] The answer is that, as Justice Gauthier observed, no matter whatever nomenclature the
OPCA litigant wants to adopt to describe his ‘other self’, it is the person before the Court who is
subject to its order.
1. Unshackling the Strawman
[424] Certain gurus see the non-corporeal half of a person as detrimental, a kind of parasitic
conjoined legal twin, and believe the state and court can only affect that aspect of a person.
Lindsay is a major proponent of this theory; he invites his followers to ‘kill their strawman’ and
thereafter be free of any income tax obligation. These OPCA litigants will therefore refuse to
acknowledge their non-corporeal aspect and its obligations: R. v. Lindsay, 2011 BCCA 99 at
para. 27, 302 B.C.A.C. 76; Canada (Minister of National Revenue - M.N.R.) v. Stanchfield,
2009 FC 99, 340 F.T.R. 150; Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at paras. 6, 8; Porisky Trial
Decision.
[425] This objective can lead to very unusual OPCA litigant responses. For example, in reply to
an action against “FRED L. JAJCZAY”, the defendant responded:
It is agreed by you in your private capacity with no dispute coming from you that
my name, Fred L. Jajczay, is my private property; that I have never given
permission or authority to any person, men or women to associate my name with
a dead corporate entity; that the alteration of my name in any manner is fraud.
[Emphasis in original.]
The intended effect is that Jajczay is trying to deny affiliation with his all capital letters
‘strawman’.
[426] OPCA gurus often seem drawn to the sea, so it is perhaps unsurprising that one variant
on this theme is that a newborn is issued a “Berth Certificate” that makes a person a “passenger”
on the “ship of state”. Instead of killing their ‘strawman’, these litigants emphasize they are “on
dry land”, and not subject to Admiralty law. They may ceremonially destroy or denounce their
“berth certificate”.
[427] Mr. Meads appears to subscribe to an aspect of this theory. In court he explained how he
was two persons, a “corporate identity” that was created by the state (or alternatively, me), and
was subject to legislation and this court. That “person” had been involuntarily attached to his
other aspect, his “living flesh and blood sentient-man” or “soul”. He now rejects that association
and the obligations that follow.
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2. Dividing Oneself
[428] Mr. Meads also applied the other form of the OPCA ‘divided/split person’ concept, that
these two linked imaginary personalities can interact with one another, and thereby structure a
kind of inter-relationship. In Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783 at
para. 14, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), Justice Brown reproduces a “most unusual”
contract:
... signed twice by Mr. Kovacevic: once in his capacity as “secured-party,
first-party”, and then again as “debtor, second-party”.
[429] Brown J. then at para. 15 summarizes the document’s intended effect:
It appears that by this document Mr. Kovacevic has attempted to split himself into
two separate persons – a “flesh and blood living man”, and a “juristic
person\strawman\legal entity” created by the Province of Ontario. If one takes
the document at face value, then Mr. Kovacevic impliedly acknowledges that up
until December 11, 2007 – i.e. three months after he had purchased the
Mercedes-Benz - he was a “juristic person”. He then attempts to transfer to his
newly created “flesh and blood living man” all his property then owned. The
document notably is silent as to what happened to the debt held at that time by the
“juristic person”.
[430] He then concludes at para. 45:
Of course this document has no legal effect. In the eyes of the law it is rubbish.
However, when read together with the other documents created by Mr. Kovacevic
it forms part of what I conclude to be a deliberate effort on his part to avoid
payment of his debt obligations.
[431] A similar strategy is reported in R. v. Crischuk, 2010 BCSC 716 at paras. 41-45,
affirmed 2010 BCCA 391, 2010 D.T.C. 5141, where the litigant attempted to create a lien
between two aspects of himself; see also Turnnir v. The Queen, 2011 TCC 495 at para. 6.
[432] With that, I turn to the documents delivered by Mr. Meads on June 19 and 21. These are,
I believe, the most complex set of ‘intra-personal’ contractual and trust relationships reported in
a Canadian court. These are carefully formatted, impressive looking documents, and are
obviously by the same author who composed the ‘fee schedule’ attached as Appendix “A” to
these Reasons. These documents share much parallel, if not identical, language and format. For
example, the “Property List” in the ‘fee schedule’ is also an element of other items.
[433] I will briefly explain my interpretation of the intended operation of these documents.
[434] As previously explained, Mr. Meads subscribes to the idea that the non-corporeal aspect
of himself was created by the state (or alternatively by me, on June 8, 2012). He must believe he
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nevertheless has ‘signing authority’ over that other personality because in his “power of
attorney” he, as “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, Debtor and Grantor”, authorizes his “attorney-infact”,
“Dennis-Larry: Meads, Secured Party Creditor” total control over his affairs. Presumably,
the ‘corporate entity’ is now a puppet for the physical person.
[435] The UCC Financing Statement registered in Ohio for a Certificate of Birth purports to
create or reflect a trust of “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust” in
favour of “Dennis-Larry:Meads, as Beneficiary of the Revested Trust”. The document continues:
This is actual and constructive notice that all of Debtors interests now owned or
hereafter acquired is hereby accepted as collateral for securing contractual
obligations in favour of the Secured party as detailed in a true, complete notarized
security agreement in the possession of the Secured party. Notice in accordance
with UCC-Property- this is the entry of the debtor in the Commercial Registry as
a transmitting utility and the following property is hereby registered in the same
as public notice of a commercial transaction: Certificate of Birth Document #[...]
[sic.]
Translated out of ‘gibberese’, Mr. Meads is purportedly assigning the value of his birth
certificate, a “commercial transaction” presumably with Canada, to his “flesh and blood” self.
[436] The Alberta Personal Property Registry Verification Statement for “DENNIS LARRY
MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust” presumably does the same for his a birth certificate,
social insurance number, UCC1 financing statement, a certificate of marriage, a motor vehicle
operator’s license, Canadian passport, and several court orders.
[437] The “Commercial Security Agreement”, which is identified by the cryptic notation
“DLM042011960 SA 01 Registration # 11120912227” purportedly promises that “DENNIS
LARRY MEADS, A LEGAL ENTITY” assumes all debts and obligations of “Dennis-
Larry:Meads, a "Personam Sojourn and People of Posterity"”, while granting Dennis-
Larry:Meads all his property. Similarly, the “Hold Harmless and Indemnity Agreement Non
Negotiable Between the Parties” causes “DEBTOR: DENNIS LARRY MEADS” to generally
indemnify “CREDITOR: Care of Dennis-Larry Meads”.
[438] This duplicates in general effect the analogous material advanced in Mercedes-Benz
Financial v. Kovacevic: everything good and of value attaches to the physical person of Mr.
Meads, while all obligation and debt is allocated to the unfortunate DENNIS LARRY MEADS,
corporate entity.
[439] Of course, that does not work. Mr. Meads is Mr. Meads in all his physical or imaginary
aspects. He would experience and obtain the same effect and success if he appeared in court and
selectively donned and removed a rubber Halloween mask which portrays the appearance of
another person, asserting at this or that point that the mask’s person is the one liable to Ms.
Meads. Not that I am encouraging, or indeed would countenance, the wearing of a mask in my
courtroom.
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3. In-Court Behaviour of the Divided Person
[440] The in-court conduct of OPCA litigants who advance a double/split person approach can
be confusing. They may ask to whom the court is talking. Or, like Mr. Meads, they may
conclude that the court is addressing the “person” rather than the “soul”.
[441] Detaxer cases provide some examples of this kind of conduct. R. v. Turnnir, 2006 BCPC
460 at para. 65 reports how the defendant referred to himself both as “the taxpayer” and “the
legal representative of the taxpayer”. During cross-examination when he was asked who signed a
document; Turnnir replied: “Who are you talking to?”
[442] In Porisky Trial Decision at paras. 60-61, Judge Myers related this kind of dialogue:
[60] ... Mr. Porisky said he could not make that decision unless he understood
whether he was to give evidence in his “inherent personality as a natural person
with no intent to profit”. He wanted to tell the truth in the stand but the capacity
he was to testify in would make a difference to his evidence. A few minutes later
in the dialogue he said:
I need to know if I make the decision to get into the stand, from which
perspective can I speak? Like therefore I need to know, in the eyes of the
law, if one man is two persons, the natural or the legal, okay, which one
can I speak as, or does it matter -- am I have the liberty to speak the truth
and qualify it so I can speak to everything? Because what it -- they have
commingled a lot of stuff, and for me to properly address it, I'm going to
have to be able to speak to everything to properly address it.
And later:
Again, I feel like I'm being railroaded because I'm asking for clear
answers. I came here with a full intention on defending my -- my rights
and -- and not having things being converted into something they're not,
and I don't know how to do that if nobody's going to give me a straight
answer. I thought Crown had a duty -- I read their web page and they talk
about honour and integrity, and now I'm been led one thing -- and for me
to speak to everything, I'm going to need to be able to speak to it from my
starting point of my existence.
I didn't make it up. Sir John Salmond I think is a highly respected man.
The Supreme Court relies on him. I didn't make it up that one man's two
persons in the eyes of the law. And so from that perspective, I need --
that's why I tried to be as honourable and as open in the development of
this, so that I could speak the truth and the whole truth from the proper
perspective, so it does not get misconstrued or mislabelled or presumed to
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be something it's not. And that's what I need to know. If I make the
decision and I go in that box, which person, in the eyes of the law am I?
THE COURT: You are Mr. Porisky.
THE ACCUSED PORISKY: Am I Russell Anthony Porisky in my inherent personality
as a natural person, or am I a sovereign-granted personality?
THE COURT: You're Russell Porisky.
THE ACCUSED PORISKY: That's fairly misleading because that's not clear enough for
me, Your Honour.
...
THE COURT: … Let's assume you get into the stand… and the Crown asks you, "What
did you have for breakfast today?" Would it make a difference as to what capacity you
were in?
THE ACCUSED PORISKY: For me, it would, Your Honour, yes.
[443] Justice Midwinter in R. v. Kaasgaard, 2011 MBQB 256 at para. 10 characterized the
result as a “... "song and dance" routine of Mr. Kaasgaard being present but not wanting to be
identified ...”.
[444] In this Court’s experience that is an accurate characterization of these antics. Alberta
courts have observed OPCA litigants, particularly Freemen-on-the-Land, allege the correct target
of civil and criminal litigation is a piece of paper such as a birth certificate, rather than the
person holding that document. There is no adequate way to describe the absurdity of that display.
4. Conclusion - Double/Split Person Schemes
[445] ‘Double/split person’ schemes have no legal effect. These schemes have no basis in law.
There is only one legal identity that attaches to a person. If a person wishes to add a legal ‘layer’
to themselves, then a corporation is the proper approach. The interrelationship between
corporation and owner, and the legal effect of that ‘layer’ is clearly established in common law
and statute.
[446] The ‘double/split’ person’ strategies all have a common underlying kernel; that the
OPCA litigant is not the person before the court, or is not subject to the court’s jurisdiction. That
allegedly falls on the other, non-corporeal (but otherwise similar) person. In other words, a
litigant who advances a variation of this scheme says to the court ‘you have no jurisdiction over
me - the person you want is someone else.’ That allegedly denies this Court’s authority, but of
course fails in effect.
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D. Unilateral Agreements
[447] OPCA litigants frequently attempt to unilaterally foist obligations on other litigants,
peace officers, state actors, or the court and court personnel. These foisted obligations take many
forms. None, of course, creates any binding legal obligation. In that sense, these are yet more
‘magic hats’.
[448] Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 materials includes a number of these unilateral foisted
agreements:
1. the “Actual and Constructive Notice” filed to the Board of Governors of the Bank
of Canada;
2. his ‘fee schedule’, that is attached to these Reasons as Appendix “A”; and
3. the “Notice By Declaration and Affidavit of Consequences for Infringement of
Copyright Trade-Name/Trademark”, that is attached to these Reasons as
Appendix “B”.
The February 15, 2011 letter to Court worker Barbara Petryk, Clerk of the Court, that appoints
her a fiduciary of “::dennis-larry:meads::” as a “living flesh and blood sentient-man” is another
example of this kind of foisted unilateral agreement. The same is arguably true of the cover letter
for Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 packages.
[449] Common examples of these foisted agreements purport to appoint someone a fiduciary,
establish a contractual relationship or declare an OPCA person no longer has an obligation, such
as to pay income tax. Some purport to unilaterally settle lawsuits or legal claims, without court
direction. Others provide a system of predetermined fines.
[450] Sometimes the unilateral agreement says that the recipient has a certain window of time
to respond and disagree, otherwise they are held to have agreed to the terms of the unilateral
agreement. That may be framed as a requirement that the recipient must rebut or prove
themselves exempt from the foisted obligation. However, some foisted unilateral agreements do
not even provide that courtesy, and instead allegedly indicate the recipient is bound, whether
they like it or not.
[451] Foisted unilateral agreements are almost always expressed in a documentary form. Many
foisted unilateral agreements include dramatic language and warnings. For example, the ‘fee
schedule’ employed by Mr. Meads states in startling large print:
ATTENTION AND WARNING!
THIS IS A LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND
FIAT JUSTITIA, RUAT COELUM
(Let right be done, though the heavens should fall)
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To: All Provincial, State, Federal and International Public Officials, by and through
Province of Alberta, Lieutenant Governor, Donald S. Ethell and/or Governor General, David
Lloyd Johnston
TAKE NOTICE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE
THIS IS A CONTRACT IN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Take a moment to read this before you proceed any further.
I do not wish to speak to you under any circumstances excluding federal judicial review
THIS TITLE IS FOR YOUR PROTECTION!
[Styling in original, see Appendix “A” for a more precise reproduction of this document.]
Later the ‘fee schedule’ sternly warns: “IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE!”
[452] Some foisted unilateral agreements are amateurish amalgams of different documents,
cobbled together, while others may appear professional and authoritative to the layperson. These
documents often feature spurious formalities such as notarial marks, witnessing, stamps, and
seals.
[453] OPCA gurus appear to have a large role in creating these documents. For example, this
Court has repeatedly received identical or very similar versions of a particular unilateral foisted
agreement, that only differ in personal information. In certain instances partially completed
forms still show tags that indicate the original document was obtained in an electronic format,
and then (partially) filled by the litigant using an automated script. I have previously noted these
features in Mr. Meads’ materials.
[454] Documents of this kind may emerge in number of ways. The foisted unilateral agreement
may be delivered to a target (often a government or elected official), filed in court, presented in
court, or ‘published’. This last approach deserves some further comment. OPCA litigants
sometimes appear to put special significance on ‘giving notice’ to others by making a document
available to the public on the Internet, for example Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB
537 at para. 22. This Court has frequently received OPCA documents that direct a recipient to an
Internet website where that same document is ‘published’.
[455] Other mechanisms to provide notice border on harassment. In 2011 Belanger attempted
to email each person employed in Alberta Justice a number of unilateral foisted agreements with
titles such as “Ecclesiastical Notice of lawful excuse for non appearance and determination of
the account of minister :Edward Jay-Robin: of the Belanger family” and “Ecclesiastical Notarial
Notice of Understanding and Intent styled after the notice to admit”, which, if not rebutted,
allegedly discharged any criminal liability by Belanger for various illegal acts.
[456] Most foisted unilateral agreements, including those of Mr. Meads, include language such
as “[notice or service] to the agent is [notice or service] to the principal, and [notice or service]
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to the principle is [notice or service] to the agent”. This instruction is presumably intended to
create as broad an ‘area of effect’ for the foisted unilateral agreement as is possible. Mr. Meads
‘fee schedule’ is addressed to government officials such as the Lieutenant Governor and
Governor General, whose acquiescence, as ‘principals’ would presumably trickle down to all
those subordinate in their organizations.
[457] Of course, documents of this kind that purportedly unilaterally impose an obligation on
another have no legal effect: Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at para. 4; Henry v. El,
2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138.
1. The Legal Effect of a Foisted Agreement
[458] Though OPCA litigants claim these documents can impose obligations on other persons,
there is no dispute that an individual person lacks that kind of authority. The best-case legal
foundation for these documents is that they are a kind of contract. Indeed, that is usually how
OPCA gurus and litigants characterize these materials.
[459] There is no question that common law contract law, in Canada and elsewhere, prohibits
enforcement of the kind of unilateral ‘agreements’ typically employed by OPCA litigants. It is
useful to examine the basis for this conclusion, since foisted unilateral agreements are such a
frequent motif in OPCA misconduct.
[460] Both parties to a contract must agree to its terms and to be bound in legal relations. The
corollary of that is that one person cannot unilaterally impose a contract on another. In Silver’s
Garage Ltd. v. Bridgewater (Town), [1971] S.C.R. 577 at 596, 17 D.L.R. (3d) 1, Laskin J. (as he
then was) expressed the rule as “... a person cannot foist a contract upon another without his
consent ...”.
[461] A contract requires a “meeting of the minds”, or in Latin, “consensus ad idem”. This is
another way of saying that the parties to a contract must agree to the terms of that contract. In
Ron Ghitter Property Consultants Ltd. v. Beaver Lumber Co., 2003 ABCA 221 at para. 8, 330
A.R. 353, Fraser C.J.A. explained the concept this way:
... Regardless of the theories underlying the enforcement of contracts, mutuality
of agreement lies at the root of any legally enforceable contract. The required
degree of mutuality of agreement mandates that the parties reach a consensus ad
idem on essential terms. ... [Emphasis added.]
[462] She continues at paras. 8-9 to outline the well established common-law test:
8. ... The accepted test is whether a reasonable observer would infer from the
words or conduct of the parties that a contract had been concluded ... That
is, on an objective basis, have the parties reached consensus ad idem?
...
102
9. The common thread running through the cases is that the parties will be
found to have reached a meeting of the minds, in other words be ad idem,
where it is clear to the objective reasonable bystander, in light of all the
material facts, that the parties intended to contract and the essential terms
of that contract can be determined with a reasonable degree of certainty ...
This requires the court to decide whether "a sensible third party would
take the agreement to mean what A understood it to mean or what B
understood it to mean, or whether indeed any meaning can be attributed to
it at all" ... "the consensus ad idem would be a matter of mere conjecture."
[Citations omitted, emphasis added.]
[463] This alone provides a basis for why the stereotypical foisted unilateral agreement cannot
bind its recipient. An objective person knows that he or she cannot usually be held bound in
contract by simple receipt of an offer. Many OPCA foisted unilateral agreements feature
language that demands its recipient respond or rebut an obligation by a certain deadline. If not,
then the agreement proclaims the recipient is bound by its terms. A moment’s consideration
shows it is absurd that the law would respect that requirement. What if a document was received,
but not read within the deadline? What if the document was received by an illiterate person, or
one who did not understand the document’s meaning? Could they have a ‘meeting of the
minds’? Of course not, no more than handing a document to a sheep and saying “By not
repudiating this agreement, I may eat you.” establishes a mutual and common intent.
[464] Instead, the common law in most cases requires that the recipient of an offer (if that’s
what these OPCA documents represent) must take a positive step to accept that offer,
acknowledge its terms and benefits, and communicate that fact. Harris C.J.B.C. in Cypress
Disposal Ltd. v. Inland Kenworth Sales (Nanaimo) Ltd. (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 598, [1975] 3
W.W.R. 289 expressed the rule as :
... I do not think that to be an acceptance creating a contract. It is communication
of the acceptance that creates the contract between the parties. One must
distinguish between the act of deciding to accept or reject an offer and the act of
communicating acceptance or rejection. [Emphasis added.]
[465] This requirement is not some recent legal innovation, but relates to the U.K. case of
Felthouse v. Bindley (1862), 11 C.B. (N.S.) 869, 142 E.R. 1037 (Ex. Ch.), part of the “common
law” so dear to OCPA gurus and litigants. In that decision a man attempted to enforce a price for
sale of a horse. He was in negotiation with his nephew over the purchase of a horse, and wrote:
“... you said the horse is mine ... If I hear no more about [the horse], I consider the horse mine at
£30 and 15s.” The horse was inadvertently sold by an auctioneer to a third party, and the uncle
sued.
[466] The nephew had, in fact, intended his uncle have the horse, but he had taken no steps to
communicate that fact. Justice Willes concluded:
103
... It is clear, therefore, that the nephew in his own mind intended his uncle to
have the horse at the price which he (the uncle) had named, £30 and 15s.: but he
had not communicated such his intention to his uncle, or done anything to bind
himself. Nothing, therefore, had been done to vest the property in the horse in the
plaintiff down to the 25th of February, when the horse was sold by the defendant.
It appears to me that, independently of the subsequent letters, there had been no
bargain to pass the property in the horse to the plaintiff, and therefore that he had
no right to complain of the sale. [Emphasis added.]
[467] Felthouse v. Bindley is a universally accepted cornerstone of the common law of
contract. Citing only a few of many possible similar authorities:
• An offeror may not arbitrarily impose contractual liability upon an offeree merely
by proclaiming that silence shall be deemed consent.
(M. P. Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of
Contract, 15th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at p.
61)
• ... the silence of the offeree, his failure to reject an offer, cannot amount to
acceptance without more. ... Although the offeror can dictate the time, place, and
manner of acceptance ... it seems clear that this will not cover the situation where
the offeror says that silence will be enough ... Indeed the Supreme Court of
Canada has said that something more than a failure to reject an offer is required to
constitute a binding contract.
(G.H.L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson
Carswell, 2006) at p. 54.)
• ... As a general rule, it is not enough for one to whom an offer is made to assent
inwardly; the offeree must communicate acceptance to the offeror ...
Ordinarily, therefore silence will not operate as an acceptance even
though the offeree should prove an intention to accept. This is not
a technicality but part of the requirement of a bargain. No
reasonable person, on receiving a proposal that looks for a reply,
considers the bargain concluded until the manifestation of assent.
Nor will a reasonable offeror ordinarily consider that silence on the
part of the offeree manifests the latter’s acceptance. It would
plainly be an imposition for an offeror to write to a stranger
offering to sell an encyclopedia and adding that the latter’s silence
will be considered an acceptance. ...
(S. M. Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 6th ed. (Toronto: Canada Law Book,
2010) at p. 67-68)
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• The requirement that there has to be an acceptance cannot be avoided or waived
by the offeror’s saying that the offeree will be assumed to have accepted the offer
if no rejection is received by the offeror. This rule is a reflection of the very
general principal that people are not to have obligations thrust upon them without
their consent and that, in general, people have to indicate their consent by some
positive action. The principle is expressed in the statement that “silence cannot be
consent”.
(Angela Swan, Canadian Contract Law, 2nd ed. (Markham:
LexisNexis, 2009) at p. 234.)
[468] This principle continues to be uniformly applied by Canadian courts. For example:
Schiller v. Fisher; Nu Towne Dev. Inc. V. Kingsmont Properties Ltd., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 593 at
598-599, 124 D.L.R. (3d) 577; Pumphrey v. Carson, 2002 NSSC 170 at paras. 19-20, 206
N.S.R. (2d) 338; Gellen v. Public Guardian and Trustee of British Columbia et al, 2005 BCSC
1615 at para. 17, 21 E.T.R. (3d) 146; Vollmer v. Jones (2007), 36 R.F.L. (6th) 340 at para. 46,
155 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1079 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J. (Fam. Ct.)).
[469] There are certain very limited instances where a court may infer acceptance of a contract,
despite failure to explicitly communicate acceptance, for example where the offoree uses an
offered service: St. John Tug Boat Co. v. Irving Refining Ltd., [1964] S.C.R. 614 at 623-624,
46 D.L.R. (2d) 1. In that case the Irving Oil Company received a contract offer that a tug
company’s ships would assist in docking oil tankers. Acceptance was not formally
communicated, but the oil company nevertheless used the tugs, and that was basis to infer the
offer and its terms had been accepted. Exceptions of this kind do not apply to the kinds of foisted
agreements used in OPCA strategies.
[470] So, even if the relationship between the state and an individual was one of contract
(which it isn’t), and the Governor General and/or Lieutenant-Governor General had the authority
to declare a person no longer subject to the organizations which they administer on behalf of the
Queen (which I seriously doubt), Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’ still founders on this key point.
Neither he, nor anyone else, can impose a demand that a person deny or disprove a foisted
agreement.
[471] Some final context may be helpful, as the rule OPCA litigants find so attractive has a
nightmarish effect. There is a story, perhaps apocryphal, that the press gangs of the English
Royal Navy would trick civilian sailors to unwittingly accept a first military employment
payment, the “King’s Shilling”, by concealing that coin at the bottom of a tankard of beer. If the
civilian sailor accepted the apparently free beer, and the concealed payment within, then he was
trapped and was deemed to have agreed to be a new recruit of the Royal Navy.
[472] That is the kind of world that is the end-point of the reasoning advanced by this OPCA
concept. If it were the law (which it is not), we all would watch, scrutinizing every document and
act, for a hidden foisted agreement. Perhaps ironically, that neatly corresponds to the neurotic
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consent/contract-fearing perspective that flows from the OPCA ‘obligation requires agreement’
strategies.
2. Common Uses of Unilateral Agreements
[473] OPCA litigants appear very fond of the foisted unilateral agreement strategy, and employ
it in a wide variety of ways.
a. To Create or Assert an Obligation
[474] A common strategy is to foist a unilateral agreement on a target, then claim the failure to
refuse or refute the “agreement” creates an obligation. The most common form of this kind of
foisted OPCA unilateral agreement is the ‘fee schedule’, which I address in more detail below.
[475] In Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at
para. 8, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447, litigants who had hired Dempsey attempted to evade debts by
foisting unilateral agreements on certain lawyers who were engaged in the debt collection
process. These ‘contracts’ demanded $100,000.00 if the lawyers continued to “... trespass on or
interfere, in any manner whatsoever, with the private contract between CIBC and [Gravlin] ...”
or triple damages of $300,000.00 if the lawyers failed to promptly deliver the $100,000.00.
[476] Similarly, in Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 15, Master
Hanebury reports on a “Notice Of No Trespassing” intended to resist a foreclosure. One of its
remedies is an unusual form of misconduct:
That document advises that a penalty will be imposed of up to ten million dollars,
the greatest amount being for anyone who violates any of God’s Supreme Laws
or causes the McCances to violate any of God’s Supreme Laws.
Several bills were issued on that basis: para. 17. Alarmingly, these tactics were at least in part
effective, as attempts to sell the property were unsuccessful (para. 18) and an involved realtor
found “... that the notices and demands were extremely disturbing and made her fearful and she
would not swear the draft affidavit prepared by the Bank.” (para. 18).
[477] Williams v. Johnston, [2008] O.J. No. 4853 (QL) at para. 3, 2008 CanLII 63194 (Ont.
S.C.), affirmed 2009 ONCA 335, 176 A.C.W.S. (3d) 609, leave refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 266
details a set of foisted obligations and claims:
In the statement of claim the plaintiff asserts in paragraph 3 that he has “issued
three default judgments against the defendants by doctrine of tacit procuration”
and that “all matters have been deemed stare decisis, res judicata and collateral
estoppel”. In paragraph 4 he states he issued default judgment against them
because they did not respond to his “International Commercial Claim” issued July
2, 2008 or his “Affidavit of Obligation” issued on July 18, 2008. In paragraph 5
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he claims that the defendants have committed the crimes of “misprision of felony,
fraud, theft, embezzlement, conspiracy, sedition, enticement into slavery, and
treason”. In paragraph 6 he refers to the Court of International Trade and penalties
due to crimes against a sovereign.
[478] These were rejected as a basis for a civil action: paras. 10-11. This OPCA litigant had
claimed what is probably best described as nation-state authority, and had personally tried and
convicted the defendants on that basis (para. 8):
In his submissions, the plaintiff made representations to the court that he had
declared himself a sovereign and as such he had established a trust account with
the US Treasury, which had provided him with an unlimited amount of credit.
Further, he advised the court he had instituted his own court proceedings as a
sovereign and had issued default judgments against the defendants because they
had not complied with his endorsement and direction. ...
Mention of the U.S. Treasury ‘trust account’ suggests this litigant had also subscribed to the
‘A4V’ ‘money for nothing’ scheme discussed below.
[479] MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347 discusses a foisted unilateral
agreement which was the basis for a $28,000,000.00 Personal Property Security Act registration
against a bank. The OPCA litigant offered to remove the registration in exchange for the bank
providing a $125,000.00 line of credit. Justice Brown called this “[a] good old-fashioned shakedown!”
(para. 3), which is an apt way to describe all foisted unilateral agreements.
[480] A similar strategy was advanced by two members of CERI, “Carl-Wayne: Duchek” and
“Judith-Patricia: Duchek”, who sent my office a unilateral foisted agreement that demanded I
disprove the supremacy of the King James Bible:
We wish to know if you have any law that can induce me or intimidate us to
violate our faith in practising the laws of the King James Bible of which such
faith is founded upon?
[481] I had seven days to respond, and if not, I:
... consent to pay me 1 million Dollars $1,000,000.00 in Gold Maple Leaf coin for
the damages to my ability to practice my faith unimpeded and that you will, once
our agreement is witnessed and published, provide me the name and address of
your liability insurance bond agent to pay me for damages due to your
intimidation should you choose to break the laws and violate your oath.
I did not respond, and to date have not faced a demand for payment, in gold. I presume from no
demand that Mr. and Ms. Duchek have been able to practice their faith without impediment.
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[482] Once an obligation is allegedly ‘created’ by a unilateral foisted agreement, the OPCA
litigant may attempt to enforce that obligation in court. Alternatively, an OPCA litigant may
register a lien or interest against property held by the agreement’s target, such as happened in
MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347 at para. 17. I understand that a number of
justices in this Court have been the subject of this kind of spurious and unlawful security
interest. My understanding is that this lien strategy is very popular among American OPCA
litigants; this technique is sometimes referred to as “paper terrorism”: Robert Chamberlain &
Donald P. Haider-Markel; Erick J. Haynie; Susan P. Koniak. OPCA gurus commonly teach these
approaches to their customers as a response to ‘unjust’ and ‘illegal’ state and court authority.
[483] Another variant of this category is reported in Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201.
This decision is particularly helpful as it reproduces much of the foisted agreement (para. 3) and
outlines the OPCA litigant’s conduct (paras. 4-10). He had asserted a foisted unilateral
agreement entitled “Admission of Facts - Non-negotiable” that, if not refuted, would mean the
defendants had admitted certain facts that would effectively decide a lawsuit:
It is My intent with this Admission of Facts, to establish agreement with you
administratively by the response or lack thereof to the questions provided. Please
answer the following questions, if you fail to do so, you will be deemed to admit,
for the purposes of this proceeding only, the truth of the facts and the authenticity
of the documents set out herein below ...
The net result was a claim for “triple damages”, a total of $74,851,078.50.
[484] The OPCA litigant explained how he had proven his case (para. 8):
I have provided all of the evidence before you in fact in the form of an Affidavit
of assessment, an Affidavit of judgment, an Affidavit of default, an Affidavit of
mode of service, a judicial notice, and an Affidavit of search. All of these
documents have been served upon the other side. They have been accepted. They
have been provided to them, served to them by a notary under notary seal.
They've accepted to all of the terms and conditions. And, therefore, they presently
are in default. I note their dishonour and on and for the record. ...
[485] The court continues at paras. 9-10 to describe the litigant’s in-court activities:
[9] The appellant was intransigent. Despite the best efforts of the trial judge to
explain the rules of procedure and evidence, the appellant refused to
testify or call any evidence. He insisted that the service of his
unconventional documents on the defendants had somehow turned into an
admission of liability by them. He insisted that the affidavits which he had
tendered on the Court, and which attached copies of those documents were
admissible evidence at the trial. He refused to be cross-examined, arguing
that counsel for the defendants had “no standing”, and were “in
dishonour”. (AR p. 76, l. 36-40)
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[10] The appellant took the position that the purpose of the trial was really to
enforce or compromise the “agreement” he had tried to foist on the
defendants:
Now, I have no desire to liquidate them and enforce the
entire default upon them. I want to settle. And I have a
judgment against them in the order of $49.9 million. And I
don't want to enforce that entire judgment against them. I
want to settle with them.
God requires of his mankind a tithe of 10 percent. I'm in a
position where I'm willing to take the example that God has
put forth and settle for 10 percent. Is that not fair? (AR p.
74, l. 21-9)
[486] Perhaps unsurprisingly, the OPCA litigant’s claims were dismissed at trial: para. 10. The
Court of Appeal confirmed that result (at para. 4):
The law does not recognize the ability of one person to foist liability on another if
they do not reply to a unilateral communication within an arbitrarily set time
limit.
b. To Discharge an Obligation or Dismiss a Lawsuit
[487] Similarly, OPCA litigants will often claim to use foisted unilateral agreements to
discharge an obligation or end a lawsuit. Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at para. 23, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447 provides an example of a
foisted notice that purported to discharge a debt. The OPCA litigants sent a bank a “Report and
Notice to Solicitor/Counsel and Notice of Suspension of Account Pending Provision of Proof of
Non-Criminality of Activity” that said:
Pending the provision of proof to the contrary, and subject to the
attached/enclosed UNCONDITIONAL TENDER OF FULL PAYMENT ON
DEMAND the aforementioned account is accordingly suspended. I will not
knowingly be a party to moral turpitude or unlawful or illegal activity.
[488] Another example is a document that my office received which, I believe, purports to
defeat a foreclosure. The writer directed a foisted unilateral agreement to the bank. Ten days
without a response led to a “NOTICE OF NON RESPONSE” which stated the bank:
... acquiesces and admits all terms by Tacit Procuration: and all issues are now
deemed Stare Decisis and may not be argued, controverted or protested; and said
acquiescence shall act as a witness and as DEFAULT JUDGMENT IN
ESTOPPEL against [the court master].
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[489] Another variation on this form is that a state actor receives a demand to prove its
authority. In Law Society of British Columbia v. Dempsey, 2005 BCSC 1277, 142 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 346, affirmed 2006 BCCA 161 at paras. 10-12, 149 A.C.W.S. (3d) 735, Dempsey demanded
the Law Society of British Columbia prove, to his satisfaction, that it had the authority it had
claimed. As usual, a stern warning explained the consequence of failure:
Ten (10) days have been allowed for the Petitioner, the LAW SOCIETY OF
BRITISH COLUMBIA to respond to this Jurisdictional Challenge. Failure to
comply with the above shall be deemed that the Petitioner does not have the
jurisdiction or legal standing to file this Petition.
[490] That same action had Dempsey direct a foisted agreement at the judge hearing whether
Dempsey had practiced law without a license:
The Undersigned does hereby and herein accept the Oath of Office of James
W. Williams d/b/a/ JUSTICE (JAMES W.) WILLIAMS / PUBLIC
SERVANT and all heirs, assigns, and successors, as his open and binding
offer of contract to form a firm and binding, private, bilateral contract
between parties in which he agrees to perform all of his duties as a Public
Servant and promises to uphold all of the Undersigned’s rights.
The foregoing “Notice of Acceptance of Oath of Office” is an instrument in
commerce CUSIP No. 718895600, and is made explicitly under reserve and
without recourse and the foregoing has established your promise to uphold all of
the Undersigned’s rights and not allow any third-party agents to interfere in your
duties to the Undersigned Failure to respond to this offer of contract within three
business days of receipt establishes your unconditional acceptance and will place
you and your office in default, and the presumption will be taken upon the public
record that you, and your office, fully agree to the points and authorities
contained within this Notice of Acceptance of Oath of Office and that they are
true, correct and certain. [Emphasis in original.]
[491] Callaghan v. McCaw; C.C. v. J.M., 2010 SKQB 79 at paras. 10-12, 351 Sask.R. 55
reports what appears to be a foisted unilateral contract scheme to deny child support. In this case
the trigger was that if the support recipient cashed a cheque, that discharged any future child
support obligation, because the cheque carried the following notation:
By Accepting and/or Endorsing and/or Indorsing and/or Cashing and/or
Negotiating and/or Selling and/or Purchasing and/or Holding this Instrument,
Payee and any/all Endorsers (and any/all of their Agents and/or Principals),
jointly and severally explicitly consent and agree to be irrevocably bound by
Agreement RW 065 579 297 CA (and all terms and conditions contained therein).
This instrument remains the property of the Drawer © common-law copy claim.
All Rights Expressly Reserved.
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The OPCA indicia on this notation are obvious.
c. Foisted Duties, Agency, or Fiduciary Status
[492] Another application of a foisted unilateral agreement is to transfer or assign some kind of
obligations to someone else. For example, in R. v. Leis, 2008 SKQB 123, 77 W.C.B. (2d) 323,
affirmed 2008 SKCA 103, 311 Sask.R. 310 the OPCA litigant had tried to unilaterally transfer
his obligation to pay utility costs to a government actor as an agent. Bank of Montreal v.
McCance, 2012 ABQB 537 at para. 6 reports an attempt to name this Court and opposing
counsel as fiduciaries.
[493] Mr. Meads’ February 15, 2011 letter to Barbara Petryk (discussed above) falls into this
category. Arguably Mr. Meads’ declaration that I am his fiduciary represents another foisted
duty.
d. Copyright and Trade-mark
[494] One of the strangest expressions of the foisted unilateral agreement concept relates to
copyright and trade-mark. OPCA litigants very frequently claim copyright and/or trade-mark of
their own names. That can combine with a ‘double/split person’ concept so that the physical
person has an intellectual property interest in the ‘name’ of the non-corporeal aspect. That
appears to be the function of Mr. Meads’ “Copyright Trade-name/Trademark Contract” between
DENNIS LARRY MEADS and Dennis-Larry: Meads.
[495] The OPCA litigant then unilaterally foists on a target a document that purports to govern
use of the copyright and/or trade-mark protected name. Invariably, the document warns that any
unauthorized use of the protected intellectual property means the target has agreed to pay a
certain sum, per use.
[496] Mr. Meads’ material includes one such document, entitled:
NOTICE BY DECLARATION and AFFIDAVIT OF CONSEQUENCES FOR
INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT TRADE-NAME/TRADEMARK.
And same are accepted for value and exempt from levy.
and is reproduced in whole as Appendix “B”.
[497] This cannot even be described as a ‘unilaterally foisted contract’, it is instead a unilateral
notice foisting obligations on the world:
With the intent of being contractually bound, any juristic person, as well as the
agent thereof, consents and agrees by this Notice that neither said juristic person
nor agent thereof shall display, nor otherwise use in any manner, the common-law
trade-name/trademark DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, nor the common-law
copyright described herein, nor any derivative of, or any variation in the spelling
thereof without the prior, express, written consent and acknowledgment of
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Secured Party, as signified by Secured Party’s signature in red ink. Secured Party
neither grants, nor implies, nor otherwise gives consent for any unauthorized use
of DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, and all such unauthorized use is strictly
prohibited. [Emphasis in original.]
[498] Any use of Mr. Meads’ protected names:
DENNIS LARRY MEADS© — including any and all derivatives and variations
in the spelling, i.e. DENNIS LARRY MEADS, MEADS DENNIS LARRY,
DENNIS L MEADS, MEADS D LARRY, D L MEADS
means a person owes Mr. Meads $100,000,000.00:
... grants Secured Party a security interest in all of User’s assets, land and
personal property, and all of User’s interest in assets, land and personal property,
in the sum certain amount of $100,000,000.00 per each occurrence of use of the
common-law copyrighted trade-name/trademark DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, as
well as for each and every occurrence of use of any and all derivatives of and
variations in the spelling of DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, plus costs, plus triple
damages ...
[499] This kind of document is far from unique, see for example: Gravlin et al. v. Canadian
Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005 BCSC 839 at para. 9, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447; Dempsey
v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 37, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309.
[500] Sometimes an OPCA litigant claims that breach of a purported copyright interest does
not merely cause a financial penalty, but can even disqualify a court or state actor’s jurisdiction.
For example, in Hajdu v. Ontario (Director, Family Reponsibility Office), 2012 ONSC 1835 at
paras. 23-25, 31, an appeal was based, in part, because the trial court “... was in violation of
international copyright law”. Coats J. concluded this argument “... that the Director or the court
was in breach of copyright law throughout the default hearing is without merit.”
[501] Mr. Meads’ copyright and trade-mark claims are suspect in a number of ways. First, he
claims ownership of his “... common law right of, in and to my Copyright(s), Trademark(s) and
Trade-Name(s) ...” [emphasis added]. The special property interests provided by copyright and
trade-mark flow from legislation (the Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-42, and the Trade-marks
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13). There has never been a common law right to either.
[502] There is not authority present, nor, I believe, capable of establishing that a personal name
can form a creative work that would be subject to copyright. In any case, even if that were so,
then copyright in a name would presumably vest with its authors, Mr. Meads’ parents. The
Copyright Act also sets the consequence of infringement on copyright: ss. 34-41. Infringement
can lead to damages and recovery of profit (s. 35) and where no damage is proven then statutory
damages (s. 38.1) can be claimed. There is no provision for the kind of ‘contract’ or ‘notice’
claims found in OPCA foisted unilateral copyright agreements.
112
[503] Similarly, the claim in relation to trade-mark or trade-name is nonsense. The process to
obtain a trade-mark and the rights that flow from that are set by the Trade-marks Act, not some
unilateral declaration. A trade-mark that has legal effect requires application to the Canadian
Intellectual Property Agency [“CIPO”] for registration. Once a trade-mark is registered and
published, then its owner has associated rights. No evidence has been provided from the CIPO
trade-marks database to establish a registered trade-mark that includes the word “Meads”.
[504] The entire ‘my name is copyright/trade-mark protected’ scheme has an overwhelmingly
juvenile character. People necessarily use names in everyday interaction, commerce, and most
certainly in court. Does it make any sense that any person who were to correspond with Mr.
Meads would be liable to him for $100 million dollars simply because they put his name in the
address? Could people operate in this regime? Must we all address one another by arbitrary
nicknames or some kind of functional description? The answer to these questions is an
overwhelming “no.”
3. Fee Schedules
[505] OPCA foisted unilateral agreements can target anyone, however, many focus on state,
government, and court actors. These purport to be agreements that a state or court actor agrees to
pay the OPCA litigant a particular amount if a certain legal procedure or result occurs, or law
enforcement personnel engage in certain conduct. OPCA litigants often label the documents that
target state actors with the title “fee schedule”, though other language is also encountered.
[506] Mr. Meads’ June 19 and 21 documents included a fee schedule, cryptically entitled:
Registered Private Tracking Number - LT 679 966 085 CA
UCC-1 Files in ALBERTA - Secured Transaction Registry Number- 11120912227
This is reproduced as Appendix “A”.
[507] Like the copyright and trade-mark notice, this is a formal appearing document, with
impressive legal-sounding language. Once the reader gets past that, one reaches the meat of the
subject. Those served with this document (directly or indirectly) have 30 days to reject it.
Otherwise, the fee schedule, addressed to “All Provincial, State, Federal and International Public
Officials, by and through Province of Alberta, Lieutenant Governor, Donald S. Ethell and/or
Governor General, David Lloyd Johnston”, states that the state, government actors, institutions,
and employees are liable to pay certain amounts if Mr. Meads is subjected to certain conduct, for
example:
Unlawful Arrest, Illegal Arrest, or Restraint, or Distraint, Trespassing/Trespass,
without a lawful, correct, and complete 4th amendment warrant: $2,000,000.00
(Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
...
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Assault or Assault and Battery without Weapon: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million)
CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
...
Unfounded Accusations by Officers of the Court, or Unlawful Determination:
$2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
...
Incarceration for Civil or Criminal Contempt of Court without lawful,
documented-in-law, and valid reason: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) per day, per
occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Disrespect by a Judge or Officer of the Court: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CDA
Dollars per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Threat, Coercion, Deception, or Attempted Deception by any Officer of the
Court: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars per occurrence, per officer, or
agent involved.
...
Coercion or Attempted Coercion of the Natural Man or Woman to take
responsibility for the Corporate Strawman against the Natural Man or Woman
Secured Party's Will: $2,000,000.00 Two Million CAD Dollars, per occurrence,
per officer or agent involved. ...
[508] This document purports to defeat all statutory, common law, judicial, or prosecutorial
discretions and immunities:
... Should you move against me in defiance of this presentment, there is no
immunity from prosecution available to you or to any of your fellow public
officers, officials of government, judges, magistrates, district attorneys, clerks, or
any other persons who become involved in the instant actions, or any future
actions, against me by way of aiding and abetting. Take due heed and govern
yourself accordingly.
[509] Further, the ‘fee schedule’ allegedly cannot be a basis for any legal obligation, sanction,
or punishment, because it says so:
This Statute Staple Securities Instrument is not set forth to threaten, delay, hinder,
harass, or obstruct, but to protect guaranteed Rights and Protections assuring that
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at no time my Unalienable Rights are ever waived or taken from me against my
will by threats, duress, coercion, fraud, or without my express written consent of
waiver. None of the statements contained herein intend to threaten or cause any
type of physical or other harm to anyone. ...
[510] Not merely satisfied with state actors and the courts, the ‘fee schedule’ extends to apply
to international entities (para. 21), businesses (para. 22), and financial institutions (para. 26). In
case any bound person dared defy their obligation, the ‘fee schedule’ warns:
All penalties contained herein will be subject to a penalty increase of one million
dollars per day, plus interest, while there is any unpaid balance for the first thirty
(30) days after default of payment. This penalty will increase by 10% per each
day until balance is paid in full, plus 18% annual interest, beginning on the thirtyfirst
(31st) day after default of payment.
“Naturally”, all payments must be in gold or silver.
[511] What is the value of this document? Nothing. It is just another foisted unilateral
agreement. Courts have uniformly refused to enforce ‘agreements’ of this kind: Szoo v. Canada
(Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696; Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver
of) v. Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at paras. 14, 18, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Sydorenko v. Manitoba,
2012 MBQB 42 at para. 5; Canada v. Rudolf, 2010 BCSC 565.
a. Disproportionate and Unlawful Penalties
[512] The amounts claimed by fee schedules are clearly disproportionate to the alleged
misconduct. If a ‘fee schedule’ were an enforceable contract, then the damages it would
authorize are limited to that which would restore the injured party to their state as if the contract
had been performed. In Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2006 SCC 30 at para. 27,
[2006] 2 S.C.R. 3, McLachlin C.J.C. and Abella J. stated this principle as:
Damages for breach of contract should, as far as money can do it, place the
plaintiff in the same position as if the contract had been performed.
[513] That does not preclude persons who contract setting damages in advance, what is
sometimes called “liquidated damages”. However, even liquidated damages must be reasonable,
and not a threat held over one party, “in terrorem”: Calgary (City) v. Janse Mitchell Const. Co.
(1919), 59 S.C.R. 101, 48 D.L.R. 328. Whether a predetermined damage amount is reasonable is
always subject to court review; “[i]t is always open to the parties to make the predetermination,
but it must yield to judicial appraisal of its reasonableness in the circumstances.” [emphasis
added]: H.F. Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp., [1976] 1 S.C.R. 319 at 331, 54 D.L.R. (3d) 385.
[514] The test to evaluate the validity of a liquidated damages amount is found in the U.K.
House of Lords case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tire Co. v. New Garage and Motor Co., [1915] A.C.
115
79 at 86 (H.L.). Two aspects of the test are particularly relevant, that reasonable liquidated
damages are a prohibited penalty where the pre-set amount:
... is extravagant and unconscionable in amount in comparison with the greatest
loss that could possibly follow from the breach [or]
... a single lump sum is made payable upon the occurrence of one or more or all of
several events, some of which may occasion serious and others only trifling
damage, there is a presumption, but no more, that the sum is a penalty.
This was, and remains, the law in Canada: H.F. Clarke Ltd. v. Thermidaire Corp., at 327.
[515] Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’ liquidated damages amounts are an archetype for the first
category of prohibited penalties. As an example, Mr. Meads is due $2,000,000.00 (in gold or
silver) for each occasion I, as a Justice, am disrespectful of Mr. Meads, or if I engage in
“Coercion or Attempted Coercion of the Natural Man or Woman to take responsibility for the
Corporate Strawman against the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party's Will”. I take that latter
prohibition to mean any attempt on my part to reject a ‘double/split person’ or other related
OPCA argument.
[516] Beyond that, these amounts are so grossly disproportionate to awards made by Canadian
courts for injuries outside a contractual context that I do not think it is necessary to survey
Canadian caselaw on that point, beyond referencing a few potential comparators: Andrews v.
Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229, 83 D.L.R. (3d) 452),
[517] Offenses to personal dignity and liberty may also lead to awards under the Charter.
Recently, the Supreme Court of Canada in Vancouver (City) v. Ward, 2010 SCC 27, [2010] 2
S.C.R. 28 ordered a $5,000.00 payment as a Charter (s. 24(1)) remedy for an unwarranted and
unlawful strip search. That stands in stark contrast to the amounts in Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’.
[518] This Court has received many ‘fee schedules’ and not one has set damage claims in a
reasonable manner. That does not exclude the possibility that such a ‘fee schedule’ may exist or
could be advanced, but to date that possibility remains only a hypothesis. Nevertheless, even in
that case that “agreement” would still be illegally imposed, and have no legal effect no matter
what amount was claimed.
b. The Targets and Intended Effect of ‘Fee Schedules’
[519] What makes ‘fee schedules’ especially problematic is the manner in which these
documents are used. ‘Fee schedules’ are commonly targeted to peace officers, government
officials, and to court personnel such as law clerks, sheriffs, and legal assistants, or court
administration personnel. Other ‘fee schedules’ purport to create an obligation for a judge or the
state, for example: Canada v. Rudolf, 2010 BCSC 565; Bank of Montreal v. McCance, 2012
ABQB 537 at para. 24; Services de financement TD inc. c. Michaud, 2011 QCCQ 14868 at
para. 9. A particularly bizarre ‘fee schedule’ demand that I have received notifies this court of a
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claim for: “Ignorance of your Legal Maxims: $500,000.00 x 7 Counts”. Never has quizzing the
court been so potentially, but unlawfully, profitable!
[520] One use of ‘fee schedules’ that has become notorious is that OPCA litigants will present
these documents to a peace officer engaged in their duties, and warn the officer that they are
bound by these obligations, personally, to pay these amounts. This is a very common way that
Freeman-on-the-Land and Sovereign Man litigants respond to being stopped while driving, see
for example: Szoo v. Canada (Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2011 BCSC 696.
[521] Obviously, a ‘fee schedule’ has no legal effect. A person cannot unilaterally foist
obligations of this kind on another or on the state. That is particularly obnoxious when coupled
with declarations that an OPCA litigant is outside state and court authority, which for example
would allegedly make any detention illegal.
[522] The amounts claimed in Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’ are not atypical. ‘Fee schedules’
uniformly include dramatic, threatening language and instruct the recipient they have been
warned and are to watch their step.
[523] Plain and simple, in these contexts ‘fee schedules’ are tools of intimidation. These
documents are intended to deter state and court officials from the proper exercise of their
obligations. They are often physically presented to persons who may have less understanding of
their legal effect (ie. none). The language used in ‘fee schedules’ is intended to heighten those
intimidation effects, as is the totally unwarranted ‘damage’ quantums demanded.
4. Effect of Unilateral Agreements
[524] In a civil context, advancing a foisted unilateral agreement is very strong evidence that a
litigant has not bargained in good faith, discharged their Rule 1.2(3) obligations, and is engaged
in vexatious litigation worthy of a declaration under Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2, s.
23.1(1).
[525] Punitive damages are warranted when a person bases a legal action or files a spurious
lien or personal property claim on the basis of a foisted unilateral agreement. The courts have
authority to indemnify the legal costs of a litigant who is forced to defend against a foisted
unilateral agreement scheme: Williams v. Johnston, [2008] O.J. No. 4853 (QL) at para. 15, 2008
CanLII 63194 (Ont. S.C.), affirmed 2009 ONCA 335, 176 A.C.W.S. (3d) 609, leave refused
[2009] S.C.C.A. No. 266; MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347 at para. 17.
[526] It occurs to me that ‘fee schedules’ may also have a potential criminal effect. Documents
of this kind are intended to impede the legitimate action of government, law enforcement, and
court actors by purporting to assign very sizable penalties for actions that are not only a part of
their jobs, but very often a duty. These penalties are a threat of “damage to property”. Since ‘fee
schedules’ have no legal force, the threats they contain are by definition unlawful.
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[527] If so, it seems that perhaps when a person advances a ‘fee schedule’, that may be prima
facie evidence of the act and intention of the Criminal Code, ss. 423.1, intimidation of a justice
system participant offence. Advancing a ‘fee schedule’ and claims based on the same, may
perhaps also prove other criminal offences. Mr. Meads’ ‘fee schedule’ claims damages that
clearly escalate in a manner that offends the Criminal Code, s. 347 criminal interest rate
prohibition. Documents of this kind may have relevance for whether bail should be granted or
denied: R. v. Boisjoli, 2012 ABQB 556 at para. 51.
[528] In summary, unilateral foisted agreements have no effect in law: Papadopoulos v. Borg,
2009 ABCA 201 at para. 4; Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011]
S.C.C.A. No. 138. Operationally, these alleged agreements would deny the authority of the court
to determine the substance of a legally binding agreement and all parties intentions. Their effect
is to say the court has no authority to implement legislative rules and prohibitions, and instead
purport to allow a litigant to fine the court, judges, and peace officers for the proper exercise of
their authority and duties. Foisted unilateral agreements are therefore a prohibited attempt to
restrict the jurisdiction of the courts, and merit civil, and possibly criminal, sanction.
E. Money for Nothing Schemes
[529] To date, OPCA litigants have employed a limited number of what may be called ‘money
for nothing’ schemes. These are different from the other OPCA strategies that I have previously
reviewed, as they do not challenge or subvert the court’s authority, but instead purport to provide
a mechanism by which the OPCA litigant can obtain unconventional benefits.
[530] These are the proverbial caves of hidden treasure. OPCA gurus who advance these
concepts claim that, with the correct combination of documents, one can open a secret path to
vast riches. One needs only know the spell!
1. Accept for Value / A4V
[531] The most common ‘money for nothing’ scheme has a number of names: “Redemption”,
“Accept for Value”, and “A4V”. The A4V concept originated in the United States, but a
Canadian version has emerged, and Mr. Meads appears to subscribe to that.
[532] The mythology behind the ‘A4V’ scheme is extremely peculiar, and requires travel into
the conspiratorial and demon-haunted shadow world of the OPCA community. Aspects of this
scheme are explained in reported U.S. cases, including: United States v. Heath, 525 F.3d 451
(6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Anderson, 353 F.3d 490, 500 (6th Cir. 2003), certiorari denied,
541 U.S. 1068 (2004); United States v. Oehler, 2003 WL 1824967 (D. Minn. Apr. 2, 2003),
affirmed, 116 Fed. Appx. 43 (8th Cir. 2004); United State v. Eddie Ray Kahn et al., No.
1:08-cr-00271-RCL-1 (U.S.D.C. D.C. May 26, 2010). As I understand it, A4V’s guru promoters
claim that each person is associated with a secret government bank account which contains
millions of dollars. The exact sum varies from guru to guru. The bank account’s number is
usually related to some identification number assigned to a person by the state, such as a Social
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Security Number, a Social Insurance Number, or a birth certificate number. The specific details
of that relationship also seem to vary between A4V schemes.
[533] Mr. Meads clearly has attempted to apply an A4V scheme. His in-court explanation of
the “corporate identity” registered at birth and its associated funds and income are a reference to
this concept. Similarly, a number of the documents Mr. Meads included in his June 19 and 21
materials indicate an A4V strategy, and his cover letter instructed that I order payment of his
child support obligations:
... thru the Provincial-Registered-Event in the PROVINCAIL BIRTH
CERTIFICATE and/or any other government(s) for the Canada Registered
Event(s) ... [sic.]
[534] In Underworld Services Ltd. v. Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327 Justice Veit
encountered an A4V variation that relied on a special property of a birth certificate. Mr. Meads’
scheme involves both his Social Insurance Number and birth certificate as having special A4V
properties.
[535] A4V proponents claim that the government maintain these bank accounts to monetize the
state after it abandoned the gold standard. Put another way, the theory, as I understand it, is that
people are property of the state that it uses to secure its currency. This is often expressed as some
form of ‘slavery’.
[536] OPCA gurus who sell the A4V scheme claim that, with a correct combination of
government documents, a person can access their secret bank account and its funds. Mr. Meads’
relies on the following documents to unlock this “account”:
1. the UCC Financing Statement registered in Ohio for a Certificate of Birth;
2. the UCC search of “DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust”;
3 the government of Alberta Personal Property Registry Verification Statement for
“DENNIS LARRY MEADS, foreign situs cestui qui vie trust” that lists as
collateral a birth certificate, social insurance number, UCC1 financing statement,
a certificate of marriage, an operator’s license, Canadian passport, and what I
believe are two court orders; and
4. the “Actual and Constructive Notice” from Dennis-Larry: Meads to the Bank of
Canada that “accepts for value” enclosed documents in accordance with the
Uniform Commercial Code and the Bank of Canada Act to charge his “public
treasury”, which is identified by his social insurance number, for $100 billion
Canadian dollars or the equivalent in silver or gold.
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I would describe how these documents have the intended effect, except that the A4V
documentary material I have reviewed has never made any sense, so I can only observe the
‘ingredients’ and describe the intended ‘spell effect’.
[537] The exact form of an A4V scheme and associated ‘unlocking spell’ varies from guru to
guru, but there are common motifs that indicate an OPCA litigant is attempting to use these
processes:
1. any reference to the UCC, or any UCC filing documents;
2. the language “accept for value” and “return for value”;
3. a claim that a government bank account exists that is linked to a personal
identification number;
4. mention of the gold or precious metal standards for money, and the dates those
standards were abandoned;
5. a claim by a litigant that they are not a slave; this relates to the idea that the state
uses people as collateral;
6. the U.S. “Emancipation Proclamation” of January 1, 1863, and/or the 13th
Amendment to the U.S. constitution; and
7. the characteristic “accept for value” stamp or statement written on a bill, court
order, or other correspondence.
[538] In Mr. Meads’ case, he seems to claim that the Court should make an order to discharge
his spousal and child support obligations by payment from the secret A4V government account.
As I understood his statements in court, he had already told his wife’s Counsel to access his
secret bank account, and presumably she too has received many of the documents that Mr.
Meads sent to this Court on June 19 and 21st. Mr Meads also asked for the modest award of $100
billion in gold or silver.
[539] When an A4V litigant writes or stamps a notation such as that described above at paras.
213-215, that, according to A4V mythology, transforms a bill or court order into a cheque drawn
from the secret account. The OPCA litigant’s obligation is gone once the modified document is
returned to its source.
[540] This Court has also seen this concept expressed as a mechanism to negate criminal
charges or an arrest warrant. For example, I have reviewed documents that say:
That the commercial offer presented, (WARRANT FOR ARREST) has been
accepted for value and endorsed by GORDON MICAHEL SCHILLER and
returned to you for settlement and account closure. [sic.]
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The litigants then demanded a $1,000,000.00 payment, or that the court:
... perform the offset, adjust and close the account and provide the original blue
ink WARRANT FOR ARREST to us ...
[541] The entire A4V concept has been reviewed and rejected in Underworld Services Ltd. v.
Money Stop Ltd., 2012 ABQB 327, and Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J.
No. 783 at para. 42, 2009 CanLII 9368 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.). I do the same.
[542] Courts have awarded special damages against OPCA litigants who advance A4V
schemes: CIBC v. Marples, 2008 BCSC 590 at paras. 3, 4, 7.
[543] It is very unfortunate that any person would be so gullible as to believe that free money
can be obtained by these theatrics, but nevertheless some, like Mr. Meads, appear unable to resist
the temptation of wealth without obligation. One can only hope that in the future OPCA gurus
will find A4V less attractive, and their risk-loving customers instead invest in alternative forms
of speculation, such as lottery tickets, which provide infinitely better prospects for return.
2. Bill Consumer Purchases
[544] Recently the Ontario Court of Appeal has, in Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Di Iorio, 2011
ONCA 792 a paras. 2-3, rejected what seems to be a new ‘money for nothing’ scheme, where the
applicants claimed that documents called “Bill-Consumer Purchases” would discharge a debt:
2 The appellants contend that the motion judge erred by not accepting that
the documents they submitted to the respondent, namely, so-called
"Bill-Consumer Purchases" were legal tender for their debts.
3 We disagree. The appellants' documents have no commercial value
whatsoever. Accordingly, the appellants' debts to T-D Bank remain
unpaid.
[545] The trial judgment is not reported, and the Court of Appeal offers little detail on the
theoretical basis of this scheme. My assumption is that this concept in some manner relates to the
“consumer bills and notes” component of the Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4, ss. 188-
192.
[546] A similar scheme may have been in play in Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201.
There the court evaluated whether a claim had been proven, when not refuted by affidavit, and
concluded that it:
... appears to be a distorted view of the Bills of Exchange Act. It is, however,
apparent that the documents do not even slightly resemble genuine bills of
exchange. Furthermore, signing for the registered mail that contained the
documents does not amount to an “acceptance” of any legitimate bill of exchange
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that might be in the envelope. “Acceptance” in the Bills of Exchange Act is a
technical term, and is not the same as acknowledging physical receipt of the
envelope.
[547] A scheme of this type warranted elevated costs against the OPCA litigant: Ramjohn v.
Rudd, 2007 ABQB 84 at paras. 9-10, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38.
3. Miscellaneous Money for Nothing Schemes
[548] I will briefly review a particularly bizarre ‘money for nothing’ scheme advanced by
Dempsey and described in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750 at paras. 27, 37,
39, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 204, Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at para. 34,
60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309, and Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005
BCSC 839, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447. For lack of any better description, Dempsey appeared to
claim that the only physical cash, or “hard currency” has value. Therefore, a loan or debt that
was a result of a cheque or electronic transaction did not have to be repaid.
[549] For example, in Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 750, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d)
204, Garson J. at para. 27 explained Dempsey’s theory this way:
In his submissions on the motions, in the actions concerning him, Mr. Dempsey
described the "money for nothing" theory. He stated that the banks do not have
money. Rather, they create money out of "thin air". He asks, "where did that
money come from", he answers "it came from us". He says the plaintiffs create
money by signing promissory notes, and as soon as the promissory note is signed
the banks deposit money in their own statement of account. The banks do not
place hard currency in the hands of the debtors. Mr. Dempsey complains that the
banks then charge interest on nothing and that is a criminal rate of interest
because interest is charged on nothing. Mr. Dempsey states, "it is not like the old
days, when people used to go to the bank and, in the back room, count out dollars,
there is no law that allows the banks to create dollars out of thin air."
[550] Unsurprisingly, the British Columbia courts have rejected this “fanciful theory” as “so
completely devoid of merit” that litigants should be penalized for launching such actions:
Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 34, 46, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309.
F. Legal Effect and Character of OPCA Arguments
1. OPCA Strategies that Deny Court Authority
[551] The majority of OPCA concepts, those other than the ‘money for nothing’ category, in
one sense or another seek to deny court authority.
a. An OPCA Argument that Denies Court Authority Cannot Succeed Due to
the Court’s Inherent Authority
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[552] As I have previously explained, that crucial flaw in the OPCA concepts is a basis to
categorically dismiss the majority of OPCA strategies and mechanisms. A court should do so at
the first opportunity.
[553] OPCA litigants cannot evade, deny, or re-frame the jurisdiction of the Canadian courts.
The judicial system is an independent, free-standing apparatus that neither relies on the state or
the individual. This authority serves everyone who has suffered an injury to their rights,
including the very OPCA litigants who deny the court’s role, when convenient, but who seem so
eager to exploit its authority to meet their own ends.
b. An OPCA Argument that Denies Court Authority is Intrinsically Frivolous
and Vexatious
[554] As discussed above, many individual OPCA concepts that attack court jurisdiction have
been identified and rejected as frivolous and vexatious arguments. For example:
1. litigation based on ‘double/split’ person schemes: Tuck v. Canada, 2007 TCC
418 at para. 18; Hovey Ventures Inc. v. Canada, 2007 TCC 139 at para. 12, 2007
CCI 139; Friesen v. Canada, 2007 TCC 287 at para. 6, [2007] 5 C.T.C. 2067;
2. tax protest based immunity: Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency),
2001 SKQB 377 at paras. 18-19, 210 Sask.R. 285; Country Plaza Motors Ltd. v.
Indian Head (Town), 2005 SKQB 442 at paras. 21-22, 272 Sask.R. 198;
3. a foisted unilateral agreement: Banilevic v. Canada (Customs and Revenue
Agency), 2002 SKQB 371 at paras. 12-13, 117 A.C.W.S. (3d) 549;
4. “Moorish Law” concepts: Henry v. El, 2010 ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused
[2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138;
5. a ‘military flag’ appeal: R. v. J.B.C. Securities Ltd., 2003 NBCA 53 at para. 9,
261 N.B.R. (2d) 199; and
6. an ‘everything is a contract’ argument: Sandri v. Canada (Attorney General),
2009 CanLII 44282 at paras. 11-14, 179 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811 (Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
[555] These are simply examples of a more general principle. A pleading is frivolous if its
substance indicates bad faith or is factually hopeless: Donaldson v. Farrell, 2011 ABQB 11 at
para 20. A frivolous plea is one so palpably bad that the Court needs no real argument to be
convinced of that fact: Haljan v. Serdahely Estate, 2008 ABQB 472 at para 21.
[556] My previous review indicates why, globally, any OPCA strategy that denies court
authority is intrinsically frivolous and vexatious. These arguments cannot succeed in the face of
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the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts of Canada. Any argument or scheme that
possesses this characteristic is therefore clearly invalid and cannot be a basis for litigation.
Further, the conduct of OPCA litigants and gurus, and their rhetoric, makes very plain that these
schemes are advanced with the express purpose of abusing the court’s processes.
c. An OPCA Argument that Denies Court Authority May Be Contempt of
Court Authority
[557] There is a further implication to the fact that OPCA strategies generally attempt to defeat
the intrinsic authority of Canadian superior courts. In my view, when a person advances an
OPCA argument, other than a ‘money for nothing’ scheme, that litigant is potentially in
contempt of court. Put another way, an OPCA technique of that kind may meet both the actus
reus and mens rea of the contempt offence.
[558] This conclusion draws from jurisprudence that evaluates the legal effect of a denial of
state authority.
i. Denial of Tax Obligation Evades Tax
[559] Several provincial courts of appeal have accepted as a principle that the mens rea
component for income tax evasion (Income Tax Act, s. 239(1)(d)), is proven where a person:
1. denies income tax liability on the basis that the Crown has no jurisdiction to tax,
or
2. chooses not to pay income tax.
[560] The income tax evasion sanctions provided by Income Tax Act, s. 239(1)(e-f), and
potentially enhanced under Income Tax Act, s. 239(2), represent serious criminal consequences:
a fine of up to 200% of the amounts evaded, and imprisonment of up to two years (s. 239(1)(ef))
or five years (s. 239)(2)).
[561] R. v. Klundert (2004), 242 D.L.R. (4th) 644, 190 O.A.C. 36 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused
[2004] S.C.C.A. No. 463 involved a taxpayer who claimed that income tax had no constitutional
basis. The central issue on appeal was whether a defence of honest mistake was possible or
instead the intentional refusal to pay tax proved an intent to evade paying tax (paras. 43-49).
Doherty J.A. noted that intent and ignorance of the law is relevant in certain criminal contexts
(para. 54), but that an asserted belief in the unconstitutional character of tax legislation does not
indicate a misunderstanding. Rather, it indicates a conscious intention to disobey:
58. ... Dr. Klundert knew full well that he owed tax imposed by the Act. His
mistake did not go to knowledge of his obligation to pay taxes owing
under the Act but rather to the government's right to impose that
obligation on him. He did not assert that he was doing his best to comply
with the law but, through ignorance or mistake, failed to do so. To the
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contrary, he acknowledged the obligation to pay under the Act and made a
considered decision to refuse to pay because of a belief that the law
requiring him to pay was invalid. [Emphasis added.]
That refusal established the mens rea component of the tax evasion offence, that the taxpayer
had willfully evaded paying income tax (paras. 62-64).
[562] The Ontario Court of Appeal returned to this issue in R. v. Ricci (2004), 190 O.A.C. 375,
[2005] 1 C.T.C. 40 (Ont. C.A.), leave refused [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 551, and evaluated a taxpayer
who advanced the relatively common OPCA argument that the taxpayer was not a person but “...
a "natural person of commoner status" and not subject to payment of income tax.” (para. 4). The
taxpayer argued he was not guilty of tax evasion, as that was his honest belief (para. 5).
Following R. v. Klundert the court concluded the taxpayer was guilty of tax evasion:
6 The trial judge concluded that the appellant intentionally disregarded his
obligations under the Act thereby finding that the requisite mens rea for the
offence had been made out. In our opinion it was open to him to do so. R. v.
Klundert, [2004] O.J. No. 3515, made it clear that a person is not exempt from
paying taxes based on his political, religious, philosophical or moral beliefs. ...
[Emphasis added.]
[563] In R. v. Kennedy, 2004 BCCA 638 at para. 14, 207 B.C.A.C. 102, leave refused [2006]
S.C.C.A. No. 15, Hall J.A. determined that the appellant’s guilt was proven by his choice to file
inaccurate income tax returns “... because of his belief that the Income Tax Act was
constitutionally invalid ...” and concluded:
... In my opinion, Klinger P.C.J. correctly held that the appellant was required to
disclose that income tax in his return regardless of any belief he may have had as
to the constitutional right of the federal government to levy or collect income
taxes. Having reached this conclusion about the appellant's duty to report income,
it seems to me that the trial judge was bound to find the appellant guilty on count
3 in the Information. No additional mental element was required ... [Emphasis
added.]
While the R. v. Kennedy cases does not explain the rationale for the litigant’s belief, the full
style of cause of his Supreme Court of Canada leave for appeal application,
“Robert-Victor-MacPherson: Kennedy v. Her Majesty the Queen (B.C.)”, is highly suggestive.
[564] The Alberta Court of Appeal has cited R. v. Klundert in R. v. Breakell, 2009 ABCA 173
at para. 17, 454 A.R. 205 though not specifically for the ‘mens rea’ rule.
ii. Denial of Firearms Restrictions Proves Intent for Illegal Possession
[565] Similarly, the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Montague, 2010 ONCA 141 at paras. 39-
41, 260 O.A.C. 12 applied the R. v. Klundert presumption in a separate criminal context,
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regulation of firearms. The appellant was a person who had been found with weapons and
ammunition stored in a hidden room: “It is fair to say that the quantity and nature of the seized
arsenal of weapons and associated items may have been sufficient for a small-scale
insurrection.” (para. 3).
[566] The court concluded it was unnecessary in this circumstance to have a jury consider
whether the gun collector had intended his unlawful conduct:
40 In this case, it is apparent from his own evidence that Mr. Montague was not
trying to obey the law; instead, in protest against various firearms laws and
regulations with which he disagreed, he was choosing which laws he thought
should be obeyed. In sum, he knowingly disobeyed the current law. In these
circumstances, the defences of honest but mistaken belief and colour of right have
no application. [Emphasis added.]
iii. Denial of Court Authority May Prove the Intent to Engage in
Contempt of Court
[567] A general principle emerges from these cases where a person denies application of law
on the basis that it is contrary to the person’s “political, religious, philosophical or moral
beliefs”. Denial that a law applies is proof that the person has intended to disobey the law. One
such possible expression of “political, religious, philosophical or moral beliefs” is a statement
that the state or the courts have no authority over a person.
[568] I have reviewed, in my discussion of the inherent authority of superior courts, why
everyone who is in Canada is subject to Canadian law and the Canadian courts. Further, this is a
simple fact known by all, an element of the most basic levels of education, and a cornerstone of
the operation of an ordered society. As Chief Justice Lamer indicated in Ref re Remuneration of
Judges of the Prov. Court of P.E.I.; Ref re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the
Prov. Court of P.E.I., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 at para. 108, 150 D.L.R. (4th) 577, the independent but
overarching operation of Canadian courts is “definitional to the Canadian understanding of
constitutionalism”.
[569] If so, then it is possible that simply advancing many OPCA concepts arguments may
prove an intention to disobey and ignore the courts and the law. Reduced to their simplest form,
many, if not most, OPCA arguments and concepts resolve to a simple claim: “I am not subject to
control or sanction by any court or government.”
[570] I have previously concluded that an OPCA concept that denies the jurisdiction of the
court is vexatious in character and a basis to immediately strike out arguments, applications, and
litigation. That also may be a basis to find a person in contempt of court.
[571] The long-established contempt of court authority exists to ensure a court can uphold its
dignity and process. Justice McLachlin (as she then was) in United Nurses of Alberta v. Alberta
(Attorney General), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 901 at 931-933, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 609 observed that “[t]he
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rule of law is directly dependent on the ability of the courts to enforce their process and maintain
their dignity and respect.”
[572] She continued to identify the kinds of misconduct that constitute the more serious form
of contempt, criminal contempt of court:
... A person who simply breaches a court order, for example by failing to abide by
visiting hours stipulated in a child custody order, is viewed as having committed
civil contempt. However, when the element of public defiance of the court's
process in a way calculated to lessen societal respect for the courts is added to the
breach, it becomes criminal. ...
... The gravamen of the offence is rather the open, continuous and flagrant
violation of a court order without regard for the effect that may have on the
respect accorded to edicts of the court.
... To establish criminal contempt the Crown must prove that the accused defied
or disobeyed a court order in a public way (the actus reus), with intent, knowledge
or recklessness as to the fact that the public disobedience will tend to depreciate
the authority of the court (the mens rea). The Crown must prove these elements
beyond a reasonable doubt. As in other criminal offences, however, the necessary
mens rea may be inferred from the circumstances. An open and public defiance
of a court order will tend to depreciate the authority of the court. Therefore when
it is clear the accused must have known his or her act of defiance will be public, it
may be inferred that he or she was at least reckless as to whether the authority of
the court would be brought into contempt. [Emphasis added.]
[573] Any hearing before a court, with some specific exceptions, is open and public. The
intended purpose of OPCA strategies and the stereotypical forms of OPCA litigant in-court
activity generally appear intended to both reduce public respect for and defeat court authority.
Therefore, advancing an OPCA strategy, concept, or mechanism that denies court authority in
Court may, by definition, meet the actus reus and mens rea elements of criminal contempt of
court.
[574] As noted above, Justice McLachlin at 931 emphasizes that defiance of court authority in
a non-public context is a basis for a finding of civil contempt. She offers, as an example:
A person who simply breaches a court order, for example by failing to abide by
visiting hours stipulated in a child custody order, is viewed as having committed
civil contempt.
What is crucial is the intention that the defiant act be public, rather than that it happens for some
reason to become the subject of public attention.
127
[575] In my view, advancing OPCA strategies outside the courtroom may in certain instances
qualify as civil contempt.
[576] Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic, [2009] O.J. No. 783, 2009 CanLII 9368 and
Mercedes-Benz Financial v. Kovacevic (2009), 308 D.L.R. (4th) 562, 74 C.P.C. (6th) 326 (Ont.
Sup. Ct. J.) provide an example of an OPCA litigant being found guilty of contempt of court for
ignoring a court order and advancing a range of ‘immunity’, ‘double/split person’ and A4V
techniques.
[577] As previously explored in relation to the intrinsic jurisdiction of the courts, when a
person says they are in the wrong court then that could be a legitimate argument, however the
argument that no court has jurisdiction over a person is vexatious and may be in contempt of
(some) court.
[578] However, in the final analysis, the limits of the application of the contempt of court
principles are best explored in a proceeding where an OPCA litigant is alleged to engage in
contempt of court by some form of OPCA conduct.
iv. Other Government Authorities
[579] It occurs to me that the approach to denial of state legislative authority taken in R. v.
Klundert, R. v. Ricci, R. v. Kennedy, and R. v. Montague could potentially also apply to
government authority outside the income tax and firearms contexts.
[580] For example, a court may conclude an OPCA litigant who argues that no government has
the authority to restrict or legislate use of automobiles advances a vexatious argument, unless the
litigant frames that argument in a constitutional context. That denial of state authority would
presumably prove the intent to engage in unlawful conduct.
[581] As the facts of this case do not relate to that kind of situation, I will leave exploration of
that possibility to another proceeding. Nevertheless, I think it is important that OPCA litigants,
including Mr. Meads, be aware of this possible consequence to their common practice of
denying state authority.
2. Other OPCA Strategies
[582] The ‘money for nothing’ category of OPCA litigation strategies is not inherently
frivolous and vexatious. That said, Canadian courts have consistently rejected the validity of
these schemes, and identified these concepts as an inappropriate basis for litigation. Litigants and
involved gurus who advance ‘money for nothing’ schemes have attracted elevated and special
costs awards: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 34, 46, 60
B.C.L.R. (4th) 309; CIBC v. Marples, 2008 BCSC 590 at paras. 3, 4, 7; Ramjohn v. Rudd, 2007
ABQB 84 at paras. 9-10, 156 A.C.W.S. (3d) 38.
128
[583] Mr. Meads has advanced a ‘money for nothing’ scheme, the A4V technique. I have
previously concluded that it has no effect in law. A4V is a fiction that OPCA litigants use to
defeat valid fiscal obligations.
[584] Further, I conclude that any litigation or defence based on the pseudolegal A4V concept
is inherently frivolous and vexatious. That favours full indemnification of a person who faces an
A4V strategy, and punitive and aggravated damages where the A4V strategy is advanced outside
a litigation context.
[585] I see no reason why other OPCA ‘money for nothing’ schemes will not be evaluated in
an analogous manner, but leave that issue to future proceedings.
3. Responses to OPCA Strategies
[586] Canadian courts have adopted a variety and range of responses to OPCA litigants and
litigation. Any judge who faces OPCA litigation should consider deployment of all tools in this
arsenal, and others that may be developed for this difficult litigant category.
a. Strike Actions, Motions, and Defences
[587] A court may strike claims or dismiss an action where the judge concludes that a
commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper (Rule 3.68(2)(c)), or
an abuse of process (Rule 3.68(2)(d)).
[588] There is also a well established common-law authority that a court’s inherent jurisdiction
may be applied to control its own process and prevent abuse: Canam Enterprises Inc v. Coles,
(2000), 51 O.R. (3d) 481 (Ont. C.A.) at paras 55 56, affirmed, 2002 SCC 63, [2002] 3 S.C.R.
307; McMeekin v. Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 144 at para. 14.
[589] This is a common response by courts to OPCA litigation. Examples where an action or
defence was struck on that basis include: Jabez Financial Services Inc. (Receiver of) v.
Sponagle, 2008 NSSC 112 at para. 19, 264 N.S.R. (2d) 224; Tuck v. Canada, 2007 TCC 418 at
para. 18; Hovey Ventures Inc. v. Canada, 2007 TCC 139 at para. 12, 2007 CCI 139; Friesen v.
Canada, 2007 TCC 287 at para. 6, [2007] 5 C.T.C. 2067; Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union,
2006 BCSC 750, 151 A.C.W.S. (3d) 204; National Leasing Group Inc. v. Top West Ventures
Ltd., 2001 BCSC 111 at para. 9, 102 A.C.W.S. (3d) 303; Borkovic v. Laurentian Bank of
Canada, 2001 BCSC 337 at para. 23, 103 A.C.W.S. (3d) 700.
[590] Alternatively, when faced with truly baffling OPCA materials, a court may take the
approach applied in Kisikawpimootewin v. Canada, 2004 FC 1426 at para. 9, 134 A.C.W.S. (3d)
396 and strike a proceeding based on incomprehensible arguments and allegations, where the
defendant is “left both embarrassed and unable to defend itself” and the court faces “a
proceeding so ill-defined that it is unable to discern an argument, or identify any specific
material facts.”
b. Punitive Damages
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[591] Where specifically sought by the party opposing an OPCA litigant, punitive damages
may be appropriate where a litigant advances an OPCA scheme, concept, or strategy. An award
of this kind would relate to pre-trial misconduct (Polar Ice Express Inc. v. Arctic Glacier Inc.,
2009 ABCA 20 at para. 21, 446 A.R. 295), such as a demand for payment or a lien filed on the
basis of a foisted unilateral agreement.
[592] The test for misconduct of this kind was recently restated by the Supreme Court of
Canada in Richard v. Time Inc., 2012 SCC 8 at para. 149, 342 D.L.R. (4th) 1:
At common law, punitive damages can be awarded in any civil suit in which the
plaintiff proves that the defendant’s conduct was “malicious, oppressive and high
handed [such] that it offends the court’s sense of decency” ... The requirement
that the plaintiff demonstrate misconduct that represents a marked departure from
ordinary standards of decency ensures that punitive damages will be awarded
only in exceptional cases ... [Citations omitted.]
See also Hill v. Church of Scientology of Toronto, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 at para. 196, 126
D.L.R. (4th) 129; Whiten v. Pilot Insurance Co., 2002 SCC 18 at para. 136, [2002] 1 S.C.R.
595.
[593] It appears to me that asserting an OPCA scheme, particularly one that has been identified
and dismissed as ineffective, can attract punitive damages, where specifically sought by the party
opposing the OPCA litigant. The manner in which ‘fee schedules’ and other foisted unilateral
agreements are used seem to make that strategy a particularly appropriate target. These
documents have no basis in law, reverse the burden of evidence, and typically involve grotesque
and unwarranted ‘fines’. To quote Justice Brown, in MBNA Canada Bank v. Luciani, 2011
ONSC 6347 at para. 3, these are “[a] good old-fashioned shake-down!” Extortion deserves a
punitive response.
c. Elevated Costs
[594] Presumptively, an unsuccessful litigant is expected to pay the opposing parties an amount
to offset the legal cost of a proceeding, hearing, or application: Rule 10.29(1). One potential
exception to that is where an issue is novel, and therefore the court should take the exceptional
step of not ordering costs, see Grant v. Grant, 2010 ABQB 735 at paras. 9-17, 1 R.F.L. (7th) 203
for a helpful review of the novelty criteria. Though many OPCA concepts and arguments
certainly are unusual, I am not aware any case where costs obligations against an OPCA litigant
were waived on the basis they are “novel”. Instead, the opposite has occurred.
[595] Perhaps unsurprisingly, OPCA litigation has historically led to elevated cost awards.
Examples that are reported include:
1. double costs: Banilevic v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2002 SKQB
371 at paras. 12-13, 117 A.C.W.S. (3d) 549; Ellis v. Canada (Office of the Prime
Minister), 2001 SKQB 378 at para. 29, 210 Sask.R. 138;
130
2. special costs: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 46,
48, 60 B.C.L.R. (4th) 309; CIBC v. Marples, 2008 BCSC 590 at paras. 3, 4, 7;
and
3. substantial or full indemnification: Williams v. Johnston, [2008] O.J. No. 4853
(QL) at para. 15, 2008 CanLII 63194 (Ont. S.C.), affirmed 2009 ONCA 335, 176
A.C.W.S. (3d) 609, leave denied [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 266; MBNA Canada Bank
v. Luciani, 2011 ONSC 6347 at paras. 3, 17.
[596] A cost award that indemnifies an innocent party has merit where that person faces OPCA
litigation, at least for the portions of an action that relates to an OPCA concept, argument, or
strategy. Frequently that may be either on a full indemnity, solicitor and own client basis, or an
elevated solicitor and client costs award. Moen J. has recently reviewed the criteria for elevated
cost awards of this kind in Brown v. Silvera, 2010 ABQB 224 at paras. 29-35, 488 A.R. 22.
[597] Some of the identified criteria for an award of those kinds include:
• solicitor and client costs are awarded where the conduct of a party has been
‘reprehensible, scandalous or outrageous’: Walsh v. Mobil Oil Canada, 2008
ABCA 268 at para. 112, 440 A.R. 199; Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd.,
2004 SCC 9 at para. 26, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 303; Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3
at 134, 108 D.L.R. (4th) 193;
• solicitor and client costs might suffice to satisfy the objectives of deterrence and
punishment that would otherwise be served by a punitive damage award:
Colborne Capital Corp. v. 542775 Alberta Ltd., 1999 ABCA 14 at para. 294, 228
A.R. 201; College of Physicians & Surgeons, 2009 ABQB 48 at paras. 4-23, 468
A.R. 101;
• misconduct during the litigation can surely be found if there is no reasonable
basis on which to commence, or continue, litigation: College of Physicians &
Surgeons, at para. 33;
• a proceeding that was based on groundless allegations and was a type of conduct
that should be discouraged: College of Physicians & Surgeons, at para. 33;
• justice can only be done by a complete indemnification for costs: Foulis v.
Robinson (1978), 21 O.R. (2d) 769, 92 D.L.R. (3d) 134 (Ont. C.A.);
• there is evidence that the plaintiff did something to hinder, delay or confuse the
litigation, where there was no serious issue of fact or law which required these
lengthy, expensive proceedings, where the positively misconducting party was
“contemptuous” of the aggrieved party in forcing that aggrieved party to exhaust
legal proceedings to obtain that which was obviously his: Max Sonnenberg Inc.
131
v. Stewart, Smith (Canada) Ltd., 48 Alta. L.R. (2d) 367, [1987] 2 W.W.R. 75
(Alta. Q.B.);
• an attempt to deceive the court and defeat justice, an attempt to delay, deceive
and defeat justice: Olson v. New Home Certification Program of Alberta (1986),
69 A.R. 356, 44 Alta. L.R. (2d) 207 (Alta. Q.B.);
• where the defendants were guilty of positive misconduct, where others should be
deterred from like conduct and the defendants should be penalized beyond the
ordinary order of costs: Dusik v. Newton (1984), 51 B.C.L.R. 217, 24 A.C.W.S.
(2d) 465 (B.C.S.C.), varied on other grounds 62 B.C.L.R. 1, 31 A.C.W.S. (2d)
199 (B.C.C.A.);
• an attempt to delay or hinder proceedings, an attempt to deceive or defeat justice,
fraud or untrue or scandalous charges: Pharand Ski Corp. v. Alberta (1991), 122
A.R. 81, 122 A.R. 395 (Alta. Q.B.); and
• the positive misconduct of the party which gives rise to the action is so blatant
and is calculated to deliberately harm the other party, then despite the technically
proper conduct of the legal proceedings, the very fact that the action must be
brought by the injured party to gain what was rightfully his in the face of an
unreasonable denial: Jackson v. Trimac Industries Ltd. (1993), 138 A.R. 161 at
para. 32, 8 Alta. L.R. (3d) 403 (Alta. Q.B.), affirmed on costs, 155 A.R. 42, 20
Alta. L.R. (3d) 117 (Alta. C.A.) (but see Polar Ice Express Inc. v. Arctic Glacier
Inc., 2009 ABCA 20 at para. 21, 446 A.R. 295).
[598] Many, if not most, of these characteristics emerge in a typical proceeding that involves
OPCA concepts and litigants. The character of that misconduct is further aggravated by the fact
that OPCA litigants enter into the courts wielding tools that they anticipate will disrupt, if not
break, the system, and thereby defeat genuine legal rights.
[599] I note that increased costs, such as special costs or double costs, were awarded by courts
which had a more limited appreciation of the OPCA movement, its members, and strategies.
With our present understanding of this vexatious litigation phenomenon, a strong deterrent
response is appropriate. Similarly, the courts have an obligation to help shield those who are
targeted in this manner.
[600] Courts have made gurus liable for costs where a guru participates and instigates litigation
of this kind: Dempsey v. Envision Credit Union, 2006 BCSC 1324 at paras. 46, 48, 60 B.C.L.R.
(4th) 309, see also Jackson v. Canada (Customs and Revenue Agency), 2001 SKQB 377 at
para. 40, 210 Sask.R. 285. I think that is a reasonable response to the participation of these
highly disruptive and manipulative persons.
d. Order Security for Costs
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[601] I am not aware of any OPCA litigation where the target of the OPCA strategy has applied
for payment into court of security for costs (Rule 4.22). That said, it seems to me that litigation, a
defence, or an application, that flows from a known OPCA strategy, might favour an order of
that kind. OPCA strategies that are proven as invalid means the merits of an OPCA litigation are
poor: Rule, 4.22(c). Second, OPCA litigants stereotypically deny any obligation to pay state and
court obligations, which would make enforcement of a costs award difficult: Rule, 4.22(a).
[602] Last, there is the fact these OPCA litigants usually say they stand outside the court’s
authority. That alone is a strong factor that may favour a security for costs order (Rule, 4.22(e)),
as that certainly does not favour a reasonable confidence that in this instance the OPCA litigant
will acknowledge and discharge his or her cost liability.
e. Fines
[603] Rule 10.49(1) authorizes a judge to order “a party, lawyer or other person” [emphasis
added] pay the court clerk a penalty where a person:
(a) fails to comply with these rules or a practice note or direction of the Court
without adequate excuse, and
(b) the contravention or failure to comply, in the Court’s opinion, has
interfered with or may interfere with the proper or efficient administration
of justice.
[604] At the present date there do not seem to be any reported judgments that apply Rule
10.49(1). A number of decisions report on application of its precursor, Alberta Rules of Court,
Alta Reg 390/1968, s. 599.1, for instances where misconduct had led to delay and unnecessary
steps (Pollock v. Liberty Technical Services Ltd. (1997), 50 Alta. L.R. (3d) 335, 71 A.C.W.S.
(3d) 20 (Alta. Q.B.)) and as a mechanism to pay for expenditures that were otherwise beyond
recovery (A.S. v. N.L.H., 2006 ABQB 708, 405 A.R. 35).
[605] This Rule provides a potentially very helpful mechanism to address OPCA litigant and
guru misconduct. Further, any fine issued under this Rule does not affect the substance of a
dispute, thus respecting any genuine legal rights and issues that an OPCA litigant may possess.
[606] Practically any OPCA document fails to comply with the formal and content
requirements of the Rules. Those criteria may be developed further by specific court procedures.
Similarly, in-court OPCA litigant behaviour often ignores judicial direction. Most OPCA
strategies are intentionally disruptive, or at least have that effect, meeting the second penalty
criterion of Rule 10.49. OPCA arguments and concepts are generally frivolous, spurious, and
vexatious, and therefore employment of these would “interfere with ... the proper or efficient
administration of justice.”
[607] If so, this Court has a very flexible tool that may be applied to penalize persons who
advance OPCA methods. Notably, this Rule allows a judge to target ‘other persons’, such as the
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third-parties who sometimes claim to ‘represent’ or act as an ‘agent’ for a OPCA litigant, or an
OPCA litigant employing a ‘double/split person’ strategy who refuses to identify themself.
f. One Judge Remaining on a File
[608] OPCA litigation is often associated with complex and unorthodox court documentation,
correspondence, irregular litigation procedures, and a difficult history, both inside and outside
the courtroom. A lay person, lawyer, or judge who confronts one of these files for the first time
will probably require significant time and effort to become familiar with the materials and events
to date.
[609] That fact is compounded by the potentially very uncooperative nature of OPCA litigants,
particularly those who are attempting to apply ‘everything is a contract’ and ‘dual/split person’
schemes. In that sense, OPCA litigation has many of the characteristics of high conflict family
disputes.
[610] As a consequence, it makes sense that a single judge should usually supervise a court
proceeding in which OPCA activities have emerged, and that action is an ongoing process. This
may be achieved by having a judge seize themselves of the matter, or a more formal process
such as assigning a case management judge - in our Court, the former converts into the latter.
[611] This has a further advantage in that the judge then will have a direct opportunity to
observe the activity and development of in-court OPCA litigant strategies and conduct. Whether
an ongoing relationship with a supervising judge is a better way to establish a meaningful
dialogue with these difficult litigants is not, at present, clear. Time will tell.
4. Responses to OPCA Litigants and Gurus
a. Vexatious Litigant Status
[612] The vexatious character of OPCA litigation may be a basis for an application under
Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2, s. 23.1(1) that a litigant be restricted in their authority to
initiate or continue an action.
[613] Vexatious litigant declarations of this kind are reported for OPCA gurus Lindsay (British
Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2007 BCCA 165, 238 B.C.A.C. 254, leave refused
[2007] S.C.C.A. No. 359; Manitoba (Attorney General) v. Lindsay, 2000 MBCA 11, 145
Man.R. (2d) 187) and Dempsey (Dempsey v. Casey, 2004 BCCA 395 at paras. 36-38, 132
A.C.W.S. (3d) 833), and Edmonton area Moorish Law OPCA litigant Henry (Henry v. El, 2010
ABCA 312 at para. 3, leave refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 138).
b. Deny Status as a Representative
[614] For reasons that I suspect are made obvious by these Reasons, there is good basis for a
court to deny persons in the OPCA movement, particularly gurus, from acting as representatives
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or agents, in court. Moreover, such representation is contrary to the Legal Profession Act, R.S.A.
2000, c. L-8, s. 106(1).
[615] Even where otherwise not prohibited by law (as it is in Alberta), I have identified a
number of decisions where agency has been denied, and those courts have offered very useful
bases for their action. In Gravlin et al. v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce et al, 2005
BCSC 839 at para. 71, 140 A.C.W.S. (3d) 447, Justice Garson concluded that any agent who
claims to not be subject to the rule of law is unfit to represent a client in court. The late Justice
Nash in R. v. Main, 2000 ABQB 56 at para. 36, 259 A.R. 163 observed that an advocate who “...
has demonstrated an intention not to be bound by rules and governing procedures in court ...”
should not be permitted to represent a litigant. I agree with both of these principles.
[616] Similarly, the fact that a person is a known OPCA litigant was a basis to deny that
litigant agent status: Hill v. Hill, 2008 SKQB 11 at paras. 29-30, 306 Sask.R. 259, see also R. v.
Romanowicz (1999), 45 O.R. (3d) 506, 178 D.L.R. (4th) 466 for commentary on “disreputable
or incompetent” representatives.
[617] In R. v. Martin, 2012 NSPC 73, Judge Atwood at para. 6 describes how an OPCA
movement member was so ineffectual as a representative that he was denied agent status:
... This agent, who identified himself as “Patrick”, known alternatively as “Ellis”,
stated clearly that he recognized the King James Bible as the only source of law,
and embarked on a lengthy inquiry of the Court as to the source of its authority,
raising the significance of portraiture of the Sovereign over the bench. As this
agent kept getting bogged down in questions and issues that were not properly
before the Court, I concluded and ordered that he not be permitted to act as agent.
I agree that Judge Atwood acted properly to deny representation by this agent once his nature
had become apparent. That said, I do not believe it is necessary to defer denial of status so as to
test effectiveness where the proposed representative has a known or obvious OPCA affiliation.
[618] I note that in R. v. L’Espinay, 2005 BCPC 662 at paras. 45-53, affirmed 2008 BCCA 20
at paras. 3-7, 228 C.C.C. (3d) 129, leave denied [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 494, the court did not limit
itself to observed misconduct, but concluded that a person’s out-of-court statements, such as a
webpage, were a fair basis to evaluate whether that person was an appropriate agent for a party. I
agree that kind of evidence is appropriate to test whether or not a person with OPCA affiliations
is an appropriate in-court litigation representative, assuming legal prerequisites are otherwise
met.
5. Conclusion - Responses to OPCA Litigation and Litigants
[619] The objectives and mindset of the typical OPCA litigant presents a challenge to the
courts. One should never lose sight of the possibility that a genuine legal issue may lurk,
somewhere, behind strange courtroom conduct, and peculiar documentation. However, that is no
135
basis to allow a disruptive and malicious litigant to run rough-shod over innocent parties and
proper judicial and court procedures.
[620] With that in mind, perhaps the best perspective is that a judge carry both carrot and stick.
It has been this Court’s experience that a firm notice that certain kinds of conduct will not be
tolerated sometimes produces the desired result. On other occasions, only active
countermeasures and sanctions will bring this kind of litigation under control.
[621] Existing court responses provide a range of response. How that will be tailored will, no
doubt, be the subject of considerable future analysis and commentary.
VII. Review
[622] Mr. Meads has advanced a remarkable cross-section of the litigation strategies and
arguments typical of the OPCA movement. All are invalid. I note with interest that Canadian
courts have previously issued written decisions on every last approach Mr. Meads has employed,
with perhaps one exception: I have not encountered a litigant or a reported case which involves
the ‘double outside colon’ or ‘triple outside colon / double inside colon’ variations of the
‘dash-colon’ magical name format. To be explicit, adding one or two additional pair of colons
outside or inside one’s name has no legal effect. I do not find, but strongly suspect, that even
more colons, within or without a name, will similarly be rejected by Canadian courts as an
operational and effective ‘magic hat’.
[623] My observation that Mr. Meads has not brought any novel concepts to the court indicates
the legal and intellectual bankruptcy of the OPCA movement. At this point they have exhausted
their schemes and now simply employ variations on prior strategies that have been rejected
following careful and exhaustive judicial review.
[624] In that sense the debate on the validity of OPCA concepts, such as there ever was, is
over. The provincial and federal courts of appeal have uniformly upheld trial decisions to reject
OPCA concepts. By my count at least nine of these cases sought leave to appeal from the
Supreme Court of Canada. None were granted. Legally, there is no dispute or issue outstanding.
[625] As such, these arguments and concepts should be disposed of in as direct a manner as
possible that:
1. protects the rights of those persons and entities who are the target of OPCA
schemes and harassment by OPCA litigants;
2. minimizes misuse and waste of court and state resources; and
3. sends a clear message that these schemes do not work, and that the misuse of
court procedures and processes in this manner will not be tolerated.
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[626] I have previously discussed the potentially appropriate civil responses to arguments of
this kind. What remains is to determine suitable penalties for those persons who sell and promote
OPCA schemes, and for their customers who, perhaps naively, employ those instructions,
techniques, and materials. I believe that question is better fully explored in a relevant factual
context.
[627] Nevertheless, I have some general guidelines, suggestions, and comments.
A. Judiciary
[628] OPCA litigants are typically self-represented, and that means they are owed the R. v.
Phillips, 2003 ABCA 4, 320 A.R. 172, affirmed en toto, 2003 SCC 57, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 623,
duty that a judge act to ensure the OPCA litigant’s right to a fair proceeding is preserved by
guiding the litigant through the trial process. The Alberta Court of Appeal in Cold Lake First
Nations v. Alberta (Minister of Tourism, Parks and Recreation), 2012 ABCA 36 at para. 24
described that obligation as a judge has “... a special duty to provide limited assistance to
unrepresented parties ...”. At para. 25 the scope of that obligation is reviewed:
The extent of this duty depends on the totality of the circumstances, including the
seriousness of the offence, the defences raised, and the sophistication of the
unrepresented party ... The judge's advice must be interactive, appropriate to the
unrepresented party and to the surrounding circumstances of the case ... Just how
far a judge should go in guiding an unrepresented party is a matter of judicial
discretion ... [Citations omitted.]
[629] That is clearly a contextual response. In OPCA litigation, that duty occurs in the face of
vexatious litigation and procedural strategies that are designed to disrupt court operation and
impede the exercise of legal rights. OPCA litigants have chosen to implement strategies that they
have been told will, at a minimum, paralyze court operation, if not break it. That means OPCA
litigants have, first and foremost, decided to adopt vexatious litigation strategies. These OPCA
litigants claim (wrongly) to be outside court jurisdiction - the rules do not apply to them.
[630] In McMeekin v. Alberta (Attorney General), 2012 ABQB 456 at para. 201, Justice
Shelley commented on the obligation of a court when faced by a litigant who purposefully
ignored court procedure and rules, engaged in repeated, abusive, and vexatious litigation, and
challenged court independence and authority:
I do not pretend to fully understand why Mr. McMeekin persists in this manner,
but I have no doubt that he knows very well that he is ignoring court procedure,
court etiquette, and advancing spurious, exaggerated claims. That is not tolerable.
Mr. McMeekin has no right to force on an ever expanding cast of Defendants in
this matter the cost and time commitments necessary to respond to his allegations
and abuse of court processes.
137
[631] I believe that a key element of an appropriate and successful response to OPCA litigation
is that these proceedings be segregated, where possible, to minimize their effect on the innocent
other parties involved. The suggested novel and conventional OPCA-specific court procedures
(judicial review of suspect documents, show cause hearings, court security procedures,
contempt, security for costs, elevated costs and damages, declaration of vexatious litigant status)
may be a starting point for that objective. A second aspect is that innocent parties be indemnified
for the legal costs associated with OPCA litigation. No, or little, cost should flow to a litigant
who is abused by OPCA strategies.
[632] The countervailing factor is that the courts should watch carefully for genuine arguments
masked inside OPCA litigation. However, since the purpose of pleadings is for a party to
identify its case for the benefit of the court and the opposing parties (Waquan v. Canada, 2002
ABCA 110 at para. 85, 303 A.R. 43; Madill v. Alexander Consulting Grp. (1999) 237 A.R. 307,
71 Alta. L.R. (3d) 50 (Alta. C.A.)), that means that it is not the court’s job to engage in an
archaeological survey, piecing together fragments of potential issues. A ‘show cause’ hearing is
therefore a potentially appropriate tool for this objective, where the OPCA litigant is invited to
demonstrate that he or she has a case.
[633] Another alternative, albeit compounded by funding challenges, is to appoint an amicus
curiae, as occurred in R. v. Martin, 2012 NSPC 73 at para. 5. In that case the appointment was
... not to represent [the Detaxer], but to assist the Court in ensuring that
evidentiary, admissibility, Charter, general and specific defence issues, as well as
other arguments that would promote the fair trial of Mr. Martin’s charges might
be raised in Court at appropriate times. ...
[634] OPCA litigants and litigation may involve significant frustration. OPCA litigants are
often instructed to follow scripts that implement strategies such as the ‘double/split person’ or
‘everything is a contract’ concepts which require the OPCA litigant act in an inscrutable, if not
defiant manner. There are no obvious solutions for that kind of conduct, other than a firm
indication that these strategies have no legal meaning.
[635] That challenge is not assisted by guru indoctrination that court and state actors are parts
of an oppressive, malignant entity, or at a minimum willing supporting characters of a dark,
concealed design. Given that, to say that the typical OPCA litigant appears to be ‘tightly wound’
is an understatement.
[636] It is my hope that these Reasons will provide a foundation for court response, but also act
to educate potential OPCA litigants. It may be helpful to refer persons who appear to have
adopted OPCA concepts to these Reasons. If nothing else, the parade of failures will refute
OPCA gurus’ all too frequent claims that the techniques they sell are universally effective.
[637] Other potentially useful steps include:
1. an explanation of court costs, and the court’s contempt authority,
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2 refusal to permit any non-lawyer representation (Legal Profession Act, s. 106(1)),
and
3. dismissing any application, action or defence where a litigant refuses to identify
themselves, or identifies themselves via cryptic double/split person language,
what Justice Midwinter called a “song and dance routine”.
[638] The first point deserves some elaboration. It has been this Court’s experience that OPCA
gurus do not educate their customers on the purpose and operation of court cost awards. An
OPCA litigant may perceive explanation of this mechanism as a threat, but this explanation is a
crucial aspect in the “limited duty” a judge owes to these self-represented litigants. OPCA
litigants seem to often believe there are no potential negative consequences to their adopting
OPCA techniques and strategies. Evidence to the contrary is a challenge to that indoctrination.
[639] Another mechanism to curb OPCA litigant misconduct is Rule 10.49(1). That too
provides a tangible measured response, but preserves potentially enforceable legal rights.
[640] My previous practice has been to simply reject OPCA materials. With this Court’s new
approach to OPCA litigation those materials become a foundation for a variety of court
responses (costs awards, vexatious litigation and litigant status, contempt, and criminal
offences), and are generally only relevant for those purposes. Of course, it is necessary to make
very clear to OPCA litigants that is the sole effect of these documents.
[641] Any OPCA litigation will be a challenge. However, time and experience will allow the
development of efficient court responses to these litigants. The first key is to know who they are,
and why they act as they do. Canadian courts have now passed that hurdle. What remains is to
manage these problematic self-represented and vexatious litigants in an effective manner.
B. Lawyers
1. A Lawyer’s Duties
[642] Like the judge, a lawyer who represents the target of an OPCA litigant faces a difficult
task. However, as an officer of the court each lawyer has certain duties not only to the client, but
also to the justice system as a whole.
a. Notarization of OPCA Materials
[643] One duty is to not participate in or facilitate OPCA schemes. During preparation of these
Reasons, I reviewed a large number of OPCA litigation files in our Court. I was very disturbed
and profoundly disappointed to see the number of occasions where an OPCA document was
notarized by a practicing lawyer. Certain of Mr. Meads’ materials were marked in that manner,
by two different members of the Alberta Bar.
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[644] Alberta Justice has instructed lay notaries to not endorse documents of this kind:
Papadopoulos v. Borg, 2009 ABCA 201 at para. 3.
[645] This Court has, on previous instances, drawn to the attention of the Law Society of
Alberta that this kind of action is inappropriate for an officer of the court. It assists
implementation of vexatious litigation strategies. In my view, a lawyer has a positive duty not to
engage in a step that would ‘formalize’ (though typically in a legally irrelevant manner) an
OPCA document. I have previously noted that certain OPCA gurus place a peculiar and mythical
authority in a notary’s hands. A lawyer should not, directly or indirectly, reenforce, or support
that purpose.
b. Triage: Identification of Legal Issues
[646] A second duty of lawyers in OPCA litigation is that captured in Rule 1.2(3)(a), that a
litigant has an obligation “... to identify the real issues in dispute and facilitate the quickest
means of resolving the claim at the least expense ...”. OPCA litigants mask their potential real
disputes in a bog of cryptic documentation, spurious argument, irrelevant legal maxims, and
stereotyped and caricatured court conduct. A judge can very much benefit from the opposing
party’s understanding of what tangible legal issues may lay buried in that morass. Indeed, once
those spurious OPCA characteristics and components are stripped away, it is the duty of the
Court to fairly adjudicate the legitimate issues that remain.
[647] As a lawyer and his or her client will have likely had much more exposure to the OPCA
litigant, those persons may be able to help identify any issues that led to the litigation now
framed in an OPCA context. It is very important to identify and narrow a proceeding to remove
illegitimate issues and procedures, so as to concentrate on any valid aspects that remain. That
helps a judge identify, isolate, and preserve the OPCA litigant’s potential valid (or arguable)
legal claims. The end result is that a dispute will be more readily resolved in a timely and
cost-effective manner.
2. Education
a. Judges and Courts
[648] The Edmonton Court of Queen’s Bench has had the dubious fortune to host not only a
significant number, but also a variety, of OPCA litigants and OPCA movements. Other parts of
Alberta and Canada may have had less exposure to OPCA litigants, their concepts, and in-court
(mis)conduct.
[649] As a consequence, a lawyer may find it useful to provide some background and evidence
to a judge. My hope is that these Reasons will provide a useful point of departure. In many
instances it should be possible to assign an OPCA strategy or concept to an identified category,
followed by dismissal, or other appropriate sanction(s), on that basis. Review for relevant
caselaw is helpful, particularly where a particular OPCA concept has been identified and
rejected.
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[650] To this point lawyers in this jurisdiction have not submitted background evidence on
OPCA litigation and concepts that explains the particular strategies advanced in a specific
dispute. While this kind of evidence is not necessary to manage and resolve OPCA litigation, it
can provide a very useful context to a judge, particularly one who is less familiar with OPCA
concepts, language, and strategies. This information may include:
1. OPCA fingerprint motifs, such as those identified in these Reasons,
2. materials from the OPCA litigant that the court has not received,
3. information about the OPCA litigant’s guru or host movement,
4. expert evidence of persons familiar with OPCA fingerprints, concepts, schemes,
and gurus,
5. communications by the litigant within the OPCA community, and
6. known security risks of a relevant OPCA movement.
[651] Several of these items deserve some elaboration. OPCA litigants often post in online
forums run by OPCA movements and gurus. The communications or recorded videos may be
helpful evidence of the litigant’s plans and perspective.
[652] There is no better way to illustrate the intention and basis for OPCA litigant misconduct
than the materials provided by the litigant’s guru. Not only do these place the litigant’s frame of
mind and attitude front and center, but they also illustrate how an OPCA scheme is intended to
operate – in a disruptive manner that subverts state and court authority. As these Reasons have
attempted to show, the rhetoric employed by OPCA gurus is anything but subtle. Of course,
these materials may not be easy to identify or obtain, but where available they are damning.
[653] Curiously, to this point the OPCA community seems to have attracted very little
academic and legal commentary. There is clearly an emerging law enforcement and security
awareness of the potential threats posed by certain OPCA movements. Nevertheless, there are
some useful starting points for a lawyer who seeks a better understanding of OPCA litigants and
concepts.
[654] Several American sources are helpful. The IRS maintains a detailed index of “frivolous
tax arguments”, which, when advanced, result in an automatic rejection and fine. Canadian
variations have emerged in one form or another for almost all of these concepts. American
lawyer Daniel B. Evans maintains “The Tax Protestor FAQ”
(http://evans-legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html), which is a remarkably comprehensive index of
American OPCA concepts and associated jurisprudence, as well as an index of certain known
American OPCA gurus.
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[655] Perhaps unsurprising for what appears to often be an Internet driven phenomenon, the
OPCA community has drawn the critical attention of others online. Anti-scam and skeptic web
forums include persons interested in OPCA concepts and their proponents. The “James Randi
Educational Foundation” (http://forums.randi.org/) and “Quatloos! Cyber Museum of Scams &
Frauds” (http://quatloosia.blogspot.com/) have significant and ongoing discussion of OPCA
concepts and movements, world-wide. Persons in these forums go so far as to actively challenge
and debate OPCA gurus, including Canadian OPCA gurus.
b. The OPCA Litigant
[656] It may be difficult to engage in meaningful discussion with a typical OPCA litigant
outside a court setting given their frequently confrontational character and distorted world
perspectives. Some of the documents from Mr. Meads in the court file illustrate that point.
Nevertheless, a lawyer may find it helpful to inform an opposing OPCA litigant of certain things.
[657] As previously noted, OPCA gurus do not appear to educate their customers on the
concept and implications of court costs awards. Similarly, cases that directly relate to arguments
advanced by an OPCA litigant may be of assistance. These Reasons provides what I hope is a
generally comprehensive review of those. In many instances OPCA gurus have appeared in
court. They have been unsuccessful. That too may assist an OPCA litigant in adopting a more
appropriate litigation approach.
3. Conclusion - Lawyers and OPCA Litigation
[658] Dealing with an OPCA litigant is difficult and frustrating. The fact that they are almost
always self-represented adds to the challenge. What is worse is if a guru is directly involved. I
anticipate most judges will not tolerate representation by these persons (Legal Profession Act, s.
106(1)), particularly if the judge understands the nature of the guru and his activities. The
reported case-law in relation to Lindsay, Dempsey, Lavigne, and Menard confirms that.
[659] Timely and cost-effective resolution of these disputes requires that an action be pared
down to its legitimate substance. That can be achieved by applications to strike irrelevant
submissions and pleadings, and to categorize materials as irrelevant except for the purpose of
costs, vexatious litigation and litigant status, and contempt and criminal sanction.
[660] I have previously commented on the vexatious and abusive character of OPCA concepts.
Litigation of that kind meets both the criteria for punitive damages and elevated cost awards,
including solicitor and own client costs. Lawyers should pursue those awards to minimize harm
to their clients.
[661] The courts are now live to these persons and their schemes. Lawyers should structure
their pre-trial steps and arguments on that basis.
C. ‘Target’ Litigants
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[662] The same considerations that apply to lawyers also are generally relevant to litigants who
are the subject of OPCA schemes and approaches. The place where a litigant can provide further
assistance is in identification and isolation of potential OPCA litigant legal issues. I anticipate
this will prove particularly relevant where an OPCA litigant is involved in a family law context.
D. OPCA Litigants
[663] As I suspect these Reasons will come to the attention of present and potential OPCA
litigants, and other members in the OPCA movements, I wish to make some comments directly
to these readers that I hope will prove of some assistance.
[664] I have attempted to review and explain every OPCA scheme of which this Court has
become aware, and why those concepts are invalid. If you seek to apply an OPCA strategy
described in these Reasons, then I hope you will carefully review the relevant caselaw.
[665] I suggest you familiarize yourself with the concept of court cost awards. This Court has
the authority to make these orders under Rules 10.28-10.33. These are amounts that a court may
require an unsuccessful party pay the other litigants. Court costs have a variety of purposes, but
generally are intended to offset the fiscal effect of a person being forced to appear in court
without a valid legal reason. Rule 10.33 includes important factors that affect costs, as do the
litigants’ duties and responsibilities that are listed in Rule 1.2: Paniccia Estate v. Toal, 2012
ABQB 11, at para. 115; Paniccia Estate v. Toal, 2012 ABQB 367 at para. 38. The ‘default’ scale
of court costs varies with the amount in dispute: Rules, Schedule C.
[666] If you choose to assert a right based on an OPCA concept, strategy, or scheme, then you
may wish to take steps to minimize the potential deleterious effect of failure. Mr. Meads
provides a helpful example of how to avoid further liability in the event his approach is not
successful. He has continued to (generally) follow this Court’s instructions and pay child and
spousal support. Compliance with existing court orders avoids a finding of contempt of court.
That precaution also reduces the possibility and quantum of interest awards that a court will
usually order where a past obligation has not been met, see the Judgment Interest Act, R.S.A.
2000, c. J.-1.
[667] That is particularly important if you choose to challenge an income tax obligation. The
Income Tax Act permits significant late payment penalties in addition to interest due for an
outstanding income tax payment. You may avoid these penalties by paying assessed income tax
amounts. If you are later successful in court in a dispute on the amount of income tax due, you
will then be refunded the excess assessed. If not, you will at a minimum avoid penalty.
[668] Last, I have some questions you may wish to direct to those gurus who provide you
advice:
1. Why do these gurus seem to have little, if any, wealth, when they say they hold
the proverbial keys to untold riches?
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2. Why do those gurus not go to court themselves, if they are so certain of their
knowledge? If they say they have been to court, ask them for the proceeding file
number, and see if their account is accurate. Those are public records.
3. Can that guru identify even one reported court decision where their techniques
proved successful? If not, why then are all successes a tale of an unnamed person,
who knew someone who saw that kind of event occur?
4. How are their ideas different and distinct from those surveyed and rejected in
these Reasons?
5. How are these advisors different from the OPCA gurus who have been
unsuccessful and found themselves in jail? What did Porisky, Warman, and
Lindsay do wrong?
6. Will your advisors promise to indemnify you, when you apply the techniques they
claim are foolproof? If not, why?
7. If they cannot explain these points, then why should you pay them for their legal
nonsense?
E. OPCA Gurus
[669] In his poem Inferno at Cantos 26-30, Dante placed the “evil counsellors” - those who
used their position to advise others to engage in fraud, and “the falsifiers” - alchemists,
counterfeiters, perjurers, and imposters, into the inner canyons of the eighth circle of hell. As
sinners, the evil counsellors and falisifiers were matched by those who induce religious schisms,
and surpassed only in fault by oath-breakers.
[670] Persons who purposefully promote and teach proven ineffective techniques that purport
to defeat valid state and court authority, and circumvent social obligations, appear to fall into
those two categories. That they do so, and for profit at the expense of naive and vulnerable
customers, is worse.
[671] William S. Burroughs in Naked Lunch (New York: Grove Press, 1962, p. 11) wrote:
“Hustlers of the world, there is one Mark you cannot beat: The Mark Inside.” I believe that is
true for you. At some basic level, you understand that you are selling lies, or at the very most
generous, wildly dubious concepts.
[672] It does not matter whether you frame your ‘business’ as a joke, religion, for educational
purposes only, or as not being legal advice; your ‘business’ harms your naive or malicious
customers, their families, and the innocent persons whom your customers abuse as they attempt
to exercise what you have told them are their rights.
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[673] You cannot identify one instance where a court has rolled over and behaved as told. Not
one. Your spells, when cast, fail.
[674] If you believe what you teach is true, then do not encourage others to be the ones to
execute those concepts in the courts. Present your ideas and concepts yourselves. You will get a
fair hearing, and as detailed a response as your ideas warrant. The caselaw cited in these Reasons
make that very clear. Canadian courts will hear you and will consider whether what you claim is
or is not correct.
[675] In that sense, I acknowledge a grudging respect for David Kevin Lindsay, in that he has
personally tested many of his ideas in court. That does not excuse his inciting others to engage in
vexatious, illegal conduct, or his profiting from the same. Nevertheless, he has “walked the
walk”. If you truly believe your ideas are valid, look at how Lindsay has been treated by
Canadian courts and the careful analyses of his ideas. Yes, he has failed, but where he has
approached Canada’s legal system with clarity and respect, he has received the same.
VIII. Application of These Reasons to the Meads v. Meads Litigation
[676] I return to the parties to this litigation.
A. Ms. Meads
1. Case Management
[677] Counsel for Ms. Meads applied to have a case management justice appointed in this case.
That was granted, and I appointed myself in this role.
[678] Case management is appropriate for several reasons. First, Mr. Meads’ materials that Ms.
Meads had attached to her application and which were already filed with the Court have obvious
OPCA characteristics. The February 15 document attempts to foist a fiduciary relationship, and
indicates Mr. Meads believes he has a unilateral authority to control litigation. These are
evidence that he believes he is not subject to this Court’s authority.
[679] Counsel for Ms. Meads did not explain in detail the OPCA strategies she had
encountered, however these were very obvious from Mr. Meads’ submissions at the June 8, 2012
hearing. His conduct in court had problematic aspects.
[680] OPCA litigation, in general, warrants close and direct judicial supervision to both control
the scope of the action and ameliorate the consequences to the target of vexatious OPCA
strategies. Here, the divorce and matrimonial property actions are in an early stage. There is
much yet to be done, absent settlement. Ongoing supervision by a single justice is therefore
appropriate.
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[681] The need for case management is confirmed by Mr. Meads’ failure to adhere to my case
management Conditions and Guidelines by his filing of the June 19 and 21 document sets
contrary to the terms thereof. I will further comment on those documents below.
2. Disclosure by Mr. Meads
[682] On June 8, counsel for Ms. Meads sought disclosure of certain information from Mr.
Meads. The information requested was routine for a divorce and matrimonial property division
proceeding. On June 25, 2012 I granted an order that required Mr. Meads, by August 31, 2012,
provide to Ms. Meads his:
1. T1 General Income Tax Return, including all schedules and attachments, and
Notices of Assessment for the 2010 and 2011 taxation years. (Since then, with the
passage of time, the same would now follow for the 2012 taxation year, by Mr.
Meads providing some voluntarily or further application by Ms. Meads and a
further Court Order);
2. three most recent statements of earnings indicating Mr. Meads’ total earnings
paid in the year to date, including overtime, or where such a statement is not
provided by the Mr. Meads’ employer, a letter from Mr. Meads’ employer setting
out that information, including Mr. Meads’ rate of annual salary or remuneration;
3. copies of the statements from 2008 to present for all RRSPs, pensions, term
deposit certificates, guaranteed investment certificates, stock accounts and other
investments in Mr. Meads’ name or in which Mr. Meads has an interest; and
4. a sworn statement of Mr. Meads’ income, assets and liabilities, which would
include a listing of the quantity and quality of his precious metals and stones
failing which the powers granted to me by the Rules of Court (including contempt of court) may
be exercised on application by Ms. Meads.
[683] The OPCA character of this action is not the basis for this Order, which is a typic order in
a family matter where disclosure has not occurred voluntarily by one or more parties.
3. Ongoing Communication with Mr. Meads
[684] Counsel for the Ms. Meads applied for case management as she could not find an
effective way to deal with Mr. Meads in an efficient and timely manner. My intention is that
these Reasons will directly address that issue. If not, I believe Ms. Mead’s Counsel will now
have a much better foundation to understand Mr. Meads’ activities. Additionally, these Reasons
will provide guidance on how this and other courts have responded to OPCA litigation. That, I
believe, will assist her in taking steps and seeking remedies that may be necessary to lead to the
early and efficient resolution of this litigation.
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B. Mr. Meads
[685] I will now review the litigation steps by Mr. Meads, to this point, and this Court’s
responses. This process will apply my survey of the OPCA phenomenon to the specific events
and materials in this action.
1. Pre-Hearing Activities
[686] A number of documents were filed in this action prior to the June 8 case management
appointment hearing. My instructions in relation to these follow:
a. The February 15, 2011 Document
[687] A very irregular document was filed with the Court on February 15, 2011. It does not
have the usual formalities associated with a proper court document, and instead most closely
resembles a letter, addressed to the “Chief Court Administrator/Clerk Queen’s Bench of
Alberta”.
[688] This document displays an extremely wide range of OPCA indicia, including:
1. OPCA naming motifs: ‘dash colon’ names, the ‘family/clan/house’ format,
duplicate upper-case and lower case related names, copyright in name;
2. irregular formalities: postage stamps without apparent function, a red thumbprint,
an unnecessary notarization;
3. an atypical postal code;
4. the writer claiming to be of ‘flesh and blood’;
5. the author is the Postmaster General”; and
6. the phrases “Notice with the Agent is notice with the Principal” and “Notice with
the Principal is with the notice with Agent”.
[689] Cursory review of this document would lead to the immediate conclusion that this
appears to be OPCA material. In the future, Court procedures may be developed and/or applied
which would immediately respond to such material. For example, I believe this is the kind of
document that may be ‘received’ by a court clerk, but not formally filed, and then diverted for
review by myself as case management justice, to determine its relevance and possible rejection.
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[690] Review of the February 15 document discloses a number of important facts. First, the
document clearly shows that Mr. Meads subscribes to a ‘double/split person’ OPCA concept. He
says that one aspect, the ‘dash colon’ and ‘family’ named entity is the ‘owner/representative’ of
a “legal estate” named “DENNIS LARRY MEADS”. The author adheres to the ‘everything is a
contract’ concept, as is illustrated by a disclaimer that the use of a notary “... does not create an
adhesion contract with the any-state/province ...”. These observations suggest that
communication with this litigant in court will be difficult.
[691] Another interesting detail is that Mr. Meads describes his non-corporeal half as “a
Provincial Registered Event/ESTATE wholly owned by “Her Majesty the Queen in Right of
Canada”. That strongly suggests that Mr. Meads’ view of his other half is a “strawman”,
something shackled to him by the government. He presumably will attempt then to deny
responsibility for that aspect.
[692] The intent of the document appears two fold:
1. it appoints a court clerk “Fiduciary Trustee Liable for the myself and one,
::dennis-larry:: of the meads family::”; and
2. purports to unilaterally adjourn the proceeding:
For, on and in the record, I, ::dennis-larry:: of the meads-family:: as the
Administrator for the Office for the DENNIS LARRY MEADS’S the
ESTATE-Creditor in the instant matter at hand, do here and now Adjourn
this instant matter until further notice, from my office. May Almighty God
Jehovah bless all of ewe through His Living Son and Reigning King, Jesus
the Christ. Amen and Amen.
[693] The attempt to appoint the court clerk is a foisted unilateral agreement, and as I have
explained, has no effect. Similarly, Mr. Meads (flesh and blood) has no authority to unilaterally
adjourn the divorce and matrimonial property division proceeding. Further, the intent of this
document is vexatious. It denies court authority over its own processes, and, contrary to law,
attempts to place an obligation on a court employee. I declare that this document has no legal
meaning or effect.
[694] I further declare that the February 15, 2011 document is of no relevance whatsoever. If I
had received this document after issue of these Reasons I would have ordered that the document
has no legal effect and was irrelevant for all purposes, except for calculation of costs against Mr.
Meads, vexatious status of the litigation and litigant, and/or whether Mr. Meads has engaged in
criminal or contemptuous misconduct.
b. The March 3, 2011 Document
[695] The next relevant document was filed with the Court on March 3, 2011, and is titled
“Good Faith Notice” in the Nature of an Affidavit. For an “affidavit”, it is highly irregular, and
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instead again more closely resembles a letter than anything else. It is addressed to “Audrey
Hardwick/AUDREY HARDWICK BEING A CORPORATE ENTITY”. That is apparently the
assistant to Ms. Meads’ former lawyer.
[696] Again, the OPCA indicia in this document are obvious:
1. OPCA naming motifs: ‘dash colon’ names, the ‘family/clan/house’ format,
duplicate upper-case and lower case related names, copyright in name;
2. irregular formalities: a red thumbprint, an unnecessary notarization;
3. an atypical postal code;
4. the writer claiming to be of ‘flesh and blood’;
5. the phrases “Notice with the Agent is notice with the Principal” and “Notice with
the Principal is with the notice with Agent”.
This is therefore another document that could be the target of specific court procedure as a result
of its OPCA indicia.
[697] The text of the document again indicates that Mr. Meads has adopted ‘everything is a
contract’ and ‘double/split person’ OPCA concepts. Mr. Meads demands that the recipient stop
attempting to enter into contract with him by correspondence. There is an aggressive tone to this
demand, as Mr. Meads says he will “make formal Criminal Charges” and “HOLD YOU AT
YOUR FULL COMMERCIAL LAIBILITY AND YOUR UNLIMITED CIVIL CAPACITY.”
[sic.]. This document also makes reference to and demands the recipient and the law office’s
“commercial bond number”. This language appears in other OPCA documents, but its origin and
meaning is obscure.
[698] This document has no legal meaning for either its recipient or the Court. A contract is not
formed by simply mailing someone a letter or other correspondence, so in this sense Mr. Meads
has nothing to complain about. Further, he has no legal right to use communication of that kind
as a basis for either criminal or civil litigation. The context of this document is unclear. I do not
know, for example, what communication from Ms. Meads’ lawyer may have triggered this
response. If that was a legitimate and typical litigation step, such as a request for disclosure, then
Mr. Meads’ response may be evidence of vexatious conduct.
[699] The threats against Ms. Hardwick and her employer clearly have no basis, and I can infer
from these materials a malicious intent to deter Ms. Meads’ pursuit of this litigation.
[700] As with the February 15 document, I declare the March 3 document is of no relevance
whatsoever.
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c. The April 27, 2012 Documents
[701] On March 29, 2012, Ms. Meads applied for appointment of a case management justice.
Her letter states that Mr. Meads has failed to disclose financial information as required by a
March 2, 2011 Order of Justice Ross. The February 15, 2011 and March 3, 2011 documents are
attached, “ ... to give you an indication of the difficulty in dealing with this particular self-rep.”
[702] A collection of documents filed by Mr. Meads on April 27, 2012 appear to be a response
to that March 29 application. The April 27, 2012 documents are more conventional in
appearance, and, for example, meet many formal requirements for documents filed in court. The
April 27 documents initially related to a May 25, 2012 application, but were instead directed to
the June 8, 2012 hearing. Justice Ouellette made handwritten notations to the cover page of these
materials that state “Fiat: Let the within documents be filed for the purposes of argument before
the A.C.J. Rooke at the case conference.” and that the date of that case conference has yet to be
determined. The manner in which these materials came before Justice Ouellette is not obvious.
[703] There are two affidavits attached, both titled “Affidavit in Support of Order to Show
Cause”, dated April 24, 2012.
[704] In brief, the first states that Ms. Meads’ Counsel, Ms. Reeves “... has failed to make
whole CRYSTAL LYNN MEADS ...”, court clerk Barb Petryk is a fiduciary of Mr. Meads,
which relates to the February 15, 2011 document, and that Ms. Reeves “... has not pursued this
remedy provided in good faith ...”. The remainder of the first affidavit quotes the instructions of
Justice Veit at a March 18 2011 hearing to determine interim support, and then requests a court
order to compel Ms. Reeves’ compliance with the March 18, 2011 instruction.
[705] The second affidavit seems to be a direct response to the March 29 case management
appointment application. Mr. Meads states:
1. he has had no contact with Ms. Reeves, and will not interact with her “... without
the provision in writing of his/her Commercial Bond Number as well as the
Insuring Company that covers that Bond.”;
2. he has not been difficult to deal with;
3. Ms. Reeves has a legal remedy for her client via court clerk Barb Petryk;
4. a refusal to enter into contract:
Michele J. Reeves appears to making an offer to Contract and/or
Enticement of Slavery (Title 18 United States Code and/or Article 4
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights) which I do not grant and give
notice he/she will be held at full Commercial Liability and Unlimited
Civil capacity for such actions.
5. his marriage to Ms. Meads was annulled by her infidelities;
6. various statements about matrimonial property and Ms. Meads’ capacity to work;
7. that Mr. Meads continues his spousal and child support obligations as ordered by
Justice Veit on March 18, 2011; and
8. quotes from email communications from Ms. Meads, that in general relate to the
end of their marriage and difficult personal interactions; these are “disturbing
communications”.
[706] Mr. Meads closes the affidavit with this summary:
SUMMARY: ::Dennis Larry:: being a “Injured-Third-Party-Intervenor” Layman-
Lawful, Power of Attorney, Secured Party Creditor for: DENNIS LARRY
MEADS (ens legis) has provided remedy for Michele J. Reeves (alleged,
PERSONA-AT-LAW PERSONA) and the Court a mean(s) to make whole
CRYSTAL LYNN MEADS the Debtor and Grantor. These assaults appear to be
in bad faith and the emotional abuse, mental cruelty will have to be addressed by
Dennis-Larry: Meads the Secured Party Creditor if continued by Michele J.
Reeves (alleged, PERSONA-AT-LAW PERSONA).
[707] The specific relief sought by Mr. Meads is stated in a “Motion For An Order To Show
Cause” that is directed at Ms. Reeves, personally, as respondent, by “::Dennis Larry:: on behalf
of DENNIS LARRY MEADS”. It names “DENNIS LARRY MEADS (juristic person)” as the
“Movant”, who is “Represented by :: Dennis Larry:: attorney in fact”. Mr. Meads asks for an
order that:
1. Ms. Reeves appear and prove why she “should not be held in contempt for
violation of false claims made under penalty of perjury dated March 29, 2012”;
and
2. Ms. Reeves “... has violated the sanctity of the court ...” by taking “... full
responsibility/liability for CRYSTAL LYNN MEADS the Debtor and Granter”
and not applying the mechanism Mr. Meads has provided to discharge his
obligations: the fiduciary status of court clerk Barb Petryk.
[708] As noted, this document appears much more conventional on its face, but still exhibits
characteristic OPCA features, including ‘dash colon’ names, duplicate names that appear to
relate to a single person, and anomalous postal code formats. Again, these indicia could be a
basis for specific procedural response.
151
[709] As for the document contents, they continue to exhibit the clear ‘double/split person’ and
‘everything is a contract’ concepts that were previously observed in Mr. Meads’ materials. I
believe that what Mr. Meads is trying to convey is that he has told Ms. Reeves that she can pay
for Ms. Meads’ interim child and spousal support by billing court clerk Barb Petryk. That, in
turn, depends on the February 15, 2011 document. Ms. Reeves has failed to do that, and so Mr.
Meads now seeks a court order to enforce his instructions.
[710] Naturally, I refuse to make that order. Ms. Petryk has no obligation that results from the
foisted unilateral agreement of February 15, 2011. Ms. Reeves would be correct to not directly
pursue Ms. Petryk on that basis.
[711] I note that this correspondence illustrates how even a totally ineffective OPCA document
may have downstream toxic effects. Even though the February 15 document had no meaning,
until the issuance of these Reasons, it had not been rejected by the Court or challenged by Ms.
Meads. That is not to say that either Ms. Meads, this Court, or the named clerk erred by ignoring
a totally spurious document, or that they had any obligation to respond. Rather, my observation
is that if Mr. Meads’ February 15, 2011 document had been diverted into a process where it was
evaluated and rejected as having no relevance then, perhaps, Mr. Meads would not have pursued
this avenue. Of course, that is simply conjecture, and only experience will show whether these
kinds of preemptive activities are, in fact, helpful in managing OPCA litigation.
[712] Mr. Meads’ other request, that Ms. Reeves be held in contempt for the March 29, 2012
correspondence, is also rejected. If the “false claims” of which Mr. Meads speaks are the
allegation of breach of court order and that Mr. Meads was difficult to deal with, then the latter
fact was established by Mr. Meads’ conduct at the June 8, 2012 hearing. At that hearing he also
acknowledged he had not previously made financial disclosure.
[713] Mr. Meads’ April 27, 2012 documents and the associated application have a vexatious
aspect as they depend on a fictitious obligation from a foisted unilateral agreement. I could, in
compliance with the general principle that Mr. Meads should not be permitted to advance
spurious vexatious OPCA arguments and inflict unwarranted expense on his opposing litigant,
now invite Ms. Reeves to indicate the solicitor and own client costs associated with her response
to Mr. Meads’ April 27, 2012 documents. I note, however, that aspects of these materials also
reflect what I think are potentially valid aspects of matrimonial property division issues, and
child and spousal support. Those topics also emerged at the June 8, 2012 hearing. I therefore
leave the issue of costs open for future application.
2. The June 8, 2012 Hearing
152
[714] I have previously commented in some detail on what occurred at the June 8, 2012 case
management application, and will therefore only make certain comments in summary. Mr.
Meads’ conduct included indica that are typical of an OPCA litigant. For example, he:
1. denied court authority on several bases, including that it was an Admiralty law
court;
2. said legislation has no hold over or relevance to him;
3. said he was subject to a different law, “God’s Law”, the “Maximus of Law”;
4. cited the UCC, Black’s Law Dictionary and the Bible as overriding authorities;
5. invoked ‘double/split person’ concepts: he as the “flesh and blood man”
represented his “corporate identity”; and
6. exhibited an apprehension that his cooperation with myself and Ms. Reeves
would lead to a contract (or “slavery”).
[715] Mr. Meads, in his submissions, applied a ‘reverse onus’. This is typical for OPCA
litigants. He demanded that I prove the relevance and application of law to him. If I did not do
that, then he would not obey.
[716] As for the substance of the hearing, certain topics emerged which appeared to be
potentially relevant in the ongoing divorce and matrimonial property actions. Other arguments
were simply OPCA irrelevancies. A new development was that Mr. Meads explained the
theoretical basis for an A4V money for nothing mechanism to pay his obligations. Obviously, I
had no reason to entertain that application or what were allegedly its supporting documents. I
note that Mr. Meads directed these materials to me, personally.
[717] The manner in which Mr. Meads introduced the A4V issue illustrates a problem with
OPCA litigants. They have a tendency to ‘ambush’ the court and other litigants with documents
in the middle of court proceedings. That, of course, interferes with the orderly progression and
management of legal disputes. I do not suggest that there is a uniformly appropriate response to
materials presented in this manner. I chose to refuse those materials, as was then my practice. A
potentially valid alternative may be to provisionally accept those documents for review, then
indicate to the OPCA litigant whether the documents are:
1. accepted,
2. rejected as irrelevant, or
3. accepted but found to be irrelevant for all purposes, except for calculation of
costs, the vexatious status of the litigation and litigant, and/or whether the OPCA
litigant has engaged in criminal or contemptuous misconduct.
153
[718] Another alternative would be to refuse to accept materials that are not formally filed with
notice to the other litigants. This, certainly, is a safe response to material of uncertain character
and significance. I believe standard practices for this kind of commonplace OPCA activity will
evolve.
[719] As these Reasons indicate, an A4V ‘money for nothing’ scheme is entirely and absurdly
spurious. To attempt to discharge an obligation with those kinds of materials is a vexatious step.
I did not accept what may have been A4V documents, nor were those filed. If there had been a
formal application by Mr. Meads to discharge his obligation in that manner, and Ms. Meads was
forced to respond to that, then a cost award would be warranted to indemnify Ms. Meads. I do
not think Ms. Meads was injured, in this instance, by Mr. Meads raising the A4V concept at the
case management appointment hearing.
[720] As previously explained, I concluded this dispute was one that deserves case
management, and that was ordered. Mr. Meads did not oppose that.
3. The June 19 and June 21, 2012 Documents
[721] I have already commented in some detail on the materials that I received by mail on June
19 and 21, 2012. These were personally directed to me, with copies to Court of Appeal Chief
Justice Fraser, the Alberta Public Trustee Cindy Bentz, and Ms. Reeves. The OPCA character of
these materials is immediately apparent. For example, the cover letter exhibits multiple OPCA
name indicia, Mr. Meads names himself in two related ways, and the letter is signed twice in
different colours and formats.
[722] Mr. Meads names me his fiduciary and demands that I discharge my duties by
implementing his A4V scheme, paying his child and spousal support obligations via that
mechanism, and “Divorce-Papers signed as the CRYSTAL LYNNE MEADS”.
[723] He also requests:
Debtor, being the CRYSTAL LYNNE MEADS and Michele J. Reeves DBA
contact via the any media with the living flesh and blood sentient - man, ::Dennis-
Larry:Meads:: and/or the DENNIS LARRY MEADS (juristic person) and whenthere
is the claim for a breach face the penalties as-is prescribed in the attacheddocuments.
I believe this cryptic passage is probably a demand that I enforce his ‘fee schedule’ against his
wife and her lawyer.
[724] As a whole, the cover latter to the June 19 and 21 documents is a foisted unilateral
agreement targeted against myself. It has no legal effect, but does further indicate that Mr.
Meads has adopted an improper and vexatious litigation strategy. I rejected receipt of this letter
and its associated materials. If I had accepted this document then it would be evidence of the
improper character of Mr. Meads’ litigation strategy.
154
[725] The attached documents have four strategic purposes:
1. to formalize the relationship between the two aspects of Mr. Meads, DENNIS
LARRY MEADS and Dennis-Larry: Meads;
2. implementation of an A4V scheme;
3. a ‘fee schedule’;
4. the copyright and trademark foisted unilateral declaration.
[726] I have previously described these items in some detail, and others are reproduced along
with the Reasons. The OPCA indicia in these items are plentiful, all contain the ‘dash colon’
name motifs, duplicate related names with stereotypic labels such as “a legal entity” vs. “a
personam sojourn and people of posterity”, and variant postal codes. Spurious application of the
UCC and other foreign and irrelevant law is frequent. Most use the “notice to the principal is
notice to the agent” and “notice to the agent is notice to the principal” phrases.
[727] In brief, the agreements between Mr. Meads and Mr. Meads are a monologue without
any legal relevance. The A4V scheme does not provide me with access to any funds that I could
then distribute on Mr. Meads’ behalf and for his benefit. The fee schedule cannot be legally
enforced, and an attempt to enforce it would be an illegal and potentially criminal act. Similarly,
Mr. Meads has no basis in law to demand $100 million per use of his name.
[728] The attached documents have no legal effect and since they were rejected by myself, are
irrelevant to the ongoing litigation. If these had instead been placed on the court file, then I
believe it would be appropriate that either I order they are irrelevant to the litigation, or only
relevant for calculation of costs, the vexatious status of the litigation and Mr. Meads, and/or
whether Mr. Meads has engaged in criminal or contemptuous misconduct.
[729] When I returned the June 19 and 21 materials, my letter informed Mr. Meads that the
Conditions and Guidelines did not permit submission of materials of this kind. I instructed him
that no further material of this kind should be submitted to the Court, noting that further actions
of this kind would be met with a formal court order to desist, and failure to comply may be
punished as contempt of court. Indeed further OPCA conduct has the potential of inviting a
vexatious litigant application under the Judicature Act, by Ms. Meads, or by the Court on its own
application.
4. Conclusion
[730] Shortly prior to his exit from the courtroom on June 8, 2012, Mr. Meads told me he had
much to think about. He certainly does. While these Reasons cast a wide net, its mesh also falls
squarely on him. I hope that he will carefully review its contents and consider his next step.
155
[731] To repeat myself, the OPCA arguments he has advanced have no effect or meaning in
Canadian law. They offer him no rights, no indemnities, and certainly not a pot of gold or silver
to call his own.
[732] I did not accept his envelope of documents on June 8, and the subsequent materials
received on June 19 and 21. I hope he now recognizes the potential consequences that he risks if
he repeats that kind of exercise, as next time I will accept those materials, but only as proof of
his continued potentially vexatious litigation, contempt of court, and, potentially, criminal
misconduct. I have made every effort in these Reasons to lay out the general categories of OPCA
concepts that have been evaluated and rejected by Canadian courts. I hope that will help him to
better understand Canadian law, and respond to the questions he says remain unanswered.
[733] From the structure of the OPCA community and the nature of his materials, I believe one
or more persons are advising Mr. Meads. I hope he will show them these Reasons, and scrutinize
their response. I believe Mr. Meads has the ability to meaningfully evaluate their reply. Mr.
Meads may also benefit from speaking to and indeed retaining legal counsel.
[734] I would also suggest that Mr. Meads read Canadian caselaw. The majority of cases that
are cited in these Reasons may be retrieved at no cost at the Canadian Legal Information
Institute website: “http://www.canlii.org”. Earlier jurisprudence and other legal texts are
available at court law libraries that are open to the public.
[735] Unlike many OPCA community members, in court Mr. Meads was generally polite to me
and Ms. Meads’ counsel. He usually respectfully waited to speak, and while his answers to me
were not always satisfactory, he nevertheless conducted himself in a generally proper manner. I
did not appreciate his demands, or his claims that my conduct was unsatisfactory, but I have an
understanding of the context in which those statements occurred. I trust that will not recur. His
premature exit from the proceedings was not appropriate, however I understand the
misconceptions that may have led him to act in that manner. I suggest he remain throughout any
future hearing, as his absence will not assist him.
[736] In our discussions on June 8 he raised several issues in relation to matrimonial property
division, spousal support, and child support that I believe are potentially valid. I look forward to
assisting him and Ms. Meads to settle or, if necessary, take those issues to trial in a cost and time
effective manner. While I am not his “Fiduciary-Trustee-Liable Position with the highest and
with the greatest-level for the care”, I am the Case Management Justice on this matter, and I
intend to see that both his and Ms. Meads’ legal rights are protected and explored in the
resolution of this dispute.
Heard on the 8th day of June, 2012.
Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 18th day of September, 2012.
156
J.D. Rooke
A.C.J.C.Q.B.A.
Appearances:
Michele J. Reeves
Attia Reeves Tensfeldt Snow
for the Applicant
Dennis Larry Meads
self-represented
157
Appendix “A” - Meads’ Fee Schedule
[Note - the format and content of this document has been reproduced, as best possible, in an
accurate manner. Certain personal information has been redacted for privacy reasons.]
Registered Private Tracking Number - LT 679 966 085 CA
UCC-1 Filed in ALBERTA - Secured Transaction Registry Number- 11120912227
ATTENTION AND WARNING!
THIS IS A LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND
FIAT JUSTITIA, RUAT COELUM
(Let right be done, though the heavens should fall)
To: All Provincial, State, Federal and International Public Officials, by and through
Province of Alberta, Lieutenant Governor, Donald S. Ethell and/or
Governor General, David Lloyd Johnston
TAKE NOTICE IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE
THIS IS A CONTRACT IN ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Take a moment to read this before you proceed any further.
I do not wish to speak to you under any circumstances excluding federal judicial review
THIS TITLE IS FOR YOUR PROTECTION!
(1) I, one Dennis-Larry: Meads [free man], the undersigned, herein request that you present anything that you say to me
in writing, signed under penalty of perjury as required by your law as shown in this instrument. Notice to Agent is
Notice to Principal. Notice to Principal is Notice to Agent. Attachments are included and are part of this contract.
(2) This Notice is in the nature of a Miranda Warning. Take due heed of its contents. If, for any reason, you do not
understand any of these statements or warnings, it is incumbent upon you to summon a superior officer, special
prosecutor, federal judge, or other competent legal counsel to immediately explain to you the significance of this
presentment as per your duties and obligations in respect to this private, formal, notarized, registered Statute Staple
Securities Instrument. As per provisions under, NAFTA, UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL Convention, Title 11 USC 501(a),
502(a), 11 USC 7001, 7013, and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Sections 8-A, AND 13-A, the claim or presumption
that I, Dennis-Larry: Meads, am a Debtor to Canada or any of its provinces, agencies or sub-corporations is forever
rebutted by this contract. This rebuttal is a counterclaim in Admiralty.
(3) Your Failure to timely do so leaves you in the position of accepting full responsibility for any and all liabilities for
monetary damages, as indicated herein, that I incur by any adversely affecting injuries caused by your overt or covert
actions, or the actions of any of your fellow public officers and agents in this or any other relevant matters as described
herein. You have thirty (30) days, from the date that this document is received by the Clerk of the Public Record, to
respond and rebut the presumptions of this contract by submitting to me signed, certified, authenticated documents of
the laws that rebut these presumptions point by point. On and For the Record under penalties of the law including
158
perjury. This document will be on file in the public record; and the clerk in charge of the public record is charged to
distribute this to any and all responsible parties, i.e., officers of the court, and /or law enforcement officers including
local, state, federal, international, multi- jurisdictional, or any and all officers, representatives, contractors, agencies, or
any such entity or person that may bring any type of action, whether civil or criminal or other, against me, and whether
in this county, state, region, area, country, corporation, federal zone, or in any venue and/or jurisdiction. Your failure to
timely rebut the statements and warnings herein constitute your complete, tacit agreement with all statements and
warnings contained herein. Your presumptions that I, the undersigned, am a "Corporate Fiction" or "Legal Entity" and
under your corporate "CANADA" jurisdiction are now and forever rebutted.
(4) I, the undersigned, tendering this document, am a Private People of Posterity; a Sovereign Personam Sojourn; by fact; a
non-juristic entity, not as legal personality in fiction, or surety within; or subject for; or allegiance to; your corporate
"CANADA"; or to any de facto, compact, corporate, commercial provinces, states, contracting therein; only to the
"canada," nonetheless carrying with me exclusive, original, sovereign jurisdiction and venue having one supreme court
and CANADA Court of International Trade. This is a matter of public record, tendered by way of registered mail to
Governor General of Canada David Lloyd Johnston and/or Lieutenant Governor of Alberta Donald s. Ethell.
These pages are recorded upon liber records and books in Register of Deeds Offices including but not limited to
Provincial Court of Stony Plain and Queens Court of Alberta.
(5) I, the undersigned, now tendering this legally binding Legal Notice and Demand in hand am not a surety under your
jurisdiction nor a subject under your corporate veil "Color of Law Venue," being acknowledged by silence and
acquiescence of, Governor General of Canada David Lloyd Johnston and/or Lieutenant Governor of Alberta
Donald s. Ethell, also but not limited to any public officers, agents, contractors, assigns, employees, and subsidiaries of
your office, regarding my Legal Notice and Demand tendered by registered mail with liber book number and page
affixed.
(6) Which silence of Corporate Office Governor General of Canada David Lloyd Johnston and/or Lieutenant Governor
of Alberta Donald s. Ethell ratifies severances of any nexus or relationship to de facto, corporate, commercial state
offices; being fraudulent conveyance by operating under " Color of Authority" upon affiant. Let this be known by the
“Good Faith (Oxford) Doctrine" to all men and women. I do not consent to any warrantless searches, or searches
that are not compliant with the "Constitution of Canada" and /or all of the amendments of the Honorable "Canadian Bill
of Rights," whether of my dwellings, cars, land craft, watercraft, aircraft, me, mine, current location, property, hotel
rooms, apartments, business records, businesses, or my machinery, vehicles, equipment, supplies, buildings, grounds,
land in my private possession or control, past, present, and future, now and forevermore, so help you God.
(7) By this record let it be known that I do not at any time waive any rights or protections, as acknowledged by the
aforementioned Constitution of Canada and/or Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights," nonetheless, demanding that you
protect these as you swore an oath to do so. I accept your lawfully required Oath of Office, bonds of any type, insurance
policies, and property of any type for my protection and making whole. Furthermore, should you witness any public
officers at this time, or any time past, present, or future violate any of my rights or protections, it is your sworn duty (of
oath) to immediately arrest, or have them arrested. You are legally required to charge them as you should any law
breaker, regardless of officer's title, rank, uniform, cloak, badge, position, stature, or office; or you shall henceforth be
accountable for monetary damages from, but not limited to, your monetary liability, your corporate bond, compensatory
costs, punitive procurements, and sanctioned by attorney attributions.
(8) Note: A true and correct, notarized copy of this Statute Staple Securities Instrument is safely deposited in the
Register of Deeds Office in Province of ALBERTA. This security instrument has also been delivered to several
trusted friends and accompanied by sworn affidavits certifying my policy of presenting this security instrument to each
and every public officer who approaches me violating my unalienable rights including, but not limited to, my right of
liberty and free movement upon any common pathway of travel. I have a lawful right to travel, by whatever means, via
land, sea, or air, without any officer, agent, employee, attorney, or judge willfully causing adverse affects or damages
upon me by an arrest, detainment, restraint, or deprivation. I will be granted the status and treatment of a foreign
Sovereign, a foreign diplomat, by all customs officials. This document or the deposited copy becomes an evidentiary
document certified herein, as if now fully reproduced, should any court action be taken upon me as caused by your acts
under color of law with you, your officers, and employees. Take note: You are now monetarily liable in your personal
and corporate capacity. I, Dennis-Larry: Meads [Free man], the undersigned, a Sovereign under God, notwithstanding
anything contrary, abide by all laws in accordance with the aforementioned Constitution of Canada and Honorable
159
"Canadian Bill of Rights" which are applicable to Sovereigns. I, Dennis-Larry: Meads, wish no harm to any man. You
agree by your non-response to uphold my "Right to Travel"; or you must rebut my presumption by lawfully documented
evidence in law On and For theRecord, Under Oath and penalty of perjury, within the thirty (30) days as aforementioned
in this Admiralty Contract.
(9) BE WARNED, NOTICED, AND ADVISED that I rely upon, in addition to constitutional limits of the "Constitution of
Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights," governmental authority, the rights and protections guaranteed
under Uniform Commercial Codes, common equity law, laws of admiralty, and commercial liens and levies pursuant to
but not limited, to Title 42 (Civil Rights), Title 18 U.S.C.A. (Criminal Codes), Title 28 U.S.C.A. (Civil Codes), and
additional ALBERTA constitution penal codes, in as much as they are in compliance with the aforementioned
Constitution of Canada and/or "Canadian Bill of Rights." There can be no violation of any of these laws unless there
is a victim consisting of a natural, flesh and blood man or woman who has been damaged. When there is no victim,
there is no crime or law broken. Unless this is rebutted within the time limit contained herein, and the conditions of
the rebuttal are met, you, or any representative in any capacity of any agency, government, corporation, or the like,
agree to abide by this contract anytime that you interact with me. I, Dennis-Larry: Meads [Free man], the undersigned,
am of lawful majority
age, clear head, and sound mind.
(10) Remember, you took a solemn binding oath to protect and defend the Crown as public trustee, and violation of said oath
is perjury, being a bad-faith doctrine by constructive treason and immoral dishonor, infra, ¶13, ¶14 & ¶15. I accept said
Oath of Office that you have sworn to uphold. I declare that any and all presumptions that I am citizen, subject,
resident, participant, legal entity, strawman, fiction, or any such thing, of any and all jurisdictions of the CANADA OR
ANY OF ITS PROVINCES, SUBDIVISIONS, AGENCIES, ENTITIES, DEPARTMENTS, SUBSIDIARIES are now and
forever rebutted. You may rebut my presumptions by submitting certified copies of lawful documents that have been
certified by ALBERTA's attorney while under oath and on the official record and under penalty of perjury and waiving
all immunities from prosecution. You have thirty (30) days to rebut my statements as indicated herein; or my
statements will stand as true, lawful, and legal in all of your courts and/or hearings.
(11) This legal and timely notice, declaration, and demand is prima facie evidence of sufficient Notice of Grace. The terms
and conditions of this presentment agreement are a quasi-contract under the Uniform Commercial Code and Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act. These terms and conditions are not subject to any or all immunities that you may claim, should
you in any way violate my rights or allow violations by others. Your corporate commercial acts against me or mine and
your failures to act on behalf of me or mine are ultra vires and injurious by willful and gross negligence.
(12) The liability is upon you, and/or your respondeat superior, and upon others including any and all local, provincial, state,
regional, federal, multijurisdictional, international, and/or corporate agencies, and/or persons of the foregoing, involved
directly or indirectly with you via any nexus acting with you; and said liability shall be satisfied jointly and/or severally at
my discretion. You are sworn to your Oath of Office, and I accept your Oath of Office and your responsibility to uphold
the rights of me and mine at all times.
BILLING COSTS ASSESSED WITH LEVIES AND LIENS UPON VIOLATIONS SHALL BE:
(13) Unlawful Arrest, Illegal Arrest, or Restraint, or Distraint, Trespassing/Trespass, without a lawful, correct, and
complete 4th amendment warrant: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
Excessive Bail, Fraudulent Bond, Cruel and Unusual Punishment, Violation of Right to Speedy Trial, Freedom of
Speech, Conspiracy, Aiding and Abetting, Racketeering, or Abuse of Authority as per Title 18 U.S.C.A., §241 and
§242, or definitions contained herein: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
Assault or Assault and Battery without Weapon: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per
officer, or agent involved.
Assault or Assault and Battery with Weapon: $3,000,000.00 (Three Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer,
or agent involved.
Unfounded Accusations by Officers of the Court, or Unlawful Determination: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD
Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
160
(14) Denial and/or Abuse of Due Process: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
Obstruction of Justice: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Unlawful Distraint, Unlawful Detainer, or False Imprisonment: $5,000,000.00 (Five Million) CAD Dollars, per day,
per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved, plus 18% annual interest.
Reckless Endangerment, Failure to Identify and/or Present Credentials and/or Failure to Charge within 48 (Forty-
Eight) Hours after being detained: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent
involved.
Counterfeiting Statute Staple Securities Instruments: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per
officer, or agent involved.
(15) Unlawful Detention or Incarceration: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars per day, per occurrence, per officer, or
agent involved.
Incarceration for Civil or Criminal Contempt of Court without lawful, documented-in-law, and valid reason:
$2,000,000.00 (Two Million) per day, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Disrespect by a Judge or Officer of the Court: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CDA Dollars per occurrence, per officer,
or agent involved.
Threat, Coercion, Deception, or Attempted Deception by any Officer of the Court: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million)
CAD Dollars per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Unnecessary Restraint: $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, per officer, or agent involved.
Refusal of Lawful Bailment as provided by the aforementioned Constitution of Canada and/or Honorable
"Canadian Bill of Rights": $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) CAD Dollars, per day of confinement, to be prorated by the
hour as per Traficant vs. Florida, per occurrence, per officer, per agent involved.
Coercion or Attempted Coercion of the Natural Man or Woman to take responsibility for the Corporate Strawman
against the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party's Will: $2,000,000.00 Two Million CAD Dollars, per occurrence,
per officer or agent involved.
The Placing of an Unlawful or Improper Lien, Levy, Impoundments, or Garnishment against any funds, bank
accounts, savings accounts, retirement funds, investment funds, social security funds, intellectual property, or
any other property belonging to the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party by any agency: $2,000,000.00 (Two
Million) CAD Dollars, per occurrence, and $100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand) CAD Dollars, per day penalty until
liens, levies, impoundments, and/or garnishments are ended and all funds reimbursed, and all property returned in the
same condition as it was when taken, with 18 % annual interest upon the Secured Party's declared value of property.
Destruction, Deprivation, Concealment, Defacing, Alteration, or Theft, of Property, including buildings, structures,
equipment, furniture, fixtures, and supplies belonging to the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party will incur a penalty of
total, new replacement costs of property as indicated by Owner and Secured Party, including but not limited to purchase
price and labor costs for locating, purchasing, packaging, shipping, handling, transportation, delivery, set up, assembly,
installation, tips and fees, permits, replacement of computer information and data, computer hardware and software,
computer supplies, office equipment and supplies, or any other legitimate fees and costs associated with total
replacement of new items of the same type, like, kind, and/or quality, and quantity as affected items. The list and
description of affected property will be provided by the Owner and Secured Party and will be accepted as complete,
accurate, and uncontestable by the agency or representative thereof that caused such action. In addition to the
aforementioned cost, there will be a $200,000.00 (Two Hundred Thousand) CAD Dollars, per day penalty until property
is restored in full, beginning on the first day after the incident, as provided by this contract.
CAVEAT
(16) The aforementioned charges are billing costs deriving from, but not limited to, Uniform Commercial Codes and Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act and this contract. These charges shall be assessed against persons, governmental bodies, and
corporate entities supra, or any combination thereof when they individually and/or collectively violate my natural and/or
civil rights as an American by declaration. The aforementioned Constitution of Canada and/or the Honorable "Canadian
Bill of Rights" establishes jurisdiction for you in your normal course of business. All violations against me, the
undersigned, will be assessed per occurrence, per officer, representative, or agent of any agency that is involved in any
unlawful action against me.
161
(17) By your actions, you shall lack recourse for all claims of immunity in any forum. Your officers' knowing consent and
admission of perpetrating known acts by your continued enterprise is a violation of my rights. This Statute Staple
Securities Instrument exhausts all state maritime article 1 administrative jurisdictions and protects my Article III court
remedies including but not limited to Title 42 U.S.C.A, Title 18 U.S.C.A., Title 28 U.S.C.A., and Title 18 U.S.C.,§ 242,
which are provided for by the North American Free Trade Agreement, UNIDROIT and the UNCITRAL Convention, of
which CANADA is governed by.
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW IS NO EXCUSE!
(18) I, one Dennis-Larry: Meads [Free man], the undersigned, am the principal; and you are the agent! Fail not to adhere
to your oath, lest you be called to answer before one God and one Supreme Court Exclusive Original Jurisdiction, which
is the court of first and last resort, not excluding my "Good Faith (Oxford) Doctrine" by my conclusive Honorable
"Canadian Bill of Rights."
(19) This Statute Staple Securities Instrument is not set forth to threaten, delay, hinder, harass, or obstruct, but to protect
guaranteed Rights and Protections assuring that at no time my Unalienable Rights are ever waived or taken from me
against my will by threats, duress, coercion, fraud, or without my express written consent of waiver. None of the
statements contained herein intend to threaten or cause any type of physical or other harm to anyone. The statements
contained herein are to notice any persons, whether real or corporate, of their potential, personal, civil, and criminal
liability if and when they violate my unalienable rights. A bona fide duplicate of this paperwork is safely archived with
those who testify under oath that it is my standard policy to ALWAYS present this notice to any public or private officer
attempting to violate me and my rights. It is noted on the record that by implication of said presentment, this notice has
been tendered by way of registered mail to Governor General of Canada David LIoyd Johnston and/or Lieutenant
Governor of Alberta Donald s. Ethell. This is prima facie evidence of your receipt and acceptance of this presentment
in both your corporate and individual capacity, jointly and severally for each and all governmental, political, and corporate
bodies. Any other individuals who have been, are, or hereafter become involved in the instant actions or any future
actions against me shall only correspond to me in writing while signing under penally of perjury. This document is now
on record in the Register of Deeds Office in ALBERTA, supra.
SUMMATION
(20) Should you move against me in defiance of this presentment, there is no immunity. from prosecution available to you or
to any of your fellow public officers, officials of government, judges, magistrates, district attorneys, clerks, or any other
persons who become involved in the instant actions, or any future actions, against me by way of aiding and abetting.
Take due heed and govern yourself accordingly. Any or all documents tendered to me, lacking bona fide ink signatures
are counterfeit security instruments causing you to be liable in your corporate and individual capacity by fraudulent
conveyance now and forevermore. If and when you cause any injury and/or damages to the Natural Man or Woman
Secured Party by violating any of the rights, civil rights, privileges, or any terms herein, you agree to voluntarily, with no
reservation of rights and defenses, at the written request of the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party, surrender,
including but not limited to, any and all bonds, public and/or corporate insurance policies, and CAFR funds as needed to
satisfy any and all claims as filed against you by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. This applies to any and all
agents, or representatives, individually and severally, of the "CANADA" or any of the subdivisions thereof, as described
herein.
NOTICE TO AGENT IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL AND
NOTICE TO PRINCIPAL IS NOTICE TO AGENT
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(21) This document cannot be retracted by any employee, agent, representative, or officer of the court, or any individuals,
excluding the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party on this registered document, for one hundred years from date on
this legally binding Statute Staple Securities Instrument.
Attention: All Agents, Representatives, or Officers, or such as, of the "CANADA" or its subdivisions including local,
state, federal, and/or international or multinational governments, corporations, agencies, and the like: You have thirty
(30) days to rebut any portion of this document, or you stand in total agreement. Non response is agreement. Partial
response is agreement. Rebuttal must be in written form with legal/lawful, verified, certified documentation in law, with
copies of said law enclosed. This documentation must be provided under penalty of perjury. Notice to Agent is Notice
to Principal. Notice to Principal is Notice to Agent. Ignorance of the law is no excuse.
(22) All other corporations including but not limited to telephone companies, cable companies, utility companies, contractors,
builders, maintenance personnel, investors, journeymen, inspectors, law enforcement officers, officers of the court,
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and all others, including all persons, are bound by all paragraphs, terms, and
conditions herein regardless of nature of limited liability corporations or affiliations as "DBA's," "AKA's," incorporations, or
any types of businesses in commerce as deeded by this securities agreement and decree.
(23) YOU ARE NOTICED having been given knowledge of the law and your personal financial liability in event of any
violations of my rights and/or being. This Statute Staple Securities Instrument now in your hand constitutes timely and
sufficient warning by good faith, notice, and grace.
(24) Dated this 22 day of December, in the year of our Lord, two thousand eleven. This contract being of honor is
presented under the "Good Faith (Oxford) Doctrine." I accept the Oath of Office of all officers of the court, including
but not limited to the clerk of the court; all judges and attorneys from all jurisdictions; all local, state, federal, international
law enforcement officers, and all agents of the "CANADA" or any province or subdivisions thereof.
(25) Any agent, law enforcement officer, employee, contractor, representative, or the like "CANADA" or any of its subsidiaries
or sub-corporations, SHALL NOT ENTER, AT ANY TIME, FOR ANY REASON, ANY PROPERTY AT WHICH I AM
LOCATED, or LEASE, OWN, or CONTROL, WITHOUT MY EXPRESS WRITTEN PERMISSION. Violation of this notice
will be considered criminal trespass and will be subject to a $2,000,000.00 (Two Million) lawful CAD dollar penalty plus
damages, per violation, per violator.
(26) Attention: Any and all lending institutions, brokerage firms, credit unions, depository institutions, insurance agencies,
credit bureaus, and the officers, agents and employees therein: You have now been notified of the law as to your
corporate and individual financial liability in the event of any violations upon the rights and/or being of Dennis-Larry:
Meads. This Statute Staple Securities Instrument constitutes timely and sufficient warning by Good Faith Notice of
your liability regardless of your political affirmations. All penalties contained herein will be subject to a penalty increase
of one million dollars per day, plus interest, while there is any unpaid balance for the first thirty (30) days after default of
payment. This penalty will increase by 10% per each day until balance is paid in full, plus 18% annual interest,
beginning on the thirty- first (31 ) day after default of payment. All penalties in this document are st assessed in lawful
money and are to be paid in one troy ounce CAD Dollars or equivalent in .999 fine silver or fine gold determined by
the value established ROYAL CANADIAN MINT, or by law, whichever is higher value at the time of the incident. Any
dispute over the par value will be decided by the Secured Party, or his designee. All definitions in Attachment "B" are
included as a part of this contract and will be applied as written herein. Any dispute of any definition will be decided by
the Secured Party. There is no contradiction of terms as written within the confines of this title pursuant to the
"Constitution of Canada." If any contradiction is found, the meaning will be determined by the Secured Party.
Definitions as they apply to this contract·are enclosed in Attachment "B" and are included as a legal part of this contract.
163
LS: ____”Dennis-Larry: Meads”___________
_______________________________________
Dennis-Larry: Meads, Secured Party Creditor
Name: Dennis-Larry: Meads, Secured Party Creditor
Country: "CANADA"
Province: Alberta
164
NOTICE TO YOURFILINGCOUNTY COUNTY REGISTER OF DEEDS CLERK
(27) Pursuant to the harmonization of this private contract to uniform law, Whoever, having the custody of any such record,
proceeding, map, book, document, paper, or other thing, willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates,
obliterates, falsifies, or destroys the same, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years; or both;
and shall forfeit his office and shall be disqualified from holding any office under the CANADA, Canada, canada. After
thirty (30) calendar days, you may not rebut this contract.
(28) SUBSCRIBED AND AFFIRMED: On this 22 day of December, 2011 AD, before me appeared Dennis-Larry:
Meads, known to me or proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the man whose name is subscribed on
this Statute Staple Securities Instrument. Witnessed by my hand and official stamp, signed, sealed, and delivered by
hand or by private, registered, or certified mail, drafted by the above Secured Party Creditor with attached property
description.
NS:____________________________
Signature of Notary Public
Theodore G. Kaklin
Barrister & Solicitor
We, the undersigned witnesses, do hereby swear or affirm that it is the policy of Dennis-Larry: Meads to present this “LEGAL
NOTICE AND DEMAND" to all law enforcement officers, agents, or representatives of "CANADA" anytime that he has any
interaction with them.
LS: __N/A______________________
First Witness
LS:___N/A______________________
Second Witness NOTARY SEAL
LS:___N/A______________________
Third Witness
Attachments: Attachment "A" - Property List
Attachment "B" - Definitions
165
LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND - ATTACHMENT "A" - PROPERTY LIST
ATTACHMENT "A" - PROPERTY LIST
ALL PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE DEBTOR BELONGS TO THE SECURED PARTY. DEBTOR IS A TRANSMITTING UTILITY. DEBTOR IS A
TRUST. ALL OF THE FOLLOWING PROPERTY BELONGS TO THE NATURAL MAN SECURED PARTY AS INDICATED HEREIN. THIS INCLUDES
BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING:
1. All proceeds from Secured Party's labor from every source; from products, accounts, fixtures, crops, mine head, wellhead,
and transmitting utilities, etc.;
2. All rents, wages, and income from every source;
3. All land in which Debtor has an interest, including the soil itself; all minerals atop or beneath the soil surface; all air rights;
all waters on or in the soil or land surface such as a lake or pond, within the land boundaries;
4. All real property and all documents involving all real property in which Debtor has an interest, including all buildings,
structures, fixtures, and appurtenances situated on or affixed thereto, as noted in #3 above;
5. All cottages, cabins, houses, mansions, and buildings of whatever type and wherever located;
6. All bank accounts foreign and domestic, bank "safety” deposit boxes and the contents therein; personal security codes,
passwords, and the like associated therewith; credit card accounts, mutual fund accounts, certificates of deposit accounts,
checking accounts, savings accounts, retirement plan accounts, stocks, bonds, securities, and benefits from trusts;
7. All inventory from any source;
8. All machinery, either farm or industrial; all mechanical tools, construction, tools, tools of trade;
9. All boats, yachts, and watercraft; and all equipment, accoutrements, baggage, and cargo affixed or pertaining thereto or
stowed therein, inter alia: all motors, engines, ancillary equipment, accessories, parts, tools, instruments, electronic
equipment, navigation aids, service equipment, lubricants, fuels, and fuel additives;
10. All aircraft, gliders, balloons, and all equipment, accoutrements, baggage, and cargo affixed or pertaining thereto or stowed
therein, inter alia: all motors, engines, ancillary equipment, accessories, parts, tools, instruments, electronic equipment,
navigation aids, service equipment, lubricants, fuels, and fuel additives;
11. All motor homes, trailers, mobile homes, recreational vehicles, houses, cargo, and travel trailers; and all equipment,
accoutrements, baggage, and cargo affixed or pertaining thereto or stowed therein, inter alia: all ancillary equipment,
accessories, parts, service equipment, lubricants, fuels, and fuel additives;
12. All animals and all farm livestock; and all things required for the care, feeding, use, transportation, and husbandry thereof;
13. All pets, including cats, dogs, birds, fish, or whatever other of the animal kingdom has been gifted or otherwise acquired:
whether kept indoors or outdoors; with all fixtures, vehicles, and housings required for their protection, feeding, care,
transportation, shelter, and whatever other needs may arise;
14. All vehicles, autos, trucks, four-wheel vehicles, trailers, wagons, motorcycles, bicycles, tricycles, wheeled conveyances of
any kind, motorized or otherwise, in which Debtor has an interest;
15. All computers, computer-related equipment and accessories, flash drives, electronically stored files or data, telephones,
electronic equipment, office equipment and machines;
16. All visual reproduction systems, aural reproduction systems, motion pictures, films, video tapes, audio tapes, sound tracks,
compact discs, i-pods, phonograph records, film, video and aural production equipment, cameras, projectors, etc.;
17. All manuscripts, books, booklets, pamphlets, treatises; treatments, monographs, stories, written material, libraries, plays,
screenplays, lyrics, songs, music;
18. All books and financial records of Debtor;
19. All trademarks, registered marks, copyrights, patents, proprietary data and technology, inventions, intellectual property,
royalties, good will;
20. All public or private scholastic degrees, titles, credentials, medals, trophies, honors, awards, recognitions, meritorious
citations, certificates from apprenticeship training and/or continuing education programs, etc., from whatever source, for
whatever trade, occupation, work, or endeavor;
21. All military (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, National Guard, etc.) discharge papers, and the like;
22. All records, diaries, journals, photographs, negatives, transparencies, images, video footage, film footage, drawings, sound
records, audio tapes, video tapes, computer production or storage of all kinds whatsoever;
23. All fingerprints, footprints, palm prints, thumbprints, RNA materials, DNA materials, genes, blood fractions, biopsies,
surgically removed tissue, bodily parts, organs, hair, teeth, nails, semen, urine, other bodily fluids or matter, voice-print,
retinal images, and the descriptions thereof; and all other corporal identification factors, and said factors' physical
counterparts in any form; and all records, record numbers, and information pertaining thereto;
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24. All biometric data, records, information, and processes not elsewhere described; the use thereof and the use of the
information contained therein or pertaining thereto;
25. All rights to obtain, use, request, refuse, or authorize the administration of any food, beverage, nourishment, or water, or
any substance to be infused or injected into or affecting the body by any means whatsoever;
26. All rights to obtain, use, request, refuse, or authorize the administration of any drug, manipulation, material, process,
procedure, ray, or wave which alters or might alter the present or future state of the body, mind, spirit, free will, faculties,
and self by any means, method, or process whatsoever;
27. All keys, locks, lock combinations, encryption codes or keys, safes, secured places, and security devices, security
programs, software, user names, passwords, machinery, or devices related thereto;
28. All rights to access and use utilities upon payment of the same unit costs as the comparable units of usage offered to mostfavored
customers, inter alia: cable, electricity, garbage, gas, internet, satellite, sewage, telephone, water, and all other
methods of communication, energy, transmission, and food or water distribution;
29. All rights to barter, buy, contract, sell, or trade ideas, products, services, or work;
30. All rights to create, invent, adopt, utilize, or promulgate any system or means of currency, private money, medium of
exchange, coinage, barter, economic exchange, bookkeeping, record-keeping, and the like;
31. All rights to use any free, rented, leased, fixed, or mobile domicile, as though same were a permanent domicile; and to be
free from requirement to apply for or obtain any government license or permission, permit and otherwise; and to be free
from entry, intrusion, or surveillance, by any means, regardless of duration of lease period;
32. All rights to manage, maneuver, direct, guide, or travel in any form of automobile or motorized conveyance whatsoever
without any requirement to apply for or obtain any government license, permit, certificate, or permission of any kind
whatsoever;
33. All rights to marry and procreate children, and to rear, educate, train, guide, and spiritually enlighten any such children,
without any requirement to apply for or obtain any government license, permit, certificate, any vaccinations, or permission
of any kind whatsoever;
34. All rights to buy, sell, trade, grow, raise, gather, hunt, trap, angle, and store food, fiber, and raw materials for shelter,
clothing, and survival;
35. All rights as outlined in the "Constitution of Canada” and the Honorable “Canadian Bill of Rights";
36. All rights to exercise freedom. of religion, worship, use of sacraments, spiritual practice, and expression without any
abridgement of free speech, or the right to publish, or the right to peaceably assemble, or the right to petition government
for redress of grievances, or the right to petition any military force of Canada for physical protection from threats to the
safety and integrity of person or property by either "public" or "private" sources;
37. All rights to keep and bear arms for defense of self, family, and parties entreating physical protection of person or property.
38. All rights to create, preserve, and maintain inviolable, spiritual sanctuary and receive into same any and all parties
requesting safety and shelter;
39. All rights to create, carry, and use private documents of travel of any kind whatsoever, inter alia: those signifying diplomatic
status and immunity as a free, independent Sovereign;
40. All claims of ownership or certificates of title to the corporeal and incorporeal hereditaments, hereditary succession and all
innate aspects of being, i.e., body, mind, spirit, free will, faculties, and self;
41. All rights to privacy and security in person and property, inter alia: all rights to safety and security of all household or
sanctuary dwellers or guests, and all papers and effects belonging to Debtor or any household or sanctuary dwellers or
guests, from governmental, quasi-governmental, de facto governmental, or private intrusion, detainer, entry, seizure,
search, surveillance, trespass, assault, summons, or warrant, except with proof of superior claim duly filed in the
Commercial Registry by any such intruding party in the private capacity of such intruding party, notwithstanding whatever
purported authority, warrant, order, law, or color of law maybe promulgated as the authority for any such intrusion,
detainer, entry, seizure, search, surveillance, trespass, assault, summons, or warrant;
42. All names used and all Corporations Sole executed and filed, or to be executed and filed, under said names;
43. All intellectual property, inter alia: all speaking and writing; All thoughts, beliefs, world views, emotions, psychology, etc.;
44. All signatures and seals;
45. All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all licenses foreign and domestic;
46. All present and future retirement incomes and rights to such incomes issuing from all accounts;
47. All present and future medical and healthcare rights; and rights owned through survivorship, from all accounts;
48. All applications, filings, correspondence, information, images, identifying marks, image licenses, travel documents,
materials, permits, registrations, and records and records numbers held by any entity, for any purpose. however acquired,
as well as the analyses and uses thereof, and any use of any information and images contained therein, regardless of
creator, method, location, process, or storage form, inter alia: all processed algorithms analyzing, classifying, comparing,
compressing, displaying, identifying, processing, storing, or transmitting said applications, filings, correspondence,
167
information, images, identifying marks, image licenses, travel documents, materials, permits, registrations, records and
records numbers, and the like;
49. All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all library cards;
50. All credit, charge, and debit cards, mortgages, notes, applications, card numbers, and associated records and information;
51. All credit of Debtor;
52. All signatures on and all value associated with all traffic citations/tickets;
53. All signatures on and all value associated with all parking citations/tickets;
54. All value from all court cases and all judgments, past, present, and future, in any court whatsoever; and all bonds, orders,
warrants, and other matters attached thereto or derived therefrom;
55. All precious metals, bullion, coins, jewelry, precious jewels, semi-precious stones, mounts; and any storage boxes,
receptacles and depositories within which said items are stored;
56. All tax correspondence, filings, notices, coding, record numbers, all benefit from social security account # [social
insurance number]; and any information contained therein, wherever and however located, and no matter by whom
said information was obtained, compiled, codified, recorded, stored, analyzed, processed, communicated, or utilized;
57. All bank accounts, all brokerage accounts, stocks, bonds, certificates of deposit, drafts, futures, insurance policies,
investment securities, all retirement plan accounts, Individual Retirement Accounts, money market accounts, mutual funds,
notes, options, puts, calls, pension plans, savings accounts, stocks, warrants, securities, benefits from trusts, Employment
Insurance (EI), Canada Pension Plan (CPP), Canada Income Tax (CIT);
58. All accounts, deposits, escrow accounts, lotteries, overpayments, prepayments, prizes, rebates, refunds, returns, claimed
and unclaimed funds; and all records and records numbers, correspondence, and information pertaining thereto or derived
there from;
59. All stockpiles, collections, buildups, amassment, and accumulations, however small, of Federal Reserve Notes (FRNs),
gold certificates, silver certificates; and all other types and kinds of cash, coins, currency, and money delivered into
possession of Secured Party;
60. All drugs, herbs, medicine, medical supplies, cultivated plants, growing plants, inventory, ancillary equipment, supplies,
propagating plants, and seeds; and all related storage facilities and supplies;
61. All fitness and/or sports equipment intended to increase vitality, fitness, and health; and whole food complexes, vitamin,
mineral, and other supplements to the diet for the same health and fitness purposes; and all juicers, grinders, dehydrators,
and storage and delivery devices or equipment;
62. All products of and for agriculture; and all equipment, inventories, supplies, contracts, and accoutrements involved in the
planting, tilling, harvesting, processing, preservation, and storage of all products of agriculture;
63. All plants and shrubs, trees, fruits, vegetables, farm and garden produce, indoors and out, watering devices, fertilizers and
fertilizing equipment, pots, collections of plants, e.g., bonsai, dry or live assortments of flowers and plants, or anything
botanical;
64. All farm, lawn, and irrigation equipment, accessories, attachments, hand tools, implements, service equipment, parts,
supplies, and storage sheds and contents;
65. All fuel, fuel tanks, containers, and involved or related delivery systems;
66. All metal-working, woodworking, and other such machinery; and all ancillary equipment, accessories, consumables, power
tools, hand tools, inventories, storage cabinets, tool boxes, work benches, shops, and facilities;
67. All camping, fishing, hunting, and sporting equipment; and all special clothing, materials, supplies, and baggage related
thereto;
68. All rifles, guns, bows, crossbows, other weapons, and related accessories; and the ammunition, reloading equipment and
supplies, projectiles, and integral components thereof;
69. All radios, televisions, communication equipment, receivers, transceivers, transmitters, antennas, towers, etc.; and all
ancillary equipment, supplies, computers, software programs, wiring, and related accoutrements and devices;
70. All power-generating machines or devices; and all storage, conditioning, control, distribution, wiring, and ancillary
equipment pertaining to or attached thereto;
71. All devices, engines, fixtures, fans, plans needed for the production or storage of electrical energy;
72. All computers and computer systems and the information contained therein; as well as all ancillary equipment, printers, and
data compression or encryption devices, processes, and processors;
73. All office and engineering equipment, furniture, ancillary equipment, drawing tools, electronic and paper files, and items
related thereto;
74 All water wells and well-drilling equipment; and all ancillary equipment, chemicals, tools, and supplies;
75. All shipping, storing, and cargo containers, and all chassis, truck trailers, vans, and the contents thereof; whether on-site, in
transit, or in storage anywhere;
76. All building materials and prefabricated buildings; and all components or materials pertaining thereto, before or during
manufacture, transportation, storage, building, erection, or vacancy while awaiting occupancy thereof;
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77. All communications and data; and the methods, devices, and forms of information storage and retrieval, and the products
of any such stored information;
78. All artwork and supplies, paintings, etchings, photographic art, lithographs, and serigraphs, etc.; and all frames and mounts
pertaining to or affixed thereto;
79. All food; and all devices, tools, equipment, vehicles, machines, and related accoutrements involved in food preservation,
preparation, growth, transport, and storage;
80. All construction machinery; and all ancillary equipment, fuels, fuel additives, supplies, materials, and service equipment
pertaining thereto;
81. All medical, dental, optical, prescription, and insurance records, records numbers, and information contained in any such
records or pertaining thereto;
82. The Last Will and Testament from any source;
83. All inheritances gotten or to be gotten;
84. All wedding bands and rings, watches, and jewelry;
85. All household goods and appliances, linen, wardrobe, toiletries, furniture, kitchen utensils, cutlery, tableware, cooking
utensils, pottery, antiques; etc.;
86. All musical instruments, whether new or old, including brass, woodwinds, percussion, strings, etc.;
87. All children's toys, clothing, playthings, and possessions of any type or amount;
88. All businesses, corporations, companies, trusts, partnerships, limited partnerships, organizations, proprietorships, and the
like, now owned or hereafter acquired; and all books and records thereof and therefrom; all income therefrom; and all
accessories, accounts, equipment, information, inventory, money, spare parts, and computer software pertaining thereto;
89. All ownership, equity, property, and rights to property now owned or held or hereafter acquired in all businesses,
corporations, companies, partnerships, limited partnerships, organizations, proprietorships, and the like; and all books and
records pertaining thereto; all income therefrom; and all accessories, accounts, equipment, information, inventory, money,
spare parts, and computer software pertaining thereto;
90. All packages, parcels, envelopes, or labels of any kind whatsoever which are addressed to, or intended to be addressed to,
Debtor or natural man Secured Party, whether received or not received;
91. All telephone numbers;
92. All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all certificates of birth documents of the natural man
Secured Party, and all said documents themselves; Registration Number [registration number]- Alberta.
93. All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all certificates of birth documents of all children and
grandchildren of the natural man Secured Party, and all said documents themselves; [child #1] born [birthdate], [child #2]
born [birthdate]
94. All signatures on all applications for social insurance numbers, and all value. associated with all accounts, [social
insurance number];
95. All signatures on all applications for social insurance numbers for all children and grandchildren of the natural man
Secured Party, and all value associated with all accounts.
96. All value associated with the private contract trust account number of the natural man Secured Party: [social insurance
number without spaces];
97. All value associated with the private contract trust account numbers of all his children under the age of twenty one;
[child #1] born [birthdate] [child #2] born [birthdate] natural man Secured Party;
98. All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with Driver License #: [driver’s license number] - Alberta;
99. All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all passports for the natural man Secured Party -
Passport Number [passport number] and his children under the age of twenty one; [child #1] born [birthdate] [child #2]
born, [birthdate].
100. All documents as recorded in the public record by and for the natural man Secured Party as indicated herein;
101. All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all marriage licenses; [marriage license number],
Registration Number [registration number] Alberta
102. All private and public marriage contracts; [marriage license number], Registration Number [registration number] Alberta
103. All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all professional licenses;
104. All private addresses of the natural man Secured party as indicated herein;
105. All signatures on all applications for and all value associated with all public addresses;
106. All private, registered, bond/account numbers; and all bonds and notes tendered to any and all entities,
including the Department/Treasury of Canada, banks, creditors, corporations, etc.;
107. Any and all property not specifically listed, named, or specified by make, model, serial number, etc., is expressly herewith
included as collateral of the natural man Secured Party.
169
LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND - ATTACHMENT "B" - DEFINITIONS
ATTACHMENT "B" - DEFINITIONS
1. Unlawful Arrest: Means restricting a man or woman's right to move about freely without the proper use of a lawful signed
by a judge of competent jurisdiction while under oath. This includes unnecessary use of restraint devices, traffic stops,
raids, or any other type of interaction, when an officer is presented with and ignores a "Notice and Demand," "Public
Servants Questionnaire," "Right to Travel" Documents, or other documents notifying the officer of the sovereign, lawful
rights of the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party, created by God, who is not to be confused with the Corporate Fiction
“Strawman" which was created by the state. This includes arrest when a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party is
incarcerated for refusing to sign any citation; arrest due to contempt of court when he or she is not violent or a physical
threat to the court; arrest by Internal Revenue Service for failure to produce books, records, or other documents; arrest
and refusal of Habeas Corpus; arrest for conspiracy of any kind without lawfully documented lawfully documented
affidavits from at least three (3) eye witnesses, signed under oath and penally of perjury.
2. Illegal Arrest: Means same as above item # 1, "Unlawful Arrest."
3. Unlawful Detention: Means restraining a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party's freedom of movement, and/or Right to
Travel, against his will for more than sixty (60) seconds without a property authorized lawful warrant signed by a judge of
competent jurisdiction while under oath. This includes routine traffic stops, raids, random identification checks, security
checks, only after the officer, agent, or representative has been notified by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party of
his status and after the officer has been given documents to prove said status, along with up to ten (10) minutes for officer
to examine said documents.
4. Unlawful Distraint: Means seizure or taking of any property that is lawfully owned or in possession of the Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party without proper probable cause, and/or due process, and lawful warrant. This includes any seizure
by any officer, agent, representative, in any capacity, or relationship with "Canada" or any of its agencies, contractors,
subdivisions, subsidiaries, or the like.
5. Lawful Warrant: Means a warrant that follows the provisions of the uniform and common law of CANADA.
6. Right to Speedy Trial: Means trial will commence within 90 days of the date of arrest.
7. Interstate Detainer: Means the same as unlawful detainer as when involving a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party
and involving more than one agency or state of the corporation, or any representative, agent, or officer who has any
agreement with, contract with, or permission to act on behalf of any municipal corporation of "CANADA" or any subsidiary
or sub-corporation thereof.
8. Unlawful Restraint: Means any action by any officer, agent, representative, contractor, associate, officer of the court, or
the like, to prevent, coerce, intimidate, hinder, or in any way limit the right of a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party from
any type of freedom of legal/ lawful speech, travel, movement, action, gesture, writing, utterance, or enjoyment of any
right or privilege that is commonly enjoyed by any member of the public, or any Sovereign.
9. Freedom of Speech: Means the right to speak open and plainly without the fear of reprisal. This includes the right of a
Natural Man or Woman Secured Party to speak at hearings and trials, before magistrates, judges, and officers of the
court, agents, representatives, or the like, of "CANADA." It also means that no attempt to suppress this right will be made
by any officer of the court or of "CANADA" corporation. No judge or officer of any court or tribunal will threaten contempt
of court for free speech by any Natural Man or Woman Secured Party.
10. Bank of Canada (CAD) Dollars: Means the currently recognized medium of exchange as used by the general public at
the time of offense, at par value, equal to a one ounce silver dollar equivalent per each dollar unit, as represented in a
claim. All claims and damages will be paid at par value as indicated. Par value will be established by written law or the
value established by the ROYAL CANADIAN MINT, whichever is higher at the time of the offense, for the purchase of an
official, one troy ounce, .999 fine silver or gold coin.
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11. Obstruction of Justice: Means any attempt by any officer of the court or representative of any agency that represents
the "CANADA," or any of its subdivisions, agencies, contractors, etc., to deprive, hinder, conceal, coerce, or threaten a
Natural Man or Woman Secured Party in an attempt to prevent any and every opportunity to legally/lawfully
defend himself by attempting to produce and file lawful documents and or testimony to agents, officers, judges,
magistrates, the court, clerk of the court, representatives, or investigators in order to settle any legal/lawful controversy.
This also includes any attempt by a judge or officer of the court to hinder the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party from
filing, recording, admitting, presenting, discussing, questioning, or using any evidence, document, paper, photographs,
audio and/or video recordings, or any other type of evidence that he desires to submit as evidence in any type of court
proceeding. The determination of what is evidence and what will be admitted is to be solely determined by the Natural
Man or Woman Secured Party. Any evidence will be tried on merits of the lawful content and validity. Any judge or officer
of the court who attempts to suppress or dismiss legal or lawful evidence will voluntarily surrender all bonds, insurance,
property, corporate property, bank accounts, savings accounts, or any corporate property of value to the Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party upon written demand and surrender all rights to and defenses against said property. This also
includes evidence that is supported by case law. This includes attempts by any officer of the court to make motions, to
issue orders such as gag orders, or to use any other means of keeping information suppressed from the public or the
official record. The determination of whether the acts of the court are an attempt to suppress evidence will be solely
determined by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. This also includes the provision as indicated in item # 18
"Racketeering and Canada, Sections 467.11 to 467.13"
12. Excessive Bail: Means any amount of bail set at an unreasonable rate. This also means bail in excess of the amount of
the fine, penalty, or penal sum that is associated with the alleged crime committed. This also means that if a Natural Man
or Woman Secured Party has lived as an upstanding member in a community or area for more than one year, works a
regular job, or is a member of or involved with a church group, civic group, community enterprise, or can produce at least
two affidavits from members of his community or area stating that he is involved with his community, he cannot be held
without bail as a flight risk or a threat to society. If the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party can produce at least four (4)
affidavits stating that he lives, works, and is involved in his community, or the prior community in which he lived, he must
be released on his own recognizance without any bail required. This provision does not apply to anyone charged with
rape, murder, or violent crimes.
13. Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Means physical violence of any type or form that is used against a Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party and that causes invisible or undetectable or visible physical injury, e.g., marks, scrapes, scratches,
bruises, abrasion, avulsions, fractures, sprains, restraint marks, dislocations, punctures, cuts, loss of blood, loss of body
fluids, etc. This includes any other type of physical stress to the body or any chemically- induced, altered mental state of
the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. This also includes any attempt to incarcerate; restrain; question; detain;
withhold food when requested; withhold drink when requested; withhold medications as requested; withhold use of
bathroom facilities and supplies when requested; withhold reading and writing materials; withhold communication with
friends, family, legal counsel, and religious counsel; withhold proper clothing as needed for comfort; withhold blankets
when requested; withhold hot and cold water for showers; withhold freedom when requested. This also includes ridicule,
coercion, threats, verbal insults, rude and offensive language, veiled threats, or any other type of mental stress or
anguish.
14. Conspiracy: Means the cooperation of two or more persons working together to restrict, suppress, inhibit, or in any way
deprive a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party of any right, benefit, or privilege that would ordinarily be offered by
CANADA, Canada and canada.
15. Victim: Means any Natural Man or Woman Secured Party who has received direct damages to himself or his property as
the result of an unlawful or illegal act by another.
16. Victimless Laws: Means any law that is passed or presumed to be passed that creates a violation of law in which no
Natural Man or Woman Secured Party has been damaged. This includes any statute, ordinance, regulation, policy, or
color of law provision. These types of laws will not be used in any action, of any kind, against any Natural Man or Woman
Secured Party.
17. Aiding and Abetting: Means the efforts of any officer, agent, or representative of CANADA or officer of the court to assist
another of the same to hinder, coerce, restrict, resist, suppress, or deprive in any way, a Natural Man or Woman Secured
Party from receiving any and all rights, benefits, or privileges, as provided by Canada that would normally be offered to
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the general Canadian public, or to a Sovereign. This also includes the provisions as provided in item # 18 "Racketeering"
and suppression of evidence.
18. Racketeering: Means any attempt by any two or more officers of the corporation to restrict, suppress, coerce,
manipulate, inhibit, or in any way deprive a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party from receiving every right, benefit, or
privilege that is outlined by Constitution of Canada and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights." This also includes any
effort by the officers of the court to hinder in any way the introduction of evidence, law, facts, affidavits, statements,
witness testimony, or any information that is considered relevant by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party, or any
attempt to prevent a jury from hearing this evidence. This also includes any attempt to prevent this evidence from being
heard in a public forum and before any and all members of the general public, as many as can be accommodated by the
main courtroom. All hearings, tribunals, or trials will be held in a public place; and any and all members of the general
public will be allowed to attend, without restriction. This also includes questioning and/or interrogation by police officers
before, during, and after an arrest.
19. Federal Zone: Means any land, property, building, area, zone, 911 zone, or postal zone that is presumed to be within the
territorial jurisdiction of CANADA or any of its representatives as defined herein. This does not include any land, property,
building, structure, dwelling, area, zone that is held by deed, title, warranty deed, contract, or any written or verbal
agreement, or any such thing by a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party non domestic to CANADA. All privately held
properties of any type that are being held by any Natural Man or Woman Secured Party are excluded from any federal
zone or any jurisdiction of any representatives of CANADA or any of its territories. This is fact and may be presented in
any court by affidavit of any Natural Man or Woman Secured Party of interest involved in any interaction with "CANADA"
or any of its representatives, as outlined in this contract.
20. Province and Territories: Means any of the ten provinces and three territories areas known as CANADA which is not the
same as the "CANADA" corporation. The Natural Man or Woman Secured Party will also determine whether or not his
land is a part of the jurisdiction of the "CANADA"; and his decision shall not be challenged by any representative of the
"CANADA." The Natural Man or Woman Secured Party will determine if the alleged offense occurred within the limits of
"CANADA." A violation of this provision will be Unlawful Determination and punishable as indicated by this contract
agreement.
21. Trespassing/Trespass: Means the entry into or onto the domain, property, residence, area, location, grounds, dwellings,
buildings, barns, sheds, caves, structures, lands, storage areas, tunnels, automobiles, trucks, safe houses, underground
shelters, automobiles, motor vehicles, recreational vehicles, boats, planes, trains, ships, containers, vans, heavy
equipment, farm implements, culverts, driveways, trees, yards, real property, real estate, land, etc., of the Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party without his express written permission, or without a lawfully executed warrant. Any and all agents
or representatives of the corporation will fully and completely observe any and all protections as outlined in the laws and
statutes of Canada. Any personal property that is damaged, lost, stolen, or misplaced, etc., will be recoverable as
indicated in this Notice and Demand document. I solemnly swear and affirm that I do not have any illegal contraband on
my property; I have never had any illegal contraband on or around my property and never will. Any contraband, if it is
found on my property, would have been placed there by the officers or agents during the time of trespass. I simply do not
allow it on my property. Contraband or illegal items if they are found in a search do not belong to me and may not be
used in any attempt in any claim against me. Any and all officers, agents, and representatives of the corporation will be
held individually liable for the full amount of damages as outlined in this Notice and Demand document for trespassing.
22. Natural Man or Woman Secured Party: Means any flesh and blood, living, breathing Man or Woman, created by God,
who notifies any representative of the corporation, verbally or in writing, that he is a Sovereign, Non "CANADA" corporate
citizen, free man or free woman, and not subject to the jurisdiction of the corporation or any of its representatives. This is
not to be confused with the Fictitious Legal Entity that was created by Canada and/or a province and is represented by an
ALL CAPITAL LETTER NAME. Any attempt to notify any officer, agent, or representative of the status of the Natural Man
or Woman Secured Party will be sufficient notice. Sufficient notice will be determined by oath, statement, or affidavit by
the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party; and the validity of such will not be challenged by any officer of the court.
23. County, Town or City: Means any subdivision of a province or territory of "Canada." This subdivision excludes any
jurisdiction, zone, or territory of "CANADA" corporation that is described by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party in
ALL CAPITAL LETTERS. Any dispute over any errors contained in spelling or grammar will be resolved at the discretion
of the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party and will not be challenged by any representative of the corporation.
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24. Agency, Entity, Department, Subdivision, Subsidiary, Contractor, Employee, Inspector, Investigator,
Organization, Officer, Agent, Authorized Representative, Policeman, Participant: Means any person, corporation,
or entity of any kind which works for, is compensated all or in part by, receives funds from, collects funds for, contracts
with, receives any benefit from, receives any privilege from, participates with, has allegiance to, or in any way has a
relationship with the "CANADA or any of its subsidiaries, sub-corporations, departments, or agencies, etc.
25. Contract: Means any agreement in writing that has been offered for review and acceptance by another party wherein the
offering party has ten (10) days or more, or as stipulated in the contract, to review, respond, accept, or rebut any
provisions of the contract as indicated in the contract. Non response on the part of the receiving party or agent of the
receiving party will be a lawful offer and acceptance of all the terms and conditions contained in said contract. Rebuttal by
the receiving party of any provision of the contract by any other means than is indicated in the contract will be non
response. Return of the contract unopened and/or without review will be acceptance of all conditions of said contract.
Recording the contract with the clerk of court or any public records officer will be a lawful offer and notification and will be
presentment to all officers of the court in that state or county. Notice to Agent is Notice to Principal. Notice to
Principal, is Notice to Agent.
26. False Imprisonment: Means any attempt by any officer of the court or corporation to incarcerate any Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party against his will and/or against any and all protections of the laws and provisions of the
"Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights".
27. Representative: Means any agent, agency, department, officer, investigator, entity, subsidiary, sub-corporation,
contractor, employee, inspector, individual, or corporation that has any affiliation or association with, collects or distributes
funds for, does any task for, receives any benefit or privilege from, of, or for the "CANADA." This includes anyone or
anything that represents the interests of, or is being funded by, or receives funds from, or has any attachment to the
"CANADA" or any of its subdivisions or sub-corporations.
28. Corporation: Means any representative, agency, sub-corporation, contractor, or any person or entity that is employed by,
receives or distributes funds for, receives any benefit or privilege from, or has any relationship of any kind with the
"CANADA" corporation.
29. Interpretation: Means if any conflict arises concerning the definition of any of the terms and/or conditions of this contract,
the conflict concerning the meaning of the term or condition will be decided by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party.
His decision will be final and not subject to review or argument. No liability or penalty will be incurred by the Natural Man
or Woman Secured Party due to his interpretation of such terms and or conditions.
30. Corporate Capacity: Means acting for, or on behalf of, a corporation, or government entity, while under law or color of
law.
31. Legal counsel: Means anyone that a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party chooses to have as legal assistance of
counsel, whether counsel is licensed or not, or a member of the Bar Association. Counsel may assist, represent, speak
on behalf of, write cases for, or perform any act in or out of court for the Natural Man or Woman Secured party without any
hindrance, threat, prosecution, charge, repercussion, etc., from any officer of the court, or representative of the "CANADA"
corporation, or any representative, officer, or agent thereof.
32. Abuse of Authority: Means anyone who denies, withholds, refuses, deprives, limits, inhibits, counteracts, conceals any
right, benefit, protections, or privilege, as protected by the "Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of
Rights." This includes arrest or detainment without documented evidence that a lawful crime has been committed by the
Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. This includes use of restraint devices on a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party
and/or physical abuse that makes or does not make any marks, scars, cuts, abrasions, or the like. This also includes
denial of lawful Due Process, Habeas Corpus, Excessive Bail, Unlawful Arrest, Unlawful Detention, or the like, as outlined
in this contract.
33. Verbal Abuse: Means the use of offensive and/or threatening, spoken words, body language, and non-verbal gestures or
actions by any representative of the corporation as defined herein upon a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. lf a
controversy arises about an incident, the version told by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party will be accepted as
truth and will not be contested.
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34. Assault and Battery with Weapon: Means any actual, threatened, or perceived use of any weapons, by any
representative of the "CANADA" corporation, against the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party or his, that creates an
atmosphere of fear for the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. This includes non lethal weapons such as tazers, stun
guns, mace, pepper spray, any chemical used to incapacitate, rubber bullets, shock force weapons, electronic weapons,
or any other type of weapon that may be used to control or to create fear. If a conflict arises about the events, the version
told by the Naturel Man or Woman Secured Party will be accepted as truth and will not be contested.
35. Unfounded Accusations: Means any accusation, charge, or claim, civil or criminal or in admiralty, that is alleged or
made by any representative of the "CANADA" corporation as defined herein that is not proven by written, documented
evidence presented under oath and penalty of perjury by an authorized agent or representative of the
corporation. The accuser has eight (8) hours to provide said documents to be reviewed and to put them into the
possession of the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party; and failure to do so will be Unfounded Accusations and subject
to the penalties contained herein.
36. Encroachment: Means to invade, intrude, or in any way prevent a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party the full and
complete use of property, including trespass or impeding ingress or egress to the property of a Natural Man or Woman
Secured Party; and to limit the ability of a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party to freely access, claim, hold, possess,
use, convey, sell, rent, lease, barter, exchange, or in any way make full and unfettered use of his property. This includes
the application of unlawful liens and encumbrances of any and all property including wages; salaries; stocks; bonds; bank
accounts (foreign or domestic); savings accounts; contents of safety deposit boxes; gold; silver; notes; insurance funds;
annuities; retirement accounts; social insurance benefits; motor vehicles; automobiles; recreational vehicles; land; real
estate; homes; structures; roads; driveways; personal property of any kind that is held by title, deed, contract, agreement
(written or verbal), or is in possession of a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. This includes, but is not limited to,
traffic stops; searches of vehicles; home invasion; confiscation of any lawful property owned by, in possession of, or under
the control of the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party.
37. Assault and Battery without a Weapon: Means the verbal abuse or physical contact, of any kind, upon a Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party without his express voluntary written consent. If a conflict arises about the facts involving the
incident, the version as told by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party will be accepted as truth, without question, and
will not be contested.
38. Abuse of Due Process: Means any action against a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party, when said action does not
abide by all the rights and defenses contained in or represented by the "Constitution of Canada and/or the Honorable
"Canadian Bill of Rights." This includes any charge, or claim, civil or criminal, or in admiralty, that is alleged or made by
any representative of the "CANADA" corporation.
39. Denial of Due Process: Means any attempt by any officer of the court and or corporation to deny, deprive, restrict,
prevent, or in any way inhibit the proper Due Process to any Natural Man or Woman Secured Party as outlined in the
"Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights." Any public law, statute, regulation, ordinance,
home rule, etc., that is incompatible with the aforementioned Constitution of Canada and/or Honorable "Canadian Bill of
Rights" is null and void and will not be used in any action against any Natural Manor Woman Secured Party.
40. Unlawful Detainer: Means any attempt by any officer of the court or representative of the corporation to arrest, check,
hinder, delay, possess, hold, keep in custody, restrain, retard, stop, withhold a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party
without affording him every protection as outlined by the “Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable Canadian Bill of
Rights.” Any public law, statute, regulation, ordinance or the like will be null and void and will not be used in any action in
which a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party is involved.
41. Reckless Endangerment: Means any attempt by any officer of the court or corporation as defined herein to endanger,
attempt or threaten to attempt to endanger the life or property of any Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. This
includes dangerous driving in a car, use or threatened use of lethal or non lethal weapons or chemicals, improper use of
restraint devices, use of restraint devices on a non-combative Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. If a conflict arises
as to whether or not reckless endangerment has occurred, the version of the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party will
be considered as truth.
42. Failure to Respond: Means any attempt by any officer or representative of the corporation to ignore, inhibit, withhold,
delay, or deny a request for information from a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party.
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43. Failure to Charge within Forty Eight (48) Hours: Means any attempt by any officer or representative of a corporation to
delay, inhibit, prevent, or in any way stop a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party from being lawfully charged by the
court within forty eight (48) hours of arrest.
44. Failure to Identify: Means any time a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party has interaction with any officer or
representative of the court or corporation, the officer or representative, must, upon request of the Natural Man or Woman
Secured Party, provide proper identification, written proof of authority, state what his business is with the Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party, complete a "Public Servants Questionnaire" in advance of arrest or detention, provide
documentation properly identifying the officer or respondeat superior’s name and contact information, and any other
relevant information as requested by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. The officer may not detain the Natural
Man or Woman Secured Party for more than ten (10) minutes while he obtains and provides this information.
45. Counterfeiting Statute Staple Securities Instruments: Means any attempt by any officer or representative of a
corporation to copy, duplicate, replicate any document that has "Statute Staple Securities Agreement” typed, printed, or
hand written anywhere on the document, without the express, written, voluntary permission of the document's owner who
is the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party who filed said document in the public record, or is in possession of said
document, or who is the maker of said document. If a dispute about permission to duplicate arises, the statements of the
Natural Man or Woman Secured Party will be accepted as fact without question and will not be contested.
46. Coercion or Attempt to Coerce: Means any attempt by any officer or representative of a corporation to threaten,
intimidate, deprive, conceal, or in anyway prevent a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party from receiving and/or enjoying
any right or privilege that is granted, outlined, or secured by "Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill
of Rights", or allow another to do so.
47. Purchase Price: Means the new replacement costs of items of property at the time of replacement. This includes
locating, packing, shipping, handling, delivery, set up, installation, and any other fee associated with total replacement of
property.
48. Destruction of Property: Means any alteration, damage, deprivation, defacing, removing, changing, breaking,
separating, removing parts from, erasing of files from, throwing, shooting, kicking, stomping, smashing, crushing, or the
like of any property belonging to or in possession of the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party.
49. Deprivation of Rights or Property: Means the concealment of, keeping from, hiding of, obstructing of any rights,
property, or privileges that are outlined or protected by the "Constitution of Canada" and/or the Honorable "Canadian Bill
of Rights."
50. Concealment: Means withholding or keeping information that should normally be revealed, about property and/or rights
from a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. This includes keeping evidence or law from a jury that could favorably alter
the outcome of a case to the benefit of the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. No officer of any court or
representative of any corporation may conceal any law and/or any evidence of any kind that is considered relevant by the
Natural Man or Woman Secured Party, and/or fail to disclose any law that benefits the Natural Man or Woman Secured
Party.
51. Defacing: Means the changing or altering the appearance of an item. This also includes changing or altering the
meaning of laws, rights, property, documents, or any other thing that has value as determined by the Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party.
52. Constitution: Means, for the purpose of this contract, "The Constitution of Canada" circa earliest in history.
53. Bill of Rights: Means, for the purposes of this contract, the original, Honorable "Canadian Bill of Rights" circa earliest in
history.
54. Rights and Defenses: Means one's legal and/or lawful right and/or ability to defend himself in any action. Upon
agreement, the defendant in an action may give up his right to defend himself in a given action. This includes tacit
agreement or agreement by default; and the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party is never the defendant.
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55. Willingly: Means that a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party is in full knowledge, understanding, agreement, and full
consent, at all times, without fear of reprisal, threat, or coercion, during any interaction in which he is involved with any
agent, officer, or representative of any court or corporation, including incorporated governments.
56. Individual Capacity: Means acting on one's behalf to do a thing. The officer, representative, agent, or the like may be
acting under law or color of law and go outside of the capacity of the law and take on a personal liability.
57. Artificial Person: Means a fictitious entity that was created by the state for transacting commerce. This Artificial Man or
Strawman is represented by the ALL CAPITAL LETTER NAME that appears to be spelled the same as the name of the
Natural Man or Woman. When the Artificial Person is used in commerce by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party, it
is a transmitting utility.
58. Agreement: Means any contract which is expressed in writing by letters or marks, or expressed orally in spoken words or
utterances by a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. Any question of any agreement or contract will be resolved by an
affidavit from the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. His affidavit will be considered fact in any action or dispute,
without question by any officer, agent, or representative of any corporation including incorporated governments.
59. Unlawful Determination: Means any statement, speech, gesture, writing, presentment, or the like that suggests an idea
that negatively represents the character, actions, plans, procedures, customs, ways of a Natural Man or Woman Secured
Party, or group of Natural Men or Women Secured Parties, that is not proven by documented, authorized, certified,
evidence, on and for the record under penalty of perjury. This includes off color statements, accusations, or remarks by a
judge or other officer of the court and any other representative of any corporation including incorporated governments.
60. Statute Staple Securities Instrument: Means an edict or proclamation from a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party.
61. Clerk of the Public Record: Means any clerk who records or files documents in the public record who is employed by a
city, county, province, state, municipality, federal government, and/or international, multi-national, or multi-jurisdictional
corporation, including incorporated governments.
62. Public Record: Means any document or record that is filed or recorded into the public record by the Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party. For example, when this document is recorded at a Register of Deeds Office, it becomes a public
record.
63. Presumption: Means legal assumption or inference that places the burden of proof or burden of production on the other
party, but never on the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party. No presumption shall prevail against the Natural Man or
Woman Secured Party without lawful, documented evidence that supports the presumption which is certified by the
officers of the court, on and for the record under penalty of perjury.
64. Unalienable Rights: Means Natural Rights given by God as acknowledged by the Law of Nations such as, but not limited
to, Right to Bear Arms; Freedom of Speech; Right to Trial by a Jury of one's Peers; Right to Due Process; Right of
Habeas Corpus; Right to be Exempt from Levy as a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party Creditor; Right to be Secure in
One's Private Papers and Effects.
65. Right to Travel: Means the right to freely move about and/or control any type of craft by whatever means, via land, sea,
or air, without any interference by any officer, agent, employee, attorney, or judge that in any manner willfully causes
adverse affects or damages upon the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party by an arrest, inhibition, detainment, restraint,
deprivation, prevention, etc.
66. Disrespect: Means anything said or written to any Natural Man or Woman Secured Party, about him or his, that he does
not like, including body language, or anything that makes him or any reasonable man uncomfortable or fearful.
67. The Placing or Filing of an Unlawful Lien, Levy, Garnishment, or Attachment: Means any attempt by any officer,
agent, or representative of a corporation to place a lien, levy, garnishment, or attachment on the property or collateral of a
Natural Man or Woman Secured Party, herein referred to as Secured Party. Any said officer, agent, or representative
must first prove his authority to do so by lawfully documented evidence, furnishing all documents, forms, and papers as
necessary to prove his authority to do so to a neutral, three (3) Notary Panel, hereinafter referred to as The Panel,
selected by the Secured Party. Said officer, agent, or representative must guarantee in writing that the officer, agent, or
representative signing said documents will be personally liable for any damages due to his unlawful and/or illegal actions.
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He must supply bonds or other lawful funds to be held in trust by The Panel until The Panel determines if any actions of
the officer, agent, or representative have violated any laws or caused damage to the Secured Party. The Panel will have
the sole power to determine if any damage has occurred and will release the funds according to The Panel's adjudication.
The decision of The Panel will be final with no recourse. The surety bonds and/or funds held in escrow by The Panel
must be at least four (4} times the estimated value of the property that is liened, levied, garnished, or attached. The
assessment of value will be recorded via affidavit by the Secured Party and delivered to The Panel. The Panel's
determination and the assessment thereof will be accepted as truth without question or recourse. Said officer, agent, or
representative agrees to surrender, including but not limited to, any and all surety bonds, public and/or corporate
insurance policies, CAFR funds, or corporate property as needed to satisfy any and all claims and/or assessments as filed
against said officer, agent, or representative by the Secured Party. Said officer, agent, or representative agrees that any
and all property or collateral with a current or existing lien will remain in the custody and control of the Secured Party until
such time as a determination has been made by a jury of twelve of the Secured Party's Peers as defined herein. In the
event that a jury of twelve of the Peers cannot be convened or has not been convened within sixty (60) days from the date
of the order of the lien, levy, attachment, or garnishment, any action against the Secured Party shall be dismissed with
prejudice; and every lien, levy, attachment, or garnishment shall be released within ten (10) days and all property rights
restored, unencumbered. The officer, agent, or representative who has authorized said lien, levy, attachment, or
garnishment agrees to surrender any and all surety bonds, public and/or corporate insurance policies, CAFR funds, or
corporate property as needed to satisfy any and all claims and/or assessments as filed against said officer, agent, or
representative by the Secured Party.
68. Peer: Means a Natural Man or Woman Secured Party who has recorded into the public record documents to prove his
sovereign status.
69. Ignore: Means to refuse or in any way to deny a lawful request by the Natural Man or Woman Secured Party to have an
officer, agent, or representative provide completed legal documents.
70. Natural Man or Woman: Means a flesh and blood, living, breathing, biological man or woman created by God, as
represented by the Upper and Lower Case Name, including "Natural Man or Woman," or "Real Man," or “Real Woman,"
or "Real Man/Woman." This is not to be confused with the Fictitious Legal Entity that was created by any “CANADIAN
GOVERNMENT" and that is represented by the ALL CAPITAL LETTER NAME.
71. Debtor: Means the Fictitious Legal Entity that was created by any “CANADIAN GOVERNMENT" and that is represented
by the ALL CAPITAL LETTER NAME.
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Appendix “B” - Meads’ Copyright and Trademark Notice
[RECORDING REQUESTED BY AND WHEN RECORDED MAIL TO:
Dennis Meads
without prejudice
c/o [...]-[...] Street
Alberta, Canada [T7Z 1L5]
NOTICE BY DECLARATION and AFFIDAVIT OF CONSEQUENCES FOR
INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT TRADE-NAME/TRADEMARK
And same are accepted for value and exempt from levy.
PLAIN STATEMENT OF FACT
I depose and say as follows:
I, Dennis Larry Meads, a natural man and competent witness, do state with the first-hand
knowledge the facts herein and in the nature of unalienable rights, claim, without prejudice, a
commercial unlimited possessory security interest and common law right of, in and to my
Copyright(s), Trademark(s) and Trade-Name(s) listed below.
I am the Secured Party of the herein said Copyright(s), Trademark(s) or Trade-Name(s), as
supported by a voluntary Copyright Notice in my possession, date December 22 , 2011.
Copyright Notice: All rights reserved re common-law copyright of trade-name/trademark
DENNIS LARRY MEADS© — including any and all derivatives and variations in the spelling,
i.e. DENNIS LARRY MEADS, MEADS DENNIS LARRY, DENNIS L MEADS, MEADS D
LARRY, D L MEADS, — Common Law Copyright © 2011 by Dennis Larry Meads. Said
common-law trade-name/trademark, DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, may neither be used nor
reproduced, neither in whole nor in part, in any manner whatsoever, without the prior, express,
written consent and acknowledgement of Dennis Larry Meads as signified by the red-ink
signature of Dennis Larry Meads, hereinafter “Secured Party”.
With the intent of being contractually bound, any juristic person, as well as the agent thereof,
consents and agrees by this Notice that neither said juristic person nor agent thereof shall
display,
nor otherwise use in any manner, the common-law trade-name/trademark DENNIS LARRY
MEADS©, nor the common-law copyright described herein, nor any derivative of, or any
variation in the spelling thereof without the prior, express, written consent and acknowledgment
of Secured Party, as signified by Secured Party’s signature in red ink. Secured Party neither
grants, nor implies, nor otherwise gives consent for any unauthorized use of DENNIS LARRY
MEADS©, and all such unauthorized use is strictly prohibited.
Self-executing Contract/Security Agreement in Event of Unauthorized Use: By this Notice,
both the juristic person and the agent thereof, hereinafter jointly and severally “User”, consent
and agree that any use of DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, other than authorized use as set forth
178
herein, constitutes unauthorized use and counterfeiting of Secured Party’s common-law
copyrighted property, contractually binds User and renders this Notice a Security Agreement
wherein User is Debtor and Dennis Larry Meads is Secured Party, and signifies that User:
(1) grants Secured Party a security interest in all of User’s assets, land and personal
property, and all of User’s interest in assets, land and personal property, in the sum certain
amount of $100,000,000.00 per each occurrence of use of the common-law
copyrighted trade- name/trademark DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, as well as for each
and every occurrence of use of any and all derivatives of and variations in the spelling of
DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, plus costs, plus triple damages;
(2) authenticates this Security Agreement wherein User is Debtor and Dennis Larry Meads
is Secured Party, and wherein User pledges all of User’s assets, land, consumer goods, farm
products, inventory, equipment, money, investment property, commercial tort claims, letters
of credit, letter-of-credit rights, chattel paper, instruments, deposit accounts, accounts,
documents, general intangibles, and all User’s interest in all such foregoing property, now
owned and hereafter acquired, now existing and hereafter arising, wherever located, as
collateral for securing User’s contractual obligation in favor of Secured Party for User’s
unauthorized use of Secured Party’s common-law copyrighted property;
(3) consents and agrees with Secured Party’s filing in any county recorder’s office wherein
User is a Debtor and Dennis Larry Meads is Secured Party;
(4) consents and agrees that said filing described in paragraph “(3)” is a continuing
financing statement, and further consents and agrees with Secured Party’s filing of any
continuation statement necessary for maintaining Secured Party’s perfected security
interest in all of User’s property and interest in property pledged as collateral in this Security
Agreement and described in paragraph “(2)” until User’s contractual obligation theretofore
incurred has been fully satisfied;
(5) consents and agrees with Secured Party’s filing, as described in paragraphs “(3)” and
“(4)”, as well as the filing of any Security Agreement, as described in paragraph “(2)”, in any
county recorder’s office;
(6) consents and agrees that any and all such filings described in paragraphs “(4)” and
“(5)” are not, and may not be considered, bogus and that User will not claim that any such
filing is bogus;
(7) waives all defenses; and
(8) appoints Secured Party as Authorized Representative for User, effective upon User’s
default re User’s contractual obligations in favor of Secured Party as set forth in “Payment
Terms” and “Default Terms”, granting Secured Party full authorization and power for
engaging in any and all actions on behalf of User including, but not limited to, authentication
of a record on behalf of User as Secured Party, at Secured Party’s sole discretion, and as
Secured Party deems appropriate, and User further consents and agrees that this appointment
of Secured Party as Authorized Representative for User, effective upon User’s default, is
irrevocable and coupled with a security interest.
179
User further consents and agrees with all of the following additional terms of
Self-executing Contract/Security Agreement in Event of Unauthorized Use:
Payment Terms: In accordance with fees for unauthorized use of DENNIS LARRY
MEADS© as set forth herein, User hereby consents and agrees that User shall pay Secured
Party all unauthorized use fees in full within ten (10) days of the date User is sent Secured
Party’s invoice, hereinafter “Invoice”, itemizing said fees.
Default Terms: In event of non-payment in full of all unauthorized use fees by User within
ten (10) days of date Invoice is sent, User shall be deemed in default and:
(a) all of User’s property and property pledged as collateral by User as set forth in paragraph
“(2)” immediately becomes, i.e. is, property of Secured Party;
(b) Secured Party is appointed User’s Authorized Representative as set forth in paragraph
“(8)”; and
(c) User consents and agrees that Secured Party may take possession of, as well as otherwise
dispose of in any manner whatsoever at Secured Party’s sole discretion including, but not
limited to, sale at auction, at any time following User’s default and without further
notice any and all of User’s property and interest, described in paragraph “(2)” formerly
pledged as collateral by User, now property of Secured Party, in respect of this
“Self-executing Contract/Security Agreement in Event of Unauthorized Use”, that
Secured Party, in Secured Party’s sole discretion, deems appropriate.
Terms for Curing Default: Upon event of default, irrespective of any and all of User’s
former property and interest in property, described in paragraph “(2)”, in the possession of,
as well as disposed of by, Secured Party, as authorized by “Default Terms”, User may cure
User’s default only re the remainder of User’s said former property and interest, formerly
pledged as collateral that is neither in the possession of nor otherwise disposed of by
Secured Party within twenty (20) days of date of User’s default only by payment in full.
Terms of Strict Foreclosure: User’s non-payment in full of all unauthorized use fees
itemized in Invoice within said twenty (20) day period for curing default as set forth in
“Terms for Curing Default” authorizes Secured Party’s immediate non-judicial strict
foreclosure on any and all remaining former property and interest in property, formerly
pledged as collateral by User, now property of Secured Party, which is not in the possession
of, nor otherwise disposed of by, Secured Party upon expiration of said twenty- (20) day
default-curing period.
Ownership subject to common-law copyright and Security Agreement filed in the office of
any county recorder. Record Owner Dennis Larry Meads, Autograph Common Law
Copyright © 2011. Unauthorized use of “Dennis Larry Meads” incurs same unauthorizeduse
fees as those associated with DENNIS LARRY MEADS©, as set forth in paragraph
“(1)” under “Self-executing Contract/Security Agreement in Event of Unauthorized Use”.
Notice for tbe clerk for any county, town, city in Alberta and record court for original jurisdiction, is notice for all.
180
NOTICE: Using a notary on this document does not constitute any adhesion, nor does it alter My status in
any manner. The purpose for notary is verification and identification only; not for entrance into any foreign
jurisdiction.
I certify and solemnly affirm on my own commercial liability, under penalties of perjury by the
Laws of Alberta and Canada, that I have read the contents herein and to the best of my
knowledge and belief state same are true, correct, complete and not misleading.
“Dennis Larry Meads”
___________________________________
Dennis Larry Meads, Secured Party, All Rights Reserved
Province of Alberta )
) ss. JURAT
On the 22 day of December, 2011, Dennis Larry Meads personally appeared before me and proved to me
on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person whose name is subscribed hereto and acknowledged to me
that he executed the same under oath or asseveration, and accepts the facts thereof: Subscribed and affirmed
before me this day. Witness my hand and seal this 22 day of December, 2011.
Stamp
________________________________
Notary Signature
Theodore G. Kaklin
Barrister & Solicitor
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